Download Even after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in

Austria-Hungary
In February 1913, the German Chief of Staff, Helmuth von
Moltke observed to the Secretary of State at the German
Foreign Office, Gottlieb von Jagow, that there were two
parties in Vienna, a war and a peace party, which kept each
other in check.
Austrian officers relaxing at a
garden party in Vienna just before
the war in 1914.
The driving force behind the “war party” was Field Marshal,
Count Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, Austrian Chief of the
General Staff of the imperial army. During 1913 he
counselled war with Serbia 25 times.
(Holger Herwig, The First World War, Bloomsbury 1996, pp.1921)
(Imperial War Museum, Public
Domain in the UK)
In 1912 Tsar Nicolas II had said of Emperor Franz Josef that
as long as he lived “there was no likelihood of any step being
taken by Austria-Hungary that would endanger the
maintenance of peace”.
Opinions on the
likelihood of an
upcoming war
Even after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in
Sarajevo officials in Berlin believed that “it would not come
to a war between Austria and Serbia”. The British
Ambassador in Vienna reported that the army was “straining
at the leash to go against Serbia” but he could not believe
they would be “let slip”.
The Russian ambassador in Vienna assured the British
Ambassador that the Austrian government would not allow
itself to be rushed into a war with Serbia, knowing that
Russia would be impelled to intervene on Serbia’s behalf.
The French Ambassador believed that the Emperor would
restrain those within his government who wanted war.
(G. Martel, The Month Changed
the World: July 1914, Oxford 2014
Chapter 2)
Archduke Franz Ferdinand
Prominent in the Austrian “peace party” was
Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the
Imperial throne, who was assassinated by
Gavrilo Princip, a Bosnian Serb, in Sarajevo
on 28 June 1914.
When Conrad, the Chief of Staff, pressed for
a preventive strike against Serbia in January
1913, as the second Balkan War began, the
Archduke was reported to have said:
“Conrad’s idea is madness. A war with Russia
will finish us. If we move against Serbia, then
we shall have war with Russia. … Tell Conrad
that I categorically reject any further
suggestions in that direction.”
Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Imperial
throne of Austria-Hungary (born 18 December 1863,
died 28 June 1914).
(Cited in C. von Bardolf, Soldat im alten
Österreich, Jena 1938, p.177)
Conrad von Hotzendorf &
Leopold van Berchthold
Left: Conrad von Hötzendorf Right: Count
Leopold von Berchthold.
(Public Domain in the European Union)
After the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, the Chief of Staff, Conrad von Hötzendorf,
called for an immediate mobilization of Austria-Hungary’s armed forces against Serbia. He
was supported by the Foreign Minister, Count Leopold von Berchthold. Berchthold favoured
an immediate invasion of Serbia on 7 July without a prior declaration of war.
Berchthold’s proposal was rejected by the Emperor in spite of the fact that it had the
support of the majority of his Council. The Emperor was reluctant to commit the AustriaHungary to war. His past had taught him to be cautious. He had led the Austrian army to
defeat by French and Italian forces at Solferino in 1859. And in 1866 he had declared war
on Prussia, against the advice of his General Staff, and lost.
Ultimatum Serbian Government
The emperor insisted that Berchthold confer
with the Hungarian Prime Minister, Count Istvan
Tisza, knowing that Tisza would be opposed to
military action and that Vienna could not
declare war without the approval of the
government in Budapest.
Tisza believed that any action against Serbia
should be delayed until there was clear evidence
of her direct involvement in the assassination.
He feared that an invasion of Serbia might lead
to nationalist uprisings amongst the other Slavic
peoples of the Habsburg Empire and lead to war
with Russia.
Emperor Franz Josef I conferring with Count Istvan
Tisza, Prime Minister of Hungary.
(Public Domain in Hungary and the USA)
He insisted that all diplomatic avenues should
be explored before military action was taken. A
compromise was reached within the Imperial
Council which led to an Ultimatum being
presented to the Serbian government at 18.00
on 23 July, 1914. This contained a long list of
demands to be met by Serbia and a requirement
that the Serbian government should reply by
18.00 on 25 July.
Great Britain
Left: Prime Minister Herbert Asquith
Right: Sir Edward Grey
(Public Domain)
By the summer of 1914 Sir Edward Grey had been Foreign Secretary for nearly nine years.
He had negotiated the entente with France, an alliance with Russia and had chaired the
London conference that brought about a peaceful conclusion to the 1st Balkan War. He also
had the support of the imperialists within his own party (the Liberals) and most of the
Conservative opposition party.
Within the Foreign Office an influential anti-German faction had emerged. These included
senior ministers and officials. Their anti-German position was a reaction to the Kaiser’s
public support for the Boers in their war with Britain, Germany’s construction of
battleships, the Kaiser’s interventions in the two Moroccan crises and colonial rivalry in
China and Africa.
Prevent the outbreak of war?
But this antagonism towards Germany was not shared by
the majority of the British Cabinet or Parliament, and
certainly not in the British Embassy in Berlin. There was
considerable support for an entente with Germany.
Manchester Evening News –
Monday 29 June 1914
(Image © Trinity Mirror. Image
created courtesy of THE
BRITISH LIBRARY BOARD.)
After the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand the
Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, Sir
Harold Nicolson, took the view that the act of political
terrorism in Sarajevo “will have no serious
consequences, outside Austria-Hungary”. Britain’s
diplomats based in the Balkan countries shared his view
that Vienna would protest and threaten but that
Emperor Franz Josef would control those within the army
and his council who favoured war with Serbia.
British military intervention
For most of the summer of 1914 the British
cabinet was preoccupied with the introduction
of devolved government in Ireland and the
possibility of a civil war breaking out there. It
did not greatly concern itself with what was
happening in the Balkans until the AustroHungarian ultimatum to Serbia on 23 July.
When the British Cabinet met on 29 July the
majority favoured British neutrality in the event
of an escalation of the conflict. They remained
undecided as to how to respond if Germany
attacked France through neutral Belgium.
Winston Churchill, when he was serving as First
Lord of the Admiralty (1911-15)
(Public Domain in the UK)
When the Cabinet met again on 31 July, Grey
and Churchill favoured British military
intervention before Germany invaded Belgium
and France. Most of the cabinet believed that
British public opinion would not support this
action but that opinion might change if Germany
violated Belgian neutrality.
British Cabinet divided
When the British Cabinet met again on 1
August 1914 it was divided on how to respond
to the crisis. The majority favoured a public
statement that Britain would not enter the
war under any circumstances. Sir Edward
Grey threatened to resign if that happened.
John Burns, who had been a radical trade unionist in the
1880s and then entered Parliament as a Liberal MP in
1892. He held government office form 1905 to 5 August
1914.
(Public Domain in the USA)
Next day the Cabinet authorised Grey to
inform the French government that Britain
would intervene if the Germans tried to
make the English Channel the base for
military operations against France. One
member of the cabinet, John Burns (Minister
Board of Trade) resigned arguing that this
statement might be regarded as grounds for a
German declaration of war against Britain.
The peace party in cabinet
By now a group within the Cabinet calling themselves
variously the peace party and the neutralists were
meeting privately to discuss a strategy for preventing
Britain from getting involved in a European war.
Lewis Harcourt, the Colonial Secretary, who saw himself
as one of the leaders of the peace party wrote in his
private journal that he and Lloyd George went to see the
Prime Minister on 3 August and informed him that “we
represented 8-10 colleagues who would not go to war for
Belgium. P.M. listened, said nothing.” There follows an
account of the Cabinet meeting that morning where
Churchill [First Lord of the Admiralty] threatened to
resign: ‘If Germany violates Belgian neutrality I want to
go to war - if you don't I must resign’. Viscount Morley
[Lord President of the Privy Council] said "if you do go to
war I resign”.
(Additional Harcourt Papers, Bodleian Library,
03.08.1914)
Caricature of Lewis Harcourt,
British Colonial Secretary (19101915) by Harry Furniss.
(National Portrait Gallery London,
Public Domain in the UK and the
USA)
Great Britain and Germany
In fact only four members of Harcourt’s “peace party”
resigned – not including Harcourt or Lloyd George – when
the British cabinet met on the afternoon of 3rd August to
discuss the news that Germany had presented Belgium
with an ultimatum. The rest of the Cabinet agreed that
Britain would have to intervene if Germany violated
Belgian neutrality.
The German government was informed that its
ultimatum to Belgium should be withdrawn, otherwise
“it will be war”.
Crowd gathered outside
Buckingham Palace in London after
news of the Declaration of War
against Germany at 23.00 on 4
August 1914.
(National Archives, Public Domain
in the UK.)
France
A cartoon in the British magazine Punch in 1906 showing John
Bull turning his back on Germany (the Kaiser) and walking off
with Marianne dressed in the French tricolour.
(Public Domain in the USA)
France’s relations with Germany from the 1870s until 1914 were always influenced to some degree by her
defeat in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71 and the loss of the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. There
was a strong nationalist, revanchist (revenge) movement in France led by politicians such as Clemenceau
and Poincaré. But anti-German feelings tended to rise and fall with shifts in international events and
relations.
In 1898 colonial rivalry between France and Britain had led to the Fashoda incident when French colonial
forces were deployed to challenge Britain’s occupation of Egypt. Delcassé, Minister for Foreign Affairs
urged Germany to support France on this issue, and proposed an alliance between France, Germany and
Russia. “For a time, the visceral distrust usually directed at Berlin was refocused on London”.
But the price for German support was French recognition of German sovereignty in Alsace and Lorraine.
France dropped all talk of a Franco-German alliance over Egypt and concentrated instead on seizing
control of Morocco, supported by Britain if France accepted British control of Egypt. This opened the way
for the Entente Cordiale between France and Britain in 1904 and the eventual emergence of two military
alliances in Europe.
The position of the doves within the French government became weaker when Raymond Poincaré became
president in January 1913 and René Viviani became Premier and minister of foreign affairs. They shared
the view of the French Chief of Staff General Joffre that a strong French army was needed that would be
able to counter a German offensive.
Théophile Delcassé and the French Foreign
Office
Delcassé built up a network of ambassadors who shared
his views and together they made and implemented
French foreign policy during his time as Minister for
Foreign Affairs.
By 1911 there French Ambassadors who favoured a
rapprochement with Germany and greater economic
cooperation to reduce tensions between the two
countries that had arisen because of the Entente
Cordiale with Britain.
Théophile Delcassé, Minister
for Foreign Affairs in France
(1898-1906)
(Library of Congress, Public
Domain in the USA)
However, there was also a group of permanent officials
in the French Foreign Office who were strongly antiGerman. They saw German foreign policy as full of
menace, tricks and cunning ploys designed to isolate
France. They stirred up the French and therefore
German media from 1911. This added to public support
for war.
(M.B. Hayne, The French Foreign Office and the Origins
of the First World War, OUP 1993, p.199).
Germany
Cartoon by American Robert Satterfield showing a bull
representing the “war mad party” in Germany accompanied
by the Kaiser rushing downhill while being encouraged to
show a little more speed.
(Public Domain of the United States of America.)
On 8 December 1912, just a few days after hostilities in the First Balkan War had ceased
and just before the London Conference convened to agree a peace treaty, Kaiser Wilhelm II
had held a special ‘war cabinet’ meeting in Berlin. Senior Generals and Admirals attended
but the Chancellor, Theobold von Bethmann-Hollweg, was not present.
According to a report the Kaiser set the scene:
“Austria must deal firmly with the Slavs living outside its borders (the Serbs) if it does not
want to lose control over the Slavs under the Austrian monarchy. If Russia were to support
the Serbs, which she is apparently already doing…war would be inevitable for us”
General von Moltke responded: “I consider a war inevitable – the sooner, the better. But we
should do a better job of gaining popular support for a war against Russia.”
General Helmuth von Moltke and Admiral Alfred
von Tirpitz
Admiral von Tirpitz, while still supporting war, advocated
postponing the decision for 18 month. He believed that if
Germany went to war with Russia then Britain and
France would support her ally and Germany would need
to be ready for a naval war with Britain.
Moltke protested that even if the navy was not ready
“the army’s situation would continue to worsen, since
due to our limited financial resources our opponents are
able to arm themselves more rapidly.” The Kaiser sided
with Tirpitz and, as Müller recorded, “That was the end
of the meeting. There were almost no results.”
Left: General Helmuth von Moltke
Right: Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz
(Translation of an entry from the diary of Admiral von
Müller, 8 December 1912 Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv,
Freiburg (BArch N 159/4 Fol. 169-171)).
Fischer, and a number of other historians, have regarded
this meeting as evidence that Germany was planning for
war 18 months before war was actually declared.
Schlieffen Plan
There were indeed advocates of war within the imperial
cabinet and for more than a decade before 1914 the High
Command were pressing for a significant increase in
military and naval budgets but encountered opposition in
the Reichstag and from the Chancellor and Treasury
Minister. (Clark p.216.)
They called for a ‘preventive war’ – a war against their
enemies before their enemies could wage war on them.
But the evidence also suggests that the Kaiser, his
Chancellor and civilian ministers in the Imperial cabinet
blocked those demands [Mombauer, pp.108ff]
The so-called Schlieffen Plan drawn up in
1905 by General Alfred von Schlieffen,
Chief of General Staff. It was based on the
belief that if the country went to war it
would have to fight on two fronts against
France and Russia and that France would be
quicker to defeat while Russia would take
longer to mobilize.
(Public Domain in the USA)
It is certainly the case that plans for war – notably the
Schlieffen Plan – had been drawn up but, according to
some historians, there is a subtle but important
difference making plans to start a war and making plans
in order to be ready for a war. Germany was not alone
in preparing for a war in 1914. The French had Plan 17,
the Austro-Hungarians had Plan B for the Balkans and
Plan R for Russia, and Russia had Plan G if attacked by
Germany and Plan A (or 19) if Germany began the war by
attacking France.
Kaiser Wilhelm II
The personalities of Wilhelm II and Bethmann-Hollweg are
important here. The Kaiser, as supreme commander believed
that he took the lead on military and foreign policy. In
practice, ministers, diplomats and military advisers often
agreed with him but delayed taking action in the
anticipation that he would change his mind or forget what he
had demanded. As one historian has observed: “He always
backed down when the moment of truth arrived. In the face
of clear and determined opposition his confidence would
evaporate”. [G. Martel, The Month that Changed the World
1914, p.25.].
Bethmann-Hollweg was viewed with mistrust by the Prussian
High Command. They saw him as a compromiser. His
attempts to find a diplomatic compromise over the naval
arms race had been bitterly opposed by the German
admiralty. In domestic politics he was trying to maintain a
balance between the reactionary right and the liberals and
social democrats in the Reichstag.
Kaiser Wilhelm II in military uniform, his
preferred mode of dress in public.
(Public Domain in Finland.)
When it looked as though the Serbs had conceded almost
every point in the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, both the
Kaiser and his Chancellor were reported to have been
relieved. The Kaiser informed his ministers that Serbia’s
response meant that “every cause for war collapsed.” The
Chancellor informed the other Great Powers that Germany
was willing to mediate between Austria and Russia.
Russia
Tsar Nicholas II came to the Imperial throne of Russia in 1894
following the sudden death of his father from a kidney disease.
He was 26 and little had been done to prepare him for rule.
Ffrom the start he made it clear that “I shall maintain the
principle of autocracy just as firmly and unflinchingly as it was
preserved by my unforgettable dead father”.
(M.T. Florinsky, The End of the Romanov Empire, New York 1961).
Nicholas II, last Tsar of All the
Russias, 1868-1918.
(Public Domain in Russia and the
USA)
In practice, however, he was indecisive and lacked a coherent set
of policies that he wanted to achieve. One observer close to
government reported that it was widely held that “He has no
character… he agrees with each of his ministers in spite of the
fact that they represent the opposite of one another”.
(quoted D.M. McDonald, United Government and Foreign Policy in
Russia: 1900-1914, London, 1992 p.16).
War and growing Unrest
Russia lost a war with Japan in 1905. In Russia there was
growing unrest. For some time a movement had been
emerging which was calling for more civil rights and greater
political equality. On 22 January 1905 (which came to be
known as Bloody Sunday) there was a march of thousands of
workers to the Winter Palace to ask the Tsar for the creation
of more democracy and rights.
The demonstrators were denied access to the Palace Square
and the official number killed was 92 with several hundred
wounded but estimates varied widely.
Protest strikes led to the setting up of a Duma (Parliament),
but by 1906 Tsarist absolute rule had been reinstated.
Painting by unknown artist of Father
Gapon leading the demonstrators in
front of the Narva Gate in St
Petersburg,22 January, 1905.
(Public Domain in the USA)
As in the other Great Powers at this time, a’ war party’ and
a ‘peace party’ emerged. But in the case of Russia there was
a major difference. The conservatives, led by Count Vladimir
Kovotsov, were the peace party. They were aware of Russia’s
internal problems and rejected, as Kovotsov put it ‘an active
foreign policy at the expense of the peasant’s stomach’.
[Lieven, Nicholas II, p.82]
The core of the war party were the liberal nationalists and
supporters of pan-Slavism. They had supported the Tsar’s
expansion to the east and now favoured support for Slavs in
the Balkans and open access to the Mediterranean through
the Turkish Straits for Russia’s warships.
Mobilisation of Russian Forces
When Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated, the Tsar’s
Council took the view that this would not lead to another
war in the Balkans. The situation changed when the Russian
Council saw the Austrian ultimatum to the Serbian
government. On 24 July Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov met
with the Austrian Ambassador and warned that these
demands on Serbia were unacceptable. “What you want is
war and you have burnt your bridges behind you”.
The Tsar inspecting his troops after the
partial mobilisation of Russian forces in July
1914.
(http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/
object/205088130. All Rights Reserved
except for Fair Dealing exceptions
otherwise permitted under the Copyright,
Designs and Patents Act 1988, as amended
and revised.)
After the meeting Sazanov advised the Tsar to sign the order
to mobilise the army. Although the Tsar hesitated for a while
the Army High Command and his Ministers were all advising
mobilisation. On the afternoon of 30 July, 1914, following a
series of telegrams between himself and the Kaiser, the Tsar
signed. Turning to Sazanov he said: “You are right, there is
nothing else left than to prepare ourselves for an attack.
Transmit to the chief of the general staff my orders of
mobilisation.”
S. Sazanov, Fateful Years 1909-1916.
On 1 August 1914 Germany declared war on Russia.
Serbia
Serbia had gained virtual independence from the Ottoman Empire through an uprising led by Miloš
Obrenović in 1815 although her formal independence was not recognised internationally until the
Treaty of Berlin in 1878.
Throughout the period 1815-1914 Serbian politics was marked by dynastic rivalries between the
Karađorđević and Obrenović families and their supporters. The Obrenović family aligned with
Austria-Hungary while the Karađorđević family had close ties to Russia and France.
On 28-29 May 1903 a coup overthrew the Obrenović regime. King Alexandar Obrenović and his wife
Draga were assassinated in the royal palace by a group of army officers led by Captain Dragutin
Dimitrijević. The conspirators also killed the prime minister and the army minister. The
conspirators belonged to a group of middle-ranking army officers who had formed a secret society
in August 1901 known as Ujedinjenje ili smrt (Unification or Death), which was unofficially known
as the ‘Black Hand’. They were committed to the unification of the South Slavs under Serbian
rule.
The National Assembly then decided to send a mission to Geneva to inform the exiled Prince Peter
Karađorđević that he had been elected king by the Parliament. He was crowned on 21 September
1904. The new democractic government needed the support of the army to survive.
A map of the Principality of Serbia after the Treaty of Berlin 1878. In 1882 it became a Kingdom.
(GNU Free Documentation License)