Download The Importance of the Monophysite and Nestorian

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This Essay copyright of Seumas Macdonald, 2005. May be reproduced freely if this Copyright
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'The Monophysites were dominated by a greater seriousness; the Nestorians by a greater
adherence to the Bible.' Critically evaluate the importance of the Monophysite and Nestorian
controversies in coming to an appropriate understanding of Christology.
Introduction and Prolegomena
The Chalcedonian definition of 451, formally and dogmatically ending the Monophysite
and Nestorian controversies1, is the beginning and end of orthodox Christology speculation. In
the Reformed tradition, an appropriate understanding of Christology is one that adequately
articulates the Biblical data concerning the Christ2. Chalcedon does this, driven by the
necessities imposed by heresy, reaching a conclusion that is entirely negative. For this reason it
is in one sense the beginning of all Christology, the boundaries of the game. On the other hand,
it presents a closure to metaphysical speculation. It asserts a mystery that is known but
unintelligible – that Jesus should be both God and Man.
1
Although both positions persisted long afterwards, with the Nestorians moving east from Assyria and as far a-field
as China and Korea. Monophysitism continuing as a factor into the 5 th, 6th, and 7th centuries, being re-addressed at
Constantinople (553), and again at Constantinople (680) in the position of Monothelitism and persisting in Oriental
Orthodox strands of Christendom to the present day.
2
I consider that an appropriate Christology will have logical and coherent conclusions that ‘make Christianity work’
– i.e. a doctrine of Christ that debilitates real salvation, or other such essential elements of the Christian faith, may
be true, but then, as Paul writes, “your faith is in vain”.
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It is of no harm to anyone, then, to consider the Definition in full3:
Following the holy Fathers we teach with one voice that the Son [of God] and our Lord Jesus Christ is to be
confessed as one and the same [Person], that he is perfect in Godhead and perfect in manhood, very God and
very man, of a reasonable soul and [human] body consisting, consubstantial with the Father as touching his
Godhead, and consubstantial with us as touching his manhood; made in all things like unto us, sin only excepted;
begotten of his Father before the worlds according to his Godhead; but in these last days for us men and for our
salvation born [into the world] of the Virgin Mary, the Mother of God according to his manhood. This one and
the same Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son [of God] must be confessed to be in two natures, (1) unconfusedly,
immutably, indivisibly, inseparably [united], and that without the distinction of natures being taken away by such
union, but rather the peculiar property of each nature being preserved and being united in one Person and
subsistence, not separated or divided into two persons, but one and the same Son and only-begotten, God the
Word, our Lord Jesus Christ, as the Prophets of old time have spoken concerning him, and as the Lord Jesus
Christ hath taught us, and as the Creed of the Fathers hath delivered to us. 4
1. The Christological Controversies
The Historical background of these two controversies is twofold. On the one hand,
Nicaea (325) and Constantinople (381), put an end to major controversy over the immanent
Trinity, rejecting Arianism and modalistic understandings of the Trinity. The two heresies
that now arise are orthodox in the understanding of the immanent Trinity, the whole realm of
their error is the economic Godhead in the Christ.
Conversely, there is a tradition of teaching that leads up to the two heresies in question.
Diodore of Tarsus, opponent of Appolinarius, claims that "only figuratively, because of
His indwelling, ... we can say of the eternal Word, the Son of God, that He is the Son of
3
Throughout the essay, I have chosen to maintain the Greek terminology where possible in order to avoid ambiguity
in dealing with the issues essentially argued out 1700 years ago in Greek, to avoid translation issues, and to clearly
correlate my argument back to that of the Fathers. I follow Macquarrie’s understanding of these terms in
Macquarrie, J. Jesus Christ in Modern Thought London: SCM, 1990. p383f.
4
Labbe and Cossart, Concilia, Tom. IV., col. 562. From Monachos.net :
http://www.monachos.net/patristics/Christology/chalcedon_definition.shtml Accessed on 14th Jun 2005.
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David"5. He in turn teaches Theodore of Mopsuestia, whose Christology is more doubtful than
Nestorius’ own6, alleged by Constantinople 553 “who has said that the Word of God is one
person, but that another person is Christ, vexed by the sufferings of the soul and desires of the
flesh, and separated by little and little above that which is inferior, and become better by the
progress in good works and irreproachable in his manner of life”7.
Both heresies entire a milieu previously dominated by Ebionism, Adoptionism, and
Docetism.
The nature of the Christological union as understood by Nestorianism may well trace
its roots back to Paul of Samosata8, who taught that “Union of two Persons is possible only by
agreement of will, issuing in unity of action, and originating by love. By this kind of union
Christ had merit; He could have had none had the union been by nature”9.
Conversely, it is Docetism that lurks in the background of Monophysitism, a dangerous
tendency to avoid the humanity of Christ, a top-down Christology, and it is only a short jump
before Christ’s humanity is assumed upwards into his divinity, i.e. Monophysitism. Indeed, this
is explicit in Eutyches, who is "reported to have maintained that Jesus' humanity was nothing
but an external appearance"10.
To understand Bonhoeffer’s statement, that '[t]he Monophysites were dominated by a
greater seriousness; the Nestorians by a greater adherence to the Bible”11, it is fitting to pursue
the historical background further, to understand the ‘schools’ of theology that had arisen
centred around Antioch and Alexandria.
5
MacArthur J.S., Chalcedon London : S.P.C.K., 1931. p12-13.
On the grounds that Nestorius was probably not Nestorian per se, cf. eg. his apologetic Bazaar of Heraclides.
7
Ibid., p18.
8
cf. MacArthur op cit. p13: "the Antiochene insistence on the real humanity of our Lord can be traced back as far as
Paul of Samosata, and about a hundred years later we find it strongly reasserted in opposition to the moral Docetism
of Apollinarius".
9
New Advent Catholic Encyclopaedia, “Paul of Samosata” http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/11589a.htm Accessed
on 14th June 2005.
10
Wolfson The Philosophy of the Church Fathers Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1956. p600.
11
Bonhoeffer, D. Christology trans. John Bowden. London : Collins, 1966. p86.
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Alexandrian theology traces its methodology back to Philo, and his allegoricalphilosophical interpretation of the Old Testament. Origen takes this on-board and develops it
in a Christian manner. Although Origen falls into disfavour, his influence pervades Alexandrian
theology, and so their Christology.
Their Word-flesh Christology is Christology from above. It begins with the Divine
Logos and focuses on soteriology. It seeks to understand how the Logos incarnates.
Bonhoeffer’s “seriousness” is perhaps not the right word for their approach. It carries a certain
philosophical gravitas.
"The Antiochene theology was distinguished from the Alexandrine by its methods of
scriptural exegesis, which were severely literal and opposed to the allegorising tendency which
was characteristic of Alexandria."12 Matched against this, its Christology is Christology from
Below, Word-man Christology. Starting with the fundamental data of the Scriptures, it was
almost inevitable that they would be forced to keep the two fu,seij distinct, as seen in their
attribution of different matters to alternate fu,seij13, which is only proper if the two
fu,seij are to continue to be distinct.
The Nestorian controversy begins quite understandably: Nestorius was concerned,
rightly, to safeguard against a use of Qeotokoj to mean that Mary begat God, in the she is
the source of God, a creatrix rather than genetrix. His concern is aimed against incipient
Arianism, and any idea that the Divine Logos was created. Although not in either parties’
minds, it is no surprise that an unbalanced application of Qeotokoj leads to Mariolatry.
Nestorius, in his opposition to the use of Qeotokoj, is guarding against one heresy. However,
in rejecting the term, he skirts another.
12
MacArthur op. cit. p12
Eg. that it is of his human fu,sij that hungers, weeps, thirsts; of his divine fu,sij that he performs miracles,
etc..
13
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For when Nestorius becomes Nestorianism, the shift is made: The two fu,seij are
held so apart, that there are two persons. This is what is deeply problematic. For, in orthodox
thought, what is predicated of the one ouvsi,a is necessarily predicated of the hypostasis, and
thus rightly predicated, rightly understood, of the other ouvsi,a. This parallels the
predication with regards to the hypostases of God - what is rightly predicated of the Father, is
rightly predicated of God, is rightly predicated of the Son or Spirit, except that they are not
Father. What is predicated of the Divine Logos is rightly predicated of Jesus is rightly
predicated of the human ouvsi,a, except that it is not the Divine ouvsia.
It is the same logic that leads Luther in his application of the communicatio idiomatum
from the two propositions that Jesus Christ was crucified, and that Jesus Christ is God, to the
conclusion that God was crucified.14 Qeotokoj is doing the same thing: Mary bore Christ,
Christ is God, Mary bore God. That is why Nestorius is wrong, but also why he is right: it is
only appropriate to say that God was crucified in the person of the Jesus Christ, likewise it is only
proper to say that Mary bore God, the Incarnate Son.
Nestorius, in rejecting Qeotokoj, in refusing to predicate the term of Mary, sets up a
descent that will lead to Mary bearing only the human fu,sij, which does indeed divide the
two fu,seij into two persons. What is asserted about the one cannot necessarily be asserted
of the other.
The ultimate failing of the Christology from below coming from the Antiochene school,
is that it does not arrive at a divine fu,sij. Its concern for a moral union leads at best to
Adoptionism, and the divinity of Christ is no different from Moses and the Prophets, except
that Jesus is a ‘son’, but the charge remains open – in what sense is Jesus more a son than those
he makes sons like himself, if not ontologically?15
14
McGrath, A. E. Christian Theology: An Introduction Oxford, UK ; Malden, MA : Blackwell Publishers, 2001.
p363.
15
MacArthur Ibid. p24-25, 30.
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Monophysitism emerges as a reaction to the appearance that, after Ephesus, Cyril had
conceded too much to Nestorianism in continuing to speak of two fu,seij. Whether Cyril
believed in two fu,seij or accepted it as a compromise is unclear, but Monophysitism itself
can be seen as the end product of the Alexandrian school. An unchecked focus and starting
locus of the Divine Logos, untempered by an equal affirmation of the real humanity of Christ,
leads to a weakening of the reality of that humanity. This is at root the path Monophysitism
takes.
For Monophysitism emerges not as a parallel and opposite heresy to Nestorianism, but
a subsequent and reactionary heresy. It is after Ephesus (431) and the subsequent document
from John of Antioch, accepted by Cyril in 433, that resistance to ‘Nestorian compromise’
emerges. Motivated by the very real concern that a compromise with Nestorianism leads to a
divided person, which is no saviour at all16, Dioscorus, Eutyches, and those like them formulate
a one-fu,sij position, which preserves their soteriological concern – that there be one
mediator.
Monophysitism is grappling with a very real problem, and like Nestorianism, it’s
important to follow them down their path. They are affirming that Jesus is fully God and fully
Man17. However their desire for unity leads to the conclusion that there is but one fu,sij.
This may well have been driven by the recognition that to have a human fu,sij is normally
to have a person.
Yet, in fusing the fu,seij, Monophysitism yields a tertium quid of Christ, and even if
it is asserted to be complete God and complete Man, it is both and neither. If the fu,sij of
God is one with the fu,sij of Man, then Christ is a second God. If the fu,sij of Man is
one with the fu,sij of God, then Jesus is a man like no other human being, not “made in all
things like unto us, sin only excepted”18, rather unalike us in his very fu,sij.
vid. infra § 2 – The implications of the Christological heresies.
Erickson, M. J. Christian Theology 2nd Ed. Grand Rapids, Mich. : Baker Book House, c1998. p745.
18
Cf. Heb 4:15.
16
17
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2. The Implications of the Christological Heresies
The errors of the two heresies have disastrous implications in two areas19 of Christian
doctrine: Revelation and Soteriology.
The consequence for Revelation consists in the problems it raises with true knowledge
of God. If Matthew 11:27 is taken as a key verse for knowledge of the immanent Trinity, then
true knowledge of God in himself is only available through the incarnate God, Jesus Christ.
Knowledge of God, if it is not to be mystery, depends on a proper incarnation, on Jesus being
o`moousioj tw| patri.20
If Nestorianism is true, then the gulf between humanity and God remains unbreached.
God has not come to us in a way that is accessible. For, if the human and divine fu,seij of
Christ are only conjoined, not hypostatically united, then the human fu,sij of Christ has no
more access to the Godhead then any of us do. He is indeed only a prophet par excellence,
exceeding Moses and the Prophets, but only in degree, not in category. Therefore we are left
not with God in himself as God toward us, but only more signs pointing to the Deity.
Nestorianism ends in mystery.
If Monophysitism is true, then the gulf between humanity and God remains equally
unbreached. Rather than the chasm left by Nestorianism, there is some nebulous new entity
floating in the gap – the Christ. For this Christ is not the unchangeable God, since his God
fu,sij has been changed not just in its state of affairs, but in its fu,sij, therefore at best
the Monophysite Christ is o`moiousioj, not o`moousioj, tw| patri. It undoes
Nicaea-Constantinople, and resurrects all the dangers of Origen’s Divine Logos being
avnautoqeoj.21 Knowledge of God in the Monophysite Christ might well be true knowledge
of God, but it is not of the Father, it is of another God.22
That are here considered, it being conceded that the effects of heresy in one dogma of the Church inevitably
sends shockwaves and fault-lines through the whole epistemic structure.
20
Doyle, R.C. ‘Doctrine 2’ (Unpublished Lecture Notes, Moore College, 2005).
21
Admittedly, as far as I know, Origen doesn’t use such a term, but the danger is implicit, and that is the outcome of
Alexandrian Word-flesh Christology.
22
Nestorius’ fear of Arianism finds an unexpected realisation.
19
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The implications for Atonement are equally dire. Nestorianism founders on two points.
Its moral emphasis and Christology from below lead to an exemplarist atonement.23 Such an
atonement does nothing either to change the state or status of humanity, since we are neither
relieved of sinfulness nor of condemnation. Secondly, contra St. Gregory Nazianzus, nothing of
the human fu,sij would be assumed by God in the Nestorian Christ, therefore nothing is
healed of humanity’s broken, degenerate, sinful fu,sij. A Mediator divided cannot mediate
himself, let alone God and Humanity.
Monophysite soteriology is in a state of like impotence. Its emphasis on the necessity of
the assumption of the human fu,sij and its divinisation, would be excellent if the human
fu,sij didn’t change with regard to it being human fu,sij. Since, however, the human
fu,sij is no longer human fu,sij, but there is one fu,sij, it’s not really human fu,sij
that is healed, not really human fu,sij that is involved in the Atonement, and therefore, not
really humanity that is represented. The Christ becomes an excellent sacrifice for other Godmen, of which there are none. Moreover, depending on the formulation of the fusion of the two
pre-incarnate fu,seij, the risk of a recurrent Appolinarism or Docetism emerges, and it will
not be a fully human fu,sij present in the Incarnate One. Conversely, since it is not God
o`moousioj tw| patri who is present in the Monophysite Christ, the mediation is
ineffective: it does not involve the Father with whom atonement must be made, and every kind
of problem arises: there are three parties to the atonement: God, Christ, and humanity, all of
whom share nothing in common; if the Christ is unwilling, the cross is immoral, since it is not
the same God sacrificed; since God himself does not atone, the extent of the atonement is a
total unknown, if it extends to any entity. Atonement becomes meaningless when a tertium quid,
whose fu,sij collapses under the weight of impossibility and absurdity, is the Subject.
3. The Chalcedonian Definition: What it is and is not.
23
MacArthur op. cit. p30.
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It is with relief then, that Chalcedon in 451 gave a formal, if not final, death to these two
heresies.
Von Harnack argues that Chalcedon is the triumph of Hellenistic philosophy over the
raw religion of Jesus. His position is that, in formulating the definition in terms of the
categories of ouvsi,a, u`po,stasij, pro,swpon, and fu,sij, the Fathers have
exchanged Jesus for a religion about Jesus.
Chalcedon, however, is the utter failure of Greek philosophical terms to give an
adequate explanation of the how of the incarnation. It is well-conceded that the terms used are
drawn from the disciplined thinking of the Hellenistic framework the Fathers are inheriting,
but not without modification and re-interpretation24. Moreover, it is in these terms that the
heresies of Nestorianism and Monophysitism are being formulated, therefore it is in these
terms that they must be answered. However, their use of the terms only sharpens the biblical
understanding of the incarnation. Language comes to an end.
No Greek philosopher would suffer the Chalcedonian definition. To have two
fu,seij, but only one u`po,stasij is absurd. That a human fu,sij has no hypostatic
or personal locus of its own, ridiculous. Two natures, united, but distinct; one, but two:
“unconfusedly, immutably, indivisibly, inseparably [united]” – preposterous.
Yet, it is with clarity that the Fathers say what must be said and what cannot be unsaid in
their context. What the philosophers find insufferable, is the exact mystery of how the
incarnation is that cannot be avoided without suffering all the pangs of heresy and its fall-out.
In §2 above, we considered some of the implications for a defective Christology. This is
what awaits a rejection of Chalcedon, and why the Definition represents the boundaries of the
game. Wherever might Christology go, and it can certainly go further since Chalcedon says true
but not exhaustively true things, it cannot step outside the Chalcedonian definition with
As Mascall highlights: Mascall, E.L. ‘On From Chalcedon’ Whatever Happened to the Human Mind? London :
SPCK, 1980. p29.
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departing from a saving and true faith. It lays the framework and foundation of Christological
theologising and devotion.25
Simultaneously it is an end of the road. As Bonhoeffer insightfully realises, "The mystery
is left as a mystery and must be understood as such"26 and also, "It works with concepts whose
formulations are declared to be heretical except when they are used in contradiction and
paradox"27.
The question is changed: no longer ‘How?’, but ‘Who?’ – Bonhoeffer continues:
The Chalcedonian Definition had also given an answer to the question, 'How?'; but in its
answer, the question, 'How?', was already superseded. It had, in fact, superseded the
doctrine of the two natures by its firm adherence to the negative in contradictory
opposites. In reality, it says that the matter of Jesus Christ is not to be settled with the
concept of 'natures', neither is it possible to bring a demonstrable unity that way.... The
starting point is given: the man Jesus is the Christ, is God. This 'is' may no longer be
derived. It is the presupposition of all the thinking and must not be constructed as a
conclusion.28
Barth concurs at this point, but with his own emphasis: Everything in his dogmatics has
been leading up to this, and yet it is this vere Deus vere Homo that is the beginning point. The
How can not be understood, but only the Is29.
The ‘Is’ is not the final word though. It is, it must be stressed, a starting point for
further Christological reflection, a declarative statement about what must be true, in light of
false assertions, but not an exhaustive statement about what only is.30
There is room for development from Chalcedon, as evidenced by the positions of avnupostasij and
evnupostasij, necessary outworkings in dealing with later Monophysitism, Monothelitism, and the issues raised
by the Definition. They are beyond our pursuit here.
26
Bonhoeffer, op. cit. p87-88
27
Ibid., p88.
28
Ibid., p98.
29
Barth, K. Church Dogmatics Vol I.2.ii §15. eds. G.W. Bromiley, T.F. Torrance. Edinburgh : T&T Clark, 19361977. p126-7.
25
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30
cf. Mascall, op. cit. p28 f.
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4. Appropriate Christology: Reflecting the Biblical Data.
Chalcedon is everything ever dreamed of for orthodox Christology, or at least as much
as can be hoped for in the formulation of the Incarnation’s ontology. Its apropos quality,
though, rests firmly on its reflection of the biblical data, which is considered in three parts: the
Divinity of Christ, the Humanity of Christ, and the Unity and Distinction of Christ.
Concerning the Humanity of Christ, it was much doubted in the early centuries of
Christianity, because of the philosophical and religious milieu of the time. Today, this is not so,
and Jesus is widely considered to be fully human, if he existed at all. However, this full
humanity must find some consideration. D.B. Knox gives succinct expression to this by the
attribution of human experiences to Jesus, “he was tired and hungry...[h]e died and was
buried... had friends; he wept... prayed and trusted God... [his knowledge] grew and increased
from babyhood onwards”.31
His divinity, conversely, is much contested these days. However, Scripture is
unambiguous on this point also. Barth’s overwhelming starting point of John 1 drives this
home. Likewise, the rigorously conservative analysis by Harris32 of explicit attribution of
qeo,j to Jesus, advancing John 1:1, 20:28 as certain in their application, and Rom 9:5, Tit
2:13, Heb 1:8, and 2 Pet 1:1 as very probable in their application, provides very strong evidence
that the canon of the New Testament considers Jesus to be God. D.B. Knox points to the
ascription of Old Testament passages concerning YHWH in the New Testament to Jesus, as a
further testament to the divinity of Jesus. The NT overwhelmingly speaks of Jesus as God.
It is, then, concerning the Unity and Distinction of Christ that Chalcedon must answer.
Theological arguments have already been advanced. Space precludes an exhaustive, or even
extensive, treatment of the NT. The task is therefore confined, as a litmus test, to the
Gethsemane episode.
31
Knox, D.B. Selected Works ed. Tony Payne Vol 1. Kingsford, N.S.W. : Matthias Media, 2000. p99. Citing Mk
4:38, Mt 21:18, Jn 15:14f, Jn 11:35, Mt 26:39, and Lk 2:52.
32
Harris, M.J. Jesus as God: the New Testament use of Theos in reference to Jesus Grand Rapids, Mich. : Baker
Book House, 1992. esp. p271ff.
13
In reflecting on Mark 14:32-42, it is impossible to conceive that the Divine nature, in
whom is Life itself, should by the possibility of death be moved to dread. It is therefore proper
to associate the distress of vv33-34 to the human nature of Jesus, which being subject to death,
falls under its dread. However, it is Jesus himself who is moved to the point of death, he and no
other, therefore it belongs to the whole of the person. That Jesus prays reminds us that even
though the Son is God, there is distinction within the Godhead, else prayer itself would be
meaningless. When Jesus prays, it is the Son communicating with the Father, the Incarnate one
beseeching the transcendent Being. In verse 36, the distinction of wills between the Father and
the Son does not raise any more problems than that God wills all to be saved; nor should this
conundrum be solved here by asserting that the human will is in conflict with the divine, lest a
similar conflict be imported to the Trinity elsewhere; rather, the human will, in conformity to
the divine will, subordinates itself to the Father’s will. Distinct wills will as one. The end of
verse 38, though directed to the three disciples, casts its glance back at Jesus. That the flesh is
weak, the corruptible and corrupted human nature, does not mean that it fails, for in Jesus it
conforms truly to the divine, without being changed, nor compromised. It is “unconfusedly,
immutably, indivisibly, inseparably [united]”.
Conclusion
Perhaps God allows heresies to flourish in order that the Church will sharpen its
understanding of truth. On both sides of the theological divide in the 4th and 5th centuries, Godfearing men pursued doctrines that sought to safeguard important truths concerning the nature of
Christ, his real and full humanity and divinity. In this context, and for the benefit of the Church,
the Chalcedonian definition emerged as a resolution, an adequate and true statement concerning
the ontology of the Incarnate one. It avoided heresy, laid down boundaries for Christological
thinking, and faithfully reflected the Scriptural evidence. An entirely appropriate Christology,
14
though not an exhaustive one, came out of Chalcedon in 451, occasioned and propelled by the
Nestorian and Monophysite controversies.
15
Works Cited
Barth, K. Church Dogmatics Vol I. Edited by. G.W. Bromiley, T.F. Torrance. Edinburgh : T&T
Clark, 1936-1977.
Bonhoeffer, D. Christology translated by John Bowden. London : Collins, 1966
Doyle, R.C. ‘Doctrine 2’ (Unpublished Lecture Notes, Moore College, 2005).
Erickson, M. J. Christian Theology 2nd Ed. Grand Rapids, Mich. : Baker Book House, 1998.
Harris, M.J. Jesus as God: the New Testament use of Theos in reference to Jesus Grand Rapids,
Mich. : Baker Book House, 1992.
Knox, D.B. Selected Works Edited by Tony Payne. Vol 1. Kingsford, N.S.W. : Matthias Media,
2000.
MacArthur J.S., Chalcedon London : S.P.C.K., 1931
McGrath, A. Christian Theology: An Introduction Oxford, UK ; Malden, MA : Blackwell
Publishers, 2001.
Macquarrie, J. Jesus Christ in Modern Thought London: SCM, 1990.
Mascall, E.L. Whatever Happened to the Human Mind? London : SPCK, 1980.
Monachos.net – Orthodox Monasticism and Patristics
http://www.monachos.net/patristics/Christology/chalcedon_definition.shtml Accessed on
14th June 2005.
- citing: Labbe and Cossart, Concilia, Tom. IV., col. 562
New Advent Catholic Encyclopedia
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/11589a.htm
Accessed on 14th June 2005.
Wolfson, H.A. The Philosophy of the Church Fathers Cambridge, Harvard University Press,
1956.
Other Works Consulted
Loofs, Friedrich, Nestorius and his place in the history of Christian doctrine New
York : B. Franklin, 1975.
Frend, W. H. C. The rise of the monophysite movement; chapters in the history of the church in
the fifth and sixth centuries Cambridge, [Eng.] University Press, 1972.
Kelly, J. N. D. Early Christian doctrines New York, Harper: 1959.