Download 4. Appendix 1 RTF - Greater London Authority

Greater London Authority
Table of Contents
Page
1
INTRODUCTION
1
2
OBJECTIVES AND METHOD
1
3
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
2
4
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
4
5
DETAILED AUDIT FINDINGS
5
6
RECOMMENDATIONS
12
Greater London Authority
1.
INTRODUCTION
1.1.
This audit forms part of the 2000/2001 audit plan, which has been approved by the Audit
Panel and the Mayor. The plan entails a review of the systems and controls operating
over the Accounting / General Ledger system.
1.2.
The General Ledger System used is the Sun Account and this system has been in
operation since the inception of the GLA. The General Ledger system is made up of
ledger accounts and is based on a single ledger structure.
2.
OBJECTIVES AND METHOD
2.1.
Internal Audit’s objectives for this audit were to assess the adequacy and effectiveness of
the internal controls put in place for the operation of the General Ledger at the Greater
London Authority. In addition, to provide assurance that these controls will assist in the
effective achievement of the Authority’s objectives.
2.2.
This review examined the following areas relating to the General Ledger:
 The General Ledger system is being managed in accordance with the Code of Practice
on Local Authorities Accounting in the United Kingdom 2000 and other relevant
regulations.
 All General Ledger transactions and journals are valid and are being supported by
proper documentary evidence.
 All data held on the General Ledger system is secure and access is appropriately
restricted.
 The authority effectively monitors and manages accounting within the General Ledger
system.
2.3.
Details of procedures were obtained from interviews with key staff and procedure or
guidance notes. Random samples of prime source documents were selected and tested
to evaluate the controls actually in operation. The results of these tests were then
assessed to determine adequacy of controls.
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Greater London Authority
3.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Policies, Procedures and Legislation relating to the management of the General
Ledger system
3.1.
This area was covered in depth within the budgetary control system audit and has therefore
not been revisited during this audit. It was identified that the Finance Management Team
were in the process of amending the Finance Manual and chart of accounts in order to fully
reflect the needs of the Authority.
General Ledger system and security
3.2.
The general ledger system at the Greater London Authority (GLA) was inherited from the
London Research Centre and implemented by the transition team prior to mayoral
elections. The main finding in this area is that there is an adequate if somewhat
cumbersome audit trail that when interrogated would provide management information.
Access privileges relating to the various modules are satisfactory in that records are
maintained to allow all users of the system to be identified.
3.3.
One area where we have made a priority two recommendation relates to the secure
storage of the master password, which can be used by nominated officers in the absence
of the Finance Manager, Systems and Technical. Tests showed that at the time of the
audit, the password was not held securely.
Completeness and Accuracy of General Ledger records
3.4.
Being an integrated package, transactions posted to one module are automatically updated
on the Ledger Accounting module. In this respect the system is sufficiently robust to
provide assurance over the completeness and accuracy of the ledger records.
Reliability and Integrity of transactions processed through the General Ledger
3.5.
The Sun Account system is an integrated system, encompassing a number of financial
systems. Our findings in this area showed that the controls over the reliability and integrity
between the modules are satisfactory. An area of weakness relates to the lack of
segregation of all key functions within the Purchase Ordering module with a consequential
impact on Ledger Accounting. At the time of the audit, the Finance Managers explained
that the core Finance section was insufficiently staffed to afford sufficient segregation.
Once the full complement of staff is in post, the Finance Managers plan to review and
improve on the current level of segregation.
Journal entries and manual adjustments within the General Ledger
3.6.
There was some inconsistency in the journal format, both the GLA and LRC documentation
was being used. There was no independent review / authorisation of journals input to
confirm that the journals were accurate and appropriate, because in the main, senior
members of staff create and then post journals. To some extent, the issue of journal
approval is less of an issue at present, but once the Finance section recruits more staff,
procedures for the approval of journals will need to be strengthened.
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Greater London Authority
Cheque Control
3.7.
Our review showed that there was no stock control system in place over cheques drawn
manually or those printed from the system. The bulk of the printed cheques were stored in
a filing cabinet in the finance office and the current batch was stored in an unmanned
printing room in a locked cabinet.
3.8.
The procedure set up for void, cancelled and /or spoilt and precarboned cheques required
that the cheques should be shredded in the presence of two officers and the details of the
cheque recorded, together with the date and signatures of the officers. We identified seven
cheques that had been recorded as shredded but there was no evidence of the date and
officers performing the shredding. Our view is that cheques are prime documents and
therefore, we would prefer to see cancelled and spoilt cheques retained but clearly marked
cancelled. However, since the authority has chosen to apply an alternative control, we are
satisfied with this approach, provided the control operates as intended.
3.9.
All the officers in the Budget & Exchequer team had access to the safe, where the manual
cheques and the system password were stored. The system password was not held
securely which we felt compromised the integrity of the whole accounting system. Again, at
the time of the audit, the risk of allowing full access to the safe is relatively small as the
majority of staff accessing the safe is senior and would genuinely require access. However,
in future, when more junior staff are recruited, the Finance Managers will need to review
access to the safe.
Audit Opinion – Substantial Assurance
Evaluation Opinion: while there is a basically sound system there are weaknesses, which may
put some of the system objectives at risk.
Testing Opinion: There is evidence that the level of non-compliance with some of the controls
may put some of the system objectives at risk.
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Greater London Authority
4.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
4.1.
We would like to thank the following for their assistance over the course of the audit.
Myfanwy Barrett
Finance Manager, Budgets & Exchequer Services
Steve Linnet
Finance Manager, Systems & Technical
Siu Lan Liu
Finance Officer, Exchequer Services
Steve Linnet
Finance Manager, Systems & Technical
Jim Lo
Accountant, Budgets & Exchequer Services
Shahid Majid
Accountant, Contracts & Financial Accounts
Julie Potter
Senior Finance Admin Officer, Exchequer Services
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Greater London Authority
5.
DETAILED AUDIT FINDINGS
General
5.1.
The Sun Account Ledger comprises Ledger Accounting, Fixed Asset Accounting, Purchase
Ordering and Sales Ordering Modules. The Ledger Accounting Module is a single ledger
system whereby one chart of accounts is used for Nominal, Purchase and Sales, rather
than separate modules. The system currently in use at the GLA is the older version and
does not use the latest windows technology. As part of the review of the operations during
the first months of the GLA, staff in Core Finance reviewed the system inherited from the
London Research Centre and concluded that the system was not suitable for the needs of
the GLA going forward in its configuration, nor was it sufficiently functional to meet the true
needs of an operational GLA. As a result, staff in Core Finance plan to make changes to
the system for the financial year 2001/02. This will include a new coding structure (Chart of
Accounts) to better reflect the operations and ensure true compliance with the Best Value
Accounting Code of Practice, revised security arrangements and new and enhanced
working practices with the introduction of a revised Finance Manual and Accounting
Manual. After the implementation of the revised Sun Configuration staff in Core Finance
plan to embark upon a full functionality needs assessment and a bench marking exercise
against the market place to determine, within the context of the GLA’s ICT Strategy,
whether Sun will be replaced with a newer and more functional system from the market
place.
5.2.
Bearing in mind the above, many of our findings highlight issues officers and management
are already aware of and intend to address once the full complement of staff is in post,
which at present management informs us, is the main reason why some matters were
outstanding at the time of the audit review.
Policies, Procedures and Legislation relating to the management of the General
Ledger system
5.3.
The need for review and amendment to the chart of accounts and the finance manual were
identified and reported in the Budgetary Control audit report and have consequently not
been revisited in this report. The specific issues raised in the Budgetary Control audit
related to the chart of accounts not fully reflecting the change in structure of the GLA.
Officers have initiated processes that will align the chart of accounts more closely with the
new structure and envisage the process to be completed by the start of the next financial
year.
General Ledger system and security
5.4.
The system supporting the General Ledger is the Sun Account system, which was
implemented by the transition team. An important control that would be expected of all key
financial systems is a clear audit trail of all transactions recorded on the system, which can
be interrogated to generate useful information. The trail should as a minimum detail the
nature of transaction, the officer making the transaction and the time and date. To test the
trail within the Sun Account system, a report was requested detailing all transactions
posted by an officer on a particular day. The system is not able to provide such information.
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Greater London Authority
Most modern systems are able to generate such a report as standard. However, should the
need arise for all transactions of an operator to be identified for one particular day, a
number of reports can be generated from the current system for each module of the
system and reviewed to identify the actions of the operator. A list of all journals posted by a
particular operator on a particular day in the Ledger Accounting can be produced as a
standard report. Changes to the masterfile data on a particular day can be produced but
the report would then have to be trawled through manually to check all changes made by
the operator. The Order Amendments Listing in Sales Ordering and Purchase Ordering can
be produced by date of change by operator. These reports together would then provide an
audit trail through the system.
5.5.
As described above, an audit trail is in place for recording changes made to standing data
on the system and this is maintained on the masterdata. The Finance Manager, Systems &
Technical indicated that from time to time, the audit trail data was printed and the electronic
version deleted from the system. The reason for this was that the increased size of the
masterdata file resulted in the reduced performance of the system. The transactions posted
on the system are not effected by the deletion of the audit trail, it is only the masterfile that
changes detailing accounts, names and addresses and bank details for supplier payments.
This process is satisfactory, but we have made a recommendation to archive the audit trail
instead of printing the trail. This will ensure that should the authority ever need to review
the trail, an electronic medium will allow the trail to be interrogated relatively easily, as
opposed to reviewing the printed audit trail manually.
5.6.
It is recommended that the masterdata on the Sun Account system is archived
instead of being deleted.
5.7.
In order to safeguard the integrity of the system, access privileges for users who no longer
require access is removed by closing the user access account. The Finance Manager,
Systems & Accounting indicated that the Sun Account system used by the GLA does not
provide the facility to suspend or close user access accounts. Most modern systems allow
a number of statuses for user accounts; open, temporarily suspend, closed and terminated.
Consequently, when a user leaves the GLA, their password is changed by the by the
Finance Manager, Systems and Technical to prevent access and then the user account is
deleted. To ensure that a record is maintained of all deleted users, a record of all users is
maintained in a lever arch file, which can be used to identify previous users of the system.
5.8.
A review of user privileges highlighted five London Research Centre (LRC) user passwords
that were still active. The Finance Manager, Systems & Technical explained that this was
because the LRC accounts were still in the process of being finalised and closed. The
Finance Manager, Systems and Technical plans to delete these users once the accounts
are finalised.
5.9.
The transition team created access levels to the Sun Account system when the system was
developed. A review of the level of access provided to officers showed that the framework
of controls within the accounting system is compromised since many of the key functions
are not fully segregated, particularly over controls in the purchasing module of the system.
At the time of the audit however, we are advised that the full complement of core finance
staff is not in post and consequently, there is little that the Finance Manager, System &
Technical can do little to fully segregate key functions. The manager plans to refine all
access privileges when new officers are appointed shortly.
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Greater London Authority
5.10. It is recommended that access levels within the Sun Account system should be
reviewed to ensure that access is commensurate with level of authority /
responsibility once additional staff is recruited.
5.11. The Finance Manager, Systems & Technical set up a control system to ensure that all Sun
Account system changes were appropriately authorised. Our review showed that all
change control forms had been approved and correctly maintained on file. The manager
also maintains a change control index to summaries all changes made, which at the time of
the review was also up to date, although the printed copy reflected changes made to
15/05/00.
5.12. It is recommended that an up to date change control index for the Sun Account
system should be printed and retained to reflect all changes authorised at the time of
processing.
5.13. The master password to the Sun Account system was held in the safe, as back up for the
absence of the Finance Manager, Systems & Technical. This allows other nominated
officers to act as supervisors in the absence of the Finance Manager. Although this is a
good control, when reviewed, the password was found to be in an envelope which had
been slit open and 'over closed' with a piece of sellotape which could allow unauthorised
officers access to sensitive information. Control over the master password is necessary to
minimise the risk to the integrity of the system.
5.14. It is recommended that the master password to the Sun Account system should be
held under seal and when the seal is opened, procedures implemented once the
master password has been used.
Completeness and Accuracy of General Ledger records
5.15. A number Finance Officers have access to the maintenance of chart of accounts, which
had been defined at the inception of the GLA by the transition team. The Finance
Manager, Systems & Technical is aware of this and in the process of redefining access
levels for all Sun Account users, to be implemented in April 2001 with the new chart of
accounts.
5.16. We concur with the Finance Manager, Systems and Technical over the need for the
introduction of new codes or amendments to the chart of account to be controlled,
authorised and co-ordinated strictly and permitted only by an officer with delegated
authority and recommend a prompt implementation of this control.
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Greater London Authority
Reliability and Integrity of transactions processed through the General Ledger
5.17. The SunAccount system is an integrated system encompassing the purchase order and
accounts payable functions. Being an integrated system, the system is designed to ensure
that the system remains in balance. Transactions processed in are module automatically
updates relevant ledgers in the general ledger thereby providing assurance over the
completeness and accuracy of the general ledger records. However, our review did
highlight weaknesses in the Purchase Ordering module that may compromise the validity of
transactions on the purchase order and accounts payable functions. A full audit review of
the ordering, receipting and payment procedures is planned which will review all functions
within the system but at this stage, our findings in relation to the impact on the general
ledger are detailed below.
5.18. It is recommended that access to add, amend, delete data in the supplier / customer
masterfile should be restricted to officer/s with delegated authority only.
5.19. The access levels set by the transition team permit all officers to access the supplier /
customer masterfiles to add, amend, delete data although we understand that this is
because the full complement of core finance staff is not in post. The lack of control
compromises the reliability and integrity of the accounting system. The risk has been
identified by the Finance Manager, Systems & Technical and a plan is in place for access
levels of the accounting systems to be amended with the implementation of the chart of
accounts and the recruitment of additional staff. New procedures are also being developed
for the control of changes to the supplier masterfile.
5.20. The Finance Manager, Systems and Technical and the staff in the Budget and Exchequer
Services are able to change details of supplier bank accounts. The ability of some officers
to update the supplier master data and then process payments to these suppliers
compromises key controls derived from the segregation of these functions.
5.21. It is recommended that changes to supplier bank details should be restricted to
delegated authorised users only.
Journal entries and manual adjustments within the General Ledger
5.22. Journals were seen to be documented on two journal formats, the GLA format and the LRC
format. The use of a standard format for journals will ensure all journals are dealt with
consistently.
5.23. It is recommended that the GLA journal format should be used for the documentation
of all journals.
5.24. A journal register was being maintained by the Budgets and Exchequer team. The register
provided a record of all journals input with cross reference to the unique Sun Account
system reference. It was noted however that other services do not use the register
maintained by the Budget and Exchequer team but maintain all posted journals in a journal
file.
5.25. It is recommended that all journals should be recorded in the journal register.
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Greater London Authority
5.26. The review also highlighted some inconsistencies between journal documentation recorded
and retained by officers preparing journals. It was noted that the journal source and
reference were not consistently recorded and control totals and the purpose of journal was
not recorded on all journals reviewed. A SunAccount journal listing of transactions created
on the system to verify and demonstrate accuracy of journal input was being used
consistently by one officer. There was no documentary evidence of journal authorisation
prior to input of journals as at present, the small size of the core finance means that the
officer preparing the journal also posts the journal. It is envisaged that in future the Finance
Managers will approve journals created by their team. The authorisation of manual journals
is necessary to ensure the integrity of the accounting information.
5.27. It is recommended that manual journals should be documented fully and authorised
prior to input. A Sun Account journal listing should be generated, used to verify
accuracy of posting and retained with the manual journal.
Cheque Control
5.28. A review of the physical controls over cheques revealed that cheques were not treated as
controlled stationery, consequently no record was held of cheques ordered, received and
issued. Without control of cheque stocks there is a risk that cheques may be lost or
misplaced and responsible officers within the authority would not be aware cheques were
missing.
5.29. It is recommended that cheques drawn either manually or printed should be treated
as controlled stationery and a record of the cheques maintained. It is further
recommended that two cheque registers should be established, one each for printed
and manual cheques. All additions to and issues from the cheque stocks should be
recorded.
5.30. It is recommended the cheques provided by the bank should be examined to ensure
that they run consecutively and the cheque register should show the consecutive
sequence of the cheques.
5.31. Printed cheques are stored in the print room in a locked cabinet and the bulk stock of
cheques was stored in the finance office. The print room is not manned and is open to all
persons with access to the GLA offices who require the use of the photocopier and /or
networked printer. There is one key to the cabinet in the print room. The Senior Finance
Officer indicated that it was necessary to have spare keys cut in case the key was lost.
The filing cabinet in the finance office is a metal four drawer, single lock cabinet. The keys
to both these storage cabinets were held by the Senior Finance Officer in a draw in a
pedestal cabinet by her desk. The cabinet holding the keys is not kept locked during office
hours.
5.32. A log was maintained of spoilt, voided and cancelled cheques shredded. The record
showed the cheque number, value, and reason for shredding, date and signatures of the
two officers involved in the shredding. Seven cheques were recorded but there was no
indication of the officers involved in the shredding or the date they were shredded. Details
of these are provided below.
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Greater London Authority
Cheque
no.
value
reason
signature
date
wrong amount
returned by post
none
None
636
£65.80
714
£1000.00
sent to wrong
address
none
None
791
£145.00
wrong payee
none
None
892
nil
void
none
none
900
£3438.77
printer error
none
none
901
£91.00
printer error
none
none
864
£1,500.00
misplaced cheque
none
none
Cheque no. 791 was held with the log at the time of the audit. The Senior Finance
Admin Officer (Exchequer Services) indicated that she was not aware whether the other
cheques had been shredded and by whom.
5.33. It is recommended officers be reminded of the need to evidence of the need to
record cheque movement and date of movement.
5.34. The status of the seven cheques listed in the rational para 5.32 should be
established and recorded.
5.35. Our view is that cancelled and spoilt cheques are prime documents and should be retained,
although the cheques should be clearly marked as cancelled so that the cheques cannot
be presented.
5.36. The stock of printed cheques currently in use at the GLA was ordered by the transition
team. Each cheque has a precarboned duplicate. The Senior Finance Admin Officer
(Exchequer Services) explained that these duplicates were not used and the printer used
would not take duplicate sheets. The cheques were being redesigned at the time of the
audit in order to reflect the new corporate logo and in future will not be carbonated. Unused
precarbon duplicate cheques were held in the pedestal draw in the print room. The Senior
Finance Admin Officer (Exchequer Services) indicated that they awaited shredding.
5.37. The safe holding the cheques is situated in the Finance Manager, Budgets & Exchequer's
office. The safe is locked by means of a key and a combination lock. The combination to
the safe was known by the Finance Manager Budgets & Exchequer, the Accountants and
the Senior Finance Admin Officer (Exchequer Services). Two keys were available to the
safe. One key was held by the Senior Finance Admin Officer (Exchequer Services) in her
desk draw. At the time of the audit, the Finance Manager, Budgets & Exchequer was not
aware who held the second key. It was later identified that the second key was given to
the Accountant (Contracts & Financial Accounts) to cover a period of absence of the
Finance Manager, but this had not been returned.
5.38. The safe can be accessed by the Senior Finance Admin Officer (Exchequer Services),
Finance Officer (Exchequer Services), in the absence of the Senior Finance Admin Officer
(Exchequer Services), Accountant (Budgets & Exchequer Services), Accountant (Contracts
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Greater London Authority
& Financial Accounts) and Finance Manager, Budgets & Exchequer. The Finance
Manager, Budgets & Exchequer indicated that a 'safe access' policy had not been written.
A clear safe policy provides a means of controlling access to the contents of the safe,
although bearing in mind the current contents of the safe, the risk in this area is relatively
small.
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Greater London Authority
6.
RECOMMENDATIONS
6.1.
The recommendations from the report are presented here as a table to assist you with the implementation of change.
6.2.
In order to assist management in using our reports, we categorise our recommendations according to their level of priority.
Priority 1
-
major issues for the attention of senior management
Priority 2
-
other recommendations for local management action
Priority 3
-
minor matters.
Report
Ref.
Detailed
Recommendation
Priority
5.6
It is recommended that
the masterdata on the
Sun Account system is
archived instead of being
deleted.
2
5.10
It is recommended that
access levels within the
Sun Account system
should be reviewed to
ensure that access is
commensurate with level
of authority /
3
Agreed / Not
Agreed
Comments or Action
Agreed if Different from
Recommendation
Person
Responsible
for Action
Date to be
Completed
Finance
Manager,
Systems &
Technical
Agreed
Currently being reviewed
for re-implementation at
commencement of next
financial year.
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Finance
Manager,
Systems &
Technical
31/05/01
Greater London Authority
Report
Ref.
Detailed
Recommendation
Priority
Agreed / Not
Agreed
Comments or Action
Agreed if Different from
Recommendation
Person
Responsible
for Action
Date to be
Completed
responsibility once
additional staff is
recruited.
5.12
It is recommended that
an up to date change
control index for the Sun
Account system should
be printed and retained
to reflect all changes
authorised at the time of
processing.
3
Agreed
Will endeavour to print on Finance
a regular basis.
Manager,
Systems &
Technical
Actioned
5.14
It is recommended that
the master password to
the Sun Account system
should be held under
seal and when the seal is
opened, procedures
implemented once the
master password has
been used.
2
Agreed
The password has been
resealed, signed over the
closure. The officer who
opened the sealed
envelope and the reason
for opening has been
established. Procedure
introduced that an officer
opening the password to
record the event in a
logbook and report the
instance to the Finance
Manager, Systems &
Actioned
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Finance
Manager,
Systems &
Technical
Greater London Authority
Report
Ref.
Detailed
Recommendation
Priority
Agreed / Not
Agreed
Comments or Action
Agreed if Different from
Recommendation
Person
Responsible
for Action
Date to be
Completed
Technical.
5.16
We concur with the
Finance Manager,
Systems and Technical
over the need for the
introduction of new codes
or amendments to the
chart of account to be
controlled, authorised
and co-ordinated strictly
and permitted only by an
officer with delegated
authority and recommend
a prompt implementation
of this control.
3
Agreed
This will be implemented
with the new chart of
accounts in April.
Finance
Manager,
Systems &
Technical
Actioned
5.18
It is recommended that
access to add, amend,
delete data in the
supplier / customer
masterfile should be
restricted to officer/s with
delegated authority only.
3
Agreed
Will implement with chart
of accounts.
Finance
Manager,
Systems &
Technical
31/05/2001
5.21
It is recommended that
changes to supplier bank
2
Agreed
Finance
Manager,
31/05/2001
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Greater London Authority
Report
Ref.
Detailed
Recommendation
Priority
Agreed / Not
Agreed
Comments or Action
Agreed if Different from
Recommendation
details should be
restricted to delegated
authorised users only.
Person
Responsible
for Action
Date to be
Completed
Systems &
Technical
5.23
It is recommended that
the GLA journal format
should be used for the
documentation of all
journals.
3
Agreed
5.25
It is recommended that
all journals should be
recorded in the journal
register.
3
Agreed
5.27
It is recommended that
manual journals should
be documented fully and
authorised prior to input.
A Sun Account journal
listing should be
generated, used to verify
accuracy of posting and
retained with the manual
journal.
3
Agreed
Finance
Manager,
Systems &
Technical
31/05/2001
Will introduce journal
reference convention to
ensure consistency within
the team.
Finance
Manager,
Systems &
Technical
31/05/2001
Authorisation will be at
Finance Manager level.
Finance
Manager,
Systems &
Technical
31/05/2001
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Greater London Authority
Report
Ref.
5.29,
5.30,
5.33,
& 5.34.
Detailed
Recommendation
The following
recommendation all
relate to accounting for
and use of cheques:

that cheques drawn
either manually or
printed should be
treated as controlled
stationery and a
record of the cheques
maintained;

that two cheque
registers should be
established, one each
for printed and
manual cheques. All
additions to and
issues from the
cheque stocks should
be recorded;

that the cheques
provided by the bank
should be examined
to ensure that they
Priority
2
Agreed / Not
Agreed
Comments or Action
Agreed if Different from
Recommendation
Agreed
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Person
Responsible
for Action
Finance
Manager,
Systems &
Technical
Date to be
Completed
30/6/01
Greater London Authority
Report
Ref.
Detailed
Recommendation
Priority
Agreed / Not
Agreed
Comments or Action
Agreed if Different from
Recommendation
run consecutively and
the cheque register
should show the
consecutive
sequence of the
cheques;

that officers be
reminded of the need
to record cheque
movement and date
of movement; and

that the status of the
seven cheques listed
in the rational para
5.32 should be
established and
recorded.
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Person
Responsible
for Action
Date to be
Completed