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The missing narrativist turn in historiography of science Dr Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen Structure of the talk Preliminary I History of historiography of science: two views II Contemporary historiography of science III Change of perspective and third view: progressivism IV Return of historical realism V The missing narrativist turn Preliminary What historiography of science is? • Young field • What is its nature? Is it historiography? • Influence first from philosophy, then social studies of science • Can we detect any general pattern in the history of historiography of science in past 50 years? Three ‘narratives’ about the history of historiography of science 1. Deepening empirization/anti-apriorism 2. From natural realism to social realism to nonrealism 3. From progressivism about natural world to progressivism about science and its past I Historiography of science: two views 1. Deepening empirisation: methodological principles • Philosophical history of science (e.g. Koyré, Sarton, Bachelard) ▫ Central feature: history of science seen through some key philosophical concepts: truth, rationality, reason • Historical philosophy of science (e.g. Kuhn, Feyerabend, Toulmin) ▫ Kuhn: historical accountability of our views of science: “History, if viewed as a repository for more than anecdote or chronology, could produce a decisive transformation in the image of science…” (SSR) • The Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (e.g. Bloor, Barnes) ▫ Central feature: impartiality and the rejection of the sociology of error: no a priori commitment and judgment on truth, falsity, rationality, irrationality • Anthropological studies; ANT (e.g. Latour, Woolgar) ▫ Central feature: No pre-empirical commitments of any kind; one needs to pretend ignorance with respect to research object like an anthropologists of an unknown tribe 2. From natural realism to social realism to nonrealism: the research object of science • Philosophical history of science ▫ Natural realism: science produces increasingly accurate knowledge of the natural world • Historical philosophy of science ▫ The historical record shows discontinuity in our knowledge of the natural world ▫ Natural anti-realism: culture, conceptual schemes, condition scientific knowledge • The Sociology of Scientific Knowledge ▫ Symmetry principle: the same type of causal explanations for all beliefs in science ▫ Society and social factors (ultimately) explain the content of the sciences ▫ Social realism: no absolute natural knowledge, but there is knowledge about society … • Anthropological studies; ANT ▫ Radical extension of the symmetry principle: “To be symmetric, for us, simply means not to impose a priori some spurious asymmetry among human intentional action and a material world of causal relations.” ▫ If no pre-given ‘nature,’ nor ‘society’ ▫ Any concepts or explanatory principles that are not directly detectable in “routinely occurring minutiae” have to be justified empirically ▫ No natural nor social realism, but nonrealism and a new ‘neutral’ ontology of ‘actants’ II Contemporary historiography of science Two central principles of contemporary historiography of science in light of its history: • Science is a social practice; not a noble search for truth: one should not portray science as convergence on the truth about the natural world • One should accept only strongly empirically rooted claims Contemporary historiography of science… • Rejects meta-narratives about science • Rejects pre-empirical commitments to (philosophical) a priori concepts • Concentrates on local cultures and social practices; micro studies • Has very high standards of empirical verifiability • Is strongly influenced by sociology and social studies of science Current ideal in science studies: ‘Descriptivism’ • Describe the ‘social practice’ of science as it is; ‘just describe’ how it happened • Follow, document, report empirical details of historical practice • In the ideal researcher historical and sociological perspectives coincide: ▫ Historian as a temporally conditioned sociologist or anthropologist ▫ Sociologists as on-the-spot observer of the ‘science in the making’ Illustrative examples: • Sociological: Latour in his many works ▫ “more details”; “the name of the game is to go back to empiricism“ ▫ “follow scientists around,” “the social fluid wherever it leads,” “the veins and arteries” of science • Historical example: Martin Rudwick: The Great Devonian Controversy ▫ "empirical studies of science in the making – whether in the past or present is of lesser consequence.” ▫ “is an attempt to look over the shoulders of nineteenth-century geologists … and to figure out what the devil they thought they were up to.” ▫ "Some philosophers may continue to portray science as 'a ship of reason powering its own way through a silent of sea of social contingencies.' Those who are concerned with what scientists really did in the past - or with what they do at present - have rightly rejected that image as incompatible with any truthful description of scientific activity.” III Change of perspective and third view: progressivism • Focus shifts from the object of research of science to the object of research of science studies and historiography of science • Has contemporary historiography produced a more accurate picture of science and the past science? • Would a Latourian description of Pasteur be better than Sartonian? And would, say, Schaffer and Shapin’s portrayal of dispute on air-pump and vacuum be better than the positivists’? • Symmetrical anthropology “must realise that the two Great Divides [between nature and society and us and other cultures] do not describe reality . . . but define the particular way Westerners had of establishing their relations with others as long as they felt modern.” (Latour, We Have Never Been Modern) • Science studies have added “realism to science” and believes in “the objectivity of science more than anyone else” (Latour, Pandora’s Hope) • It is evident that contemporary historiography views its own history in progressive terms: that it has corrected the mistakes of earlier tradition and managed to produce a better image of the nature of science, and of its past. • But … it is (ironically) a manifestation of modernist thinking: Modernism and progressivism of science studies • As a result, we can construe a third view of the history of contemporary historiography of science (arrows denotes a progressive step): From progressivism about natural world to progressivism about the nature of science and the past science: Philosophical history of science Historical philosophy of science The Sociology of Scientific Knowledge Anthropological studies; ANT Material and regional studies of science IV Return of historical realism Classical Rankean historical realism • To describe the past as it really is – wie es eigentich gewesen • Extinguish oneself - in order not add anything subject-sided to it • Rely strictly on documents and archival sources Contemporary historical realism • Progressivism about past science and descriptivism implies ... historical realism: ▫ science not seen as forming increasingly accurate image of its object, nature, but ▫ science studies and historiography of science are forming increasingly accurate picture of their object, science and its past • The ideal of empiricism and descriptivism: no a priori concepts; no abstractions, ‘just describe,’ ‘pretend ignorance,’ ‘veins and arteries of science’ V The Missing narrativist turn Narrativist philosophy of historiography • Central figures: Hayden White (Metahistory); Frank Ankersmit (Narrative Logic) • Focus on complete historical works and their literal nature • The central claim: the most important knowledge contribution are narratives, central theses or messages: ▫ “There was a scientific revolution in the 16th and 17th centuries,” “Louis Pasteur was so successful, because he was most cunning negotiator,” “the dispute about the existence of vacuum was a struggle of social order” … • Narratives/theses are cognitive structures that organise historical ‘knowledge’ into meaningful wholes • Narratives/theses do not emerge naturally from the past or from historians’ source material • Narratives/theses are historians’ constructions that cannot as such be true of historical reality or refer to any corresponding entity: historical reality is not the structured as these are • In contemporary historiography science not enough focus on the process of construction and the role of historian in this construction • More work needed to understand this process … and to understand how specific historiographical theses are justified …. to spell how some interpretations seem more justified or more rationally warranted than others … without assuming that they are true in the sense of correspondence • My suggestion: historiography is argumentative practice that tries to produce as rationally compelling accounts as possible. • Three dimensions: ▫ Epistemic (epistemic values) ▫ Rhetorical (argument) ▫ Discursive (intervention in existing discourse) Conclusions • The history of historiography of science is both a narrative of deepening empirisation and of the transition from realism to non-realism • But it also implies progressivism about science and historical realism • A better recognition and understanding of the constructive aspects of historiography is called for