Download Red Scare General Background Guide

WAMUNC XV – America and the Red Scare
General Background Guide
1. Introductory Letter
Dear Delegates,
Welcome to the Red Scare Joint Crisis Simulation. Each of you has been assigned a role in one of the
three entities constituting this crisis: the House Un-American Activities Committee, the Executive
Committee of the Communist Party USA, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Each of your chairs has prepared a committee-specific guide for the entity to which you belong. These
guides (available only to you and your fellow committee members) detail much of the internal
workings, substantive expectations, and portfolio powers of your body. Those documents are meant to
guide your debate and ensure that your committee has operational secrecy.
By contrast, this Crisis Guide has been made available to all participants in the JCC. It outlines the
historical and political backdrop for the simulation, highlights the rules and flow of crisis, enumerates
ways in which you and your committee may interact with our crisis staff, and provides procedural
guidelines to streamline your debate and caucuses.
We hope this information will facilitate your participation and creativity during the simulation, as well
as provide you with the insight needed to be knowledgeable on the topics at hand. During the
simulation, we will be looking for delegates who: display good public speaking and negotiating skills,
can strike a balance between committee and private directives, and challenge their peers and our staff
with unique solutions and developments.
We are excited for a weekend full of propaganda, criminal prosecutions, Congressional hearings,
espionage, and all sorts of intrigue – and we hope you are too!
Best,
--Red Scare JCC Staff
2. Historical/Political Backdrop
Seeds of the Cold War: Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam
It is May 1948.
Three years ago, the supreme commanders of the Allied and Axis forces signed the German Instrument
of Surrender, which brought the European campaign of World War II to a close. Just a few months later,
after Hiroshima and Nagasaki were leveled by nuclear bombs, Emperor Hirohito capitulated to the
supreme commanders of the Allied forces in the Pacific. For the first time in nearly a decade, peace
reigned across the globe.
The road to peace, however, had been bloody and arduous – and it befell the Allied powers to establish
order and begin reconstruction. As early as 1942, the Allies recognized the burden of responsibility
should the Axis Powers face unconditional defeat. In the Declaration by United Nations, the Allies
committed themselves “to defend life, liberty, independence and religious freedom, and to preserve
human rights and justice in their own lands as well as in other lands.” Signed by the United States, the
United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the Republic of China among others, the treaty consolidated
the war effort against Nazi Germany and ostensibly maintained international unity.
However, by the time President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Premier Stalin met at the
Tehran Conference in November 1943, there were discernible differences in the postwar agendas of the
Allied powers. The Soviet victory at the Battle of Kursk and their fortified positions on the German
eastern front made Stalin a dominating figure at the conference. This advantage forced Churchill and
Roosevelt to acquiesce to many of Stalin's demands at the summit. Among the concessions agreed upon
at Tehran were: the annexation of eastern Poland to the USSR, the establishment of puppet Soviet
governments in Czechoslovakia, the Baltic states, and Romania, and the tacit approval of the Stalin
regime in Moscow.
The Big Three met again at the Yalta Conference in February 1945. By this time, the war in Europe was
drawing to a close, and the main items on the agenda dealt with postwar restructuring and occupation.
In similar fashion to Tehran, Stalin attempted to dictate the Yalta negotiations – but this time was met
with greater resistance from the American and British delegations. Each country had its own interests in
mind, and because the threat from the Axis powers was greatly diminished, none was too eager to make
concessions.
At the conference, Stalin demanded the ratification of Soviet holdings in eastern Poland, the extension
of Poland's holdings in the west at the expense of Germany, and continued support for the pro-Moscow
Polish provisional government despite an agreement for free and fair elections. Roosevelt was willing
to meet these demands, so long as the Soviets agreed to enter the war against Japan and participate in
the newly-minted United Nations. Stalin acceded, but only if the US recognized Mongolia's
independence and Soviet interests in Manchurian railway operations. Meanwhile, Churchill attempted
to negotiate an agreement whereby British interests in the Mediterranean would be respected, and free
elections would be held in the satellite Soviet states. His unwillingness to capitulate to Stalin's demands
and his general distaste for the authoritarian regime in Moscow, however, made the initiatives
untenable and no agreements with London were formally recognized.
In many respects, the Yalta Conference set the stage for what some are now calling the Cold War. By
the time the three leaders met again at Potsdam in July 1945, the effects of Yalta were palpable. The
Soviets had consolidated political control in Central and Eastern Europe and established a powerful
presence in the far East, the United States had all but triumphed in the Pacific and ensured control of an
occupied German zone, and Britain had distanced itself considerably from its friends in Moscow.
Despite being criticized for “selling out” to the Kremlin, President Roosevelt was convinced that a
Communist takeover of Europe could be dealt with through the UN Security Council. This strategy,
however, would not see the light of day as a result of extenuating circumstances.
When the three powers met at the Potsdam Conference, it was under considerably different political
circumstances. President Roosevelt had passed away in April and had been replaced by his VicePresident, Harry Truman, who was more skeptical and cautious about Stalin's devices. Similarly,
Winston Churchill's party lost the British Parliamentary election of 1945, ceding control of the United
Kingdom to Clement Attlee and the Labour Party. Although Attlee's administration was more
concerned with domestic reconstruction, his focus on stopping the onslaught of Communism in Europe
helped consolidate Anglo-American cooperation in the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO). It was under these auspices that Potsdam occurred, and the results of new
leadership exacerbated the rift between the Allied powers.
At Potsdam, the main debate centered around the reorganization of occupied Germany, the
unconditional surrender of Japan, and the recognition of the Lublin government in Poland. After much
antagonism, the three leaders agreed to split Germany into French, British, American, and Soviet
occupation zones. Each would be separately administered by its occupying power, and was to be
allowed self-determination. The city of Berlin, firmly nestled within the Soviet zone, would be
similarly split into three occupation zones, And while there was no formal agreement with the USSR on
commerce between the zones, the American and British delegations foolishly expected little
recalcitrance from their wartime ally. Of course, the advent of the atomic bomb and the threats leveled
against Japan, made Stalin weary of President Truman's intentions and power. Secretly, he began plans
to steal the Americans' nuclear technology and escalate tensions along the occupation zones in
Germany.
By the time the Japanese surrendered in August 1945, the Truman Administration had grown suspicious
of Moscow – fearing not only their presence in Central and Eastern Europe but also their involvement
in the Pacific theater (particularly in Manchuria and Korea). It had become clear that the collapse of the
Third Reich in Germany had paved the way to a bipolar world, and both nations braced for
deteriorating diplomatic relations. The economic, political, and cultural implications of protracted
animosity have since steered events within the United States and abroad in unprecedented ways. We
now constantly live in fear of Communist infiltration and influence, and our society has grown averse
to such threats. But in order to understand this reality, we must first grasp those domestic and
international developments that led to such a Soviet-American schism.
Developments in the United States since World War II
The death of President Roosevelt in April 1945 marked the start of a new era in American society and
politics. With Harry Truman in the White House, millions of servicemen returning home, and an
industrial economy operating in full swing, the United States was prepared to embrace a new domestic
order.
Increasingly tense relations with the Soviet Union over post-war negotiations prompted President
Truman to adopt a policy of containment first posited by George Kennan in his “Long Telegram” of
February 1946. This policy geared the state apparatus toward ensuring that Communist regimes did not
spread from Moscow to other parts of the world, as well as exposing subversive entities seeking a
Marxist overthrow of the federal government. In line with these efforts, the President created the
Central Intelligence Agency to carry out foreign anti-Communist operations, and aid the FBI in
investigating leftist groups within the United States. Containment has since become the modus
operandi for the diplomatic and military corps, the CIA, and the White House among other important
government agencies. Today, it forms part of the foreign policy posture which many Congressional
Republicans and conservative Democrats favor, as evidenced by the $44 million awarded to Marshall
Plan investments.
However, despite crafting an effective foreign policy, President Truman remained unpopular with the
American public. For one, Truman didn't have the pedigree or political skills that made Roosevelt a
charismatic and effective leader. From the moment he stepped into the Oval Office, he was unable to
hold together the coalition of liberals that had put FDR in the White House for over a decade. He upset
many low-income voters when he didn't order the immediate termination of rationing and price
controls instituted during the war – even as the economy reeled from such oblique policies during
peacetime. To make matters worse, the return of many soldiers to their pre-war jobs yielded an unusual
amount of strain on the labor markets and catalyzed several worker's strikes throughout 1946. Truman
was unable to calm these manifestations, a fact which crippled the transportation and energy sectors of
the economy. He failed to broker negotiations between the United Mine Workers, the Teamsters, the
United Railroad Workers and a slew of their respective employers, and in return received an outpouring
of criticism from the GOP. By the time Congressional elections happened in November 1946, President
Truman carried an all-time low approval rating of 32%.
It is under these auspices that, on Election Day, Republicans gained their first Congressional majority
since 1928. In the House of Representatives, the GOP picked up 55 seats – leaving the chamber with
246 Republicans and 188 Democrats. Similarly, in the Senate, they gained 12 seats – leaving the
chamber split with 51 Republicans and 45 Democrats. These crushing results were seen as a
referendum on President Truman's administration, and gave the GOP fresh energy to mount a
considerable opposition to the President's policies. Several filibusters in the Senate blocked Truman's
plans of expanding New Deal programs, and there was a stalemated debate in the House over
budgeting issues for Social Security.
With a powerful public mandate, and in response to the crippling wave of labor strikes, Congressional
Republicans passed the Taft-Hartley Act in June 1947 despite a Presidential veto. The new law
prohibited jurisdictional, wildcat, solidarity and political strikes, secondary boycotts, mass picketing,
closed shops, and monetary donations by unions to federal political campaigns. It also required union
officers to sign non-Communist affidavits with the government. Furthermore, the executive branch was
given authority to obtain strikebreaking injunctions if an impending or current strike imperiled the
national health or safety. Union leaders around the country called it the “slave labor law” in an attempt
to galvanize a repeal movement, which has failed to this day. This victory for the conservative
movement gave way to other initiatives that sought to dismantle and expose the radical liberal
establishment within the United States.
In March 1947, under pressure from Congress, President Truman signed Executive Order 9385 (the
Federal Employees Loyalty Program) which established review boards for federal workers suspected of
spying for the Soviet Union or being "Un-American." The Executive Order inspired many national
figures to lend their efforts toward the cause of anti-Communism, and propelled institutions like the
House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) to the forefront of American culture.
With the help of the FBI, the HUAC had investigated fascist and socialist advocates in the United
States for decades. During World War II, the Committee endorsed the internment camp program for
Japanese-Americans in a report popularly called the “Yellow Paper.” With growing cries against
Communism, however, the Committee turned on radical leftists with a vengeance. In 1946 alone,
HUAC investigated and helped the FBI build indictments for Communists working in the Works
Progress Administration, the Federal Theatre Project, and the Federal Writer's Project. Then, in 1947,
the Committee held a week of widely-viewed hearings inquiring upon Communist influence in the
Hollywood film industry. Hundreds of actors and actresses, directors, producers, and film executives
were made to testify in front of HUAC and reveal those who were believed to have ties to radical
subversive groups. Many witnesses interviewed by the Committee refused to answer questions about
their political affiliations or that of their peers, citing their 1st Amendment right to freedom of
expression and their 5th Amendment right against self-incrimmination. These witnesses were placed on
a blacklist, and though they were never officially indicted for a crime, their reputations and careers
were ruined by the scrutiny and labeling they received.
The movie industry, however, was not the only institution put on trial by Congress and the FBI. Joseph
McCarthy, a freshman Republican senator from Wisconsin, denounced President Truman for covering
up investigations carried out through his Executive Order 9385. He also antagonized the Voice of
America radio program, the American Civil Liberties Union, and a variety of other organizations in a
series of floor speeches that have since brought him national attention. Although Senator McCarthy's
claims have not been completely corroborated, many in Congress have begun to respect and consider
him as the leader of the anti-communist movement. Most recently, the Senator has been interested in
collaborating with HUAC and the FBI in investigating the diplomatic and military corps of the US
government, the radio and TV industry, the American Federation of Labor, and several other sectors of
the American economy.
The growing political turmoil in our country has even permeated this year's Presidential election. With
the primary season in full swing, several candidates from the right and left have thrown their hat in the
ring. The popular anti-left movement championed in Congress, coupled with Truman's incompetence
with domestic challenges, has left Democrats immensely vulnerable. To make matters worse, the party
has begun to tear at the seams over the issue of civil rights – a plank which northern liberals like
Minneapolis mayor, Hubert Humphrey, have stated they will support at the DNC this summer.
President Truman has expressed his reservations about civil rights, recognizing how important
Southern “states' rights” Democrats (like South Carolina governor Strom Thurmond) are in getting him
reelected. Although Truman's nomination at the DNC is assumed, the squabble over state's rights is
bound to have profound effects on his viability as the party's choice.
Unlike Democrats, the Republican party seems to be enjoying a wave of popular support and political
energy this election year. Their major victory in the midterm elections of 1946 has given them
important publicity, despite Truman's attempts to label them a “do-nothing” Congress. Just a few
months from the convention, there are three frontrunners vying for the GOP nomination. New York
governor, Thomas Dewey, has been considered the heavyweight during the primaries and carries the
support of the Eastern establishment. He has fervently campaigned against Ohio Senator, Robert Taft
(who curries favor among Southern and Midwestern conservatives), as well as former Minnesota
governor Harold Stassen. Many GOP enthusiasts have begun talking about a a Dewey ticket with
California Senator, Earl Warren, as the most formidable way of defeating Truman in November. If a
Dewey/Warren ticket emerges from the RNC this summer, many journalists and scholars predict the
White House will change hands.
A third party has also picked up considerable steam since 1947, and now threatens to change the
electoral landscape for November. The Progressive Party, championed by former Agriculture Secretary
Henry Wallace, claims to be the “last true liberal bastion” in America. It's proposals are radical by
today's standards, and include: the abolition of HUAC, de-funding the Marshall Plan and disavowing
Containment Policy, engaging in rapprochement with the Soviet Union, extending equal rights to
African-Americans and women, and repealing the Taft-Hartley Act. Although Wallace has stated
several times that he is not a Communist, many outside his party view him as a covert agent of
radicalism, Phillip Murray, president of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, has warned union
members to avoid voting for a “closet Leninist,” citing evidence brought to light by various press
outlets that Communist operatives could be working within the Progressive Party. Wallace is expected
to be nominated at his party's convention this summer, but tensions with many Americans have
heightened security risks for the event.
Note: Because it is May 1948 in “simulation time,” several domestic developments have yet to happen
in the course of the Red Scare. Nonetheless, in order to be prepared for a variety of potential crisis
situations, delegates should become familiarized with the following events: The Whittaker
Chambers/Alger Hiss affair, the Julius and Ethel Rosenberg investigations, the release of the “Red
Channels” publication, the Foley Square Trials and Dennis v. United States, the debate over retaliation
to the Berlin Blockade, Strom Thurmond's walk-out at the DNC, the Progressive Party Convention in
Philadelphia, the passage of the Communist Control Act and the McCarran Internal Security Act,
Joseph McCarthy's Wheeling speech, and the anti-McCarthy work of CBS journalist Edward R.
Murrow. All or some of these events could develop over the course of the JCC simulation, but
delegates will be expected to “re-write” history on their own terms and in response to the climate of
debate during the conference. It is also possible that fictional events relating to real organizations and
people will happen, so delegates should be familiar with the political affiliation of major American
figures, organizations, and government agencies of the time.
Developments in Europe since World War II
The signing of the German Instrument of Surrender on May 8 1945 effectively ended the war in
Europe. The Potsdam conference a few months later established rules for the Allied occupation of
Germany, and by January 1946, there were distinct American, British, French, and Soviet zones. The
Allied Control Council was in charge of administering the four zones, collecting reparations, and
expediting military tribunals for officers of the Third Reich. Between 1945 and 1947, US postwar
policy focused on de-industrialization and demilitarization – the goal being the dismantling of the
German economy to 1937 levels. However, the Truman and Attlee administrations soon saw benefits in
a stable German economy. Not only would German productivity fuel recovery in the war-torn
continent, but an economy resilient to Soviet influence would be key to stopping the incursion of
Communism into Western Europe.
With the help of General Lucius Clay and Secretary of State George Marshall, the Truman
administration created the European Recovery Program (ERP) – a stimulus package that relied on
providing loans to European countries for infrastructural and economic recovery. In March of 1947,
President Truman elucidated a doctrine of containment, with the ERP as the main instrument of
implementation. Truman's doctrine specified the United States' commitment to supporting countries
resisting radical groups and external influence during the postwar period. And while the immediate
motive for the ERP and the Truman doctrine was to stimulate recovery in Germany and Western
Europe, the failure of the Soviet Union to withdraw from Iran as agreed at Yalta made the new
American policies key to the containment of Communist influence. To this day, the ERP continues to
disburse aid to Europe, and while the program was extended to the USSR and its satellite countries,
they have since refused the aid out of fear of American oversight in their economies.
The political implications of President Truman's doctrine became immediately palpable in Greece,
where civil conflict had broken out between the government and Communist rebels. The Democratic
Army of Greece (DSE), backed by Stalin through Yugoslavia and Albania, launched major offensives
against Athens in late 1946. They would have been successful in establishing a Communist state, were
it not for ERP aid from the United States and Britain. The war in Greece continues to rage on, though it
seems robust aid from the United States has allowed the government to formidably defend itself.
Secretary of State George Marshall has emphasized the need to continue aiding Turkey and Greece in
this conflict, as defeat would imply a breach of the security cordon established by the newly-minted
NATO.
American efforts in Greece, Turkey, Italy, and other European countries hasn't gone unnoticed by
Moscow and its allies. Stalin has since taken steps to ensure that his interests in Central and Eastern
Europe remain uncontested, and has kept his eye on the growing tide of Communism in Western
European countries. He has become particularly interested with developments in the German occupied
zone, where he sees American and British troops as a threat to the viability of Soviet occupation. In
1946, with the help of the Red Army, German leftist factions coalesced into the Socialist Unity Party
(SED) in the hopes of taking control of administrative positions in Berlin. However, American and
British presence in the capital has thwarted major progress for a Red takeover of Germany. Stalin has
made clear his intentions to remove that presence, and many in the American intelligence community
fear Soviet interference with commerce and supply lines for Allied troops. This fear is particularly
driven by the fact that there was never a formal agreement at Potsdam over rail and air passages from
the Western occupation zones to Berlin. Earlier this year, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia
forcibly took over the country's government with help from the Soviets, and Stalin's movements in
Berlin seem to indicate similar plans for Germany.
Developments in Asia/the Pacific since World War II
After the unconditional surrender of Japan to the Allied forces, the International Military Tribunal for
the Far East was established. This instrument prosecuted all officials found guilty of war crimes, and in
conjunction with the Far Eastern Commission, collected reparations from the Japanese government. In
1946, the US Congress approved the Government and Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA) program,
which provided emergency supplies and food to Japanese and Chinese citizens. This initiative was later
incorporated into the more extensive Marshall Plan (see section on Europe for more details). Just a few
months ago, the Johnston Committee Report recommended graduated demilitarization and deindustrialization in Japan. But it is still unclear how long-term reconstruction will occur, and how that
will affect US interests in the country.
Meanwhile, the end of the war against Japan reignited violence within the Republic of China. Since
1927, the Kuomintang (KMT) had been waging a civil war against the Communist Party of China
(CPC) for control of the government. The threat of Japanese invasion in 1937, however, led to a de
facto truce between the factions. With the defeat of the Axis powers, this truce came to an end and the
bloody civil war resumed – but this time with intercession from the global powers. The Soviet
occupation of Manchuria in 1945 gave Mao Zedong and the Communists a safe base of operations, and
thus an upper hand in the conflict. Despite financial and military support from the United States, the
KMT was unable to counter major offensives from the north in 1946 and 1947. Much of their force and
resources had been depleted in the conventional war against the Japanese, and even though they
continue to fight the CPC, some in the United States have begun to doubt the KMT's ability to contain
the Red onslaught. The Truman administration has expressed its reservations of having a Communist
government in China.
A similar confrontation between the Soviets and Americans emerged on the Korean peninsula upon the
expulsion of Japanese forces. At first, there was an Allied consensus to split the peninsula into four
occupied zones (much like was agreed in Germany). The situation on the ground, however, led to an
agreement between the Red Army and the US military in Seoul to split the territory in half along the
38th parallel. By 1947, the Soviets had extradited all Chinese and Japanese refugees from the north, and
established a base of operations in Pyongyang. Similarly, a US-backed military administration was
established in the south. This settlement, while in violation of the Cairo Accord of unification from
1943, has led to the emergence of separate republics in the north and south. The ideological split
between Seoul and Pyongyang is palpable, and both governments have received extensive military and
financial support from the Soviets and Americans. Although tensions along the 38th parallel have
become concerning, a fragile peace still exists on the peninsula. Many in the US Congress have called
for preemptive military action, though the Truman administration has expressed concern about a
confrontation with the Soviets.
3. Rules and Flow of Crisis
In order for this three-committee crisis to develop in an effective and engaging way, delegates should
be familiar with the guidelines set by the JCC staff. These rules establish ways by which delegates can
interact with each other, between committees, and with the crisis staff. They also include notes on
debate procedure and the flow of crisis. Chairs will be given the discretion to establish committee rules
as a supplement to these guidelines. Those will be available in the committee-specific guides.
Interactions between delegates inside Committee
Delegates are expected to be courteous and attentive when one or more of their peers have the floor.
Leaving the committee room for private discussions is discouraged but not prohibited, as debate and
crisis updates will move quickly. Delegates are allowed to pass notes among each other and to the dais,
but should be kept relevant to the simulation. To streamline note-passing, a page will be provided if
available, but delegates will be required to clearly mark their notes with “To” and “From” labels (If the
note is addressed to the dais but isn't an official interaction with crisis staff, the note should be labeled
“To: Chair” as opposed to “To: Crisis”). As per standard rules of procedure, delegates may also talk
with their peers during unmoderated caucuses and outside of sessions.
Interactions between Committees
The crises developed for this simulation are intended to prompt not only individual and unilateral
committee actions, but also to catalyze communication between delegates of different committees and
action between committees as a whole. In order to facilitate these interactions, delegates from different
committees will be allowed to pass Inter-Committee Notes among each other, so long as they are
relevant to the simulation. If a delegate wishes to send a note to a peer in another committee, he should
send it to the dais, clearly marked in the following manner:
Inter-Committee Note
From: Name, Committee
To: Name, Committee
Delegates may also request to meet in person with 2-5 peers from different committees outside of the
debate rooms. These Delegate Meet-Up Requests should be sent to the dais. Crisis staff will coordinate
a meeting time/place with the delegates who agree to convene, and will inform them of the decision.
There will be a crisis staffer proctoring and timing each meeting. All meetings will be limited to a
maximum of 5 minutes. These items should be marked as follows:
Delegate Meet-Up Request
To: Name, Committee (min 2, max 5)
From: Name, Committee
Re: Subject of Meeting
Finally, committees will able to communicate and request things of each other as a whole. Committeeto-committee interactions can happen in two ways: via an Inter-Committee Communique or an Inter-
Committee Directive. Both of these require a majority vote before being passed.
Inter-Committee Communiques are secret messages known only to members of the participating
committees, and will include a succinct statement of policy, a response to an earlier Inter-Committee
Communique, or a question about the other committee's activities or policy. Committees may vote to
not respond to an Inter- Committee Communique, but are encouraged to do so. Inter-Committee
Communiques should be labeled as follows:
Inter-Committee Communique
From: Committee (author names, vote tally)
To: Committee
Inter-Committee Directives are actionable documents which make use of committee portfolio powers
in a collaborative way. These directives must pass by majority vote in all the involved committees
before taking effect on the timeline of events. Inter-Committee Directives that take action outside of the
committee portfolio powers outlined in the committee-specific guides will be voided by the crisis staff.
These should be labeled as follows:
Inter-Committee Directive
Sponsor: Committee (author names, vote tally)
Approved by: Committee (vote tally)
Interactions with the Crisis Staff
The main way delegates and committees can influence the timeline of events during the simulation is
by interacting with the Crisis Staff. For the purposes of making the timeline as responsive and
participatory as possible, interactions with the staff will be limited to: Private Directives, Private
Communiques, Private Inquiries, Committee Communiques, Committee Directives, and Press
Releases/Conferences. A brief description of each is included below:
Private Directives are secret actionable items sent unilaterally from a delegate to Crisis. These items
will be considered by the staff only if they fall within the delegate's enumerated portfolio powers (see
committee-specific guides). They should be labeled as follows:
Private Directive
From: Name, Committee
To: Crisis
Private Communiques are secret messages sent from a delegate to a non-represented person or
organization. Crisis staff will respond as the non-represented actor. Private Communiques will usually
consist of a request for information or help. They should be labeled as follows:
Private Communique
From: Name, Committee
To: Non-Represented Actor via Crisis
Private Inquiries are messages sent from a delegate to the Crisis staff, and are reserved only for the
purposes of clarifying private portfolio powers, following up on previous Private Communiques or
Directives, and requesting relevant factual information/statistics. They should be labeled as follows:
Private Inquiry
From: Name, Committee
To: Crisis
Committee Communiques (not to be confused with Inter-Committee Communiques) are secret
messages crafted and voted upon by the committee and sent to a non-represented person or
organization. Crisis staff will respond as the non-represented actor. Committee Communiques will
usually consist of a request for information or help, or for an intercession in the timeline of events.
Chairs are allowed to add rules on the types of Communiques their committee can send. They must be
approved by a majority vote, and should be labeled as follows:
Committee Communique
From: Committee (author names, vote tally)
To: Non-Represented Actor via Crisis
Committee Directives (not to be confused with Inter-Committee Directives) are actionable items sent
unilaterally from a committee to Crisis. These items will be considered by the staff only if they fall
within the committee's enumerated portfolio powers (see committee-specific guides). Chairs are
allowed to add rules on the types of Directives their committee can send They must be approved by a
majority vote, and should be labeled as follows:
Committee Directive
Sponsors: Name(s), Committee (vote tally)
To: Crisis
Press Releases are statements made by a committee for public record, and for use and scrutiny by all
participants in the simulation. Quotes from press releases can appear in crisis updates, and as is the case
in the media, could be misinterpreted or misunderstood. Like Communiques and Directives, these items
can affect the timeline of events during the simulation. They must be passed by a majority vote, and
should be labeled as follows:
Press Release
Sponsor: Committee (author names, vote tally)
To: Crisis
If the crisis staff deems the Press Release of particular importance to the timeline of events, they may
choose to release the statement in the form of a Press Conference. The time and place for the press
conference will be arranged by the staff, and all members of the simulation will be invited to
participate. The authors of the Press release will have the chance to read the statement and take
questions from the audience.
Note on Debate Procedure
All three committees will broadly follow the WAMUNC Rules of Procedure. However, because of the
more intimate nature of the JCC and the unique structure of each committee, committee-specific rules
of procedure will be adopted at the discretion of the Chairs. To move events along, the crisis staff
encourages debate to occur largely inside moderated and unmoderated caucuses. In the cases of a press
conference, a special Crisis Update, or Sessions V and VI, the crisis staff reserves the right to craft
special rules of procedure for those events. Information on those rules will be provided on a case-bycase basis as the simulation develops throughout the conference.
Note about Crisis Updates
A mixture of pre-determined events, private and committee directives, and press releases will create a
unique crisis arc for this Red Scare simulation. In response to these inputs, the crisis staff will
frequently release Crisis Updates to certain people, committees, or for public record. Crisis Updates
could come in many forms – a note, a one-on-one meeting with a staffer, an acted scene inside or
outside the debate room, a newspaper/magazine story, a press conference, or an audio or video message
to name a few. These Crisis Updates are meant to direct debate , add new facets to relationships
between characters, and prompt the creation of new directives, communiques and press releases.
Although the staff has prepared extensively for several scenarios, the timeline of events and
culmination of the JCC will squarely depend on the creativity, writing, and negotiations of the
participating delegates.
Note on the flow of “Simulation Time”
The start date for the simulation is May 1948 – meaning everything that has happened in America and
the world up to that point is factual. Any events or circumstances ahead of May 1948 could arise in the
course of the simulation, but might have different causes or outcomes. Entirely fictional situations
could also arise. The simulation will extend from May 1948 until New Year's 1950 (twenty months),
but will not follow precise real-time parameters. The crisis staff may choose to speed up or slow down
time depending on the needs of the committees or the development of crisis in response to delegate
actions. Delegates will be periodically notified of the simulation date and state of world affairs, so as to
better inform their debate and negotiations.
Note on Procedures for Sessions V and VI
This joint crisis simulation will end with a confrontation of sorts between members from all three
committees. This culmination will occur during the last two sessions of the conference, and will
provide a sense of closure for the work done throughout the weekend. The three committees will meet
together during all of Session VI and at least part of Session V, and all delegates will have the chance to
participate in some form of debate. The nature and format of the sessions will depend entirely on the
events that unfold throughout the simulation and how the committees react to them. Possible examples
include, but are not limited to: subpoena hearings of alleged Communists and FBI informants in front
of HUAC, indictment and conviction of subversive operatives in a federal court trial, or arrests and
sentencing of anti-Communists by a People's Justice Council established in the wake of a leftist
revolution.
4. Outside Materials to Consider
In order to capture the essence of the era, learn about different perspectives, and gain a deeper
knowledge of the political climate during the Red Scare, we encourage all delegates to look at
audio/visual primary evidence in addition to conducting reading-based research. The following are
suggestions of where to start:
Movies related to the Red Scare:
Good Night, and Good Luck (2005)
Guilty by Suspicion (1991)
The Front (1976)
The Manchurian Candidate (1962)
Red Dawn (1984)
Useful YouTube Clips:
From Red Menace (1949)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dXO88iyOyK8
“Duck and Cover”
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IKqXu-5jw60
Red Scare propaganda
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OrGDVuMlGe8
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aMwbvIVh2EQ
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=saLwgBKJT7o
HUAC, Hollywood Blacklist Hearings
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ds2SDTFXIgM
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=saVnq3snkeI
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F7W3XbDZqO4
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EWLmfNEzaZo
Joseph McCarthy
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NziBMP7DDBw
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8iGGjGSdqf8
Edward Murrow on CBS “See it Now”
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e4LZsDqSSfk
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pJkJ6j0Z2Ro
5. Research and Bibliography
Fried, Albert (1997). McCarthyism, The Great American Red Scare: A Documentary History. Oxford University Press
Hakim, Joy (1995). War, Peace, and All That Jazz. New York, New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 29–33
Haynes, John Earl (2000). Red Scare or Red Menace?: American Communism and Anti Communism in the Cold War Era.
Ivan R. Dee
Haynes, John Earl and Klehr, Harvey (2000). Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America. Yale University Press
Levin, Murray B. (1971). Political Hysteria in America: The Democratic Capacity for Repression. Basic Books
Morgan, Ted (2004). Reds: McCarthyism in Twentieth-Century America. Random House
Powers, Richard Gid (1997). Not Without Honor: A History of American AntiCommunism. Free Press
Schrecker, Ellen (1998). Many Are the Crimes: McCarthyism in America. Little, Brown
Cuordileone, K.A. (September 2011). "The Torment of Secrecy: Reckoning With Communism and Anti-Communism After
Venona". Diplomatic History 35 (4): 615–642
Blum, William (1986). The CIA: A Forgotten History. London: Zed.
Cook, Bernard A (2001). Europe Since 1945: An Encyclopedia. Taylor & Francis.
Granville, Johanna (2004). The First Domino: International Decision Making during the Hungarian Crisis of 1956. Texas
A&M University Press.
Grenville, John Ashley Soames (2005). A History of the World from the 20th to the 21st Century. Routledge
Iatrides (ed), John O (1981). Greece in the 1940s: A Nation in Crisis. Hanover and London: University Press of New
England.
Jones, Howard (1989). A New Kind of War: America's global strategy and the Truman Doctrine in Greece. London: Oxford
University Press.
Laar, Mart, Tiina Ets, Tonu Parming (1992). War in the Woods: Estonia's Struggle for Survival, 1944-1956. Howells House
Männik, Mart (2008). A Tangled Web: British Spy in Estonia. Tallinn: Grenader Publishing
Martin, David (1990). The Web of Disinformation: Churchill's Yugoslav Blunder. San Diego: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich
Naimark, Norman M. (1995). The Russians in Germany; A History of the Soviet Zone of occupation, 1945-1949. Harvard
University Press
Peebles, Curtis (2005). Twilight Warriors. Naval Institute Press
Roberts, Geoffrey (2006). Stalin's Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939–1953. Yale University Press
Sayer, Ian & Douglas Botting (1989). America's Secret Army: The Story of Counter-intelligence Corps. London: Grafton.
Stevenson, William (1973). The Bormann Brotherhood. New York: Harcourt, Brace.
Wettig, Gerhard (2008). Stalin and the Cold War in Europe. Rowman & Littlefield
Wiesenthal, Simon (1984). SS Colonel Walter Rauff: The Church Connection 1943-1947. Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal
Center.