Download Leon Petrażycki - PLT - kropek135

Leon Petrażycki.doc
(53 KB) Pobierz
Olga Ceran (247364), II SSP
LEON PETRAŻYCKI AND HIS CONCEPT OF SOCIOLOGY OF LAW
Leon Petrażycki comes under the greatest Polish scientists from the turn of 19th and 20th century. The
influence of his work on the further development of knowledge, mostly on theory of law and sociology of law,
was appreciated not only in Poland or Europe, but also worldwide. Despite living in difficult and anxious times,
he left a rich legacy, including numerous books, articles and unpublished manuscripts. Moreover, they are still
discussed, argued and reviewed by many researchers and students.
Petrażycki was born in 1867 in a Polish family, in the area of Witebsk. He graduated from high school
in Witebsk and decided to study medicine in Kiev. Although, after 2 years he decided to relocate to the faculty
of law. After obtaining a degree, he continued his studies in Berlin, Heidelberg, Paris, Geneva and – probably
- London. His first extensive books, which attracted attention of the world of German lawyers and law
professors, were written in that period of time. Thanks to the aforementioned publications, he got a nickname
‘der genial Pole’. In 1897, in Petersburg, he got a PhD degree in law and a professorship in Faculty of Law’s
Philosophy’s History, one year after. After the February Revolution in Russia Petrażycki rejected job
propositions from universities in Oxford, Berlin or Riga. Instead, he decided to settle in Poland. In 1919, at the
University of Warsaw, he created the first Faculty of Sociology in Poland, which was led by him until the
suicidal death in 1931. The years spent in Poland were not very productive, since Petrażycki did not publish
his works by many reasons. They remained manuscripts and were mostly destroyed or lost during the Second
World War. Fortunately, many of his late ideas were preserved in lecture notes, taken by his students.
A theory constructed by Petrażycki was fiercely discussed, even in the interwar period. The main goal
of humanistic knowledge, including the theory of law, was creating methods, which would enable to
consciously form and achieve goals, appointed by authorities, in practice. Petrażycki proposed initiating studies
of emotional psychology, that was a part of humanities, and also a basis for knowledge about law and state.
Consequently, using the results, human beings would supposed to be able to knowingly impact on social
behavior of both individuals and social groups to make them act in a desired way. However, to understand the
essence of law and morality, motives that guide people’s action should be determined. Petrażycki abandoned a
traditional psychological division for cognition, feelings and will by extending it with one more category:
emotions, which are basic experiences for human beings and their behavior. His work was to formulate rules
of politics of law, defined as an ability to set targets in human’s development by legislating proper laws and
legal instruments. This huge challenge was meant to be accomplished with the usage of psychological rules.
As it was mentioned, Petrażycki redefined the traditional division for cognition, feelings and will, by
adding the new category – emotions. The original system was based on an assumption that cognition and
feelings are passive states, while will is the active one. Besides the distinction, Petrażycki did notice, that in
human’s life, there is one more kind of states to be observed, which connects characteristics of the passive and
the active ones. Those states were named by him “emotions”, in the precise understanding of their meaning.
Emotions were perceived by Petrażycki as the basic experiences, consisting of a passive sensation and an
activity at the same time. They also have a two-sided character and, consequently, appoint the criteria of
human’s behaviour – emotions decide how an individual behaves. The other psychological categories
(cognition, feelings, will) are also relevant, but only as circumstances forming an emotion. The emotion prevails
in psychic life of an individual and practically determines its decisions. This theory assumed that the emotion
can be both repulsive and inviting (‘apulsive’). The repulsive emotion is bounded with the thought of an action,
that is connoted with blame or even condemnation (e.g. a theft or a murder). On the other hand, the inviting
emotion is connected to an action, that is admirable (e.g. honesty, loyalty). Our connotations are, according to
Petrażycki, a result of a long historical development. In the past, humanity was harshly punished for all of its
reprehensible actions, just to consolidate the common conviction about its abnormality and harmfulness for
community (and vice-versa with the ‘good behavior’). The idea of ethical emotion is accordingly related to an
inception of the concept of inner imperative in man’s personality, understood as an order, conscience telling
people how to behave, even if it is against their individual interest and goals. Consequently, the theory of
emotions led Petrażycki to rejecting all of hedonistic and egoistic directions, which assume that people’s actions
are controlled by maximizing pleasures and minimizing unpleasantness.
To sum up, ethical emotions have an essential meaning for our decisions and actions and are also
characterized by a couple of statements, so world-shattering, that have real influence on our behavior as a
whole. The complex definition could explain that ethical emotions have basic character, can be both repulsive
or inviting, consist of our perception of certain action and, as a consequence, make human’s behavior an
obligation, a duty. This process is very important, because consciousness of the duty of our behavior is what
signalizes a certain level of culture of being, culture of action. Petrażycki perceived this as a ground to play our
roles in society and perpetuate proper attitudes as individuals.
When knowing what ‘ethical emotion’ is, we can move on to a more complex distinction and divide
ethical emotions into two groups: legal experiences and moral experiences. Legal experiences are bound with
consciousness of inseparable connection between rights and duties. One-sided fact, based e.g. just on rights,
cannot be seen as a legal experience. A result of legal experience, it is a thought responding to assumptions of
legal norm, where certain arrogation has to be conformed with certain obligation of another individual subjects.
Moral experiences, on the other hand, are based upon sense of duty. They are consequently one-sided
imperatives, understood as an order to fulfill specific duties according to definite subjects. Comparing these
two institutions: legal experience inspires us to take such an action in regard to others, which is adequate
response for our rights. In a category of moral experiences this type of motivation doesn’t exist. Active ethical
motivation of law is, as a result, distinct for one-sided ethical psyche of morality. It’s the consciousness of law,
what gives morality this kind of power, which allows people to act more reliably and predictably. And this is a
reason, why legal experiences have basic meaning for organization of human’s relationships.
Petrażycki gives an advantage to law according to morality, just because of its organizational aspects
in social life. Moral experiences don’t guarantee a required balance of actions and calculations, necessary in
individual’s and society’s life. The distinction for moral and legal experiences isn’t however constant and the
boundaries between them are moving around all the time. An experience treated as a moral one, can easily
become a legal one just by legislating such a norm. The boundary changes according to decisions of lawgiver,
which can implement something to or remove from a legal system. These considerations don’t mean that moral
experiences are irrelevant in our lives. They have a great meaning because they complete the legal system (legal
experiences) and create personality of a citizen, their catalogue of values – not necessarily or understandably
expressed in legal norms. Ethical, moral consciousness connected with legal emotions (obligations) make
human’s behavior something natural and ordinary.
The important thing is also that Petrażycki distinguishes theory of law from dogmatics of law. Theory
of law investigates law experiences (certain emotion responding to content of legal norm) while dogmatics of
law centres on validity of law in specific time and space. Interests of dogmatics are therefore narrower. Theory
of law should on the other hand strive for discovery of universal rights and truths, connected with legal
emotions, usage of law and people’s responses to legal norms. Petrażycki’s psychological theory of law, to do
so, makes a new distinction of legal experiences: positive legal experiences and intuitive legal experiences.
Positive legal experiences are based on psychological reactions of an individual, which are caused by norms of
written law. Another words, this is a consciousness of an individual connected with imposition of certain duties
created by valid positive law. Intuitive legal experiences also impose us some rules of behavior, but they rise
without any external circumstances or sources. A human being imagines automatically a catalogue of
obligations, that should be obeyed in certain situations. At the same time, it is fully conscious that there is no
imposition of acting this way and the source of these obligation is located in its images. The positive legal
experiences are in consequence more or less common for all people while intuitive legal experiences reply
personal impressions and level of culture and knowledge.
Distinction between positive and intuitive legal experiences does not mean, that these both categories
cannot remain in various relations. There could be three classic situations: 1) positive law is compatible with
intuitive law, 2) positive law outruns intuitive law, 3) intuitive law outruns positive law. Conscious politics of
law relies on an assumption that the most favorable situation is the compatibility of intuitive and positive law.
There is one more term bounded with the distinction between intuitive and positive legal experience –
justice. Petrażycki claimed that the term of justice functions in the sphere of intuitive law. In our minds, we
equalize justice and law – so it has to be investigated only in this sphere, directly connected with human’s inner
experiences. Justice is also a psychic experience, but included in a broader category of legal experiences. The
experience of justice is subjective and changeable, there are no universal schemes or patterns of justice.
Simplifying, every human being has its own concept of justice and it is impossible to create a universal one.
Regardless of this, experience of justice can be a reference point for positive law, because positive law is valued
by an individual from this perspective. Sense of justice in a society can both coax a lawmaker to make certain
decisions and cause resistance to valid laws. In both situations, the real source of these actions could be seen
in the intuitive legal experience of every individual, connected to the autonomous sense of justice.
Considering theoretical constructions, we cannot forget that, for Petrażycki, the main goal was to
create methods ready to put into practice. Politics of law, according to Petrażycki, was supposed to be a
possibility of scientific anticipation in human’s reaction to legislating certain legal norm. This ability will make
guidance of social processes more efficient and enable to reach appointed goals. Lawmaker should legislate
only such legal norms that lead to desired results, replying to requirements of civilization and social progress
(understood not only as a material enrichment, but also a moral and ethical development of an individual and
a society). Smart politics of law accelerates moral progress and is ‘a teacher’ for younger generations. Pursuant
to this concept, wrong assumptions can make huge damages in the attitude of whole society. Petrażycki also
realizes that human’s psyche is evolving and developing all the time, therefore politics of law cannot base on
constant schemes. It should be dynamic, elastic and appoint actual goals, which reply to abilities of individuals
and social groups in the moment. Regarding to this, the analyses of human’s actions ensures coherent behavior
of whole social groups.
It is also important to mention that Petrażycki did not define law as ‘rights and obligations protected
by state apparatus’. Law is above state and it is wrong to assume that law comes from behind, and rights and
duties are imposed for people. Legal experiences exists regardless of state or any other political or social
organization, giving orders and imposing obedience. The conviction about certain rights and obligations could
come into existence without government. Petrażycki claimed that law itself had almost nothing in common
with state, because only a little part of it exists as an official, positive law, so it cannot be defined by invoking
to some power. State power is only one of many sources of law. There are state authorities, religious authorities,
an authority of parents and many authorities of people playing their roles (at work, at home, etc.) in the society.
Every relation, even the most egalitarian one, is based on a complicated system of rights and duties.
The concept of Petrażycki was later contemplated as very original. Many other researchers indicated
value of his psychological analysis of legal and moral emotions, meaning of his politics of law and importance
of the distinction between positive and intuitive law. As an advantage of Petrażycki’s theory was also seen the
fact, that Petrażycki understood law not only as a specific experience, but also as an important element of
human’s culture. To the listeners of Petrażycki, especially in Sankt Petersburg, belonged a lot of future scholars,
who was well-known in the Western world of science – e.g. Pitrim A. Sorokin, Georges Gurvitch, Nicholas S.
Timasheff and Max M. Laserson. They all had always seen Petrażycki as an extraordinary mind and respected
him very much.
Also in Poland was Petrażycki noticed and admired. His works occurred in polish magazines for the
first time during his career in Russia. After moving to Poland, Petrażycki’s works were still appreciated, but
also criticized – as too liberal in the times of raising totalitarianisms. However, under the influence of Petrażycki
were formed Polish sociology of law and philosophy of law. Additionally, he was a main power that led to
distinguishing sociology in Polish academic tradition. Soon after his death, his listeners decided to found
Association of Leon Petrażycki to honor and protect his work. Unfortunately, this mission was interrupted by
the World War II and – later – the whole strand was forbidden as incompatible with the official doctrine of
Marxism-Leninism. However, thanks to efforts of many people, Petrażycki’s work survived and he started to
be treated as a classic researcher who has to be mentioned in discussions about law and social problems. The
main aspects of his idea remain actual today. Nobody dares to question the usefulness of the term ‘emotion’,
its characterization or historical and sociological genesis of human’s experiences. He is considered to be one
of the most important forerunners of the sociology of law. Full valuation of Petrażycki’s work remains,
however, very difficult considering the fact that many of his manuscripts were lost, destroyed or wasn’t yet
translated for wider multitude of scholars.
***
Bibliography:
1. Henryk Olszewski, Krystyna Chojnicka “Historia doktryn politycznych i prawnych”
2. Marek Maciejewski, Janina Kundera „Leksykon myślicieli politycznych i prawnych”
3. Andrzej Sylwestrzak „Historia myśli politycznej i prawnej”
4. Marcin Kik „Leona Petrażyckiego filozofia prawa”, Czasopismo Filozoficzne (nr 1, wrzesień 2006)
5. Andrzej Kojder „Idee społeczno-prawne Leona Petrażyckiego i ich współczesne kontynuacje” (z
opracowania „Klasyczna socjologia polska i jej współczesna recepcja” pod redakcją Janusza Muchy i
Włodzimierza Wincławskiego, 2005, Wydawnictwo Naukowe UMK)
Plik z chomika:
kropek135
Inne pliki z tego folderu:


65. Revolution in A. de Tocqueville_s perspective.docx (29 KB)
 ADAM SMITH v2.doc (50 KB)
Alexis de Tocqueville on freedom and democracy - Anna Celuch SSP II.docx (31 KB)
 American revolution.docx (23 KB)
 Ancient philosophers - critics of Athenian democracy.docx (15 KB)
Inne foldery tego chomika:
Zgłoś jeśli naruszono regulamin







Strona główna
Aktualności
Kontakt
Dla Mediów
Dział Pomocy
Opinie
Program partnerski




Regulamin serwisu
Polityka prywatności
Ochrona praw autorskich
Platforma wydawców
Copyright © 2012 Chomikuj.pl