Download THE BRITISH ROLE IS? THE SECOND COALITION AGAINST

THE BRITISH ROLE IS? THE SECOND COALITION
AGAINST FRANCE 1797 - 1802
by
Joan Gilmore Thomasson
A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
In the Graduate College
THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA
1 9 66
.
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PREFACE
In this brief account of the participation of the British in the
Second Coalition against France, I have stressed the English foreign
relations with the monarchies of Austria, Prussia, and Russia.
Little
mention has been made of the position played by the British in Naples,
despite extensive use of the letters of Sir Arthur Paget, the English
minister at that Court, nor has more than a brief reference to Napoleon’s
Egyptian Campaign been included.
Further, in an attempt to limit the
span of the paper, no reference has been made to the greatest domestic
problem faced by the government of William Pitt at this time - the Union
with Ireland.
In spite of these omissions, I hope to have presented an
accurate picture of the coalition in action and to have given the impres­
sion that the alliance was destroyed by its own internal jealousies and
dissentions as much as by the growing strength of the French Consulate.
I would especially like to thank Dr. Donald Lammers for the
extensive time he devoted to the reading and correction of the several
versions of this thesis and both Dr. Lammers and Dr. Robert Vignery for
their many helpful suggestions.
J.G.T,
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Chapter I
Britain and the European Setting in 1
7
9
7
„
1
Chapter II
The Formation of the Second Coalition against the French......
13
Chapter III
The Military and Diplomatic Successes and Reversals of the
Campaigns of 1799 .........
26
Chapter IV
The Dissolution of the Coalition.
40
.....
Chapter V
The End of the War and Treaty of Amiens......................
58
Appendix
The Treaty of Amiens
70
.........
iv
ABSTRACT
The aim of this paper is to explore the British diplomatic and
military involvement in the Second Coalition against the French Directory
and, after 1799, the Consulate.
First the positions of Austria, Prussia,
Russia and Great Britain after the disastrous first anti-French coalition
are considered.
The struggle of the English to form a new coalition in
the face of a threatened invasion by the Republican forces was hampered
by an Anglo-Austrian financial dispute and the bitter mutual distrust of
Prussians and Austrians.
Further French aggressions in Switzerland, the
Netherlands, and Italy presented a threat to the interests of all of the
future coalition members and forced them into first a defensive and later
an offensive alliance.
In the beginning the British-subsidized coalition
made rapid gains and seemed likely to defeat the French.
However,
internal dissention led by jealousies and misinformation soon estranged
the Allies just as France was strengthened by a new administration.
The
Russians withdrew from the coalition after several incidents of poor
treatment from the British and Austrians alike. Austria was thoroughly
defeated by the consular armies, and Britain, alone, negotiated the
Treaty of Amiens with Napoleon.
The attempt has been made to present
all of these events from the viewpoint of English motives and activities;
it has been based primarily upon the correspondence of lord William
Grenville, Foreign Minister of the Pitt administration.
v
BRITAIN AND THE EUROPEAN SETTING, 1797-98 1
When Girondist firebrands agitated in the National Assembly for
a war against all tyrants, Europe was suddenly stunned by the spectre
of the French Revolution militant.
The execution of Louis XVI in January
of 1793 made republican France an outcast among the monarchies of Europe,
and the war against tyrants soon became a desperate straggle of a regi­
cide nation for self preservation.
Revolutionary enthusiasm, now
transformed into aggressive patriotism, enabled the French to halt the
Allied invasions of 1792-93, regain the initiative, and turn the war
again from a defensive struggle into one of republican conquest.
Great
Britain, Austria, Prussia, Holland, Sardinia, and Spain had formed a
loose coalition because they felt menaced by the threat of further French
expansion on the Continent.
Their efforts proved ill-planned and irres­
olute, and were doomed to failure.
By 1795, all of the Allied governments
had sued the vistorious French for peace.
At this time the Allies were prepared to grant moderate French
annexations, for Austria, Prussia, and Russia had all profited terri­
torially by the recent Polish partitions of 1772 and 1793.
In April 1795,
Frederick William II of Prussia made peace with France on terms which
1. The basic sources for this chapter are: William Cobbett,
The Parliamentary History of England from the Earliest Times to 1803
(36 vols; London:; -T.C. Hansard, 1808); and The Report of the British
Manuscripts.Commission: The Manuscripts of J. B, Fortescue preserved at
Dropmore Castle (10 vols; London; Her Majesty's Stationary Office,
1892) (Referred to hereafter as the Dropmore Papers) .
1
saved northern Germany from the ravages of war, but surrendered the
Netherlands and the left bank of the Rhine to the French Republic.
Hol­
land, conquered and reconstructed as the Batavian Republic, submitted in
May, as did Russia, temporarily immersed in the consolidation of her
Polish provinces.
Austria had struggled on for two additional years with the help
of loans supplied by William Pitt's government, which was naively confi­
dent that financial ruin would soon force France to sue for peace.
Instead, British credit collapsed in the winter of 1796-97.
By February
of 1797, the drain of the war forced the Bank of England to suspend cash
payments and to place credit payments on a paper basis.
Austria, beaten
in the field and unable to pay her troops without British subsidies,
accepted Napoleon's terms when negotiations were held at Leoben.
The
final Treaty of Campo Formio gave Venetia to Austria in exchange for a
secret agreement that France should occupy the left bank of the Rhine.
The British government, now isolated and dissatisfied with
Austria's conduct, sent Lord Malmesbury to Lille to negotiate a treaty
with the victorious Directory.
England's control of the seas, her
colonial strength, and her commercial power seemed likely to offset the
French victories on the Continent, and the much desired peace, based on
mutual concessions, seemed imminent.
During the conferences, however, a
coup d'etat in Paris placed the French government in the hands of a small
ruling Jacobin group which owed its supremacy to the strength of the army,
which was living on the plunder of foreign conquests.
The Directors
terminated the negotiations at Lille by presenting extravagant demands.
The war with France had left the British government in a danger­
ous position, compounded of military defeats, an enormous debt, political
isolation and popular discontent.
The year 1795 marked the beginning of
a long period of monetary difficulty.
With the extensive debt left by
the war and the need to maintain a large navy and army until peace could
be arranged, the Prime Minister, William Pitt, was forced to invent new
measures to provide the necessary capital.
Meanwhile, even though trade
was flourishing, bad harvests had caused a scarcity of grain.
1797, wheat cost 108 s a quarter.
In August
On the opening of Parliament the same
'
'• '
2
year, the King was greeted by cries of "Bread” , "Peace” , and "No Pitt,"
Fearful of civil rioting, the Cabinet extended the law of treason and
introduced the Sedition Bill.
The budget of 1797 was least controversial at best.
Pitt arranged
for a new loan through the Bank of England to cover immediate government
expenses.
Taxes were trebled, and the Prime Minister planned to diffuse
the additional taxes needed as extensively as possible on a graduated
basis, excluding those least able to pay.
This left heavy taxes on
approximately 700,000 to 800,000 householders and heads of families.
In
addition, new duties were laid on tobacco, carriages and horses, and an
income tax was proposed.
Despite these drastic proposals the budget
showed a deficit of L 2 2 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,
The revenue measures were highly un­
popular, and civil unrest was evident all over Britain.
The Ministry also encountered political opposition in Parliament.
The New Whigs, headed by Charles James Fox and Richard Sheridan, were
2.
Parliamentary History, XXXI, 1313.
pressing a campaign for parliamentary reform.
They urged that a new
ministry be formed that would end the Continental war, reestablish sound
fiscal policies at home, and enlarge the franchise.
Demands for peace and
reform also came from radical clubs and great mass meetings.
The Old
Whigs, under the Duke of Portland, Burke, and William Wyndham, fearful of
the possible results of widespread liberal reforms, reinforced Pitt's
majority and voted repressive measures to put down the agitation.
While the internal situation in Britain looked menacing, Pitt and
3
his Foreign Minister, Lord William Grenville,
realized that the British
recovery depended upon the security of knowing that the revolutionary
doctrines of France were contained within her own boundaries.
The terri­
torial expansion of the French Republic already threatened British
commercial interests in Holland.
Therefore in late 1797, Lord Grenville
began making discret inquiries among the Continental powers in the search
for potential allies.
-
Frederick William II of Prussia, whom the British never forgave
for selling out the First Coalition, died in October of 1797, and Pitt
and Grenville hoped that his heir, Frederick William III, could be pert
suaded to join Great Britain in a new war against France. The new king's
wife, a princess of Mecklinburg-Strelitz, was the niece of Britain's
Queen Charlotte, and Frederick William had always listened with deference
to the Duke of Brunswick, brother-in-law of George III.
Pitt, Grenville,
and George III all believed that if the Duke could be persuaded to exert
3.
William Wyndham Grenville (1759-1834) was the nephew of the
Whig leader William Wyndham and a cousin of Pitt. He possessed a great
deal of experience in the area of foreign policy and served as Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs from 1791 to 1801, when Pitt's ministry
resigned.
. ,
his influence, Count Haugwitz, the Prussian minister who headed the peace
party and who had negotiated the Treaty of Basle with France, could be
overthrown.
Then, perhaps, the young king would become the chief instru­
ment in forming a quadruple alliance of Austria, Prussia, Russia, and
Britain.
In November of 1797, M.de Luc, a prominent Swiss diplomat in
British service, was sent to consult with the Duke of Brunswick and
enlist his assistance.^
The Duke of Brunswick, while a man of unusual abilities in war
and politics, was a timid negotiator.
He wanted to retain George's good
favor, yet he saw the risks and problems of this plan quite clearly.
Reports to the British ministry from Hanoverian envoys at the Court of
Berlin told of the Duke's timidity and dispelled British hopes of his
favorable influence on Frederick William III.
The Duke himself reported
to George III that the conditions which had caused the late king to sign
the Treaty of Basle still existed;
the treasury was empty;
there was
mutual hatred and distrust between Austria and Prussia which all but
prohibited effective cooperation between the two;
there was discontent
in the recently annexed Polish provinces which could flare into revolt
momentarily;
and finally, a British alliance would be unpopular in
Prussia where the ruling class felt that British failure to make terms
with France was due to selfish motives.
As France controlled the Rhine,
all her forces could easily be directed at Prussia before the Prussians
could mobilize.
The Prussians believed that their own interests could
best be served by the conclusion of peace with France on the terms agreed
4.
IV, 8.
A detailed account is to be found in the Dropmore Papers,
to at Rastadt.
Haugwitz told Brunswick that he felt it impossible to
break the Treaty of Basle so long as France observed it faithfully.
He
was anxious to end Prussian isolation, however, and agreed to a defensive
treaty.
If the rumored plans of the French Directory to occupy Hanover
and Hamburg were attempted, Prussia would resist this violation of neu­
trality to the utmost.
The British Ministry had to be satisfied tempo­
rarily with this answer. Now British efforts in the search for allies
shifted to St. Petersburg and Vienna.
Meanwhile, disputes had broken out at the Congress of Rastadt
between Austria and Prussia.
This conference had been called to estab­
lish compensation for the princes who were dispossessed by French
annexation of the left bank of the Rhine.
France proposed that the
Prince of Orange, also dispossessed by French conquests, be compensated
by the secularization of ecclesiastical lands in the Germanies.
Austria
violently protested confiscation of Church property and insisted that if
the Prince of Orange were given indemnity in Germany for losses in
Holland, then the Austrian Archduke, the Duke of Modena, was equally
entitled to receive similar compensation for his losses in Italy.
Des­
pite his realization of the dangers further French aggressions would
pose to continental Europe, this latest Austrian demand convinced
Frederick William III as proof of the impossibility of an Austro-Prussian
alliance.
At the end of March, 1798, De Luc returned to London to report
the deadlock to George III.**
The British search for allies was hurriedly intensified in the
spring of 1798, when France invaded Switzerland and, after a prolonged
5.
M.deLuc to George III, April 4, 1798.
Ibid. IV, 160.
struggle, succeeded in abolishing its ancient constitution and substi­
tuted another of the latest Parisian pattern.
With the support of a
second French army, a democratic system was likewise established in
Holland." A third army entered Rome, interned the Pope in a French
prison, and converted the Ecclesiastical States into the Roman Republic.
Austria watched the balance of power, so lately established at Campo
Formio, being violently overthrown to her disadvantage.
The King of
Naples and Grand Duke of Tuscany, close relatives of the Austrian
Emperor, appealed to Vienna for protection.
Baron Thugut, Imperial Chancellor and Minister of Foreign
Affairs for Austria, was a bitter enemy of the French Revolution and
the Treaty of Campo Formio. He had remained in office only at the
urgent request of Emperor Francis II, expecting to renew the war in
more propitious times.
The provocation from France came, however,
before conditions in Austria had improved appreciably.
The resources
of the treasury had long been exhausted, and Austria's relations with
Great Britain, the only power able to supply any monetary assistance,
were strained to the breaking point.
The British were considering the
withdrawal of their minister from Vienna in February of 1798, due to
Austria's attempted concealment of certain articles in Austria's recent
treaties with France, which were believed to be prejudicial to British
interests.
In addition, Austria had failed to fulfill a prior financial
agreement with the English.
In 1796, Pitt's government had advanced
L 1,600,000 to Vienna on the understanding that it was to be repaid by
an Austrian loan raised in London.
British public credit fell to a low
point during the winter of 1796-97, while Britain's own needs were so
demanding that Pitt could not raise the repayment loan.
By May, Britain's
financial situation had been improved considerably by an increase in trade
and the government's emergency tax measures, and a financial convention
was made, which Count Starhemberg signed for Austria, but the Austrian
government stubbornly refused to ratify the convention for fear of excit­
ing the French; in addition, Baron Thugut believed there was a chance of
raising the repayment funds on easier terms in the Germanics. Austria
now faced an additional problem.
She had allowed the interest on a
L 4,600,000 British loan made in 1795 to fall into arrears.
In April, Thugut wrote to Grenville stating that Austria declined
direct discussion with Prussia concerning the difficulties encountered at
Rastadt, and that he would refer all disputes to Czar Paul for mediation.
Thugut and Francis II both felt that the aggression of the Directory
could be halted only by a superior force.
They suggested that Britain
and Austria come to an understanding on certain points and form the basis
for a quadruple alliance which would later be proposed to Czar Paul and
the King of Prussia.
However, Austria needed a British guarantee of
financial subsidy, not a loan, in a liberal amount for the preparation of
i .
her forces and the aid had to be continued through 1799. The Emperor also
pleaded for the dispatch of a British fleet to the Mediterranean to pro­
tect the King of Naples.
Pitt and Grenville eagerly welcomed the idea of a new coalition
and promised to send a fleet to the Mediterranean if the Neapolitan ports
would be open to it.
They declined to discuss the subsidy until the
Emperor had ratified the Convention of 1797, thus recognizing Austria's
previous debts, and declared that British confidence could be restored
only if Austria disclosed the secret articles of Campo Formio.
9
The diplomatic deadlock was quickly broken when a Viennese mob
pulled
down the French tricolor during an attack on the embassy.
General
Bernadette, the French Minister in Austria, was forced to flee the
country.
Thugut, now certain that war with France was imminent, sent
M.
Ransonet to London to arrange payment for the arrears on the interest
of
the 1795 Austrian loan, but he refused to ratify the financial conven­
tion until Britain named the amount of the subsidy she would pay.**
He
feared to provoke the French further without being positive of possessing
adequate means of resistance, and he also felt that Britain might demand
the right to control the deployment of the Austrian troops, a concession
the imperial Government was quite unwilling to make.
Meanwhile, the British leaders had successfully persuaded the
Prince of Orange to renounce his claims for compensation for his Dutch
losses.
M. de Luc returned to Brunswick to announce to Prussia and
Austria that many of the independent princes in the Germanies had agreed
to a personal meeting and to invite the ministers of the great monarchial
powers to convene in Berlin to discuss a defensive alliance.
Czar Paul of Russia ruled the fourth of the monarchial powers
which was to be involved in hostilities with Republican France.
He had
no material interests to serve by waging war against the French, but in
his romantically oriented mind, he coveted the glory of being universally
acclaimed as the champion of conservative principles and the savior of
Europe.
Paul yielded now to the appeals from Francis II and George III,
sparing no efforts to bring Frederick William III into the coalition.
He also attempted to strengthen the alliance by reconciling the British
and Austrian governments.
6.
Baron Thugut to Grenville, undated. Ibid., IV, 250.
10
The loose coalition which faced France gave little promise of a
long life.
Frederick William proved hesitant to commit Prussia at all,
preferring to remain neutral.
Austria realized the great need to join
the coalition, but would be unable to do so without a promised British
subsidy, as the Austrian treasury could not support her own armies.
The
British, who were urging the entire project, were already annoyed with
Vienna due to Thugut’s attitude concerning the repayment of past loans.
Parliament would almost certainly require some guarantee that any addi­
tional financial grants would be used along lines that coincided with
British policy and that Britain would be able to exercise some control
over the deployment of the Imperial troops.
This condition Francis II
had already refused.
The situation in France in 1797 under the Directory seemed to
favor even this weak coalition, however.
The country was submerged in
almost hopeless bankruptcy, originating partially from two fiscal innova­
tions of the National Assembly:
abolition of indirect internal taxation
(which had constituted one-third of the revenue for the French monarchy)
and the transfer of the assessments of direct taxation to local author­
ities, who often neglected the thankless duty.
The gap between the
public revenue and expenditures was covered by enormous emissions of
assignats, which swamped the money market and fell rapidly in value as
a medium of exchange.
Under the dictatorship of the Committee of Public
Safety all of the difficulties were overcome by placing the entire popu­
lation and all property of France under requisition for the public
safety (1794-95).
Popular reaction after the death of Robespierre caused
the wholesale confiscation policy to be abandoned.
The new Directory
11
resorted to additional issues of paper money, and, when these lost value,
repudiated the national debt.
During 1798, all of the taxation proceeds
and resources of public credit together did not suffice to provide half
the funds necessary for public expenditures. Army contractors, public
functionaries, and other creditors were either not paid at all or paid
only by "bills of arrears" to be held until money came into the treasury
or exchanged for unsold government-held lands.
A progressive, forced
loan designed by the Directory to stop speculation in government cur­
rency failed in its object and swelled the public clamor.
The armies,
unpaid, ill-fed, and unsupplied with winter gear and sufficient muni­
tions, could hardly be held together.
Reinforcements, which were sup­
plied by conscription, abandoned their colors almost immediately and
covered the roads as beggars.
The government lived from hand to mouth
as best it could.^
Thus 1797-98 saw Great Britain, still weakened financially and
militarily from the unsuccessful struggles of the first coalition,
seeking a defensive alliance with Prussia, Austria, and Russia.
Unfor­
tunately the Prussians were reluctant to break their treaties with
France, and the Austrians, although anxious to join England, desperately
needed financial subsidies to participate.
Russia under Czar Paul I
was the only power to ally itself with the British unconditionally.
The
French Republic which was to face this loose alliance seemed to offer
an immediate threat to their security, and the monarchies soon began to
7.
This summary is based on comments in Thiers' Consulate and
Empire translated by P. Lanfrey (12 vols. London. 1893-94). Although
this account is essentially true, Thiers often exaggerated the hopeless­
ness of the pre-Napoleonic decade to emphasize the improvements brought
by the accession of his hero to power.
search for a defensive alliance guaranteeing their mutual boundaries.
Within weeks, further French aggressions in Switzerland, the Netherlands,
and Italy would prompt them to seek an offensive alliance as well.
THE FORMATION OF THE ALLIANCE AGAINST FRANCE 1
When the Conference of Four Powers opened in 1798, Great Britain
had not yet settled her dispute with Austria.
Vienna had found it neces­
sary to avoid a war which she could not support financially and therefore
had conceded most of the demands the French had made in reprisal for the
mob attack on their embassy.
Top Austrian diplomats were sent to nego­
tiate the details of these concessions at Rastadt.
The Directory's
representatives at the Conference made further demands that were totally
unexpected.
They demanded all of the islands of the Rhine, control of
commerce along the river, the possession of Cassel and Kehl on the right
bank, and destruction of the fortresses along the German banks.
The
Prussians were now violently alarmed and thoroughly surprised when
Austria, intent on avoiding war at all costs, refused to protest.
The
Prussians believed that French demands endangered Northern Germany, and
Frederick William III began to consider yielding to British pressure
and joining the coalition.
In Britain during April of 1798, Henry Dundas, the Minister of
War, was hurriedly organizing the nation’s forces to repel a threatened
invasion from France.
In a message to Parliament on April 20, 1798, the
King reported that "preparations for the embarkation of troops and war­
like stores were being carried out with considerable activity in the
1. The basic sources for this chapter are: Dropmore Papers,
volume IV, Cpbbett’s Parliamentary History, volume XXXIII, and the
English,Historical Documents, edited by A. Aspinal and E. Anthony Smith,
(12 vols; New York: , Oxford University Press, 1955), XI.
13
14
ports of France, Flanders, and Holland with the avowed design of attempt­
ing invasion of his majesty's domains.”
He advised full use of the
*
o
volunteer and professional forces of the nation for defense.
Lord
Grenville and Pitt both urged the support of national defense, while
Arthur Young wrote fiery, patriotic pamphlets declaring that though "the
navy could become the sport of tempests, and the regular troops may be
defeated, England will never be overrun for every man that has a horse
is part of a corps of cavalry, and her infantry is as numerous as her
population."
In a lighter vein, Young estimated that "if propriety
would allow, enough fox-hunting parsons could be raised to form many
an active corps.
The great invasion never came; in February Napoleon, who was to
command the attacking forces, reported to the Directory, "Make what
effort we will, we shall not for many years gain naval supremacy.
To
make a descent on England without being master of the sea is the boldest
and most difficult task imaginable."^
The French general then turned
his full attention to preparations of the magnificent scheme for the
conquest of the East - the Egyptian Campaign.
Pitt wrote to Lord Grenville early in June announcing the French
fleet's departure from Toulon on May 19, in the evident belief that it
had sailed for Ireland.
The next word of the whereabouts of the French
fleet arrived with the news of the capitulation of Malta.
From French
'2. The King's Message to Parliament, Cobbett's Parliamentary
History, XXXIII, 1421.
3„. Arthur Young, "National Danger and the Means of Safety",
English Historical Documents, XI, 73.
4.
Quoted in General J.FeC e Fuller, Military History of the
Western World, (2 vols; New York; Funk and Wagnalls, 1955), 11, 372.
15
accounts, it is clear that the Grand Master, Ferdinand de Hompesch
betrayed his Order to the French for a large bribe.
The fortress of La
Valleta was so strong that General Caffarelli, commander of the French
artillery, declared upon entering, "How lucky for us that we had a
friend inside to open th.6 gites.
The British fleet was greatly impeded in the pursuit of the
French as it lacked access to a friendly port in the Mediterranean and
could not secure needed supplies and repairs.
Those ports not actually
in French hands were usually being threatened by that Republic with
reprisals if they allowed the British to dock.
The Anglo-Austrian agree­
ment to grant Naples protection produced favorable results later in June,
when the Queen of Naples promised covert help.**
Soon thereafter, a
defensive treaty was signed between Austria and the King of Naples,
further encouraging the opening of Neapolitan ports to Britain in defi­
ance of the French.
While the Conference of Four Powers assembled, the French leaders
took counsel among themselves.
Though they realised that the Four Powers
were still divided among themselves and distrustful of one another,
France was unable to capitalize upon the situation.
The Republic was
still close to bankruptcy, and her recent aggressions in Switzerland and
Italy had left her disorganized.
were scattered;
Her victorious armies and great generals
>
Napoleon was in Egypt5 Hocke was dead; Pichegru -was in
exile, and Moreau had been deprived of command for failing to expose
5. Lord Kieth enclosed this account in a letter to Lord Grenville,
undated. Dropmore Papers, IV.
6 , Caroline of Naples to Lady Hamilton, forwarded to Grenville,
June 18, 1798. Ibid, IV, 237.
16
Pichegru's treason.
The vacancies had temporarily been filled by inferior
officers who plundered the occupied countries without mercy, embezzled
military funds, and often left their troops without needed supplies to
forage as they could.
The Directory had passed conscription laws to
fill the vacancies in the ranks, making every French man between 20 and
25 years of age liable for service in the army or navy.
The 20,000
troops who were recruited could not be trained, armed, and equipped for
several months.
To calm the ruffled nerves of her neighbors and thus
gain valuable time, the French ministers at Rastadt were ordered to with­
draw the harsh demands on the Germanies which had so angered Prussia.
In July, Czar Paul, infuriated by the expulsion from Malta of the
Order of the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem, of which he was the selfstyled protector, instructed Count Woronzow, his London ambassador, to
begin negotiations with the British government for an offensive treaty.
Pitt in a letter to Grenville welcomed the proposals and stated Britain's
terms:
"On the condition of Russia furnishing an army of 60,000 men, we
should engage to pay L 300,000 preparation money on the ratification, or
if necessary, the signature of the treaty; and afterwards L 100,000 per
month, with the power of discontinuing payment on a notice and advance
of two months; and should also pay after the war, as a debt, a further
sum to be computed at the rate of L 50,000 per month for the time the
treaty shall be acted upon."^
Doubts subsequently arose in Pitt's mind as to whether a return to
the system of subsidizing foreign powers would be tolerated in Britain.&
Richard Sheridan, usually an eloquent critic of the Administration, sided
T,
8,
Pitt to Grenville, August 16, 1798. Ibid, IV, 283.
Pitt to Dundas, August 19, 1798. Ibid. IV,,284.
17
with the government in the subsidy case arguing that while the nation was
threatened by invasion from France or Ireland a national emergency re­
quired the support of all British subjects.
When the situation eased,
however, he returned to his stand that the French had a right to choose
their own form of internal government and to express their views on
government freely.
A war fought only to restore the French monarchy
should be opposed by all in his estimation.
The majority in Parliament
supported the Prime Minister, agreeing that this was an emergency situa­
tion, but the debates on foreign subsidies grew longer and stormier with
each such proposal.
In the end Grenville's foreign subsidy policy pre­
vailed until it met with an unexpected obstacle in St. Petersburg.
Austria had sent Count Cobentzl to Russia with a request for
Czar Paul's mediation in two matters essential in Austria's plans:
first,
to prevail upon Frederick William of Prussia to guarantee the neutrality
of the German states, thus leaving Austria free to prepare for action in
Italy and Switzerland; secondly, to obtain a promise of adequate subsidy
from England before the ratification of the Convention of May 1797.
In
a letter on August 30, Paul instructed Count Woronzow to offer his mediai
.
■
tion between Austria and Britain so that the two might resolve their
i
Q
quarrel and present a united front against their mutual enemy.
Grenville
explained to the Czar that Pitt could spare only L 2,000,000 for foreign
subsidies during the next year, of which L 200,000 went to Portugal,
L 500,000 to the free Swiss cantons, and L 100,000 per month went to
Russia.
This was the entire amount Parliament would grant.
Britain felt
that by maintaining the Mediterranean fleet at a cost of L 1:,500,000 both
9.
Paul I to Count Woronzow, August 30, 1798? Ibid, IV, 246.
18
Austria and Naples would be materially aided.
Pitt and Grenville realized
that Parliament would hardly subsidize Austria while she failed to dis­
charge her prior financial obligations.
They assured Paul that if he
could convince the Emperor to ratify the Convention of 1797, Britain
would enter into an alliance covering military operations in Switzerland,
naval operations in the Mediterranean, and modes of deploying the sub­
sidized Russian armies.
The Czar was furious at this answer, especially as it was evident
that the British economy was recovering its elasticity and could probably
provide the additional subsidy demanded with little effort.
Finally,
however. Count Woronzow was able to convince Paul that the British Par­
liament made and broke ministries at will and would not permit any deal­
ings with Vienna until the old engagements were fulfilled.
Lord
Loughborough’s description of the problem further reassured Paul of the
British position:
11
The obstinacy of the Court of Vienna seems so perfectly irratioiial as well as unjust, that I strongly suggest that either Monsieur
Thugut has misunderstood or.Sir Morton Eden has ill explained the
object of his instructions to insist on the ratification of the
Convention of May, 1797. M. Thugut stated that his Imperial
Majesty's finances were in such a state as to permit no idea of
fulfilling at present the engagement of that convention....all
this seems to imply that the ratification was to be followed up
by an immediate repayment of the money due according to that con­
vention. Our idea, I think, was only to require an avowal of the
engagement in form, but to give every reasonable allowance for
the pecuniary difficulties of Austria and forebear insisting on
immediate payment.
*
While the Anglo-Austrian quarrel was doomed to remain unsettled tempo­
rarily, the Czar was assured that the British Ministry Was not deliber­
ately antagonizing the Austrians.
10.
11.
335.
Lord Grenville to Count Woronzow, August, 1798, Ibid, IV; 297.
Lord Loughborough to William Pitt, October 5, 1798„ Ibid, iv
19
In late August of 1798, word arrived in London of Napoleon's
landing in Egypt,
The Turkish Porte declared war against France early
in September, and Gzar Paul sent a fleet and army to the Sultan’s assist­
ance.
Lord Grenville immediately dispatched Sir Sidney Smith and Colonel
Koehler, both of whom had served with distinction in the East, to help
the Turks on sea and land.
The news of Admiral Nelson's victory at Aboukir Bay on August 1,
1798, which cut Bonaparte’s Egyptian army off from a route of retreat
and also from supplies from France, began to encourage the resistance of
countries overrun by the French armies,
The Maltese rose against the
French garrison and forced them to remain in the fortress of Valetta.
The British Mediterranean fleet supplied the rebels and blockaded the
island to prevent French reinforcements reaching it.
Paul and the
British Ministry made an agreement that Malta, once recovered, would be
defended by a mixed force of Russians, British, and Neapolitan troops.
In a letter to Sir Arthur Paget at Naples, Sir Charles Whitworth, the
British Minister in St. Petersburgh, outlined Paul’s plans to reorganize
and restore the Order of St. John to its governing position on Malta as
soon as the French forces there were completely subdued.
Naples began to arm openly in defiance of French demands, A
party of Dutch federalists applied to Rufus King, British minister in
that area, for aid in freeing Holland from French occupation.
They
12. The Letters of Sir Arthur Paget (2 vols; London: Longmans,
Green, and Company, 1896) II, 144. Hereafter.referred,to as the Paget
Papers.
20
insisted on excluding the Prince of Orange from the country, though, and
Grenville could not accept this proposal; the negotiations temporarily
fell through.
A most important change in Prussia's foreign policy came at this
point.
The aggression of the French Directory had thrown the King of
Prussia, the Duke of Brunswick, and Count Haugwitz into ever increasing
alarm for the safety of Northern Germany.
War seemed to be merely a
matter of time, and Haugwitz and the Duke were able to convince Frederick
William that bolder action might easily be taken without much additional
risk.
The Prussians still did not feel that they had justifiable reasons
to break their neutrality without any direct provocation, but they told
the Czar, through Count Panin, the leading Russian minister, that they
would intervene in Holland to help with the expulsion of the French once
hostilities opened between Austria and France.
Haugwitz concluded this
proposal with a note to Lord Grenville stating that all Prussian action
would depend upon the assistance Britain could give.
Exemplifying a new
spirit of cooperation, the Duke of Brunswick then drew up a plan by which
the Prince of Orange would be restored to power in Holland through the
joint action of Britain and P r u s s i a . P r u s s i a promised to intervene as
soon as Austria and the allies declared war on France.
did not want to make a separate agreement with Prussia.
Britain, however,
Lord Grenville
wrote to Count Woronzow, the Russian Minister in London, that only by
13. Grenville to R. King, November 6, 1798, Dropmore Papers.
IV, 365-367.
"
.
14. Duke of Brunswick, undated^ Ibid, IV, 350.
21
joining the Quadruple Alliance could Prussia derive benefit from the
L 2,000,000, which was all Britain could spare for the subsidy of foreign
powers.15
The King of Prussia now began seriously to consider joining the
coalition, but he insisted that the goals of the alliance and the aims
of its members be set down in writing beforehand.
The Czar, as the only
member of the loosely-knit group entirely trusted by all the others, was
to draft the articles of coalition and present them to the Courts of
Vienna and Berlin.
Britain’s goals:
Lord Grenville presented the following provisions as
first, that France be reduced to her pre-revolutionary
boundaries; secondly, that a union be created of Holland and Belgium and
the new country be under the government of the Prince of Orange; third,
that Switzerland regain her independence; fourth, that the integrity of
the German states be guaranteed, and that Austria should be given the
control of Lombardy, while Prussia should be asked what territorial com­
pensation she required.
While asking no direct compensation for Britain,
the proposals would create a unified and strengthened Netherlands under
a government friendly to Britain, would assure the English the freedom
of Channel trade, give them an entrance port for commercial transactions
in Europe, and act as a buffer state against further French expansion.
Turkey's quarrel with France and the alliance with England opened new
prospects for British trade in the Levant.
Grenville fully expected
to keep any of the French colonies captured by the British fleets once
hostilities commenced.
15.
IV, 358.
Lord Grenville to Count Woronzow, November 2, 17980 Ibid.
22
At Naples, disaster quickly overtook the hope raised by the
destruction of the French fleet in Egypt,
The presence of Nelson's
fleet in the Neapolitan harbor had put the direction of affairs into the
hands of the war party which was led by the Queen,
General Mack, lead­
ing the Neapolitan army, proceeded to take advantage of the weakened and
dispersed state of the French armies in Italy and crossed the Ecclesias­
tical States in November with 40,000 troops, quickly occupying Rome,
But, the French armies under General Championnet and General Macdonald
rallied and drove the Neapolitans back to Volturno where, despite a
strong position. General Mack lost heart and fled to the French camp.
The King and Queen of the Two Sicilies, being without protection, fled
to Sicily on Nelson's flagship.
banded.
The leaderless Neapolitan army dis­
The city of Naples was taken and transformed into the capital
of the Parthenopian Republic.
On December 30, 1798, the Czar replied to Lord Grenville's
coalition proposals, saying that he would send an army of 45,000 Russian
cavalry and artillery to assist the Prussians in Holland, for which
Britain would advance L 400,000 (L 225,000 for preparation and L 37,000
per month).
He agreed that Holland and Belgium should be united under
the Prince of Orange, and that Prussia should be allowed to enlarge her
territory by acquisitions along the French borders.
He suggested,
however, that Austria not be limited to Lombardy, lest she find it more
profitable to deal with the French.
He urged Austria to delay hostili­
ties no longer and declared himself ready to take any action for the
common aims suggested by the British government.^
16.
Paul I to Lord Grenville, December 30, 17980 Ibid, IV, 427.
23
Thomas Grenville, Lord Grenville's younger brother, was now sent
to Berlin to press Frederick William III to accept the Czar's plan, al­
though it had only feeble support from Count Haugwitz and the Duke of
Brunswick.
Prussia felt adoption of the plan would lead her closer to
hostilities with France and force her to repudiate the Treaty of Basle
without preliminary explanation.
Further, Prussia was not anxious to
ally herself with Austria, who. Count Haugwitz felt, was interested only
in the accumulation of power.
Count Panin, Grenville, and De Luc urged
i
the Duke of,Brunswick to cast his influence in support of a Quadruple
Alliance, but Brunswick wavered.
In order to please his sovereign.
Count Haugwitz proposed a Prussian defensive alliance for the protection
of Northern Germany, Denmark and Sweden,
He turned down the promise of
British subsidies arid Russian troops, at the same time assuring Count
Panin and Thomas Grenville that the slightest change in the political
situation would bring Prussia into the war to free Holland or defend
Germany.
Frederick William III declared Prussia could go no further and
negotiations were terminated.
In November of 1798, Napper Tandy, a French general, arrived in
Hamburg and was arrested; the local Senate turned him over to the British
government.
The Directory threatened vengeance for the insult, and the
Czar immediately proposed to send an army of Russian, Prussian, British,
and Danish troops to defend the threatened city.
Sir James Gaufield was
instructed by Lord Grenville to try to persuade the principal inhabitants
to receive part of the composite force within the gates of the city„^
17. Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville, March 4-18, 17980 Ibid,
IV, 520.■ • .
18. Thomas Grenville to Sir James Gaufield, March 21, 1798^
Ibid, IV, 517.
.
24
As Hamburg was within the line of territory guaranteed neutral by
Prussia, the success of this measure would have served the dual purpose
of forcing Berlin and Paris into war and providing an especially advan■
I
tageous starting point for an expedition into Holland.
Unfortunately
for Britain, the citizens of Hamburg had no wish to enter the conflict
with France, and refused to admit the garrison.
19
Thus, with Prussia definitely refusing to join the coalition
either for hope of territorial enlargement, or under the threat of further
French advances, the alliance became a loose, three-sided affair with two
of the partners mutually estranged.
Britain placed all of her faith in
the Russian alliance, while her sentiments toward her Austrian ally were
recorded clearly in a note from George Canning, Under-Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs, to Sir Arthur Paget5 ^
..We are all in anxious expectation of news of the opening of I
hostilities, having heard in a way that leaves us little doubt of
its truth that the French have declared war against the King of
Hungary and Bohemia (the Emperor of Austria). For my part, I have
made up my mind to hear that the Austrians are terribly beaten.
But I do not care.Next to their setting a good example, the best
,thing is that they should be made an example for the rest of
Europe.
Those Powers who will not fight, ought to fall. The only
means by which the French could not shake the firmness and deci­
sion of this country, would be by shewing in any one instance the
possibility of a safe compromise with them....As long as they go­
on overwhelming everybody who is stupid enough to trust them. We
are as safe as We can be until they are finally overwhelmed them­
selves. Upon these principles, I scarcely care whether the first
account you send be of victory or defeat.
War came late in March, 1799, as the Directory learned of the
movement of 90,000 Russian troops marching across the Germanies to join
19. Thomas Grenville to Sir Charles Whitworth, March 26, 1799*
Ibid. IV, 522,
20. Paget Papers, March 15, 1799^ II, 160.
the Austrian armies„
The Czar, whose patience had been worn thin by
Baron Thugut's bargaining tactics, had threatened to withhold aid if
Austria continued procrastinating; Austria began assembling her armies.
The French Directory declared war on the 24th of March 1799.
THE SUCCESSES AND REVERSES OF 1799 1
From the opening of the campaign, even prior to the arrival of
•
,
fi
Russian troops on the battlefields, the Austrian generals and their armies
showed decisive superiority over the French.
Archduke Charles defeated
General Jourdan at Stockach and drove his army in headlong confusion across
the Rhine.
Moving into Switzerland, the Austrians dislodged the French
under Messena from fortified positions which appeared to defy attack.
In
Italy, General Kray opened the campaign with a brilliant victory over the
French forces that General Scherer commanded at Magnano.
Just after this successful beginning by the Austrian forces.
Marshal Souvarow entered the field with a large Russian army and assumed
command of the allied forces.
He routed three French armies in rapid
succession and captured the fortresses of Alessandria and Turin, expelling
the French from the entire Italian peninsula except for Genoa and the
Maritime Alps.
These splendid successes changed the political situation
and raised the hopes of France's enemies again.
Frederick William instructed Count Haugwitz to resume negotiations
with Lord Grenville on the proposal for joint intervention in Holland
and for the restoration of the House of Grange.
The British government,
knowing from past experience that Frederick William's timidity could
prove disastrous to any project which demanded sudden, bold decisions,
framed new plans that relied heavily on Czar Paul.
on three series of military operations„
1.
Lord Grenville planned
First there was to be a joint
This chapter is based on the Dropmore Papers, V and VI.
26
expedition of British and Russian troops, in British pay, to recover
Holland and Belgium from French occupation and restore the Prince of
Orange as head either of the entire Netherlands or of the Dutch Republic,
on terms which were quite advantageous to British interests.
Secondly,
a large army was to be enlisted in Switzerland, composed of Russians,
Swiss, Wurtembergers, and the corps of emigres, who were also in British
pay.
It was to be commanded by the brilliant General Souvarow, who would
proceed to Switzerland as soon as his work was ended in Italy.
This army
was to operate with the Austrian troops under Archduke Charles to expel
General Massena from his remaining strongholds in Switzerland.
If suc­
cessful, the allied forces would then move into France where they would
act as a rallying point for royalist dissatisfaction, which was at a
i
high pitch in the western and southern Departments.
Finally, after the
Netherlands were conquered, the British proposed to land a sizeable body
of Russian and British soldiers in Brittany, to capture and destroy the
harbor at Brest.
George Gadoudal and other French rebels were to dis­
tract the efforts of the Directory by raising rebellion within France
and were to be encouraged in these activities by generous gifts from the
British treasury.
The first of these enterprises moved smoothly through the prep­
aration stages.
Paul supplied 18,000 Russian troops and secured the
promise of an additional 6,000 from the King of Sweden, which the British
government decided not to use.
The Prince of Orange, who had maintained
constant contact with his Dutch supporters during his exile in Berlin,
now attempted to rally his followers for simultaneous uprisings at the
appropriate moment.
Their efforts were very encouraging, showing dis­
satisfaction to be widespread among the Dutch people, the army, and navy.
28
The French garrison was known to be only a skeleton force, and the party
in power was understood to be discouraged and divided within itself.
Though mustering the needed troops and providing the needed transportation
would require several weeks. Lord Grenville felt the favorable conditions
would hold.
From Berlin, Thomas Grenville pictured the occupation of the
Netherlands as a triumphal march rather thaft- a desperate and dangerous
campaign.%
The campaign got off to a slow start.
Sir Ralph Abereromby, xdio
led the British divisions, was prevented from landing for two weeks by
poor weather, but when he did land, a fleet of Dutch warships at Texel
surrendered to him.
Dutch soldiers deserted in crowds after the arrival
of the Hereditary Prince of Orange.
General Brune still had a few troops
that he could count on, but contrary to the expectations of the British
Ministry, Abereromby, although reinforced with 10,000 Russian troops,
remained strictly on the defensive.
Two weeks later the arrival of the
Duke of York brought the invading force to a total of 48,000 men.
Unfor­
tunately, the 6,000 Dutch deserters %ho joined the Hereditary Prince of
Orange were not put to use, as there was no transportation to help them
across the Zuyder Zee.3
After the Duke of York's arrival, there was
another long delay which Brune utilised to the fullest extent
his forces.
Thomas Grenville's letters to his brother betray astonish­
ment and dismay at
staunch
to augment
the dilatory
supporters of the House
techniques of the Britishgenerals.
The
of Orange refused to riskrebellion
as
long as the armed aid they had been promised was withheld.4
2. Thomas Grenville toLord Grenville, May 27, 1799. Ibid, V, 67-70.
3. Thomas Grenville to
Lord Grenville, September27, 1799. Ibid,Y.
4. . Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville, October 1, 1799. Ibid, V.
29
Despite minor victories for the Allies, the situation was far
from encouraging.
The enemy's force was daily increasing, while the
Allied army could expect no further reinforcements.
The autumn rains,
which had sturck with unusual severity, rendered the roads almost unpassable for the artillery and provision wagons.
It was evident that unless
some important position could be captured, it was impossible for the
Allies to retain their footing in Holland.
The city of Haarlem was
chosen as an objective, for it was most likely to furnish needed
supplies.
The battle for Haarlem raged back and forth as fresh troops
were added to either side.
were lost on each side.
In the end, approximately two thousand men
The Allies had forced the French back a con­
siderable distance from the battlefield, but what is true of an insur­
rection is also true of an invading army:
equivalent to a defeat.
an indecisive success is
Haarlem was the object of the English general,
without the possession of which he could not maintain his troops in the
increasingly poor weather, and Haarlem was still in the hands of the
Republicans.
The enemy's force was hourly increasing, and, two days
later six thousand infantry arrived to strengthen their already
formidable army.
The Duke of York saw the French garrison enlarging daily; after
weeks of minor skirmishes without the magnificent victory he expected,
the Duke decided to take his troops back to Britain.
Elizabeth, Lady
Holland, described the situation in her diary in the following manner:-*
5.
The Journal of Elizabeth, Lady Holland, edited by The Earl
of Ilchester (London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1908), November 10,
1799.
30
The whole Dutch expedition has failed, and the troops are com­
ing back forthwith, tho1 there are great apprehensions enter­
tained as to their being able to withdraw without immense loss.
They calculate upon losing their rearguard of 3000 men. The
position of the troops in Holland has become so unsatisfactory
and precarious owing to the inclemency of the weather and
various other circumstances, that the Duke of York had decided
to withdraw the advanced posts and report the whole matter to
the Home office.
I
The French troops made a determined attack on the retreating
British, but were repulsed with decisive losses.
On October 17, a truce
was arranged between the combatants, and it was agreed to permit the
British to re-embark without hindrance.
In return, 8,000 French and
Batavian prisoners held in England were to be returned to France.
The
entire result of this expensive expedition was to discredit the British
leadership in the. eyes of both the English populace and the Russian
monarchy.
The British public was somewhat pacified by the news of
renewed naval attacks upon the French coast, but Lord Grenville expressed
great disgust, in private, at the conduct of the whole expedition, espe­
cially the lack of guidance by the Duke of York.
This was the disastrous result of the greatest expedition which
had yet sailed from Britain during the war.
Coming as it did, after
the hopes of the nation had been excited by its early successes and
when the great conquests of the Allies in the first part of the campaign
had led to a very general expectation of the fall of the French Republic,
it produced bitter disappointment, and contributed to the impression that
the English soldiers had declined tremendously from their former renown.
The Opposition, as usual, magnified the public distress, and pointed to
the supposed rashness and imbecility of the Administration.
The cred­
ulous public, incapable of just discrimination, overlooked the important
31
fact that the naval power of republican Holland had been completely
destroyed by the expedition.
Instead of ascribing the failure of the
mission to its real causes, inadequacy of means and the jealousies of
an Allied force unaccustomed to acting together, they loudly proclaimed
that it was utter madness to resist the overwhelming power of France on
the land
The second phase of the British military plan, the assembling
of the mixed Austrian, Swiss, and Russian force to free Switzerland,
likewise started auspiciously.
Austria agreed to the British plan only
because it offered a method for getting General Souvarow, of whom the
Austrian generals were quite jealous, out of Italy without rupturing
relations with the Czar.
Grenville, reassured by Austria’s acceptance
of the plan, sent William Wickham^ as the British minister to Switzer­
land to reopen communications with the French royalists and to hasten
the enrollment of 20,000 Swiss recruits.
The Count of Artois, younger
brother of the late French monarch, stood ready to join Souvarow at the
opportune moment.
Just as everything seemed ready for the campaign to
begin, Thugut refused the British subsidy or even joint action with them.
He resolved to hold the Austrian armies in reserve as much as possible
for the accomplishment of Austrian aims.
Where Austria was not directly
6 . Archibald Allison, History of Europe during the French Revo­
lution (10 vols; Edinburgh; William Blackman and Sons, 1831) IV, 163.
.7. William Wickham (1761-1840) had been a fellow student of
Lord Grenville’s at Christ Church, Oxford, and acted as a secret foreign
correspondent from Switzerland from 1790-94. In 1795 he became minister
to the Swiss cantons and provided such extensive, accurate information
on conditions in Provence and la Vendee that, in 1797, the Directory
demanded his expulsion from the Continent on the grounds that he was more
of a fomentor of insurrection than a diplomatic agent. In 1799, Wickham
returned as a special envoy to the Swiss, Russian, and Austrian armies.
32
in a position for gains, the British-subsidized Russian and Swiss troops
were to be allowed to bear the brunt of the war with France„ Having
lost faith in the French royalist cause, the Austrian Chancellor was not
going to lose a man or a florin to advance it.
As he was assured that
the Russian forces were strong enough to rout the French in Switzerland,
he ordered the Archduke to withdraw the Austrian troops to protect Ger­
many and to prepare to occupy the Netherlands.
He said that this was
the most effective way for Austria to assist her allies, but it was ob­
vious that this move would be fatal to the British plan of attack. There
were other problems, however; Wickham was able to recruit only about
2000 Swiss as opposed to the 20,000 the British had expected.
The forces
from Wurtemberg had not yet arrived, and Korsakow's Russian army
numbered only about 40,000.
As the Archduke moved off, the reinforced
French army fell upon Korsakow's troops and completely routed them.
The
Archduke hurried back at receipt of the news, but found the damage irre­
parable.
Lady Holland reported;
"On that night word came of a strange
defeat the allies have experienced, 17,000 Russians and Austrians
captured and slaughtered, Zurich retaken, and many other places in
Switzerland; Hotze, the Austrian general, killed.
Souvarow had crossed the Alps by forced marches under fantastic
handicaps of snow, treacherous paths, and few provisions.
i
The Russians
.
arrived only to find that the Austrian positions and armaments that they
had counted upon were in the hands of the French. Souvarow fought his
!
way out of the trap with great losses and finally rescued his troops by
an outstanding march across the glaciers to Grisons. This decisive
8.
Journal of Elizabeth, Lady Holland, October 17, 1799.
33
defeat also dealt a death blow to the Anglo-Russian expedition in Holland
and left the Directory free to dispatch large reinforcements to General
Brune.
The Austrians realized that their jealousies and shabby treatment
of Souvarow, Korsakow, and the Russian troops were likely to cost them
the Russian alliance, but both the Emperor and Thugut were confident of
the strength of their victorious Italian armies and both were furious at
Paul's perpetual dictates.
They decided to dispense with Russian mili­
tary aid except in situations where the Austrians would remain in com­
plete control.
Furiously jealous of the military triumphs of Souvarow
as well as his persistence in following Paul's orders rather than those
of the Austrian war office, they were determined that the illustrious
general would never again assume the command of Austrian troops.
Realizing that unwelcome political isolation might result.from
the pursuit of this policy, Thugut approached the British in the hope
of reaching a secret understanding.
He proposed that Britain and
Austria come to an agreement between themselves by frankly disclosing
the political objectives each had in mind.
The Emperor planned to keep
all of upper Italy to the Rover Var and the three Papal Legations.
He
did not want Bavaria or the Netherlands, unless they were enlarged and
fortified by the addition of French Flanders.
The Netherlands could be
given to the Prince of Orange if England also transferred to him the
burden of the Austrian loans.
If Britain agreed to these arrangements,
ratification of the 1797 Convention could be secretly obtained.
Austria
preferred secrecy so as not to ruin Austrian credit in the Germanies.
Britain was willing, so far as Paul I would agree, to give
Austria a free hand in Italy.
The English desired strong barriers in
34
every quarter against the threat of French aggression.
The British
Ministry, although placing a much higher value on Austrian cooperation
than they had done earlier in the year, still looked to the Russian
alliance as the only completely sound plank in their Continental coali­
tion.
They therefore notified Thugut that they could enter into no
negotiations without the concurrence of the Czar, and that the signed
Convention must be laid before Parliament before Britain could agree to
do all in her power to promote Austrian interests in Italy.
Lord Grenville and his associates also had begun to prepare a
new plan for the following spring campaign.
In mid-October 1799,
Wickham delivered a copy to Souvarow, which the Russian general found
much like the one which had so recently ended disaster.
It again pro­
posed a combined allied force to be assembled in Switzerland, composed
of one-third German, Swiss, and French royalist soldiers and the rest
Russian troops with an Anglo-Russian command.
The British were to supply
the forces’ provisions.
Souvarow was at this point very much angered at the Austrian
officials, whom he held responsible for his defeat in Switzerland.
He
was furious at Thugut for removing him from Austria and exposing his
army to defeat; with the Austrian General Me las for delaying his march
by not providing needed transportation; and with the Archduke for not
returning more swiftly to his assistance.
His troops now numbered only
28,000, including the remnants of Korsakow's army, and all needed rest,
reorganization, and re-equipping.
However, when Souvarow suggested
one all-out, combined attack against Massena, the Archduke proposed
that the Austrians distract the French while the Russians assaulted the
35
strong fortified positions of the victorious French army.
ness of the proposal further infuriated Souvarow,
The unfair­
The Austrian's, even
if Souvarow had bedn willing to change his mind about them, absolutely
refused to accept any plan under which the Russian general would be in
command of the Austrian troops.
As winter approached and the armies settled into their winter
camps. Lord Grenville suggested that Austria attempt to devise a plan
for the military operations for the forthcoming year and submit it to
both the Czar and the British Cabinet.
It was hoped that the plan would
entail joint Austro-Russian armies, and that a way would be found to end
the quarrel of their military commanders.
Thugut's plan for the cam­
paigns of 1800 discarded Souvarow and excluded the Russian forces from
any fields of military importance on the Continent.
He declared that
the Austrian armies could easily rout the French from Italy and Switzer­
land if they were reinforced with 30,000 British-paid German mercenaries.
The Russians could be utilized with the British troops in Holland, or
in raids along the French coast.
Archduke Charles in his memoirs explained the reasons for the
rupture of the Austro-Russian alliance:
The Alliance between Austria and Russia blew up, like most coali­
tions formed between powers of equal pretensions. The idea of
common interest, the illusion of confidence based on the same
general views, prepares the first advances; differences of opin­
ion as to the means of attaining the desired objects, soon sows
the seeds of misunderstanding; and that envenomed feeling in­
creases in proportion as the events of war alter the views of
the coalesced powers, derange their plans, and undeceive their
hopes. It seldom fails to break out openly when the Armies are
destined to undertake any operation in concert. The natural de­
sire to obtain the lead in command, as in glory, excites the
rival passions both of chiefs and nations. Pride, and jealousy,
tenacity and presumption, spring from the conflict of opinion
and ambition; continual contradictions daily inflame mutual
36
exasperation, and nothing but a fortunate accident can prevent
such a coalition from being dissolved before one of the parties
is inclined to turn his arms against the other.9
Despite Thugut's blustering about the capabilities of the Austrian
forces, Lord Minto reported from Vienna that Austria was daily more
eager to reach a thorough understanding with the British government.
The revenues from her Italian possessions had proved highly disappoint-
'
ing; French requisitions had impoverished the countryside, and the popu­
lace of the occupied states passively resisted the Austrian troops.
Gradually, Thugut limited his territorial demands from the Piedmont and
Savoy to the Novarese, for which Austria would provide compensation to
the King of Sardinia from Genoese lands.
He agreed to the restoration
of the French monarchy, and consented at last to ratify the financial
Convention of 1797.
He proposed as terms of the alliance that Britain
should relieve the Emperor of repayment of the last Austrian loan.
Further, he requested that Britain advance L 1,600,000, of which ten
per cent was to meet the pressing needs of the Austrian government.
Britain was to support Austria in her claim to the Papal Legations,
Novarese, and the territory of Genoa.
These proposals seemed acceptable to Lord Grenville, and Wickham
was granted extraordinary powers to negotiate the agreement and told to
rely on his own judgment when quick decisions were necessary.
Wickham,
who had always favored the Austrian alliance, sent glowing reports of
the Austrian commanders and caused the British to reestimate the rela­
tive importance of their two major allies.
9.
The Memoirs of Archduke Charles, II, 273, as quoted in
Allison*s History of Europe during the French.Eevolution. IV, 182.
37
Through the letters of M. N'Andre, a Frenchman with no particular
scruples against British reimbursement for valuable information, the Pitt
Ministry obtained copies of confidential reports to the French War Office
telling of the diminishing strength of the Republican armies and un­
doubted evidence of the Internal dissension which was crippling the Direc­
tory.
The British economy had again begun to feel the burden of the
increased cost of the extended war, and the Cabinet realized that their
aims must be accomplished swiftly or not at all.
What few British statesmen understood was the importance of a
little-publicized event which was eventually to spell the defeat of the
coalition.
Early in November, 1799, Napoleon and his most trusted staff
members had returned to Paris from an indefensible position in Egypt.
Within days, he had arranged a coup
d 1 etat, overthrown the Directory
and established his own consular government.
The British were now preparing for an all out effort the follow­
ing spring, and planned to lend all
possible support to the royalists in
western France.
Napoleon could maintain his power
They believed that
only by using his armies to suppress the royalist and Jacobin enemies
of the regime.
This would by necessity leave him without troops to oppose the
Austrian forces in the east.
Wickham was urged to foment insurrections
in the southern and eastern sections of France, which might further
distract Napoleon* s attention from La Vendee and thus assist the planned
British expeditions in the spring.10
10; Lord Grenville to Wickham, November 30, 1799, Dropmore
Pagers, VI, 52.
38
On December 13, 1199, Wickham reported that he had commissioned
General Pichegru to enroll French army deserters to act with the Austrians
in an invasion of France.11, He enthusiastically estimated the allied
forces, and predicted that Napoleon could probable raise no more than
180,000 men, a force inferior to Austria's in number, quality, and
equipment.
French bankers estimated that Napoleon could raise a maximum
of L 3,500,000 sterling, which would prove utterly inadequate to supply
the French military needs.
Wickham conceded that the Consulate was
winning support and ventured, "It seems possible that the war will be
conducted with more talents and energy than has lately been the case...
(but Napoleon) cannot steer long between Jacobins and Royalists.
If he
fails to obtain peace, he must lean for support on the former, and for­
feit the public favor, as he can only carry on war by resorting to
revolutionary methods."12
Despite his optimism concerning the weaknesses of France and
the relative strength of the allies, Wickham felt that Austria was
Britain's most important ally, that her alliance must be preserved and
strengthened if the British hoped to make any progress in the war.
a letter to Lord Grenville he emphasized this viewpoints
pared tothrow yourself into the arms of
If not, renounce at once
In
"Are you pre­
the House of Austria or not?
every idea of a Continental war against France
for neither can you carry it on without her nor force her to carry it
on in any but her own way,"13
He urged that the British alter their
11.
12.
Wickham to
Wickham to
Lord Grenville, undated. Ibid, VI, 73.
Lord Grenville, December 13, 1799. Ibid, VI,
13,.
Wickham to Lord Grenville, undated. Ibid, VI, 78,
74.
tactics, and flatter and cajole Francis II; thus, England would gain the
confidence of Austria instead of dictating military operations and criti­
cizing the political activities of her government.
By cooperating, by
giving Austrian strategists a free hand, and by praising and pensioning
them, the British could wield considerable influence over the Austrian
army.
He did not suggest, however, that England follow the Austrian
lead and ignore the valuable assistance that the Russian Czar had pro­
vided.
This latter policy seems to have been the result of a great deal
of distorted information which reached Lord Grenville.
The Duke of York,
who blamed the entire Dutch fiasco on the poor discipline of the Russian
troops and urged closer relations with Austria partially out of animosity
for the Czar's armies, was a major source of this information.
Wickham
himself was prejudiced in his reports, although not intentionally, as he
had many friends among the Austrian military leaders and favored an
alliance relying heavily upon Emperor Francis as opposed to one which
depended on the erratic behavior of Czar Paul. With these slanted views
of the value of their two allies, the Ministers naturally made decisions
which favored the Austrian alliances.
Thus in one short year came two changes which would radically
effect the fate of the coalition.
The new consular government, under
Napoleon, would soon strengthen France, making her a much more formid­
able enemy than in the immediate past.
At the same time the coalition
was showing new signs of internal dissension, and the British, by re­
evaluating their alliances and choosing to support Austria's goals
above those of Russia, was laying the grounds for an inevitable AngloRussian quarrel.
THE DISSOLUTION OF THE COALITION 1
In January, the First Consul sent a proposal for peace to the
heads of the coalition states.
Lord Grenville's reply to Napoleon was
scathing, despite British public opinion, which was strongly inclined
toward peace, and the counsel of Lord Buckingham, his brother, who urged
moderation. He still believed that there was a great deal of dissatis­
faction in France with the Consulate, that Napoleon was without adequate
resources of either men or money to carry on the war, and that he could
only maintain his position by making peace.
Grenville felt it would be
sheer folly for the allies to negotiate instead of proceeding with their
plans, crushing France and ending the war on their own terms.
In his answer to Napoleon, Grenville pointed out that the English
ministry had never claimed a right to interfere in the internal affairs
of France, or dictate to her inhabitants the form of government or race
of sovereigns they were to choose; the objective of the war was declared
to have been, from the beginning, defensive.
It was undertaken not to
impose a government upon France, but to prevent its imposing one upon
other nations.
The existence of the Batavian, Ligurian, Cisalpine,
Helvetian, Roman and Parthenopeian republics, most of whom had been
"republicanized" in a state of peace, afforded ample evidence of the
reality of the peril the French government posed to Europe.
1.
This chapter is based primarily upon accounts found in Genera
Fuller's Military History of the Western World, Bruun's Europe and the
French Imperium (New York: Harper Brothers Publishers, 1938), Thiers'
Empire and Consulate, and The Dropmpre Papers.
40
41
In the House of Commons, the Opposition, led by Charles James Fox,
presented arguments for an immediate peace.
Fox stated that the war had
originally been declared on the speculation of the dangers the French
Revolution posed to religion and the government.
He admitted that France
had committed great offences, but added that she had been joined in the
worst of them by the Allies:
Russia had attacked France.
Austria had received Venice from Bonaparte;
Having pictured the Allies as at least as
much at fault for the war as the French, Fox proceeded to ask, "Is then
peace so dangerous a state, war so enviable, that the latter is to be
chosen as a state of probation, the former shunned as a positive evil?"^
On the other hand. Lord Grenville and Mr. Pitt argued:
The same necessity which originally existed for the commence­
ment and prosecution, still called for perseverance in the war.
The same proneness to aggression, the same disregard for jus­
tice, still actuated the conduct of the men who rule France.
Peace with a nation by whom war was made against all order,
religion, and morality, would rather be a concession of re­
sistance to wrong than a suspension of arms in the nature of
ordinary warfare. To negotiate with established governments
was formerly not merely easy, but in most circumstances safe;
but to negotiate with the government of France now would be
to incur all of the risks of an uncertain truce, without at­
taining the benefits of even temporary peace. France still
retains the sentiments, and is constant to the views which
characterized the down of her Revolution.^
They went on to show that although France frequently represented
herself as disinclined to conquest, the declarations were followed up
with the seizure of the Netherlands and parts of Switzerland and Italy.
"What reliance", asked Pitt, "can be placed on a power which thus
uniformly makes peace or truce a stepping-stone to further aggressions;
and systematically uses perfidy as an allowable weapon for circumventing
its enemies?"
2.
3.
Parliamentary History, XXXIV, 1291.
Ibid. 1398.
42
The House, upon a division, supported the measures of the Ministry
by a majority of 265 to 64.
Events in France had already belied the weakness on which the
allies counted.
The majority of French citizens were neither radical
Jacobins nor adherents of Louis XVIII„
They would have preferred almost
any type of efficient government to the corrupt Directory which had
trampled upon civil and religious liberties and prolonged the war to
serve its own ends.
Few Frenchmen would have voluntarily accepted a
devine right monarchy and the return of the ancient regime with its in­
equalities and abuses.
To adopt this form of government would be to
foresake all the principles of the Revolution.
The overthrow of the
Directory and the formation of the new government by Napoleon were re­
garded favorably by most of the citizens, primarily as the new First
Consul was already famous for his victorious dictation of the Treaty of
Campo Formio.
On his accession, Bonaparte offered as conciliatory gestures the
repeal of the conscription laws, the reopening of the churches and en­
couragement of Christian worship, and an invitation to Frenchmen of all
political groups to serve the State.
All who accepted his government
were welcome to its protection, but those remaining insurgents in La
Vendee were quickly and thoroughly crushed as an example to others that
he would not tolerate internal rebellion.
With this show of firmness
and efficient government, public confidence increased,
Public credit
revived and instead of the L 3,500,000 which Wickham had estimated,
Napoleon's financial resources now amounted to almost L 13,500,000.
This
sum was still insufficient to run the government, but was enough to give
it a temporary start.
43
Despite his strong position, Napoleon sincerely desired peace to
consolidate his power.
He knew that a peace on British terms would
destroy the reputation for success on which his authority rested.
this reason, he welcomed the haughty British reply.
For
It had the double
effect of silencing the French demand for peace and stimulating the idea
that the British prolonged a war from which they profited while others
suffered.
The Czar ignored the French proposals, but Thugut returned a
courteous reply, leaving the way open for negotiations until the British
government officially accepted his terms for an offensive alliance.
Napoleon restored good relations with Prussia by promising to evacuate
Holland and support Prussian interests in the Germanies.
The negotiations certainly did not halt the strenuous activi­
ties of all of the belligerents for the renewal of hostilities in the
spring.
By February, 1800, the British Cabinet had established its
policy for the forthcoming campaign.
Wickham had been authorized to
conclude treaties with the Electors of Bavaria and Wurtemberg for 12,000
troops to serve under the Austria Archduke Charles; Britain was to pay
L 1,000,000 for their support.
An additional L 500,000 was placed at
Wickham’s disposal for secret service expense.
Lord Grenville assured
Thugut, on February 13, 1800, that L 200,000 would be granted by the
British to pay Piedmontese troops serving under Austria’s General Melas.
In addition, L 1,600,000 was loaned to Austria without interest to be
repaid at the conclusion of the war.
George III renounced any claim to
interfere in Austria's military campaigns and promised to support his
ally by expeditions along the French coasts.
44
Territorially, the British agreed that if Emperor Francis II did
not want the Belgic provinces, they could be given at his option to the
Prince of Orange, to the Archduke Charles as an imperial fief, or to the
Duke of Tuscany as a means of facilitating Austrian arrangements in Italy.
Britain would transfer the burden of the Austrian debt to the new Belgian
overlord as a concession to keep Austria in the war.
The Emperor was re­
quired to guarantee that France would retain no part of the Netherlands
and that he would not negotiate separately with Napoleon.
The British
planned to garrison the Belgian fortresses with British troops, requir­
ing the new ruler to pay for their support in lieu of interest on the
Austrian loans.
In this way it was hoped to secure Belgium against the
French and to maintain an army ready for immediate service with no direct
expense to Britain herself.
Sir Charles Whitworth was instructed to inform the Czar of these
agreements and to explain to him that the Russian forces were no longer
needed in the area.
The Czar already nursed ill-feeling toward the
British as the Duke of York had blamed the apparent failure of the Dutch
expedition on the lack of discipline of the Russian troops.
Paul's own
generals, Hermann and Essen, told him in official reports how the British
had encouraged the occupation of Bergen, and then left the Russians with­
out support in the face of overwhelming French forces once the Russians
had succeeded in the mission.
Now came the news that the British had
broken their solemn agreement to make no engagements without consulting
with him.
Paul, furious with this treatment at the hands of the British,
applied through Count Woronzow in London for Sir Charles Whitworth's re­
call and then settled back into watchful inactivity, expecting his allies
to plunge on to their own destruction alone.
45
Lord Minto had been convinced that Lord Grenville's favorable
reply would bring the Austrian and British governments into complete ac­
cord.
He foresaw the avowed English preference for an Austrian alliance
quickly overshadowing any ill-feelings between the two.4
Much to the
surprise of the British leadership, Thugut claimed that Lord Grenville
had deliberately neglected to mention such essential particulars as an
immediate advance of L 200,000 to the Emperor and an agreement to support
the Austrian plan to annex the Papal Legations.^
The controversy flared
and an open quarrel was only avoided when Lord Minto conceded on every
point, except for the question of the annexation of the Papal Legations,
which he referred to Lord Grenville.
The British government agreed to
advance L 2,400,000 to the Austrian monarchy in three installments, to
advise the King of Sardinia to consent to the exchange of territory
required by Austria, and to acquiesce to the Austrian annexation of the
Legations.
The King of Sardinia bluntly refused the exchange of terri­
tory, however, and appealed to the Czar, who granted him protection.
Despite the extensive British concessions, the Austrians ultimately
refused to sign the new alliance papers.
manding peace.
The Austrian people were de­
Few desired to continue the war merely to remove the
French occupation forces from the Netherlands or to restore the Bourbon
monarchy.
Thugut now felt that a few timely victories would allow
Austria to achieve her goals without further pursuing the British ambi­
tions.6
4.
Lord Minto to Grenville, February 23, 1800; Dropmore Papers.
VI.
5.
VI.
Report of Wickham to Lord Grenville, April 15, 1800; Ibid,
.
'
" . '
6 . Lord Grenville to Minto, June 27, 1800* Ibid. VI, 256.
46
While the English efforts at recruiting new troops in the Ger­
mania s had been quite successful, Wickham's plans for creating chaos
inside of France failed before the growing power and popularity of the
•
|
Consulate.
Political exiles such as Carnot, Barthelemy, Malouet and
Mounier returned to France as confirmed supporters of the new regime and
were permitted public employment.
Even worse, from the British view­
point, Wickham discovered belatedly that French insolvency had temporarily
been overcome, the Bank of France founded, and a new taxation system in­
stituted.
The French planned to move swiftly while the coalition members
were still at odds with one another.
To isolate Austria in advance,
Napoleon wooed the Czar and flattered neutral Frederick William III of
Prussia by the suggestion that he might act later as mediator, a move
which disguised his own ambitious plan and helped disarm Prussian sus­
picions without promoting peace.
To the French, the most direct line of attack against Austria
lay through Bavaria and down the Danube Valley.
Moreau, with 120,000
men, the major forces of the French Republic, opened the campaign in
April.
Within two months, the French had driven the Austrian forces
under General Kray from Bavaria.
In the meantime, Napoleon had
assembled a reserve army at Dijon, and led it across the Great St.
Bernard Pass (May 15-20, 1800) into the Po Valley.
This venture had
been carefully planned; Napoleon turned on Milan, intending to separate
the Austrians from their stores in Lombardy and to block their lines of
retreat.
He divided his army into three parts, and therefore had only
18,000 men available when on June 14, he stumbled upon the main Austrian
army of 30,000 under General Me las at Marengo.
The sudden return of
47
General Desaix with 5,000 French troops spelled defeat for the Austrians
despite heavey French casualties.
Austria had no enthusiasm for further
fighting and General Melas agreed to an armistice, the Convention of
Alexandria.
The British View of this catastrophe naturally was one of dismay,
but they hoped the Austrians might be brought back into the war if
Napoleon's terms for the peace were too harsh.
Lord Minto wrote to
Arthur Paget on July 16, 1800;^
The battle of Marengo, or rather the convention of Alexandria,
has made a total change. I am sorry to add that the state of
the Austrian army in Germany, despirited and rendered I may say
wholly unserviceable by faction and indiscipline, creates a
still more serious difficulty than the events in Italy would
do alone. These circumstances have rendered an Armistice as
necessary to the Emperor as it seems to be thought desirable by
the French, and you may expect to hear immediately that the
Armistice is extended to Germany. I flatter myself that mea­
sures which are in contemplation for restoring the spirit and
discipline of the Army in Germany may prove successful and fur­
nish the means of measuring superiority in that quarter. If
these hopes are realized there is a fair prospect of seeing
hostilities renewed at no distant period.
General Moreau no sooner learned of Napoleon's victory than he
swept across the Danube, and dislodged General Kray from his strong
position at Ulm, thus driving the Austrians back to Inn.
At first
Wickham, still an optimist, made light of the Austrian defeats, but
kray's subsequent defeat at Biberbach opened his eyes.
A few days later
he wrote to Lord Grenville of the confusion and discouragement in the
Austrian camp, and of the universal cry of the Austrian people for peace.
While the hostilities between France and Austria were tem­
porarily halted by negotiations which lasted from June, 1800, until
7.
Paget Papers, II, 250.
48
November of 1801, Francis II signed a new subsidy treaty with the British.
Discussions were held between Britain and Austria for a possible general
peace.
The Austrians naturally were reaping the greatest benefits from
the prolonged discussions for they allowed Austria time to regroup her
armies wherever possible.
Napoleon therefore demanded that the British
fleets blockading Malta and Egypt grant a naval armistice as a compensa­
tion for the benefits Austria was receiving.
He would agree to a meeting
at Luneville to discuss the grounds for a general peace, if this condi­
tion were met.
The British also desired to gain time, knowing that the Austrians
could not continue to fight at present.
The English Mediterranean fleet
had captured a French ship from Egypt in November of 1799 that carried
letters from General Kleber to the French Directory.
However, the mes­
sages from the disgruntled Frenchman, who desired to discredit Napoleon,
gave the British an entirely false picture of the conditions of the
French army in Egypt.
Lord Grenville then formed the idea that Napoleon
would seize any chance to reinforce Kleber's army.
When reports reached
Britain that the French citizens were pleading for peace, he wrote to
Pitt that this news "may certainly enable us both to raise our demands
as to terms, and to insist strictly on the conditions of our project of
armistice."8
Grenville felt that England and Austria had only to stand
firm, and they might impose their conditions on the French.
Napoleon
received word of the British decisions and demanded the liberty of six
French frigates to go to Alexandria and return without hindrance or the
armistice would terminate within ten days.
8.
Pagers, VI, 329.
Grenville to William Pitt, September 23, 1800.
Dropmore
49
Emperor Francis meanwhile joined the Austrian army at Inn, where
he found an almost impossible situation.
After the British had rejected
the French ultimatum, the Austrians were forced to purchase an additional
forty-five days of armistice by the surrender of the blockaded fortresses
of Dim, Ingolstadt and Philipsburg.
Baron Thugut was replaced in the
Austrian foreign office as his policies had failed to gain the Austrian
goals and had placed the Empire in this precarious position.
Count
Gobentzl was sent to Moreau's headquarters to ask for further prolonga­
tion of the armistice, while Austria made some secret reforms in the army.
When Pitt and Lord Grenville inferred from this journey that the
Austrians intended to treat separately for peace with Napoleon, they
refused payment of the second installment of the latest Austrian loan.
The British ministry then informed the Austrians that the next L 800,000
would be paid only after hostilities were renewed.
So many miscarriages, especially in situations which had seemed
to offer all the conditions for easy conquest, caused widespread dis­
satisfaction in England.
The "great effort" of the British government
in 1800, which was to produce 70,000 troops, yielded barely 30,000.
Pitt had planned to capture Belleisle and Brittany, but the attempt was
abandoned at the last minute due to a difference of opinion as to its
chances of success.
The British reputation for bravery, masterful planning, and
decisive action had seldom fallen so low as during the campaign of
1799-1800.
After the fiasco of the Duke of York's Dutch expedition,
neither Paul I, the Emperor Francis, nor General Melas would allow their
troops to fight under British generals.
The incapacity of British
officials especially selected for important Continental duties was the
50
subject of several confidential letters to Lord Grenville.
Wickham wrote
on March 27, 1800, "I have sworn never to have anything to do with your
military men again unless they will learn their own business better be­
fore they come abroad, or have a more moderate opinion of their own know­
ledge and suffer themselves to be instructed.
Besides it is not conceived,
presence of mind on the field expected, how very cheap we are holden on
the C o n t i n e n t . Lord Elgin, British Minister in Constantinople, wrote
in a letter to Lord Grenville, ’’Seeing Englishment in authority here
takes away all delight in reading Don Quixote."10
Meanwhile, the Pitt ministry was having its problems at home as
well.
George III was opposed to sending any more troops on uncertain
ventures and was even mediatating, in his more lucid moments, a change
of ministry.
There were several members of Parliament, both in Lords
and Commons, who supported the King's concern about British war commit­
ments .
In a speech to Commons on May 8, 1800, Thomas Tywith Jones
questioned the purpose of the heavy taxation and carnage, voicing the
increasingly popular view that while England controlled the seas,
possessed a flourishing trade, and could guarantee the security of her
colonies there was no threat presented by the French Consulate.
The
speaker also pointed out that while the British people bore the heavy
expenses of the war, Austria did not repay even the interest on her
loans.
In the view of the peace faction, Austria and Russia were them­
selves eager for the territorial expansion which they struggled to deny
France.
Attacks on the government's war policy were increasingly
frequent.
9;
10.
Wickham to Lord Grenville, March 27, 1800. Ibid, VI, 183.
Lord Elgin, December 29, 1799. Ibid, VI, 91.
51
In consequence of the growing distrust of its allies' intentions,
Pitt's administration found every proposed foreign subsidy meeting in­
creased Parliamentary opposition.
The financial grants of 1799^ were
easily passed when compared with the lengthy and bitter arguments raised
in a similar situation a year later (July 18, 1800).
Time and again the Ministry was attacked for its "foreign policy,
spiritless conduct and the mismanagement of the war."
In December of
1800, Sheridan moved that a petition be sent to George III asking him to
enter into separate negotiations for a speedy and honorable peace.
Pitt's
majority was able to defeat the motion 156 to 35, but the attacks came
more frequently as the demand for peace grew among the British people.
To add to English problems. Czar Paul announced late in 1800
that he was encouraging the formation of a coalition of the neutral
Northern Powers, Prussia, Sweden, and Denmark, to protest the alleged
abuses of British maritime supremacy.
Wickham claimed the Czar's be­
havior was due to an attack of insanity, to which Paul was unfortunately
prone.
The Russian Emperor had had ample provocation from both the
Austrian and British governments to justify his new demands.
Frist,
Austria had attempted to overrun and annex principalities whose soverigns, including the Pope, were under Paul's protection.
Then she had
flagrantly disregarded the Russians once she had risen to power, largely
with the support of the Russian troops.
Likewise, the Czar felt that
errors in strategy and the lack of proper Austrian support in Switzer­
land in 1799 had exposed his armies to costly and unnecessary defeats.
11. See the debate on the Russian subsidy, June 11, 1799.
Cobbett, Parliamentary History, XXXIV, 304.
52
For these reasons Paul had broken off the Austrian alliance, feeling that
he could not remain attached to a power which consistently sacrificed the
welfare of Europe for its own selfish aims.
Although the Czar had resented the results of disastrous AngloRussian expedition to Holland, his patience completely snapped at the
news that the French garrison on Malta had surrendered to the British
fleet in September.
Contrary to previous agreements with Russia and
Naples, the English had hoisted only the Union Jack over the captured
fortress of La Valette.
Until April of 1800, the British had sincerely
planned to return the island to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem when
the French forces surrendered.
However, late in 1800, glowing reports
of the natural resources, the harbor facilities, and the commercial possi­
bilities of Malta flowed in to Lord Grenville from British travelers in
the a r e a . A s
the British saw the hopes they had placed in the Austrian
alliance evaporate, Lord Grenville and others began to suggest that the
English conquests be retained to offset those of France on the Continent.
As early as December, 1800, Sir Arthur Paget reported to Lt. General
1q
Pigot
that he understood the British definitely planned to hold Malta
for themselves.
In contrast to the British program which provoked the Czar so
violently, Napoleon sought to win him by offering to return Malta to the
Order of the Knights of St. John if the French could retain it until the
end of the war.
This offer was made just before the garrison surrendered
to the British.
The romantic sentiment of Czar Paul was especially
12. P. Abbott to Lord Grenville, November 20, 1800. Dropmore
Papers. VI, 385.
■
13. General Pigot was the British officer to whom the French
surrendered Malta.
„
-
53
touched when Napoleon presented him with the sword which Pope Leo X had
presented to the Grand Master L ’Isle Adam.
Further, the French First
Consul collected 6000 Russian prisoners who had been captured in Holland,
had them reclothed, rearmed, and presented to the Czar as a token of
friendship and understanding. Although no longer hostile to the Consular
government, the Russians entered into no alliances with them, even when
old relations with Denmark and Sweden had brought the Czar into conflict
with Britain.
The Armed Neutrality had first been organized in 1780, and issued
the Declaration of Maritime Rights.
One of its articles was a declara­
tion that ships under the convoy of warships flying national flags were
exempted from search by a declaration of the naval officer in charge
that the cargoes belonged to the country he represented and contained
no "contraband of war."
Pitt's government, on the other hand, asserted
its right as a belligerent to search neutral vessels under all circum­
stances for enemy goods or contraband.
British cruisers took forcible
possession of any Danish and Swedish vessels which resisted search.
The violent disruption of trade, much to the British advantage, aroused
great dislike for the Pitt ministry in the countries involved.
The
Czar supported the members of the League and laid an embargo on British
goods until the British left the Baltic.
The King of Prussia, in retaliation for the confiscation of Prus­
sian merchantmen, sent troops to occupy Cuxhaven, the city which formed
the British communication link with the Continent, and joined the League
14.
Lord Carysfort to Lord Grenville, September 30, 1800.
Dropmore Papers, VI.
„
54
of Neutrality.
The British treated the revival of the Confederation as
a declaration of war and dispatched Sir Hyde Parker to assail Copenhagan.
Pitt, realizing the dangers if England was forced into a two-front
war, decided that it was necessary to engage the public resources imme­
diately to assure that the people were not depressed by any appearance
of vacillation on the part of the government.
The Prime Minister was no
sooner informed of the signature of the armed neutrality, than he took
steps to let the northern powers feel Britain’s anger.
On January 14,
1801, the British Government issued an order for a general embargo on
all vessels belonging to any of the confederated powers.
Prussia was
excepted only because word had not yet been received of her partnership
in the League. Letters of marque were issued at the same time for the
numerous vessels belonging to these states who were working on the Baltic
Sea.
The British captains were so thorough in their captures that nearly
one-half of the merchant ships of the Northern Powers soon found their
way into English harbors.
The League represented England as a common European enemy, to
be regarded as a sordid monopolist, keeping alive a war that served only
her particular profit, without regard in her selfish egotism for the
rest of the world.
At the end of November, 1800, the war between France and Austria
entered its final phase.
The French armies, victorious and re-equipped
at the expense of Germany and Italy, were in excellent condition.
Austrians were barely supplied, demoralized, and outnumbered.
The
Britain,
still suspicious of Austrian intentions, refused Austria the money des­
perately needed to send the troops into the field.
The Archduke John,
who had assumed command of the imperial forces, was crushingly defeated
at Hohenlinden.
55
In Italy, General Brune drove the Austrians back across the
Tyrolean Alps.
In order to save Vienna, the Emperor agreed to negotiate
a separate peace.
The Treaty of Luneville, signed in February of 1801
pushed the Austrian boundary back to the Adige in Italy, forced the Em­
peror to cede the left bank of the Rhine to France, stipulated that the
lay rulers dispossessed by this cession should be compensated by lands
in the Germanies, and deprived the Emperor's brother of the Grand Duchy
of Tuscany, which was bestowed upon the Duke of Parma, son-in-law of the
Queen of Spain.
The British policy of reevaluating their alliances and placing
one member before another in importance had backfired dangerously in
1800.
Austria, which had seemed to offer the most strength and relia­
bility, had proved an expensive drain on the British treasury.
She had
sought only to fulfill her own territorial objectives and had not pur­
sued the expressed goals of the coalition.
militarily.
Now she lay totally defeated
Russia, on the other hand, could have been treated with
equal consideration by the British, but they chose to ignore the Rus­
sians extensively once they decided to rely so heavily upon the Austrian
alliance.
The inevitable result, beginning with Russian surprise and
indignation at such treatment, was the Czar's active resistance to the
coalition and his organization of the Armed Neutrality of the North.
The British Cabinet saw this last action as one of perversity or insanity
on Paul's part, failing to realize that it was a logical outcome of their
own foreign policy, but regardless of where the blame for the situation
lay, England now faced war on two fronts.
THE END OF THE W A R 1
In spite of the fact that Russia officially remained a member of
the Second Coalition, Britain was now effectively isolated diplomatic­
ally.
She faced the French armies on the Continent, the ships and guns
of the Armed Neutrality on the North Sea and Baltic Sea, and a growing
popular demand for peace at home.
The subject of the northern coalition was fully discussed in the
parliamentary debates which took place on the King's speech at the open­
ing session.
The Opposition stated "that although without a doubt the
Emperor of Russia had been guilty of the grossest violence and injustice
toward Great Britain in the confiscation of the property of its mer­
chants, yet it did not follow that ministers were free of blame."
The
Czar had accused the Ministry of violating a Convention in regard to the
surrender of Malta to him as a reward for his cooperation against France,
and the Whigs questioned the Administration about the existence of such
a secret treaty.
While supporting the retention of naval supremacy, the
Opposition doubted that the present British maritime policy was either
just or expedient.
Further, they attacked the Ministry for having placed
the English fleet in a position which effectively added the Baltic re­
sources to those upon which France could draw and meanwhile, diminished
1.
This section is based primarily upon information found in
Gobbett’s Parliamentary History, volumes XXXV and XXXVI, Coquelle1s
Napoleon and England, translated from French by Gordon;D. Knox, (London;
G. Bell, 1904), Bruun's Europe and the French Imperium, and the Dropmore
Papers, volume VII,
.
.
56
57
the effectiveness with which a divided British navy could meet this new
challenge.
To this tirade, Pitt and Sir William Grant replied:
As to the question of expenditure, the matter is less doubtful.
The question is whether we are to permit the navy of our enemy to
be supplied and recruited; whether we are to suffer blockaded forts
to be furnished with warlike stores and provisions; whether we are
to allow neutral nations, by hoisting a flag upon a sloop or a
fishing bout, to convey the treasures of South America to the har­
bors of Spain, or the naval stores of the Baltic to Brest and
Toulon? The honorable gentleman talks of the destruction of the
naval power of France, but does he imagine that her marine would
have decreased to the degree which it actually has, if, during
the whole of the war, this very principle had not been acted upon?
....Does he not know, that the naval preponderance which we have
by this means acquired, has since given security to this country
amidst the wreck of all our hopes on the Continent? If it were
once gone, the spirit of the country would go with it.^
On February 5, 1801, just one week before Austria accepted the
t
Treaty of Luneville, William Pitt resigned as Prime Minister, a post he
had held for eighteen years.
The deciding issue in his defeat was not
the government’s conduct of the war, but the relatively minor issue of
Catholic emancipation to which George III was inflexibly opposed.
George
believed in the necessity of a legislative union with Ireland while ob­
jecting to the proposals for Roman Catholic relief that were associated
with it.
Pitt had given the Irish Catholics reason to believe that a
complete removal of disabilities would follow the union as a matter of
royal grace.
While on a visit to Weymouth on September 27, 1800,
Chancellor Loughborough had shown the King a private letter from Pitt
summoning Loughborough to a Cabinet meeting on the question of Catholic
emancipation.
The Prime Minister had not yet seen fit to mention the
plan to George, and the news caused the King great anxiety.
2.
Cobbett, Parliamentary History. XXXV, 915.
At a levee
58
on January 28, 1801, the day of the swearing-in of new members of Parlia­
ment, the King informed Henry Dundas that the idea of Catholic emancipation
was "the most Jacobinical thing he had ever heard of," adding, "I shall
reckon any man my personal enemy who proposes such a measure„
On the
first day of February, he received word from Pitt that the Prime Minister
would be forced to resign unless the measure could be brought forward
with the King’s "full concurrence and the whole weight of the government.
Feeling that he could not change his position, George accepted Pitt’s
resignation.
The King sent for Henry Addington^ to form a government, but be­
fore the ministers could receive their seals, the worry and excitement
of the crisis caused George to lapse into another attack of insanity.
The reconstructed Ministry took office on the eighteenth of February with
Addington as Prime Minister and Lord Hawkesbury^ as the head of the
Foreign Office.
Pitt and his more intimate friends regarded the new
Ministry as a temporary expedient which would allow him to resume leader­
ship under more favorable circumstances.
Addington accepted the position
only when assured of Pitt's counsel and support.
3. Dictionary of National Biography. XXIX, 311.
4. Ibid.
5. Henry Addington, first viscount Sidmouth (1757-1844) was a
personal friend and strong supporter of William Pitt.. Elected to Par­
liament in 1784, he served as speaker in Commons from 1789-1801. He
repeatedly tried to talk Pitt out of further concessions to the Irish
Catholics, but remained his friend when the Pitt government fell on
this issue.
6. Robert Banks Jenkinson (1770-1828), afterwards second Earl
of Liverpool, had been a supporter of Pitt, but being opposed to any
Roman Catholic concessions, he remained in office under the new Addington
Ministry. He had a long history of anti-French sentiments and had served
several minor administrative posts before .becoming Secretary of the
Foreign Office.
59
The new Ministry seems to have excited feelings of both derision
i
and distrust. In every point of ability, the new Cabinet presented a
very unfavorable contrast to the last.
It was composed of inefficient
members of the late Cabinet such as the Dukes of Portland, Westmorland, ,
and Chatham, and its new recruits were chosen on the basis of conformity
with the King's political outlook.
high Tory views.
The new administration was of Anglican,
It had the complete support of George III and possessed
overwhelming majorities in both houses of Parliament largely due to Pitt's
backing.
Even the Whig opposition accepted the Addington government, as
it was known to favor peace.
Lady Holland described the new ministry in her diary on February
26, 1801:
The first laugh over, people begin to think this Administration
may last, and if they commence negotiations, they will even be
popular. Pitt, however, is to be regretted, and there are those
who think the whole is a juggle, that he is, in fact. Minister
behind the curtain; but these are just refinements. He certainly
solicits persons to take office, and his own friends to hold
theirs; but this is a shallow artifice to prevent the odious cry
of his deserting the King. The new ministers like to let it
' appear that Pitt is cordial to them, and account for the resig­
nations by saying those who resign are chiefly of Canning's fac­
tion .and that Pitt has reprimanded Canning for his intemperate
language.7
By March the new Cabinet had yielded to popular demand and
opened the negotiations for peace, which were to culminate one year
later in the Treaty of Amiens.
Throughout the months of bargaining,
the British resolye to stand firm crumbled steadily; Addington's reputa­
tion for incapacity would have been justified if it had been based on
these negotiations alone.
Opening with the suggestion that Britain
7.
Of this final statement, no proof can be found in the docu­
ments available to the author.
60
retain all of her colonial conquests, with the possible exceptions of
Minorca and the Cape of Good Hope, as fitting compensation for French
aggrandisement on the Continent, the British ended by signing a treaty
which surrendered everything except Ceylon and Trinidad, and ignored
every important European issue„
Early in April of 1801 came news that seemed to improve the
British position and prestige greatly.
First, word came of the defeat
of the Danish Navy and, soon thereafter, of the break-up of the Armed
Neutrality.
Lord Nelson had attacked the League at Copenhagen, its most
vulnerable port.
After destroying the Danish fleet, his fleet was
riddled with holes from the cannon of the shore batteries, and seven
ships had been forced aground.
He then sent word to the Danish Regent
that he would be forced to burn his prizes, loaded with wounded Danes,
unless a truce was granted to give him time to remove his ships.
The
Regent yielded to popular opinion and allowed Nelson's fleet to leave
the Harbor, where he joined Admiral Parker. A short while later Lord
Parker concluded a convention with the Crown Prince of Denmark agreeing
to a suspension of hostilities for fourteen weeks, with the liberty to
resume the conflict at the end of the period if either saw fit.®
In early April, word came of Paul I's assassination in St.
Petersburg on March 24.^
Paul's eldest son, Alexander, accepted the
throne from the conspiritors, though he was still shaken at the thought
of his father's strangulation.
He had expected his father to be deposed
8. Lord Grenville to the Earl of Carysfoot, April 21, 1801.
Dropmore Papers. VII, 7.
9. Lord Hawkesbury to Lord Grenville inclosing the announcement
from Count Panin, April 3, 1801. Ibid, VII, 7.
61
peacefully.
Anxious to avoid more violence so early in his reign, the
young Czar disbanded the League of Armed Neutrality.
Count Panin acted
for Alexander in raising the embargo on British goods and returning most
of the 300 merchants who had been seized by the League members when the
war had been declared two months before (February 1, 1801).
The British
government was quick to recognize an opportunity and distributed L 60,000
among the Imperial advisors, followed by proposals for an active alliance
soon thereafter.
Following the news from the North came word of General Abercromby's
brilliant victory of March 21, in which he had destroyed French suprem­
acy in Egypt.
British attempts to dislodge General Kleber1s troops from
Cairo had failed completely until the general was assassinated by a
Muslim fanatic in June, 1800.
The less competent General Menow took
over command of the army and attacked the British forces outside Cairo,
only to be completely defeated.
torious British.
Two Turkish armies then joined the vic­
Town after town surrendered with little resistance.
The terrible heat took a great toll of the British armies, however, and
they made sure that the terms offered the French were light enough to
insure acceptance immediately.
In June of 1801, Count Panin and Lord St. Helena signed the
treaty in St. Petersburg which ended the quarrel between Great Britain
and the Armed Neutrality.
Russia conceded to agree to British theory
that ships of a neutral nation under convoy of a man-of-war with a
national flag were not exempt from search.
The right of search was to
be more strictly regulated and restricted to naval vessels.
1801.
Arbitrary
10. Colonel Robert Anstruther to Colonel Brownrigg; April 20,
Ibid. VII, 8.
62
seizures were restrained by heavy penalties,
"Paper blockades" were for­
bidden; in the future the blockading force must be so strong and in such
a position as to make an attempt to enter enemy ports plainly perilous.
Naval stores and foodstuffs, the bulk of the Baltic trade, were no longer
classed as "contraband of war."H
The treaty was generally felt to be
just, but when communicated to Lord Grenville (by Lord Hawkesbury) it re­
ceived severe criticism.
Grenville, like most of the British people, was
becoming used to brilliant naval victories which fulfilled English objec­
tives without compromising anything of importance to the enemy.
In this
case he seemed
tofeel that concessions to Denmark were an affront to
British honor,
in
spite of the fact that they greatly reducedthe war
front.12
On October 1, 1801, preliminaries to
the peace between
Britain were signed at London by Lord Hawkeisbury
Franceand
and M. Otto. One of the
primary difficulties had been Napoleon's refusal to restore Egypt to the
Turks.
Yet, all of the First Consul's efforts to reinforce General Menow
proved unsuccessful, and the capitulation of Alexandria to the British
removed the chief obstacle for the conclusion of the peace.
Lord
Hawkesbury wrote to Grenville, "We will retain possession of Ceylon and
Trinidad; the Cape of Good Hope is to be made a free port; Malta is to
be restored to the Order under the guarantee
and protection of
Power; Egypt is to be restored to the Turks;
the integrity of the
Turkish Empire
11.
isto be maintained; the Kingdom of Naples and
George Hammond to Lord Grenville, July 11, 1801.
a third
the Roman
Ibid,
VII, 29.
12,
VII, 30-33.
Lord Grenville to Lord Hawkesbury, July 15, 1801.
.
.
Ibid,
63
territory is to be evacuated by the French armies.
I am inclined to hope
that, under the circumstances, you will consider this an honorable peace."13
Lord Grenville was angered at these terms.
He felt that surrender of the
Cape and Malta was a sacrifice of honor, interests, and even the safety
of the monarchy.
While the populace generally went wild with joy at the news of
the signing of the preliminaries, many thoughtful men were grieved at the
conditions by which the peace had been purchased.
They observed that the
war had been abruptly terminated, without any of the objects being gained
for which it had been undertaken.
Supposedly it had been waged to curb
the ambition and democratic propagandism of France and to prevent the ex­
tension of republican authority in the Low Countries.
The preliminary
articles contributed nothing to the coercion of France, while at the same
time giving the Republic a means of restoring its fleet and recruiting an
army for future wars.
The administration's supporters and advocates of peace throughout
the country opposed these arguments.
Without admitting that Britain's
resources were exhausted or that peace was a matter of necessity, it was
still possible to see that the question of reducing French military power
at this time was almost hopeless.
The war had ceased to be a life and
death struggle against revolutionary doctrines and had become a war be­
tween normal governments; the cost of its maintenance had to be weighed
against the advantages which might be gained by its further prosecution.
The cost of continuing the struggle was enormous, and the Addington
13.
VII, 45.
Lord Hawkesbury to Lord Grenville, October 1, 1801.
Ibid.
64
administration felt that it would be worthwhile to try peace.
If the
first consul proved he was not sincere, there would be time enough to
take up arms again later.
At first. Lord Grenville intended to oppose the Cabinet1s policy
concerning the treaty with Russia and F r a n c e . H o w e v e r , public opinion
was nearly unanimous in its support of the Ministry.
Only a few of the
members of the House of Lords would follow Lord Grenville's lead, and
in Commons, Windham did not even dare to divide.
The British had always
disclaimed any selfish motives concerning Malta and the Cape of Good
Hope publically and could hardly retain Malta without brushing aside the
sovereign rights of the King of Two Sicilies, their ally, which they
refused to do at this time.
Lord
C o r n w a l l is
was appointed Ambassador Extraordinary and
was to conclude with Joseph Bonaparte a definite treaty between the
Consulate and George III (See Appendix, the Treaty of Amiens).
When
the Preliminaries of London had been signed in October, 1801, Napoleon
had sent immediate notice of his ratification, commencing with the
phrase, "En consequence du retablissement de la paix...."
This approach
should have given Addington and Hawkesbury at least an idea that the
First Consul was determined to regard the preliminary agreement as
definitive, and that in permitting this interpretation they would com­
promise their case in advance.
They ratified the agreement nonetheless,
•
I
clinging to the hope that they would be able to improve their claims
14. See Lord Grenville's letter to Henry Dundas, October 4,
1801.
Ibid, VII, 48 and also Lord Grenville's letter to William Pitt
of October 6, 1801.
15. Charles Cornwallis, the first marquess, 1738-1805, had
served as the governor general of India and viceroy to Ireland. While
an understanding man, he was not a brilliant negotiator.
65
during the subsequent discussions.
For the next five months the British
plenipotentiaries sought to strengthen their claims, only to end by pon­
dering the duplicity of French diplomacy and acknowledging themselves
outmatched in the battle of wits.
Allegedly, one of Napoleon’s chief reasons for considering peace
was a desire to restore foreign trade and commerce with France,
Early
in the war, the Committee of Public Safety had excluded British merchant­
men from French ports by a decree which punished attempts at evasion
with the confiscation of ships and their cargoes and the imprisonment of
the crews.
The English merchants and shippers had assumed that these
hostile regulations would be relaxed or repealed with the peace settle­
ment,
At the first word of the truce and impending peace negotiations,
they eagerly crowded into French ports only to find that these regula­
tions were still in effect,
Napoleon listened only to the cries of
French industrialists who pleaded for protection and refused to grant
what the British considered adequate concessions.
The British com­
mercial classes soon began to feel that the peace would prove more dan­
gerous to their financial interests than the war.
While the English deplored the lack of a commercial pact with
France, Napoleon found a personal grievance in the articles printed
?
!
about him and his policies in emigre-sponsored newspapers sold in London.
He refused to believe that the British government could not maintain the
close censorship on all publications which he exercised on the press in
France,
He expressed his views on the subject frequently, one example
'
|
being found in a note of instruction to General Andreossy, who assumed
66
the position of French minister in London in the fall of 1801
Whenever they speak to you of trade, reply we cannot here con­
sider any proposals calculated to strengthen commercial bonds as
long as the English do not show that they are really desirous of
emerging from a condition, Which is in point of fact but a ces­
sation of hostilities, to enter into an actual state of peace.
For our relations with England we cannot but see a kind of armis­
tice, and this position will appear to us unsatisfactory and dis­
tasteful as long as we see the intrigues against the internal
government of France being formed in London: two hundred indivi­
duals who by the terms of the Treaty of Amiens should be banished
from British territory living in Jersey: and libels directed
against the present administration of France permitted, if not
actually subsidized.
These dissatisfactions had injurious effects on the negotiations
at Amiens.
Both governments made new demands and insisted more stub­
bornly on other points that remained unsettled.
One article already
agreed upon, the plan to use a Russian garrison on Malta, had to be
abandoned.
Alexander had turned his interest to Russia's domestic
problems and refused to be concerned with foreign entanglements.
He
proposed that the King of Naples should furnish a garrison until the
restored Knights of St. John could command strong enough force for its
defense.
This suggestion was eventually agreed upon, but the distrust
between the two negotiating Powers grew more intense daily.
The treaty was eventually signed on March 27, 1802, and it em­
bodied even more extensive concessions than Lord Cornwallis had been
empowered to make.
The Cabinet ratified the treaty after a great deal
of hesitation, rather than disown its distinguished envoy.
More important than the items included in the Treaty of Amiens
were those which were excluded.
The House of Savoy, whose claims the
British had formerly championed, was not mentioned.
16.
No assurance was
P. Coquelle, Napoleon and England, p. 20.
67
given that French aggression on the Continent would cease.
Compensation
for the House of Orange was mentioned in the treaty, but no special defi­
nition of territory was made.
Belgium remained in the hands of the
French without independence, and there was no guarantee that the French
controlled continental markets would be reopened to British trade.
The failure of the treaty to provide for a Trade pact was later
felt to be the principal factor in the resumption of hostilities the fol­
lowing year.
The merchants of London recognized the flaw in the settle-
ment from the beginning and protested that its omission rendered Article
I, which promised peace, friendship, apd good intelligence between the
contracting parties, an empty and hypocritical phrase.
When the treaty was published, the terms proved a great dis­
appointment to the British people.
It appeared that Britain had made
all of the concessions and gained nothing in return.
Egypt, which France
had already lost, was returned to Turkey; Malta was to be returned to the
Order of St. John; all of the military conquests the British had won in
the Mediterranean were to be restored to their pre-war possessors, as
were all of the colonial conquests.
The treaty meant a return of the
status quo ante bellum to the British, but for the French Consulate it
meant a tacit recognition of French superiority on the Continent.
Napoleon had refused stubbornly to sign away an inch of territory
*
if it was still held by the French forces.
He agreed only to withdraw
from the Neapolitan Kingdom and the Papal States, and to acknowledge the
Republic of the Ionian Islands, which had been formed under the protec­
tion of Russia and Turkey in 1799.
Aside from the British, the only vic­
tims of the treaty were the Spanish who surrendered Trinidad, and the
Dutch who failed to regain Ceylon.
68
It was hard for the British to find cause for self-congratulation,
;
but the desire for peace was so great that even Pitt joined in urging
the ratification of the pact.
Lord Hawkesbury defended the settlement
saying that nothing essential was lost as long as.Britain remained mis­
tress of the seas.
Her gain from eight long years of war was a small
gain in territory and no new markets, but she was assured of naval suprem­
acy.
The treaty had left Britain in a favorable position to renew hos­
tilities if the truce failed to work satisfactorily.
At the beginning
t
of the war, in 1798, Britain had possessed 135 ships-of-the-1ine and 133
frigates; by its conclusion, the numbers had risen to 202 and 277 respec­
tively.
France, on the other hand, had seen her 80 ships-of-the-line
cut to 39, while only 35 of her 66 frigates remained afloat.
The re­
assurance of this naval supremacy made the greatly-desired peace seem
like a safe experiment.
Some of the more optimistic Englishmen were
certain that Napoleon would be content with the conquests he had already
gained.
The Treaty of Amiens was doomed from its inception for several
reasons.
In the first place, Napoleon admitted that the treaty was
i
merely a truce, in his estimation, to grant time for the regrouping of
his forces and the consolidation of his conquests.
The Russians had been
given the tacit understanding during the war that they would receive
i
Constantinople, a prize that neither the French, British, or Austrians
were actually willing to grant.
The Prussians looked longingly at Hanover,
a personal possession of George III.
Finally, the Addington ministry had
surrendered all of the territorial conquests which seemed important to
the British people.
None of the goals of the coalition had been accom­
plished, and all of its members were discontented with the terms granted
69
by the French,
The distrust and jealousies were present and growing,
and it took only the French occupation of Hanover and Naples the follow­
ing year to bring Great Britain back into conflict with Napoleon once
more.
APPENDIX
The Treaty of Amiens was signed by the governments of Great
Britain and France on March 27, 1802 at Amiens, France.
Lord Cornwallis
represented the government of George III; Joseph Bonaparte signed for
the French Republic.
The Treaty of Amiens in its entirety is presented
below.
"His Majesty
the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Ireland, and the First Consul of the French Republic, in the name
of the
to the
French people, being animated with an equal desire to put an end
calamities ofwar, have laid the foundations of peace with the
Preliminary Articles signed in London the first of October, 1801....
Article 1.
There shall be peace, friendship and understanding
between H.M. the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland
his heirs and successors, bn the one part; and the French Republic, H.M.
the King of Spain, his heirs and Successors, and the Batavian Republic,
on the other hand.
The contracting parties shall give the greatest
attention to maintain, between themselves and their States, a perfect
harmony, and without allowing on either side any kind of hostilities by
sea or by land, to be committed to any cause or under any pretense what­
soever.
They shall carefully avoid everything which might hereafter
affect the union happily reestablished, and they shall not afford any
assistance or protection, directly or indirectly, to those who should
cause prejudice to any of them.
Article 2.
All prisoners taken on either side, as well by land
as by sea, and the hostages carried away during the war, and to this day
shall be restored without ransom in six weeks at the latest, to be com­
puted from the day of exchange of the ratification of the present treaty,
and on paying the debts they have contracted during their captivity.
Each contracting party shall respectively discharge the advances which
have been made by any of the contracting parties for the subsistence and
maintenance of the prisoners in the country where they have been detained.
For this purpose a commission shall be established by agreement, which
shall be especially charged to ascertain and regulate the compensation
which may be due to either of the contracting powers.
Time and place
where the commissioners who shall be charged with the execution of this
Article, shall assemble, shall also be fixed upon by agreement.
Article 3.
His Britanic Majesty restores to the French Republic
and her Allies, namely His Catholic Majesty and the Batavian Republic,
all of the possessions and colonies which had belonged to them respec­
tively, and which had been occupied or conquered by the British forces
in the course of the war, with the exception of the island of Trinidad
and the Dutch possession of the island of Ceylon.
Article 4,
His Catholic Majesty cedes and guarantees, in full
right and sovereignty, to His Britanic Majesty, all of the possessions
and establishments in the island of Trinidad.
Article 5.
The Batavian Republic cedes and guarantees, in full
right and sovereignty, to His Britanic Majesty, all of the establishments
and possessions in the island of Ceylon which belonged to the Republic
of the United Provinces or to their East India Company.
Article 6.
The Cape of Good Hope remains in full sovereignty to
the Batavian Republic, as it was before the war.
The ships of every
72
description belonging to the other contracting parties shall have the
right to put in there and purchase such supplies as they may need with­
out paying any other duties than those to which the ships of the Batavian
i
'
Republic are subjected.
.
Article 7.
The territories and possessions of Her Most Faithful
Majesty are maintained with their integrity, such as they were previous
to the commencement of the war.
Nevertheless, the limits of French and
Portuguese Guiana shall be determined by the River Arawari....
Article 8.
Territories, possessions and rights of the Ottoman
Porte are hereby maintained in their integrity, such as they were pre­
vious to the war.
Article 9.
The Republic of the Seven Isles is hereby acknow­
Article 10.
The islands of Malta, Gozo, and Gomino shall be
ledged .
restored to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, and shall be held by it
upon the same conditions on which the Order held them previous to the
war, and under the following conditions:
i.
The Knights of the Order, whose langues shall continue to
subsist after the exchange of the ratification of the present treaty,
are invited to return to Malta as soon as that exchange shall have taken
place.
They shall there form a General Chapter and shall proceed to the
election of a Grand Master, to be chosen from among the natives of those
nations which preserve langues if no such election shall have been al­
ready made since the exchange of the ratification of the preliminary
Articles of Peace.
It is understood that an election which shall have
been made subsequent to that period, shall alone be considered as valid
73
to the exchange of every other which shall have taken place at anytime
previous to the said period.
ii.
The Government of Great Britain and the French Republic,
being desirous of placing the Order of St. John and the island of Malta
in a state of entire independence on each of these Powers, do agree that
there shall be henceforth no English nor French langues, and that no in­
dividual belonging to either of said Powers shall be admissible into the
Order.
iii.
A Maltese langue shall be established, to be supported out
of the land revenues and commercial duties of the island.
There shall
be dignities with appointments, and an Auberge appropriated to this langue.
No proof of nobility shall be necessary for the admission of knights into
said langue,
They shall be competent to hold every office and enjoy
every privilege in the like manner as the knights of the other langues.
The municipal, civil, judicial and other offices under government of the
island, shall be filled at least in the proportion of one-half by native
inhabitants of Malta, Gozo, and Comino.
iv.
The forces of his Britanic Majesty shall evacuate the island
and its dependencies within three months of the exchange of ratification,
or sooner if it can be done.
At that period, the island shall be de­
livered up to the Order in the state in which it is now provided to the
l
Grand Master, or Commissioners fully empowered, according to the provi­
sions of the Statutes of the Order, [who should] be upon the island to
receive possession, and that the force to be furnished by his Sicilian
Majesty, as hereafter stipulated, be arrived there.
v.
The garrison of the island shall, at all times, consist at
,i
least one-half of native Maltese; and the Order shall have the liberty
74
of recruiting the remainder of the garrison from the natives of these
countries which possess langues.
The native Maltese troops shall be
offered by the Maltese; and the supreme command of the garrison, as well
as the appointment of the officers, shall be vested in the Grand Master
of the Order.
vi.
The independence of the islands of Malta, Goza, and Comino,
as well as the present arrangement, shall be under the protection of
Great Britain, France, Austria, Russia, Spain and Prussia.
vii.
The perpetual neutrality of the Order, and of the island
and its dependencies, is hereby acknowledged.
viii.
The port of Malta shall be open to the commerce of all
nations who shall pay equal and moderate duties.
ix.
The Barbary States are excepted from the provisions of the
two preceding paragraphs until, by means of an arrangement to be made by
the contracting parties, the system of hostility which subsists between
the said Barbary States, the Order of St. John, and the powers possess­
ing langues, or taking part in the formation of them, shall be terminated.
x.
The Order shall be governed, both in spiritual and temporal
matters by the same Statutes that were in force at the time when the
knights quitted the island, so for as the same shall not be derogated
from the present treaty.
xi.
Stipulations iii, vii, and viii and x shall be converted
into laws and perpetual Statutes of the Order in the customary manner.
xii.
His Sicilian Majesty shall be invited to furnish 2,000 men,
natives of his dominions, to serve as a garrison for the several fort­
resses on the island.
The troops shall remain one year or until the Order
of St. John has sufficient forces as judged by the Powers.
75
xiii.
The several Powers specified in paragraph vi shall be in­
vited to accede to the present arrangements„
Article 11.
The French forces shall evacuate the Kingdom of
Naples and the Roman territory.
The English forces shall, in like manner,
evacuate Porto Ferrajo, and generally all ports and islands which they
may occupy in the Mediterranean or in the Adriatic.
i
Article 12.
j
The evacuations, cessions, and restitutions stipu­
lated for the present Treaty, except where otherwise especially provided
for, shall take place in Europe within one month, in the Continent and
seas of America and Africa within three months and within the Continent
and seas of Asia within six months of the ratification of the present
Treaty.
Article 13.
In all cases the restitution agreed upon by the
present treaty, the fortifications shall be delivered up in the state
in which they may have been at the time of the signature of the Pre­
liminary Treaty; and all the works which have been constructed since the
occupation shall remain untouched.
It is further agreed that all articles of cession stipulated,
there shall be allowed to the inhabitants of whatever condition or na­
tion they may be, a term of three years to be computed from the ratifica­
tion of the present treaty, for the purposes of disposing of their property
acquired and possessed either before or during the war, in which term
of three years they may have full exercise of their rWligion and the
enjoyment of their property.
The same privilege is granted in the countries restored, to all
those, whether inhabitants or others, who shall have made therein any
76
establishments whatsoever during the time when those countries were in
the possession of Great Britain.
With respect to the inhabitants of the countries restored or
ceded, it is agreed that none of them shall be prosecuted, disturbed,
or molested in their persons or properties, under any pretext, on account
of their conduct or physical opinions, or of their attachment to any of
the contracting Powers, nor on any other account, except that of debts
contracted to individuals, or on account of acts posterior to the present
i
treaty.
Article 14.
All sequestrations imposed by any of the parties on
the funded property, revenue or debts, of whatever description, belong­
ing to any of the contracting Powers, or their citizens or subjects, shall
be taken off immediately after the signature of this treaty.
The deci­
sion of all claims brought forward by individuals, subjects or citizens
of any of the others, for rights, debts, property or effects whatsoever,
which according to received usages and the law of nations, ought to revive
at the period of peace, shall be heard and decided before competent tri­
bunals; and in all cases prompt and ample justice shall be administered
in the countries in which the claims are made.
Article 15.
The fisheries on the coast of Newfoundland, and of
the adjacent islands, and of the Gulf of St. Lawrence, are replaced on
the same footing on which they were previous to the war.
The French
fishermen, and the inhabitants of St. Pierre and Miguelon, shall have
privileges of cutting such wood as they may have need of, in the bays
/
of Fortune and Dispair, for a space of one year from the date of notifi­
cation of the ratification of the treaty.
77
Article 16„ In order to prevent all causes of complaint and dis'
!
pute which may arise on account of prizes which may have been taken at
sea, after the signature of the Preliminary Articles, it is reciprocally
agreed that the vessels and effects which may have taken in the British
Channel and in the North Sea, after a space of twelve days, to be com­
puted from the exchange of the ratification of such Preliminary Articles,
shall be restored on each side; that the term shall be one month from the
British Channel and North Sea, as far as the Canary Islands, inclusively,
whether in the ocean or in the Mediterranean; two months from said Canary
Islands as far as the equator; and lastly, five months from all other
parts of the world, without any exception, or any more particular des­
cription of time and place.
Article 17.
The Ambassadors, Ministers, and other agents of the
contracting Powers shall enjoy respectively in the states of the said
Powers, the same rank, privileges, perogatiyes, and immunities which
public agents of the same class enjoyed previous to the war.
:
Article 18.
The branch of the House of Nassau, which was estab­
lished in the Republic formerly called the Republic of the United Provinces,
and now the Batavian Republic, having suffered losses there in private
property as a consequence of the change of the constitution adopted in
that country, an adequate compensation shall be procured for the said
House of Nassau for the said losses.
Article 19.
The present Difinitive Treaty shall be declared
common to the Sublime Ottoman Porte, the ally of his Britanic Majesty,
and the Sublime Porte shall be invited to transmit its act of accession
thereto in the shortest possible delay.
78
Article 20.
It is agreed that the contracting parties shall on
requisitions made by them respectively, deliver up to justice persons
accused of crimes of murder, forgery, or fraudulent bankruptcy, com­
mitted in the jurisdiction of the requiring party, provided that this
shall be done only when the evidence of criminality shall be so authenticated as that the laws of the country where the accused shall be found
would justify his apprehension and commitment for trial if the offense
had been there committed.
It is understood that this article does not
regard in any manner crimes committed antecedently to the conclusion of
this treaty.
Article 21.
The contracting parties promise to observe sincerely
and bona fide all Articles contained in the present Treaty; and they
will not suffer the same to be infringed, directly or indirectly, by
their respective subjects or citizens, and that said contracting parties
generally and reciprocally guarantee to each other all the stipulations
of the present Treaty.
Article 22.
(Signatures)
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Majesty's Stationary Office, 189,2)„
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Cobbett, William, The Parliamentary History of England from the Earliest
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I
Leprade, W. L,, "England and the French Revolution," Studies in History
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79