Download 1AC – NIB Aff

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1AC – NIB Aff
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Plan
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The United States federal government should substantially increase investment
in its transportation by establishing a foundation, with the authority to form
partnerships with private investors, to disperse grants for transportation
infrastructure in the United States.
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Economy
Contention 1 is the Economy
Public and private infrastructure investment is declining significantly
Nutting, 12 (Rex, MarketWatch's international commentary editor, 6/1/2012, “Investments in the future have dried up;
Commentary: Infrastructure spending down 20% since recession began,” http://www.marketwatch.com/story/investmentsin-the-future-have-dried-up-2012-06-01)
WASHINGTON (MarketWatch) – When I was growing up in the 1960s and 1970s, the legacy of the Great Depression
was everywhere: Dams, bridges, roads, airports, courthouses and even picnic areas and hiking trails. Leaders of that dire
time — Democrats and Republicans — took advantage of the Depression to put millions of Americans back to work,
building the infrastructure that we still rely on today. They had lemons, and they made lemonade. This time, however,
we’re not so fortunate. Instead of picking up the shovel and getting to work, we’ve thrown the shovel aside,
complaining that we just can’t afford to repair what Hoover, FDR, Eisenhower, and LBJ built, much less invest in the
infrastructure than our grandchildren will need. The fact is, we’re investing less than we were before the recession
hit more than four years ago, not just in government money but in private money, as well. Here are the facts,
according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis: Government investments (in structures and in equipment) ramped up
between 2007 and 2010, only to fall back to 2005 levels by early 2012. The trajectory for private-sector investments was
the opposite — a collapse followed by a modest rebound — but they arrived in the same place: back at 2005 levels, some
6% lower than when the recession began. Looking just at investments in structures (such as buildings, roads, mines,
utilities and factories), private companies are investing no more today (in inflation-adjusted terms) than they were in late
1978, according to data from the BEA. All together, public- and private-sector investments in structures are down
about 20% compared with 2007, in inflation-adjusted terms. In 2007, we spent $684 billion on structures; in 2011, we
spent $550 billion. Even before the recession arrived, we were underinvesting. Investments in infrastructure as a share of
the economy had declined by 20% compared with 1960, according to a study by the Congressional Research Service. One
widely cited estimate from civil engineers put the infrastructure gap at more than $2 trillion.
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Scenario 1 is Keynesian Stimulus
Double Dip by 2013 without stimulus now – don’t trust neg authors, empirics prove they suck at
predicting dips
Rasmus 12 (Jack, Jack Rasmus Ph.D in Political Economy and currently teaches economics and politics at St. Mary’s
College and Santa Clara University in California is the author of the just-released book, "Obama's Economy: Recovery for
the Few," Thursday, 05 January 2012, Economic Predictions for 2012 to 2013,
http://truthout.org/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=5904:economic-predictions-for-2012-to-2013
A striking fact of the past four years is that the world's 10,000 or so economists have overwhelmingly failed to
predict the three major economic developments of this period, 2007-2011. First, only a handful predicted the
financial crash of 2007-08 and subsequent deep global contraction that I have called an "Epic" recession, to
distinguish it from normal recessions (and also from depressions). Second, the 10,000 have failed to predict the
current protracted economic stagnation that has occurred since 2008 as well; instead, nearly all mainstream
economists in recent years forecast a sharp "V"-shaped sustained economic recovery since 2008-09 that has yet to take
place. Third, at year end 2011, they once again failed to see the sharp and even deeper retrenchment of the US
and global economies that is coming, no later than 2013 - and possibly even earlier should the eurozone currency and
banking system crash in 2012, which appears increasingly likely. In contrast to mainstream economists, the
methodology applied to the US and global economy used by this writer to predict the US and global economies the
past four years (as outlined in my book, "Epic Recession: Prelude to Global Depression") has relatively accurately
forecast the course of economic events. Based on that same methodology, this writer has recently predicted a doubledip recession in the US no later than early 2013, a major financial crisis in the eurozone and a slowing of the global
economy once again. This double dip in the US and global slowdown in 2012-13 is treated in more detail in this
writer's forthcoming book available in 2012, Obama's Economy: Recovery for the Few." In the meantime, here are this
writer's predictions for 2012-13 for the US, euro and global economy. Predictions for 2012 to 2013 1. The US will
experience a double-dip recession in early 2013. Or, in the event of another banking crisis in Europe, perhaps - though
less likely - earlier in 2012. Despite a continual hyping of economic reports by the media and business press in
recent months, there is no recovery underway for jobs, housing or state and local government finances. Job growth
has been stuck throughout 2011 at around 80,000 to 100,000 a month per the Labor Department's monthly data. The
broader measure of unemployment, the U-6 rate, has been consistently in the 16 percent range, or about 25
million to 26 million for the past year. State and local governments continue to lay off workers in the 20,000
range every month. Little effective stimulus will be forthcoming from the federal government in 2012, despite the
election year, and further deficit cutting is even possible in 2012. The first quarter of 2012 will record a significant
slowing of gross domestic product (GDP) growth once again. Should the eurozone debt crisis escalate once more in the
second quarter of 2012, the US economy will weaken further in the second quarter. It may even slip into recession if
the euro crisis is particularly severe. More likely, however, is the scenario of an emerging double-dip recession in
early 2013, when deficit cutting by Congress and the administration intensifies.
Infrastructure stimulus is effective – empirics prove
Blodget 12 ( Henry Blodget is co-founder, CEO and Editor-In Chief of Business Insider a top-ranked Wall Street
Internet analyst. Jun. 19, 2012, Yes, It's Time For A Massive Infrastructure Spending Program,
://www.businessinsider.com/infrastructure-spending-program-2012-6?op=1)
YES, GOVERNMENT SPENDING DOES WORK--SOME GOVERNMENT SPENDING. The economy is basically
composed of three big spending engines —consumers, corporations (investment), and governments. So when the first
two weaken, as they have in recent years, the third can help offset this weakness. Specifically, the government can
increase its spending to offset the lost consumer and business spending. When governments spend money well,
moreover—such as on infrastructure projects that benefit all citizens—the impact of this spending lasts far beyond
the years in which the money is spent. Roads, bridges, schools, airports, national broadband networks, and other
investments can improve the country for decades. When the government spends money badly, meanwhile--on
bailouts and handouts and by perpetuating unsustainable promises of entitlement programs--the money is just wasted.
Ever since the 2009 stimulus "failed to fix the economy," the consensus in the US has been that government
stimulus doesn't work. There's actually a lot of evidence to suggest that it did work, or at least helped improve
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the situation (check out these charts). But the theory that government spending "doesn't work" is pervasive. In support
of this theory, everyone first points to Japan, where the government has been frantically "stimulating" the economy for
two decades now. Then they point to the Great Depression, with its massive public-works programs. But other
evidence suggests that the impact of government stimulus, specifically infrastructure stimulus, is being badly
misunderstood. Richard Koo Think Japan's stimulus has failed? Look at what it would have done with government
intervention (red line). The work of economist Richard Koo, for example, suggests that Japan's stimulus has been
vastly more successful than is commonly believed. Far from not working, Koo argues, Japan's government stimulus
has kept Japan's economy alive for the past 20 years. Without the stimulus, Koo says, Japan's economy would not
have crawled along for the last two decades—it would have collapsed. When the same logic is applied to the US
stimulus of 2009-2010, the conclusion is that the stimulus "failed to fix" the US economy, but that it kept the recession
from being much worse. In addition to Japan, one of the most often-repeated examples cited by those who say
stimulus doesn't work is the US experience in the Great Depression. To see that stimulus doesn't work, they say, all
you need to do is look at the huge public-works programs of the 1930s, which failed to pull the US permanently out of
the Depression. What finally got the US out of the Depression, these folks continue, was World War 2. World War 2:
The biggest Keynesian stimulus ever. But what was World War 2 if not a gigantic government stimulus? That's exactly
what World War 2 was. It put the US government deeply in debt, vastly deeper in debt than we are today. But it got
our production engine humming again. And it set the stage for decades of impressive growth, during which we
eventually worked off the World War 2 debt. So there's a lot of evidence to suggest that the current consensus that
stimulus "doesn't work" is flat-out wrong. In fact, the evidence suggests, stimulus can keep the economy from
collapsing while the private sector heals itself. And this, in turn, suggests that ruling out future stimulus in the form
of infrastructure investment as a way to help the economy is a major mistake, especially with US infrastructure in such
lousy shape and so many US workers idled by the construction industry slowdown. To learn more about how
government stimulus helps economies get through depressions, flip through some of Richard Koo's excellent slides
below. They focus on Japan, the Depression, and recent US and Europe experiences...
Keynesian stimulus is good – monetarists got it wrong by basing their theory on beauty and
greed rather than fact and monetarist statistical analyses are false
Krugman ’09 (Paul Krugman is a Professor of Economics and International Affairs at Princeton University, Centenary
Professor at the London School of Economics, and an op-ed columnist for The New York Times. In 2008, Krugman won
a Nobel Prize in Economics, September 6, 2009, “ How Did Economists Get It So Wrong?”,
http://www.csus.edu/indiv/d/dowellm/Econ100A/krugman_macro.pdf) SRK
not long ago economists were congratulating themselves over the success of their field
in a 2008 paper
declared that “the state of macro is good.”
I. MISTAKING BEAUTY FOR TRUTH It’s hard to believe now, but
. Those
successes — or so they believed — were both theoretical and practical, leading to a golden era for the profession. On the theoretical side, they thought that they had resolved their inter nal disputes. Thus,
titled “The State of Macro” (that is, macroeconomics, the study of big-picture issues like
The battles of yesteryear, he said, were over, and there had been a “broad convergence of vision.” And in the
recessions), Olivier Blanchard of M.I.T., now the chief economist at the International Monetary Fund,
real world, economists believed they had things under control: the “central problem of depression-prevention has been solved,” declared Robert Lucas of the University of Chicago in his 2003 presidential address to the American Economic Association. In 2004, Ben Bernanke, a former Princeton professor who is now the chairman of
w economists saw our current crisis
coming, but this predictive failure was the least of the field’s problems More important was the profession’s
blindness to the possibility of catastrophic failures
the Federal Reserve Board, celebrated the Great Moderation in economic performance over the previous two decades, which he attributed in part to improved economic policy making. Last year, everything came apart. Fe
.
very
in a market economy. During the golden years, financial economists came to believe that markets were inherently stable — indeed, that stocks and other assets were always priced just
right. There was nothing in the prevailing models suggesting the possibility of the kind of collapse that happened last year. Meanwhile, macroeconomists were divided in their views. But the main division was between those who insisted that free-market economies never go astray and those who believed that economies may stray now
and then but that any major deviations from the path of prosperity could and would be corrected by the all-powerful Fed. Neither side was prepared to cope with an economy that went off the rails despite the Fed’s best efforts. And in the wake of the crisis, the fault lines in the economics profession have yawned wider than ever. Lucas
says the Obama administration’s stimulus plans are “schlock economics,” and his Chicago colleague John Cochrane says they’re based on discredited “fairy tales.” In response, Brad DeLong of the University of California, Berkeley, writes of the “intellectual collapse” of the Chicago School, and I myself have written that comments
because economists, as a group, mistook
beauty, clad in impressive-looking mathematics, for truth. Until the Great Depression, most economists clung to a vision of capitalism as a perfect or nearly perfect system. That
vision wasn’t sustainable in the face of mass unemployment, but as memories of the Depression faded, economists fell back in love with the old, idealized vision of an economy in which
rational individuals interact in perfect markets, this time gussied up with fancy equations. The renewed romance with the idealized market was, to be sure, partly a response to
shifting political winds, partly a response to financial incentives. But while sabbaticals at the Hoover Institution and job opportunities on Wall Street are nothing to sneeze at, the
central cause of the profession’s failure was the desire for an all-encompassing, intellectually elegant approach that also gave economists a chance to show off their mathematical
prowess. Unfortunately, this romanticized and sanitized vision of the economy led most economists to ignore all the things that can go wrong. They turned a blind eye to the limitations
of human rationality that often lead to bubbles and busts; to the problems of institutions that run amok; to the imperfections of markets — especially financial markets — that can
cause the economy’s operating system to undergo sudden, unpredictable crashes; and to the dangers created when regulators don’t believe in regulation. It’s much harder to say
where the economics profession goes from here. But what’s almost certain is that economists will have to learn to live with messiness. That is, they will have to acknowledge the
importance of irrational and often unpredictable behavior, face up to the often idiosyncratic imperfections of markets and accept that an elegant economic “theory of everything” is a
long way off. In practical terms, this will translate into more cautious policy advice — and a reduced willingness to dismantle economic safeguards in the faith that markets will solve
all problems. II. FROM SMITH TO KEYNES AND BACK The birth of economics as a discipline is usually credited to Adam Smith, who published “The Wealth of Nations” in
1776. Over the next 160 years an extensive body of economic theory was developed, whose central message was: Trust the market. Yes, economists admitted that there were cases in which markets might fail, of which the most important was the case of
from Chicago economists are the product of a Dark Age of macroeconomics in which hard-won knowledge has been forgotten. What happened to the economics profession? And where does it go from here? As I see it, the economics profession went astray
“externalities” — costs that people impose on others without paying the price, like traffic congestion or pollution. But the basic presumption of “neoclassical” economics (named after the congestion or pollution. But the basic presumption of “neoclassical” economics (named after the late-19th-century theorists who elaborated on the
concepts of their “classical” predecessors) was that we should have faith in the market system. This faith was, however, shattered by the Great Depression. Actually, even in the face of total collapse some economists insisted that whatever happens in a market economy must be right: “Depressions are not simply evils,” declared Joseph
Schumpeter in 1934 — 1934! They are, he added, “forms of something which has to be done.” But many, and eventually most, economists turned to the insights of John Maynard Keynes for both an explanation of what had happened and a solution to future depressions. Keynes did not, despite what you may have heard, want the
government to run the economy. He described his analysis in his 1936 masterwork, “The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money,” as “moderately conservative in its implications.” He wanted to fix capitalism, not replace it. But he did challenge the notion that free-market economies can function without a minder,
expressing particular contempt for financial markets, which he viewed as being dominated by short-term speculation with little regard for fundamentals. And he called for active government intervention — printing more money and, if necessary, spending heavily on public works — to fight unemployment during slumps. It’s important
to understand that Keynes did much more than make bold assertions. “The General Theory” is a work of profound, deep analysis — analysis that persuaded the best young economists of the day. Yet the story of economics over the past half century is, to a large degree, the story of a retreat from Keynesianism and a return to
neoclassicism. The neoclassical revival was initially led by Milton Friedman of the University of Chicago, who asserted as early as 1953 that neoclassical economics works well enough as a description of the way the economy actually functions to be “both extremely fruitful and deserving of much confidence.” But what about
depressions? Friedman’s counterattack against Keynes began with the doctrine known as monetarism. Monetarists didn’t disagree in principle with the idea that a market economy needs deliberate stabilization. “We are all Keynesians now,” Friedman once said, although he later claimed he was quoted out of context. Monetarists
asserted, however, that a very limited, circumscribed form of government intervention — namely, instructing central banks to keep the nation’s money supply, the sum of cash in circulation and bank deposits, growing on a steady path — is all that’s required to prevent depressions. Famously, Friedman and his collaborator, Anna
Schwartz, argued that if the Federal Reserve had done its job properly, the Great Depression would not have happened. Later, Friedman made a compelling case against any deliberate effort by government to push unemployment below its “natural” level (currently thought to be about 4.8 percent in the United States): excessively
expansionary policies, he predicted, would lead to a combination of inflation and high unemployment — a prediction that was borne out by the stagflation of the 1970s, which and high unemployment — a prediction that was borne out by the stagflation of the 1970s, which greatly advanced the credibility of the anti-Keynesian
movement. Eventually, however, the anti-Keynesian counterrevolution went far beyond Friedman’s position, which came to seem relatively moderate compared with what his successors were saying. Among financial economists, Keynes’s disparaging vision of financial markets as a “casino” was replaced by “efficient market” theory,
which asserted that financial markets always get asset prices right given the available information. Meanwhile, many macroeconomists completely rejected Keynes’s framework for understanding economic slumps. Some returned to the view of Schumpeter and other apologists for the Great Depression, viewing recessions as a good
thing, part of the economy’s adjustment to change. And even those not willing to go that far argued that any attempt to fight an economic slump would do more harm than good. Not all macroeconomists were willing to go down this road: many became self-described New Keynesians, who continued to believe in an active role for the
government. Yet even they mostly accepted the notion that investors and consumers are rational and that markets generally get it right. Of course, there were exceptions to these trends: a few economists challenged the assumption of rational behavior, questioned the belief that financial markets can be trusted and pointed to the long
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history of financial crises that had devastating economic consequences. But they were swimming against the tide, unable to make much headway against a pervasive and, in retrospect, foolish complacency. III. PANGLOSSIAN FINANCE In the 1930s, financial markets, for obvious reasons, didn’t get much respect. Keynes compared
them to “those newspaper competitions in which the competitors have to pick out the six prettiest faces from a hundred photographs, the prize being awarded to the competitor whose choice most nearly corresponds to the average preferences of the competitors as a whole; so that each competitor has to pick, not those faces which he
himself finds prettiest, but those that he thinks likeliest to catch the fancy of the other competitors.” And Keynes considered it a very bad idea to let such markets, in which speculators spent their time cha sing one another’s tails, dictate important business decisions: “When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of
the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done.” By 1970 or so, however, the study of financial markets seemed to have been taken over by Voltaire’s Dr. Pangloss, who insisted that we live in the best of all possible worlds. Discussion of investor irrationality, of bubbles, of destructive speculation had virtually disappeared from
investor irrationality, of bubbles, of destructive speculation had virtually disappeared from academic discourse.
The field was dominated by the “efficient-market hypothesis
,” promulgated by Eugene Fama of the
University of Chicago, which claims that financial markets price assets precisely at their intrinsic worth given all publicly available information. (The price of a company’s stock, for example, always accurately reflects the company’s value given the information available on the company’s earnings, its business prospects and so on.)
And by the 1980s, finance economists, notably Michael Jensen of the Harvard Business School, were arguing that because financial markets always get prices right, the best thing corporate chieftains can do, not just for themselves but for the sake of the economy, is to maximize their stock prices. In other words, finance economists
believed that we should put the capital development of the nation in the hands of what Keynes had called a “casino.” It’s hard to argue that this transformation in the profession was driven by events. True, the memory of 1929 was gradually receding, but there continued to be bull markets, with widespread tales of speculative excess,
followed by bear markets. In 1973-4, for example, stocks lost 48 percent of their value. And the 1987 stock crash, in which the Dow plunged nearly 23 percent i n a day for no clear reason, should have raised at least a few doubts about market rationality. These events, however, which Keynes would have considered evidence of the
unreliability of markets, did little to blunt the force of a beautiful idea. The theoretical model that finance economists developed by assuming that every investor rationally balances risk against reward — the so-called Capital Asset Pricing Model, or CAPM (pronounced cap-em) — is wonderfully elegant. And if you accept its premises
it’s also extremely useful. CAPM not only tells you how to choose your portfolio — even more important from the financial industry’s point of view, it tells you how to put a price on financial derivatives, claims on claims. The elegance and apparent usefulness of the new theory led to a string of Nobel prizes for its creators, and many
the more arcane uses of CAPM require physicist-level computations —
professors could and did
, earn Wall Street paychecks.
finance theorists didn’t accept
the efficient-market hypothesis merely because it was elegant, convenient and lucrative They also produced a great
deal of statistical evidence
Finance economists rarely asked the seemingly obvious
question of whether asset prices made sense given real-world fundamentals like earnings they asked
only whether asset prices made sense given other asset prices
of the theory’s adepts also received more mundane rewards: Armed with their new models and formidable math skills —
mannered business-school
become Wall Street rocket scientists
mild-
ing
To be fair,
.
, which at first seemed strongly supportive. But this evidence was of an oddly limited form.
(though not easily answered)
. Instead,
. Larry Summers, now the top economic adviser in the Obama administration, once mocked finance professors with a parable about “ketchup economists” who
“have shown that two-quart bottles of ketchup invariably sell for exactly twice as much as one-quart bottles of ketchup,” and conclude from this that the ketchup exactly twice as much as one-quart bottles of ketchup,” and conclude from this that the ketchup market is perfectly efficient. But neither this mockery nor more polite critiques
from economists like Robert Shiller of Yale had much effect. Finance theorists continued to believe that their models were essentially right, and so did many people making real-world decisions. Not least among these was Alan Greenspan, who was then the Fed chairman and a long-time supporter of financial deregulation whose
rejection of calls to rein in subprime lending or address the ever-inflating housing bubble rested in large part on the belief that modern financial economics had everything under control. There was a telling moment in 2005, at a conference held to honor Greenspan’s tenure at the Fed. One brave attendee, Raghuram Rajan (of the
By October of last year,
however, Greenspan was admitting that he was in a state of “shocked disbelief,” because “the whole intellectual
edifice” had “collapsed.”
University of Chicago, surprisingly), presented a paper warning that the financial system was taking on potentially dangerous levels of risk. He was mocked by almost all present — including, by the way, Larry Summers, who dismissed his warnings as “misguided.”
Since this collapse of the intellectual edifice was also a collapse of real-world markets, the result was a severe recession — the worst, by many measures, since the Great Depression. What should policy makers do? Unfortunately, macroeconomics, which should
have been providing clear guidance about how to address the slumping economy, was in its own state of disarray. IV. THE TROUB LE WITH MACRO “We have involved ourselves in a colossal muddle, having blundered in the control of a delicate machine, the working of which we do not understand. The result is that our possibilities
of wealth may run to waste for a time — perhaps for a long time.” So wrote John Maynard Keynes in an essay titled “The Great Slump of 1930,” in which he tried to explain the catastrophe then overtaking the world. And the world’s possibilities of wealth did indeed run to waste for a long time; it took World War II to bring the Great
Depression to a definitive end. Why was Keynes’s diagnosis of the Great Depression as a “colossal muddle” so compelling at first? And why did economics, circa 1975, divide into opposing camps over the value of Keynes’s views? I like to explain the essence of Keynesian economics with a true story that also serves as a parable, a
small-scale version of the messes that can afflict entire economies. Consider the travails of the Capitol Hill Baby-Sitting Co-op. This co-op, whose problems were recounted in a 1977 article in The Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, was an association of about 150 young couples who agreed to help one another by baby- sitting for
one another’s children when parents wanted a night out. To ensure that every couple did its fair share of baby-sitting, the co-op introduced a form of scrip: coupons made out of heavy did its fair share of baby-sitting, the co-op introduced a form of scrip: coupons made out of heavy pieces of paper, each entitling the bearer to one halfhour of sitting time. Initially, members received 20 coupons on joining and were required to return the same amount on departing the group. Unfortunately, it turned out that the co-op’s members, on average, wanted to hold a reserve of more than 20 coupons, perhaps, in case they should want to go out several times in a row. As a result,
relatively few people wanted to spend their scrip and go out, while many wanted to baby- sit so they could add to their hoard. But since baby-sitting opportunities arise only when someone goes out for the night, this meant that baby-sitting jobs were hard to find, which made members of the co-op even more reluctant to go out, making
baby-sitting jobs even scarcer. . . . In short, the co-op fell into a recession. O.K., what do you think of this story? Don’t dismiss it as silly and trivial: economists have used small-scale examples to shed light on big questions ever since Adam Smith saw the roots of economic progress in a pin factory, and they’re right to do so. The
question is whether this particular example, in which a recession is a problem of inadequate demand — there isn’t enough demand for baby-sitting to provide jobs for everyone who wants one — gets at the essence of what happens in a recession. Forty years ago most economists would have agreed with this interpretation. But since then
macroeconomics has divided into two great factions: “saltwater” economists (mainly in coastal U.S. universities), who have a more or less Keynesian vision of what recessions are all about; and “freshwater” economists (mainly at inland schools), who consider that vision nonsense. Freshwater economists are, essentially, neoclassical
purists. They believe that all worthwhile economic analysis starts from the premise that people are rational and markets work, a premise violated by the story of the baby-sitting co-op. As they see it, a general lack of sufficient demand isn’t possible, because prices always move to match supply with demand. If people want more babysitting coupons, the value of those coupons will rise, so that they’re worth, say, 40 minutes of baby-sitting rather than half an hour — or, equivalently, the cost of an hours’ baby-sitting would fall from 2 coupons to 1.5. And that would solve the problem: the purchasing power of the coupons in circulation would have risen, so that people
would feel no need to hoard more, and there would be no recession. But don’t recessions look like periods in which there just isn’t enough demand to employ everyone willing to work? Appearances can be deceiving, say the freshwater theorists. Sound economics, in their view, says that overall failures of demand can’t happen — and
that means that they don’t. Keynesian economics has been “proved false,” Cochrane, of the University of Chicago, says. Yet recessions do happen. Why? In the 1970s the leading freshwater macroeconomist, the Nobel laureate Robert Lucas, argued that recessions were caused by temporary confusion: workers and companies had
trouble distinguishing overall changes in the level of prices because of inflation or deflation from changes in their own particular business situation. And Lucas warned that any attempt to fight the business cycle would be counterproductive: activist policies, he argued, would just add to the confusion. By the 1980s, however, even this
severely limited acceptance of the idea that recessions are bad things had been rejected by many freshwater economists. Instead, the new leaders of the movement, especially Edward Prescott, who was then at the University of Minnesota (you can see where the freshwater moniker comes from), argued that price fluctuations and changes
in demand actually had nothing to do with the business cycle. Rather, the business cycle reflects fluctuations in the rate of technological progress, which are amplified by the rational response of workers, who voluntarily work more when the environment is favorable and less when it’s unfavorable. Unemployment is a deliberate decision
by workers to take time off. Put baldly like that, this theory sounds foolish — was the Great Depression really the Great Vacation? And to be honest, I think it really is silly. But the basic premise of Prescott’s “real business cycle” theory was embedded in ingeniously constructed mathematical models, which were mapped onto real data
using sophisticated statistical techniques, and the theory came to dominate the teaching of macroeconomics in many university departments. In 2004, reflecting the theory’s influence, Prescott shared a Nobel with Finn Kydland of Carnegie Mellon University. Meanwhile, salt water economists balked. Where the freshwater economists
were purists, saltwater economists were pragmatists. While economists like N. Gregory Mankiw at Harvard, Olivier Blanchard at M.I.T. and David Romer at the University of California, Berkeley, acknowledged that it was hard to reconcile a Keynesian demand-side view of recessions with neoclassical theory, they found the evidence
that recessions are, in fact, demand-driven too compelling to reject. So they were willing to deviate from the assumption of perfect markets or perfect rationality, or both, adding enough imperfections to accommodate a more or less Keynesian view of recessions. And in the saltwater view, active policy to fight recessions remained
desirable. But the self-described New Keynesian economists weren’t immune to the charms of rational individuals and perfect markets. They tried to keep their deviations from neoclassical orthodoxy as limited as possible. This meant that there was no room in the prevailing models for such things as bubbles and banking-system
collapse. The fact that such things continued to happen in the real world — there was a terrible financial and macroeconomic crisis in much of Asia in 1997-8 and a depression-level slump in Argentina in 2002 — wasn’t reflected in the mainstream of New Keynesian thinking. Even so, you might have thought that the differing
worldviews of freshwater and saltwater economists would have put them constantly at loggerheads over economic policy. Somewhat surprisingly, however, between around 1985 and 2007 the disputes between freshwater and saltwater economists were mainly about theory, not action. The reason, I believe, is that New Keynesians,
unlike the original Keynesians, didn’t think fiscal policy — changes in government spending or taxes — was needed to fight recessions. They believed that monetary policy, administered by the technocrats at the Fed, could provide whatever remedies the economy needed. At a 90th birthday celebration for Milton Friedman, Ben
Bernanke, formerly a more or less New Keynesian professor at Princeton, and by then a member of the Fed’s governing board, declared of the Great Depression: “You’re right. We did it. We’re very sorry. But thanks to you, it won’t happen again.” The clear message was that all you need to avoid depressions is a smarter Fed. And as
long as macroeconomic policy was left in the hands of the maestro Greenspan, without Keynesian-type stimulus programs, freshwater economists found little to complain about. (They didn’t believe that monetary policy did a ny good, but they didn’t believe it did any harm, either.) It would take a crisis to reveal both how little common
ground there was and how Panglossian even New Keynesian economics had become. V. NOBODY COULD HAVE PREDICTED . . . In recent, rueful economics discussions, an all-purpose punch line has become “nobody could have predicted. . . .” It’s what you say with regard to disasters that could have been predicted, should have
been predicted and actually were predicted by a few economists who were scoffed at for their pains. Take, for example, the precipitous rise and fall of housing prices. Some economists, notably Robert Shiller, did identify the bubble and warn of painful consequences if it were to burst. Yet key policy makers failed to see the obvious. In
2004, Alan Greenspan dismissed talk of a housing bubble: “a national severe price distortion,” he declared, was “most unlikely.” Home-price increases, Ben Bernanke said in 2005, “largely reflect strong economic fundamentals.” How did they miss the bubble? To be fair, interest rates were unusually low, possibly explaining part of the
price rise. It may be that Greenspan and Bernanke also wanted to celebrate the Fed’s success in pulling the economy out of the 2001 recession; conceding that much of that success rested on the creation of a monstrous bubble would have placed a damper on the festivities. But there was something else going on: a general belief that
bubbles just don’t happen. What’s striking, when you reread Greenspan’s assurances, is that they weren’t based on evidence — they striking, when you reread Greenspan’s assurances, is that they weren’t based on evidence — they were based on the a priori assertion that there simply can’t be a bubble in housing. And the finance
theorists were even more adamant on this point. In a 2007 interview, Eugene Fama, the father of the efficient-market hypothesis, declared that “the word ‘bubble’ drives me nuts,” and went on to explain why we can trust the housing market: “Housing markets are less liquid, but people are very careful when they buy houses. It’s
typically the biggest investment they’re going to make, so they look around very carefully and they compare prices. The bidding process is very detailed.” Indeed, home buyers generally do carefully compare prices — that is, they compare the price of their potential purchase with the prices of other houses. But this says nothing about
whether the overall price of houses is justified. It’s ketchup economics, again: because a two-quart bottle of ketchup costs twice as much as a one-quart bottle, finance theorists declare that the price of ketchup must be right. In short, the belief in efficient financial markets blinded many if not most economists to the emergence of the
biggest financial bubble in history. And efficient-market theory also played a significant role in inflating that bubble in the first place. Now that the undiagnosed bubble has burst, the true riskiness of supposedly safe assets has been revealed and the financial system has demonstrated its fragility. U.S. households have seen $13 trillion in
wealth evaporate. More than six million jobs have been lost, and the unemployment rate appears headed for its highest level since 1940. So what guidance does modern economics have to offer in our current predicament? And should we trust it? VI. THE STIMULUS SQUABBLE Between 1985 and 2007 a false peace settled over the
field of macroeconomics. There hadn’t been any real convergence of views between the saltwater and freshwater factions. But these were the years of the Great Moderation — an extended period during which inflation was subdued and recessions were relatively mild. Saltwater economists believed that the Federal Reserve had
everything under control. Freshwater economists didn’t think the Fed’s actions were actually beneficial, but they were willing to let matters lie. But the crisis ended the phony peace. Suddenly the narrow, technocratic policies both sides were willing to accept were no longer sufficient — and the need for a broader policy response
brought the old conflicts out into the open, fiercer than ever. Why weren’t those narrow, technocratic policies sufficient? The answer, in a word, is zero. During a normal recession, the Fed responds by buying Treasury bills — short-term government debt — from banks. This drives interest rates on government debt down; investors
seeking a higher rate of return move into other assets, driving other interest rates down as well; and normally these lower interest rates eventually lead to an economic bounceback. The Fed dealt with the recession that began in 1990 by driving short-term interest rates from 9 percent down to 3 percent. It dealt with the recession that
began in 2001 by driving rates from 6.5 percent to 1 percent. And it tried to deal with the current recession by driving rates down from 5.25 percent to zero. But zero, it turned out, isn’t low enough to end this recession. And the Fed can’t push rates below zero, since at near-zero rates investors simply hoard cash rather than lending it
out. So by late 2008, with interest rates basically at what macroeconomists call the “zero lower bound” even as the recession continued to deepen, conventional monetary policy had lost all traction. Now what? This is the second time America has been up against the zero lower bound, the previous occasion being the Great Depression.
Fiscal
stimulus is the Keynesian answer to the kind of depression-type economic situation we’re currently in
And it was precisely the observation that there’s a lower bound to interest rates that led Keynes to advocate higher government spending: when monetary policy is ineffective and the private sector can’t be persuaded to spend more, the public sector must take its place in supporting the economy.
. Such Keynesian thinking underlies the
Obama administration’s economic policies — and the freshwater economists are furious. For 25 or so years they tolerated the Fed’s efforts to manage the economy, but a full-blown Keynesian resurgence was something entirely different. Back in 1980, Lucas, of the University of Chicago, wrote that Keynesian economics was so
ludicrous that “at research seminars, people don’t take Keynesian theorizing seriously anymore; the audience starts to whisper and giggle to one another.”
humiliating a comedown.
Admitting that Keynes was largely right, after all, would be too
And so Chicago’s Cochrane, outraged at the idea that government spending could mitigate the latest recession, declared: “It’s not part of what anybody has taught graduate students since the 1960s. They [Keynesian ideas] are fairy tales that have been proved false.
It is very comforting in times of stress to go back to the fairy tales we heard as children, but it doesn’t make them less false.” (It’s a mark of how deep the division between saltwater and freshwater runs that Cochrane doesn’t believe that “anybody” teaches ideas that are, in fact, taught in places like Princeton, M.I.T. and Harvard.)
Meanwhile, saltwater economists, who had comforted themselves with the belief that the great divide in macroeconomics was narrowing, were shocked to realize that freshwater economists hadn’t been listening at all. Freshwater economists who inveighed against the stimulus didn’t sound like scholars who had weighed Keynesian
arguments and found them wanting. Rather, they sounded like people who had no idea what Keynesian economics was about, who were sounded like people who had no idea what Keynesian economics was about, who were resurrecting pre-1930 fallacies in the belief that they were saying something new and profound. And it wasn’t
just Keynes whose ideas seemed to have been forgotten. As Brad DeLong of the University of California, Berkeley, has pointed out in his laments about the Chicago school’s “intellectual collapse,” the school’s current stance amounts to a wholesale rejection of Milton Friedman’s ideas, as well. Friedman believed that Fed policy rather
than changes in government spending should be used to stabilize the economy, but he never asserted that an increase in government spending cannot, under any circumstances, increase employment. In fact, rereading Friedman’s 1970 summary of his ideas, “A Theoretical Framework for Monetary Analysis,” what’s striking is how
Keynesian it seems. And Friedman certainly never bought into the idea that mass unemployment represents a voluntary reduction in work effort or the idea that recessions are actually good for the economy. Yet the current generation of freshwater economists has been making both arguments. Thus Chicago’s Casey Mulligan suggests
that unemployment is so high because many workers are choosing not to take jobs: “Employees face financial incentives that encourage them not to work . . . decrea sed employment is explained more by reductions in the supply of labor (the willingness of people to work) and less by the demand for labor (the number of workers that
employers need to hire).” Mulligan has suggested, in particular, that workers are choosing to remain unemployed because that improves their odds of receiving mortgage relief. And Cochrane declares that high unemployment is actually good: “We should have a recession. People who spend their lives pounding nails in Nevada need
something else to do.” Personally, I think this is crazy. Why should it take mass unemployment across the whole nation to get carpenters to move out of Nevada? Can anyone seriously claim that we’ve lost 6.7 million jobs because fewer Americans want to work? But it was inevitable that freshwater economists would find themselves
trapped in this cul-de-sac: if you start from the assumption that people are perfectly rational and markets are perfectly efficient, you have to conclude that unemployment is voluntary and recessions ar e desirable. Yet if the crisis has pushed freshwater economists into absurdity, it has also created a lot of soul- searching among saltwater
economists. Their framework, unlike that of the Chicago School, both allows for the possibility of involuntary unemployment a nd considers it a bad thing. But the New Keynesian models that have come to dominate teaching and research assume that people are perfectly rational and financial markets are perfectly efficient. To get
anything like the current slump into their models, New Keynesians are forced to introduce some kind of fudge factor that for reasons unspecified temporarily depresses private spending. (I’ve done exactly that in some of my own work.) And if the analysis of where we are now rests on this fudge factor, how much confidence can we
have in the models’ predictions about where we are going? The state of macro, in short, is not good. So where does the profession go from here? VII. FLAWS AND FRICTIONS Economics, as a field, got in trouble because economists were seduced by the vision of a perfect, frictionless market system. If the profession is to redeem
itself, it will have to reconcile itself to a less alluring vision — that of a market economy that has many virtues but that is also shot through with flaws and frictions. The good news is that we don’t have to start from scratch. Even during the heyday of perfect-market economics, there was a lot of work done on the ways in which the real
economy deviated from the theoretical ideal. What’s probably going to happen now — in fact, it’s already happening — is that flaws-and-frictions economics will move from the periphery of economic analysis to its center. There’s already a fairly well developed example of the kind of economics I have in mind: the school of thought
known as behavioral finance. Practitioners of this approach emphasize two things. First, many real-world investors bear little resemblance to the cool calculators of efficient- market theory: they’re all too subject to herd behavior, to bouts of irrational exuberance and unwarranted panic. Second, even those who try to base their decisions
on cool calculation often find that they can’t, that problems of trust, credibility and limited collateral force them to run with the herd. On the first point: even during the heyday of the efficient-market hypothesis, it seemed obvious that many real-world investors aren’t as rational as the prevailing models assumed. Larry Summers once
began a paper on finance by declaring: “THERE ARE IDIOTS. Look around.” But what kind of idiots (the preferred term in the academic literature, actually, is “noise traders”) are we talking about? Behavioral finance, drawing on the broader movement known as behavioral economics, tries to answer that question by relating the
apparent irrationality of investors to known biases in human cognition, like the tendency to care more about small losses tha n small gains or the tendency to extrapolate too readily from small samples (e.g., assuming that because home prices rose in the past few years, they’ll keep on rising). Until the crisis, efficient-market advocates
like Eugene Fama dismissed the evidence produced on behalf of behavioral finance as a collection of “curiosity items” of no real importance. That’s a much harder position to maintain now that the collapse of a vast bubble — a bubble correctly diagnosed by behavioral economists like Robert Shiller of Yale, who related it to past
episodes of “irrational exuberance” — has brought the world economy to its knees. On the second point: suppose that there are, indeed, idiots. How much do they matter? Not much, argued Milton Friedman in an influential 1953 paper: smart investors will make money by buying when the idiots sell and selling when they buy and will
stabilize markets in the process. But the second strand of behavioral finance says that Friedman was wrong, that financial markets are sometimes highly unstable, and right now that view seems hard to reject. Probably the most influential paper in this vein was a 1997 publication by Andrei Shleifer of Harvard and Robert Vishny of
Chicago, which amounted to a formalization of the old line that “the market can stay irrational longer than you can stay solvent.” As they pointed out, arbitrageurs — the people who are supposed to buy low and sell high — need capital to do their jobs. And a severe plunge in asset prices, even if it makes no sense in terms of
fundamentals, tends to deplete that capital. As a result, the smart money is forced out of the market, and prices may go into a downward spiral. The spread of the current financial crisis seemed almost like an object lesson in the perils of financial instability. And the general ideas underlying models of financial instability have proved
highly relevant to economic policy: a focus on the depleted capital of financial institutions helped guide policy actions tak en after the fall of Lehman, and it looks (cross your fingers) as if these actions successfully headed off an even bigger financial collapse. Meanwhile, what about macroeconomics? Recent events have pretty
decisively refuted the idea that recessions are an optimal response to fluctuations in the rate of technological progress; a more or less Keynesian view is the only plausible game in town. Yet standard New Keynesian models left no room for a crisis like the one we’re having, because those models generally accepted the efficient-market
view of the financial sector. There were some exceptions. One line of work, pioneered by none other than Ben Bernanke working with Mark Gertler of New York University, emphasized the way the lack of sufficient collateral can hinder the ability of businesses to raise funds and pursue investment opportunities. A related line of work,
largely established by my Princeton colleague Nobuhiro Kiyotaki and John Moore of the London School of Economics, argued that prices of assets such as real estate can suffer self-reinforcing plunges that in turn depress the economy as a whole. But until now the impact of dysfunctional finance hasn’t been at the core even of
Keynesian economics. Clearly, that has to change. VIII. RE-EMBRACING KEYNES So here’s what I think economists have to do. First, they have to face up to the inconvenient reality that financial markets fall far short of perfection, that they are subject to extraordinary delusions and the madness of crowds. Second, they have to
admit — and this will be very hard for the people who giggled and whispered over Keynes — that
recessions and depressions. T
Keynesian economics remains the best framework we have for making sense of
hird, they’ll have to do their best to incorporate the realities of finance into macroeconomics.
Stimulus through increased financing would greatly increase GPD in the short term
McConaghy and Kessler 11
(Ryan, Deputy Director of the Third Way Economic Program, Jim, Vice President for Policy at Third Way, January 2011,
“A National Infrastructure Bank”, http://www.bernardlschwartz.com/political-initiatives/Third_Way_Idea_Brief__A_National_Infrastructure_Bank-1.pdf)
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By providing a new and innovative mechanism for project financing, the NIB could help provide funding for projects stalled by
monetary constraints. This is particularly true for large scale projects that may be too complicated or costly for traditional means
of financing. In the short-term, providing resources for infrastructure investment would have clear, positive impacts for
recovery and growth. It has been estimated that every $1 billion in highway investment supports 30,000 jobs,37 and that
every dollar invested in infrastructure increases GDP by $1.59.38 It has also been projected that an investment of $10
billion into both broadband and smart grid infrastructure would create 737,000 jobs.39 In the longer-term, infrastructure
investments supported by the NIB will allow the U.S. to meet future demand, reduce the waste currently built into the system,
and keep pace with competition from global rivals.
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Scenario 2 is Infrastructure
All sectors of American transportation infrastructure are falling apart
The Economist 11 (Life in the slow lane, Americans are gloomy about their economy’s ability to produce. Are they
right to be? We look at two areas of concern, transport infrastructure and innovation, Apr 28th 2011,
http://www.economist.com/node/18620944)
America, despite its wealth and strength, often seems to be falling apart . American cities have suffered a rash of recent
infrastructure calamities, from the failure of the New Orleans levees to the collapse of a highway bridge in Minneapolis, to a fatal
crash on Washington, DC’s (generally impressive) metro system. But just as striking are the common shortcomings. America’s civil
engineers routinely give its transport structures poor marks, rating roads, rails and bridges as deficient or functionally obsolete. And
according to a World Economic Forum study America’s infrastructure has got worse, by comparison with other countries, over the
past decade. In the WEF 2010 league table America now ranks 23rd for overall infrastructure quality, between Spain and Chile. Its
roads, railways, ports and air-transport infrastructure are all judged mediocre against networks in northern Europe. America is known
for its huge highways, but with few exceptions (London among them) American traffic congestion is worse than western Europe’s.
Average delays in America’s largest cities exceed those in cities like Berlin and Copenhagen. Americans spend considerably more
time commuting than most Europeans; only Hungarians and Romanians take longer to get to work (see chart 1). More time on lower
quality roads also makes for a deadlier transport network. With some 15 deaths a year for every 100,000 people, the road fatality rate
in America is 60% above the OECD average; 33,000 Americans were killed on roads in 2010. There is little relief for the weary
traveller on America’s rail system. The absence of true high-speed rail is a continuing embarrassment to the nation’s rail enthusiasts.
America’s fastest and most reliable line, the north-eastern corridor’s Acela, averages a sluggish 70 miles per hour between
Washington and Boston. The French TGV from Paris to Lyon, by contrast, runs at an average speed of 140mph. America’s trains
aren’t just slow; they are late. Where European passenger service is punctual around 90% of the time, American short-haul service
achieves just a 77% punctuality rating. Long-distance trains are even less reliable. The Amtrak alternative Air travel is no relief.
Airport delays at hubs like Chicago and Atlanta are as bad as any in Europe. Air travel still relies on a ground-based tracking system
from the 1950s, which forces planes to use inefficient routes in order to stay in contact with controllers. The system’s imprecision
obliges controllers to keep more distance between air traffic, reducing the number of planes that can fly in the available space. And
this is not the system’s only bottleneck. Overbooked airports frequently lead to runway congestion, forcing travellers to spend long
hours stranded on the tarmac while they wait to take off or disembark. Meanwhile, security and immigration procedures in American
airports drive travellers to the brink of rebellion. And worse looms. The country’s already stressed infrastructure must handle a
growing load in decades to come, thanks to America’s distinctly non-European demographics. The Census Bureau expects the
population to grow by 40% over the next four decades, equivalent to the entire population of Japan. All this is puzzling. America’s
economy remains the world’s largest; its citizens are among the world’s richest. The government is not constitutionally opposed to
grand public works. The country stitched its continental expanse together through two centuries of ambitious earthmoving. Almost
from the beginning of the republic the federal government encouraged the building of critical canals and roadways. In the 19th century
Congress provided funding for a transcontinental railway linking the east and west coasts. And between 1956 and 1992 America
constructed the interstate system, among the largest public-works projects in history, which criss-crossed the continent with nearly
50,000 miles of motorways. But modern America is stingier. Total public spending on transport and water infrastructure has fallen
steadily since the 1960s and now stands at 2.4% of GDP. Europe, by contrast, invests 5% of GDP in its infrastructure, while China is
racing into the future at 9%. America’s spending as a share of GDP has not come close to European levels for over 50 years. Over that
time funds for both capital investments and operations and maintenance have steadily dropped (see chart 2). Although America still
builds roads with enthusiasm, according to the OECD’s International Transport Forum, it spends considerably less than Europe on
maintaining them. In 2006 America spent more than twice as much per person as Britain on new construction; but Britain spent 23%
more per person maintaining its roads. America’s dependence on its cars is reinforced by a shortage of alternative forms of transport.
Europe’s large economies and Japan routinely spend more than America on rail investments, in absolute not just relative terms,
despite much smaller populations and land areas. America spends more building airports than Europe but its underdeveloped rail
network shunts more short-haul traffic onto planes, leaving many of its airports perpetually overburdened. Plans to upgrade air-trafficcontrol technology to a modern satellite-guided system have faced repeated delays. The current plan is now threatened by proposed
cuts to the budget of the Federal Aviation Administration. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that America needs to spend
$20 billion more a year just to maintain its infrastructure at the present, inadequate, levels. Up to $80 billion a year in additional
spending could be spent on projects which would show positive economic returns. Other reports go further. In 2005 Congress
established the National Surface Transportation Policy and Revenue Study Commission. In 2008 the commission reckoned that
America needed at least $255 billion per year in transport spending over the next half-century to keep the system in good repair and
make the needed upgrades. Current spending falls 60% short of that amount.
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Infrastructure degradation will cost the US increasingly more – congestion already saps 1.6
percent of GDP
Regan 12 (Ed Regan is a CDM Smith senior vice president based in Columbia, South Carolina, USA, and a preeminent
thought leader on transportation finance and planning. Nearly 4 decades of dedication to the toll industry have fed his
passion to advocate sustainable solutions for funding transportation infrastructure today and in the future. January 10,
2012, Falling Behind: A Crisis in Transportation Infrastructure Investment FUNDING FUTURE MOBILITY: EXIT 1,
http://cdmsmith.com/en-US/Insights/Funding-Future-Mobility/Exit-1-Falling-Behind.aspx)
This is our first stop in a thought leadership series that discusses the current state of transportation infrastructure and
explores future funding solutions. In “Falling Behind,” we examine how today’s investments are not meeting the
growing needs of the U.S. transportation system, creating a gap that will continue to grow if action isn’t taken.
Coming Up Short Recognizing a growing problem with infrastructure investment, the last federal transportation
authorization bill in 2005 enacted by the U.S. Congress established two independent commissions to address
transportation policy and funding: the National Transportation Policy and Revenue Study Commission and the National
Transportation Infrastructure Finance Commission. Both commissions identified huge shortfalls in transportation funding
at virtually every level of government. Assuming no improvement from current conditions over the next 25 years, the
finance commission forecasted average federal needs for capital transportation investments at $78 billion per year and
total investment at all government levels at $172 billion per year. Assuming reasonable improvements in the system,
including capacity expansion, the finance commission estimates rose to $100 billion per year in federal dollars and $215
billion per year at all levels of government. The policy commission estimated even higher amounts will be needed.
Forecasts of revenue from current federal sources are expected to meet just 41 percent of needs without improvements
to the system, and only 33 percent of the amount needed to improve the system. Similar shortfalls are shown at all
levels of government. In short, the two commissions indicated that transportation funding needs to be increased between
175 and 240 percent over the next 25 years to maintain and improve transportation infrastructure. Inflation Brings Gas
Tax Deflation Are these estimates realistic? A quick look at recent trends in the U.S. Highway Trust Fund (HTF) show
they are. The HTF is the primary source of dedicated funding for transportation at the federal level. It was established
with the advent of the federal gas tax in 1956 as a means to fund the interstate highway system. The current federal gas
tax is $0.184 per gallon—slightly higher for diesel—and has not been increased in almost 20 years. This chart shows
recent HTF trends and forecasts provided by the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials
(AASHTO). Revenue into the HTF had historically been close to outlays, but since 2008, outlays have significantly
exceeded revenues. The HTF essentially went broke in 2008 and has required significant transfers of funding from the
U.S. General Fund in each of the last 3 years. By 2015, just 3 years away, federal funding needs are expected to exceed
revenues by $17 billion assuming no increase is made to the federal gas tax. Over the long term, there have been increases
in both the federal and state gas tax levels, but they have not kept up with inflation. As this chart shows, the total gas tax
—including the federal and average state taxes—rose from $0.115 per gallon in 1963 to about $0.39 per gallon in 2009.
After adjusting for inflation, the 2009 tax is equivalent to just $0.056 in 1963 dollars, a decrease of 50 percent in
purchasing power in spite of several rate increases over 46 years. But the real demand for transportation investment comes
from vehicle miles of travel, not gallons of fuel consumed. Over the years, we have seen significant improvements in fuel
efficiency, which further erode the effective funding capacity of the per-gallon tax. Fleet fuel efficiency standards for the
future have been aggressively increased, which will further reduce the funding capacity by another 45 percent by 2016.
Hybrid and electric vehicles are great for reducing greenhouse gas emissions and our dependency on foreign oil, but they
will have a major negative impact on transportation funding. The Cost of Falling Behind The U.S. transportation system is
aging rapidly and is in bad need of reconstruction and rehabilitation. Much of the interstate highway system is more than
50 years old, and reconstruction and expansion will cost 10 to 20 times its original cost. There is a real cost to this
underinvestment in transportation—a price paid every day by sitting in traffic, paying more for goods, and deteriorating
competitiveness in an increasingly global economy. The American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) recently issued a
report, entitled “Failure to Act,” which attempted to quantify the economic impact of underinvestment in infrastructure. It
estimated in 2010, the cost to businesses and households was nearly $130 billion, including increased operating costs,
safety issues and travel time that delays. It also projected that this will increase to more than $500 billion per year
by2040, with a cumulative economic cost over the next 30 years of $3 trillion if current transportation investment
levels continue. These ASCE estimates may well be conservative. In a recent report, Building America’s Future— a
bipartisan coalition of elected officials dedicated to increasing infrastructure investment—puts the annual cost of urban
congestion alone at $115 billion, noting that Americans waste 4.8 billion hours per year sitting in traffic. If the costs of
delays to freight movement are factored in, congestion costs reach $200 billion per year—about 1.6 percent of the U.S.
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gross domestic product. Without significant increases in investment, at levels which will not only maintain but increase
capacity, we can look forward to exponential growth in congestion in U.S. cities. Global Perspective Today, we see an
increasingly global economy with a rapidly changing, competitive landscape. Never has mobility and transportation
efficiency been more important to stay competitive in world markets. Thankfully, the United States has always led the
world in transportation investment and innovations. At least until now. According to Building America’s Future, U.S.
infrastructure was ranked first globally by the World Economic Forum’s 2005 index. In 2010, that number dropped to
15th. It is clear that the United States is facing an uphill battle to improve funding systems and bridge the widening gap
between its current transportation system and the worldwide norm. In our next series installment, we will explore how
much investment is actually being made in this vital system.
Infrastructure investment boosts long-term growth
Boushey, 11 (Heather, Senior Economist at American Progress, 9/22/2011, “Now Is the Time to Fix Our Broken
Infrastructure: American Jobs Act Will Put Millions to Work,
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/09/aja_infrastructure.html)
Investing in infrastructure creates jobs and yields lasting benefits for the economy, including increasing growth in
the long run. Upgrading roads, bridges, and other basic infrastructure creates jobs now by putting people to work
earning good, middle-class incomes, which expands the consumer base for businesses. These kinds of investments also
pave the way for long-term economic growth by lowering the cost of doing business and making U.S. companies
more competitive. There is ample empirical evidence that investment in infrastructure creates jobs. In particular,
investments made over the past couple of years have saved or created millions of U.S. jobs. Increased investments in
infrastructure by the Department of Transportation and other agencies due to the American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act saved or created 1.1 million jobs in the construction industry and 400,000 jobs in manufacturing by March 2011,
according to San Francisco Federal Reserve Bank economist Daniel Wilson.[1] Although infrastructure spending began
with government dollars, these investments created jobs throughout the economy, mostly in the private sector.[2]
Infrastructure projects have created jobs in communities nationwide. Recovery funds improved drinking and
wastewater systems, fixed bridges and roads, and rehabilitated airports and shipyards across the nation. Some examples of
high-impact infrastructure projects that have proceeded as a result of Recovery Act funding include: An expansion of a
kilometer-long tunnel in Oakland, California, that connects two busy communities through a mountain.[3] An expansion
and rehabilitation of the I-76/Vare Avenue Bridge in Philadelphia and 141 other bridge upgrades that supported nearly
4,000 jobs in Pennsylvania in July 2011.[4] The construction of new railway lines to serve the city of Pharr, Texas, as
well as other infrastructure projects in that state that have saved or created more than 149,000 jobs through the end of
2010.[5] Infrastructure investments are an especially cost-effective way to boost job creation with scarce government
funds. Economists James Feyrer and Bruce Sacerdote found for example that at the peak of the Recovery Act’s effect,
12.3 jobs were created for every $100,000 spent by the Department of Transportation and the Department of Energy—
much of which was for infrastructure.[6] These two agencies spent $24.7 billion in Recovery dollars through September
2010, 82 percent of which was transportation spending. This implies a total of more than 3 million jobs created or saved.
The value of infrastructure spending Analysis of all fiscal stimulus policies shows a higher “multiplier” from
infrastructure spending than other kinds of government spending, such as tax cuts, meaning that infrastructure
dollars flow through the economy and create more jobs than other kinds of spending. Economist Mark Zandi found,
for example, that every dollar of government spending boosts the economy by $1.44, whereas every dollar spent on a
refundable lump-sum tax rebate adds $1.22 to the economy.[7]
US slowing down causes double dip
Rahman ‘11 (Ashfaqur former Ambassador and Chairman of the Centre for Foreign Affairs Studies.. “Another global
recession?”. August 21. http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=199461)
Several developments, especially in Europe and the US, fan this fear. First, the US recovery from the last recession has
been fragile. Its economy is much more susceptible to geopolitical shocks. Second there is a rise in fuel prices. The
political instability in the Middle East is far from over. This is causing risks for the country and the international
economy. Third, the global food prices in July this year is markedly higher than a year ago, almost 35% more.
Commodities such as maize (up 84%), sugar (up 62%), wheat (up 55%), soybean oil (up 47%) have seen spike in their
prices. Crude oil prices have also risen by 45%, affecting production costs. In the US, even though its debt ceiling has
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been raised and the country can now continue to borrow, credit agencies have downgraded its credit rating and therefore
its stock markets have started to flounder. World Bank President Zoellick recently said: "There was a convergence of
some events in Europe and the US that has led many market participants to lose confidence in economic leadership of the
key countries." He added: "Those events, combined with other fragilities in the nature of recovery, have pushed US
into a new danger zone." Employment in the US has, therefore, come near to a grinding halt. Prices of homes there
continue to slide. Consumer and business spending is slowing remarkably. So, when the giant consumer economy
slows down, there would be less demand for goods she buys from abroad, even from countries like Bangladesh. This
would lead to decline in exports from such countries to the US. Then these economies would start to slide too,
leading to factory closures and unemployment on a large scale. There would be less money available for economic
development activities. Adding to the woes of the US economy are the travails of European economies. There, countries
like Greece and Portugal, which are heavily indebted, have already received a first round of bailout. But this is not
working. A second bailout has been given to Greece. But these countries remain in deep economic trouble. Bigger
economies like Spain and Italy are also on the verge of bankruptcy. More sound economies like France and Germany are
unwilling to provide money through the European Central Bank to bail them out. A proposal to issue Euro bonds to be
funded by all the countries of the Euro Zone has also not met with approval. A creeping fear of the leaders of such big
economies is that their electorate is not likely to agree to fund bankruptcies in other countries through the taxes they pay.
Inevitably, they are saying that these weaker economies must restrain expenditures and thereby check indebtedness and
live within their means. Thus, with fresh international bailouts not in the horizon and with possibilities of a debt default by
countries like Greece, there is a likelihood of a ripple going through the world's financial system. Now what is recession
and especially one with a global dimension ? There is no commonly accepted definition of a recession or for that matter of
a global recession. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) regards periods when global growth is less than 3% to be a
global recession. During this period, global per capita output growth is zero or negative and unemployment and
bankruptcies are on the rise. Recession within a country implies that there is a business cycle contraction. It occurs when
"there is a widespread drop in spending following an adverse supply shock or the bursting of an economic bubble." The
most common indicator is "two down quarters of GDP." That is, when GDP of a country does not increase for six months.
When recession occurs there is a slowdown in economic activity. Overall consumption, investment, government spending
and net exports fall. Economic drivers such as employment, household savings, corporate investments, interest rates are
on the wane. Interestingly, recession can be of several types. Each type may be literally of distinctive shapes. Thus Vshaped, or a short and sharp contraction, is common. It is usually followed by a rapid and sustained recovery. A U-shaped
slump is a prolonged recession. The W-shaped slowdown of the economy is a double dip recession. There is also an Lshaped recession when, in 8 out of 9 three-monthly quarters, the economy is spiraling downward. So what type of
recession can the world expect in the next quarter? Experts say that it could be a W-shaped one, known as a double
dip type. But let us try to understand why the world is likely to face another recession, when it has just emerged from the
last one, the Great Recession in 2010. Do not forget that this recession had begun in 2007 with the "mortgage and the
derivative" scandal when the real estate and property bubble burst. Today, many say that the last recession had never
ended. Despite official data that shows recovery, it was only a modest recovery. So, when the recession hit the US in
2007 it was the Great Recession I. The US government fought it by stimulating their economy with large bailouts. But
this time, for the Great Recession II, which we may be entering, there is a completely different response. Politicians are
squabbling over how much to cut spending. Therefore, we may be in a new double dip or W-shaped recession.
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Scenario 3 is Net Savings
Infrastructural crisis is looming—costs are projected to rise by 351%
ASCE 11 (American Society of Civil Engineers, Failure to Act The economic impact of current Investment trends In
surface Transportation infrastructure, http://www.asce.org/uploadedFiles/Infrastructure/Report_Card/ASCEFailureToActFinal.pdf)
The nation’s surface transportation infrastructure includes the critical highways, bridges, railroads, and transit systems that
enable people and goods to access the markets, services, and inputs of production essential to America’s economic
vitality. For many years, the nation’s surface transportation infrastructure has been deteriorating. Yet because this
deterioration has been diffused throughout the nation, and has occurred gradually over time, its true costs and economic
impacts are not always immediately apparent. In practice, the transportation funding that is appropriated is spent on a
mixture of system expansion and preservation projects. Although these allocations have often been sufficient to avoid the
imminent failure of key facilities, the continued deterioration leaves a significant and mounting burden on the U.S.
economy . This burden will be explored further in this report. Deteriorating conditions and performance impose costs on
American households and businesses in a number of ways. Facilities in poor condition lead to increases in operating
costs for trucks, cars, and rail vehicles. Additional costs include damage to vehicles from deteriorated roadway
surfaces, imposition of both additional miles traveled, time expended to avoid unusable or heavily congested roadways
or due to the breakdown of transit vehicles, and the added cost of repairing facilities after they have deteriorated as
opposed to preserving them in good condition. In addition, increased congestion decreases the reliability of transportation
facilities, meaning that travelers are forced to allot more time for trips to assure on-time arrivals (and for freight vehicles,
on-time delivery). Moreover, it increases environmental and safety costs by exposing more travelers to substandard
travel conditions and requiring vehicles to operate at less efficient levels. As conditions continue to deteriorate over time,
they will increasingly detract from the ability of American households and businesses to be productive and prosperous at
work and at home. This report is about the effect that surface transportation deficiencies have, and will continue to have,
on U.S. economic performance. For the purpose of this report, the term “deficiency” is defined as the extent to which
roads, bridges, and transit services fall below standards defined by the U.S. Department of Transportation as “minimum
tolerable conditions” (for roads and bridges) and “state of good repair” for transit 1 . These standards are substantially
lower than ideal conditions, such as “free-flow2 ,” that are used by some researchers as the basis for highway analysis.
This report is about the effect these deficiencies have, and will continue to have, on U.S. economic performance. In 2010,
it was estimated that deficiencies in America’s surface transportation systems cost households and businesses
nearly $130 billion. This included approximately $97 billion in vehicle operating costs, $32 billion in travel time
delays, $1.2 billion in safety costs and $590 million in environmental costs. In 2040, America’s projected
infrastructure deficiencies in a trends extended scenario are expected to cost the national economy more than 400,000
jobs. Approximately 1.3 million more jobs could exist in key knowledge-based and technology-related economic sectors
if sufficient transportation infrastructure were maintained. These losses are balanced against almost 900,000 additional
jobs projected in traditionally lower-paying service sectors of the economy that would benefit by deficient transportation
(such as auto repair services) or by declining productivity in domestic service related sectors (such as truck driving and
retail trade). If present trends continue, by 2020 the annual costs imposed on the U.S. economy by deteriorating
infrastructure will increase by 82% to $210 billion, and by 2040 the costs will have increased by 351% to $520
billion (with cumulative costs mounting to $912 billion and $2.9 trillion by 2020 and 2040, respectively). Table 1
summarizes the economic and societal costs of today’s deficiencies, and how the present values of these costs are
expected to accumulate by 2040. Table 2 provides a summary of impacts these costs have on economic performance
today, and how these impacts are expected to increase over time. The avoidable transportation costs that hinder the
nation’s economy are imposed primarily by pavement and bridge conditions, highway congestion, and transit and train
vehicle conditions that are operating well below minimum tolerable levels for the level of traffic they carry. If the nation’s
infrastructure were free of deficient conditions in pavement, bridges, transit vehicles, and track and transit facilities,
Americans would earn more personal income and industry would be more productive, as demonstrated by the gross
domestic product (value added) that will be lost if surface transportation infrastructure is not brought up to a standard of
“minimum tolerable conditions.” As of 2010, the loss of GDP approached $125 billion due to deficient surface
transportation infrastructure. The expected losses in GDP and personal income through 2040 are displayed in Table 2.
Across the U.S., regions are affected differently by deficient and deteriorating infrastructure. The most affected regions
are those with the largest concentrations of urban areas, because urban highways, bridges and transit systems are in worse
condition today than rural facilities. Peak commuting patterns also place larger burdens on urban capacities. However,
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because the nation is so dependent on the Interstate Highway System, impacts on interstate performance in some regions
or area types are felt throughout the nation. Nationally, for highways and transit, 630 million vehicle hours traveled were
lost due to congestion in 2010. This total is expected to triple to 1.8 billion hours by 2020 and further increase to 6.2
billion hours in 2040. 3 These vehicle hours understate person hours and underscore the severity of the loss in
productivity. The specific economic implications of the further deterioration of the U.S. national surface transportation
system are as follows: « Deficient surface transportation infrastructure will cost Americans nearly $3 trillion by 2040, as
shown in Table 1, which represents more than $1.1 trillion in added business expenses and nearly $1.9 trillion from
household budgets. « This cost to business will reduce the productivity and competitiveness of American firms relative to
global competitors. Increased cumulative cost to businesses will reach $430 billion by 2020. Businesses will have to
divert increasing portions of earned income to pay for transportation delays and vehicle repairs, draining money that
would otherwise be invested in innovation and expansion. « Households will be forced to forgo discretionary purchases
such as vacations, cultural events, educational opportunities, and restaurant meals, reduce health related purchases along
with other expenditures that affect quality of life, in order to pay transportation costs that could be avoided if
infrastructure were built to sufficient levels. Increased cumulative costs to households will be $482 billion in 2020. « The
U.S. will lose jobs in high value, high-paying services and manufacturing industries. Overall, this will result in
employee income in 2040 that is $252 billion less than would be the case in a transportation-sufficient economy. In
general three distinct forces are projected to affect employment: n First, a negative impact is due to larger costs of
transportation services in terms of time expended and vehicle costs. These costs absorb money from businesses and
households that would otherwise be directed to investment, innovation and “quality of life purchases.” Thus, not only will
business and personal income be lower, but more of that income will need to be diverted to transportation related costs.
This dynamic will create lower demand in key economic sectors associated with business investments for expansion and
research and development, and in consumer sectors. n Second, the impact of declining business productivity, due to
inefficient surface transportation, tends to push up employment, even if income is declining. Productivity deteriorates
with infrastructure degradation, so more resources are wasted in each sector. In other words, it may take two jobs
to complete the tasks that one job could handle without delays due to worsening surface transportation infrastructure.
n Third, related to productivity effects, degrading surface transportation conditions will generate jobs to address problems
created by worsening conditions in sectors such as transportation services and automobile repair services.6 American
Society of Civil Engineers « Overall job losses are mitigated by more people working for less money and less
productively due to the diminished effectiveness of the U.S. surface transportation system. Recasting the 2020 and 2040
initial job impacts based on income and productivity lost reduces worker effectiveness by an additional 27% (another
234,000 jobs). By 2040, this drain on wages and productivity implies an additional 115% effect if income and
productivity were stable (another 470,000 jobs). « By 2040 the cost of infrastructure deficiencies are expected to result in
the U.S. losing more than $72 billion in foreign exports in comparison with the level of exports from a transportationsufficient U.S. economy. These exports are lost due to lost productivity and the higher costs of American goods and
services, relative to competing product prices from around the globe.
The National Infrastructure Bank is the best way to solve—if we don’t act now, costs will rise dramatically
Rohatyn, 10 (Felix G. Rohatyn, special adviser to the chairman and CEO of Lazard Frères & Co. LLC,
9/15/2010 , “The Case for an Infrastructure Bank; We need projects that meet national economic
objectives, not local political ones,”
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703376504575491643198373362.html)
President Obama has proposed a program to renew and expand America's infrastructure. Central to the
president's plan is the creation of a permanent, national infrastructure bank that could leverage private capital for
projects of regional and national significance. Hopefully members of Congress will make jobs and the
economy their priority and support its establishment. A national infrastructure bank could begin to
reverse federal policies that treat infrastructure as a way to give states and localities resources for
projects that meet local political objectives rather than national economic ones. The bank would evaluate
prospective infrastructure projects on consistent terms. It would be able to negotiate with state or local sponsors of a
project what their cost shares should be. The bank also could help groups of states come together for regional
projects such as high-speed rail and better freight management. Such consolidation would improve project selection.
The bank also could ensure that states and localities consider all other options—from wetlands preservation to
implementing tolls—before structural options are funded. It would create an avenue for private investors to put
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risk capital into new projects and bless their involvement with the bank's own participation. In short, it
would treat infrastructure like a long-term investment, not an expense. The American Society of Civil Engineers
periodically estimates the cost of bringing our infrastructure to an acceptable level—it now exceeds $2 trillion. This is a
staggering sum, but the infrastructure bank could make strides to meet it by issuing its own bonds of up to 50 years
maturity and, with a conservative gearing, could initially raise $200 billion to $300 billion and become self-financing
over time. The legislation that embodies the concept of an infrastructure bank already exists in a bill that
Rep. Rosa DeLauro (D., Conn.) has introduced in the House and that Sen. Chris Dodd (D., Conn.) and
former Republican Sen. Chuck Hagel from Nebraska have introduced in the Senate. In addition,
Pennsylvania Gov. Ed Rendell has encouraged the rebuilding of America through an infrastructure
bank. As he points out, a functioning national infrastructure is not optional—it is necessary to our economic
future, global competitiveness and ability to create millions of jobs over the long term. A number of
alternatives have been suggested, including the creation of state infrastructure banks. By investing
significantly in infrastructure we would act in the tradition of American leaders whose bold programs
shaped our progress. President Lincoln transformed the country by beginning a transcontinental
railroad during a time of war. FDR's GI Bill allowed millions of Americans to attend college and
become the source of our technological and intellectual power. President Eisenhower built the
interstate highway system, creating millions of jobs and a suburban economy still basic to the U.S.
Renewing our country's infrastructure will have similar impact. The infrastructure bank is an idea
whose time has come.
Spending now is best due to low interest rates – no risk of crowd out due to preexisting
unemployment
Avent 12 (Ryan Avent is The Economist's economics correspondent. He covers the field of academic economics, with a
focus on developments in macroeconomic, Mar 28th 2012, A good time for infrastructure investment,
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2012/03/low-hanging-fruit)
The Treasury has just published a white paper full of reasons to favour additional investment. Even if you are sceptical of
the utility of fiscal stimulus qua stimulus, now seems like a very good time to undertake much more investment than
normal. As the Treasury paper points out, very low interest rates and high unemployment mean that the odds of
crowding out private spending and investment are much lower than normal. Cheaper than normal capital and labour
also imply that taxpayers will receive a better deal on spending than would typically be the case. The cost-benefit
calculus on infrastructure investment has shifted toward doing more of it, or at least squeezing more expected
investment into the present period. Other research, like the new Brookings paper by Brad DeLong and Larry Summers,
also indicates that the bar for greater investment should be lower. Given the potential that unemployment will become
increasingly persistent as time goes on, the value of government spending that reduces joblessness—even temporarily—is
higher than may be appreciated. Any projects that seemed like good ideas in general, and there are a lot of them, look like
really, really good ideas now. And yet Congress has struggled mightily to keep even existing spending going. The nation's
primary transportation-funding law expired in 2009. Normally a wholesale replacement or reauthorisation would follow
that expiration; Congress has instead repeatedly extended the old law while bickering over how to come up with money to
replace the increasingly meagre take from the nation's petrol tax. The latest extension is set to expire, and legislators are
arguing over what to do next. They might extend the measure again—for 60 to 90 days. Or they might stonewall
themselves into a temporary shutdown of all federally funded projects. Inaction is absurd and embarrassing, especially
since funding is the primary (though not the only) source of disagreement and the costs of borrowing and unemployment
(and the likelihood of a decent return on infrastructure investment) indicate that just borrowing the money to spend on
new roads and rails would be a reasonable course of action. If ever there should have been a policy so obviously
sensible as to attract bipartisan support, more money for infrastructure was it. Right now, when it comes to partisan
politics, sensibility's got nothing to do with it.
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The Impact
Contention 2 is the Impact
All three scenarios risk an economic collapse
That causes a power vacuum, spurring terrorism and great power war
Royal 10 – Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010,
“Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” in Economics of War and Peace:
Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215
Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science
literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defense
behavior of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels.
Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson’s
(1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and
fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such,
exogenous shocks such as economic crisis could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin, 1981) that
leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fearon, 1995). Alternatively, even a
relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek
to challenge a declining power (Werner, 1999). Seperately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles
combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers,
although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain
unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland’s (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that ‘future
expectation of trade’ is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behavious of states. He
argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of
future trade relations, However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such
as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those
resources. Crisis could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers
protectionist moves by interdependent states. Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and
external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict
and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write, The linkages between internal and
external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal
conflict, which in turn returns the favor. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which
international and external conflict self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. P. 89) Economic decline has
been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the
capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a
sitting government. ‘Diversionary theory’ suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting
governments have increase incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a ‘rally around the flag’ effect.
Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995), and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that
economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and
Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic
states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of
domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the
United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In
summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlated economic integration with an increase in the frequency of
economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic
and national levels. This implied connection between integration, crisis and armed conflict has not featured prominently in
the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.
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Solvency
Contention 3 is Solvency
NIB avoids partisan gridlock and solves infrastructure development
Tyson 11 (Laura Tyson, Professor at the Haas School of Business of UC-Berkeley, PhD in Economics from MIT, BA
Summa Cum Laude in Economics at Smith College, former Chair of the US President’s Council of Economic Advisers,
served as the Director of the National Economic Council, Harvard Business Review, “A Better Stimulus Plan for the U.S.
Economy,” 2011, http://hbr.org/web/extras/hbr-agenda-2011/laura-d-tyson)
Although stimulus spending is a politically contentious issue, America is now in urgent need of a national
infrastructure bank to help finance transformative projects of national importance. During the coming year I will
work with the Obama administration; Senator John Kerry, Representative Rosa DeLauro, and other members of Congress;
governors; mayors; and business leaders on legislation to establish and provide the capital for such an institution. I will
also foster public support for its creation through speeches, interviews, and opinion columns like this one. Unlike most
other forms of stimulus, infrastructure spending benefits the economy in two ways: First, it creates jobs—which,
because those jobs put money in consumers' pockets, spurs demand. Analysis by the Congressional Budget Office
indicates that infrastructure spending is a cost-effective demand stimulus as measured by the number of jobs created per
dollar of budgetary expenditure. Second, the resulting infrastructure enhancement supports supply and growth over
time. By contrast, underinvestment not only hobbles U.S. competitiveness but also affects America's national security as
vulnerabilities go unaddressed. In its 2009 report on the state of the nation's infrastructure, the American Society of Civil
Engineers gave the U.S. a near-failing grade of D. Perhaps that should not be surprising, given that real infrastructure
spending today is about the same as it was in 1968, when the economy was smaller by a third. A 2008 CBO study
concluded, for example, that a 74% increase in annual spending on transportation infrastructure alone would be
economically justifiable. That calculation leaves out additional infrastructure spending needed for other key public goals
such as water delivery and sanitation. Realizing the highest possible return on infrastructure investments depends on
funding the projects with the biggest impact and financing them in the most advantageous way. Properly designed and
governed, a national infrastructure bank would overcome weaknesses in the current selection of projects by
removing funding decisions from the politically volatile appropriations process. A common complaint today is that
projects are often funded on the basis of politics rather than efficiency. Investments would instead be selected after
independent and transparent cost-benefit analysis by objective experts. The bank would provide the most appropriate form
of financing for each project, drawing on a flexible set of tools such as direct loans, loan guarantees, grants, and interest
subsidies for Build America Bonds. It should be given the authority to form partnerships with private investors,
which would increase funding for infrastructure investments and foster efficiency in project selection, operation, and
maintenance. That would enable the bank to tap into the significant pools of long-term private capital in pension
funds and dedicated infrastructure equity funds looking for such investment opportunities. Crafting the law to achieve
these goals is a serious and challenging undertaking, particularly in view of large budget deficits and a contentious
political atmosphere. But I believe they are worthy of the political and legislative effort required to realize them. The U.S.
must invest considerably more in its infrastructure to secure its competitiveness and deliver rising standards of living. This
effort would also put millions of Americans to work in meaningful jobs. The time has come to make it happen.
Public private partnerships effectively spur infrastructure and economic growth
Likosky et al. 11 ( Michael Likosky: senior fellow at NYU’s Institute for Public Knowledge, directs the Center on Law
& Public Finance at the Social Science Research Council, Josh Ishimatsu, senior fellow at the Center on Law & Public
Finance. Joyce L. Miller is senior fellow at the Center on Law & Public Finance and a board member of the New York
State Empire State Development Corporation, June 2011, “RETHINKING 21ST - CENTURY GOVERNMENT:
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS AND THE NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE BANK,
http://www.ibtta.org/files/PDFs/Rethinking%2021st%20Century%20Government%20Public%20Private%20Partnerships%20and%20the%20National%20Infrastructure%20Bank.pdf)
In an era of severe budgetary constraints, how can the federal government ensure that America is investing in what is
needed to promote economic competitiveness, broad-based opportunity, and energy security? Increasingly, public-private
partnerships enjoy broad support as the answer to this question, across party lines and political divisions. Partnershipdriven projects are pursued today in wide-ranging areas, including education, transportation, technology, oil and gas,
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clean energy, mineral extraction, and manufacturing. Well-considered partnerships compliment, strengthen, and reinforce
those existing meritorious approaches carried out through traditional means. They represent a fundamentally distinct way
for government to address complex challenges, with federal agencies playing a catalytic role rather than a directive one. A
National Infrastructure Bank can provide the requisite capacity to implement public-private partnerships. RETHINKING
THE FUNCTION OF GOVERNMENT America is at a standstill. Federal, state, and local governments are facing
overburdened public balance sheets while enormous sums sit in limbo in pension funds and in the accounts of what the
McKinsey Global Institute has called the new global power brokers: Asian sovereign funds, petrodollar accounts, private
equity funds, and hedge funds. 1 It is why President Obama posed this question to his Economic Recovery Advisory
Board in 2009: Obviously we’re entering into an era of greater fiscal restraint as we move out of deep recession into a
recovery. And the question I’ve had is people still got a lot of capital on the sidelines there that are looking for a good
return. Is there a way to channel that private capital into partnering with the public sector to get some of this infrastructure
built? 2 Unless we can shepherd this money into our productive economy, the country will have to forego much-needed
projects for lack of financing. Public-private partnerships involve federal agencies coinvesting alongside state and local
governments, private firms, and nonprofits. Having partnerships within a government’s toolbox not only brings a sizable
new source of capital into the market, it also allows public officials to match assets with the most appropriate and costeffective means of financing. If a class of existing and new projects can be financed from private sources, then we can
begin to decrease our debt burden while also investing and growing our economy. Scarce public funds are then freed up to
be spent on essential services and those projects best financed through traditional means. Because the success of
partnerships depends upon collaborations between government and private firms that may under other circumstances be
viewed as raising conflicts of interest, a rethinking of the function of government is essential. In a recent opinion piece in
the Wall Street Journal, the president announced an executive order, Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review, 3
which “requires that federal agencies ensure that regulations protect our safety, health and environment while promoting
economic growth.” 4 The piece, entitled “Toward a 21st-Century Regulatory System,” “ Federal, state, and local
governments are facing overburdened public balance sheets while enormous sums sit in limbo. ”5 was accompanied by an
evocative drawing of a regulator wielding an oversized pair of scissors busily cutting through a sea of red tape. While
widely viewed as an effort to curry favor with American businesses, this presidential outreach can also be read as an
indication that the federal government will support—and encourage—divergent groups working together to cut through
outmoded, counterproductive, or unnecessarily burdensome regulation. Public-private partnerships are especially suited to
fulfilling the order’s directives and can serve as amodel for our twenty-first-century federal agencies. If coming together
as a team—public and private, Republican and Democrat, progressive and Tea Party—is a precondition not only to
winning the future but also to solving today’s seemingly intractable problems, then we must take the task at hand
seriously. Diverse groups must appreciate the unique and valuable resources and perspectives that those who are their
combatants in other contexts bring to the team. Government agencies, more accustomed to acting as referee—setting
down basic rules of the game and constraining behavior deemed contrary to the public interest—must find ways of
coaching this unruly bunch, not from the sidelines but as a vital player.
National Infrastructure bank doubles investments in infrastructure
Anderson 11 (Norman, the president and CEO of CG/LA Infrastructure, “The Case For The KerryHutchison Infrastructure Bank”, March 25, http://progressivepolicy.org/the-case-for-the-kerryhutchison-infrastructure-bank)
As a small business owner who helps people think through infrastructure issues, I’m struck by the
extraordinary opportunity here. We’re all aware of the need: A national infrastructure bank that uses
federal borrowing authority to leverage private investment for roads, bridges, water systems and power grids is the
only way for the U.S. to increase infrastructure investments in tight fiscal times. And the technical
opportunity is irrefutable. Why not raise money for infrastructure at a time of historically low borrowing
costs? What’s more, every major economy in the world has an infrastructure bank, so we should have one, too. Need
is not the issue. Opportunity is. We need a model for smart government. Forget the weirdly
inefficient, old-style European model. Re-engineering an old public sector is nearly impossible, and
no one has the patience for it anyway. Think about a national infrastructure bank as an exercise in
creating smart government, in an area that is strategically important for the future of our country.
Doubling Annual Investment A high-functioning infrastructure bank would have three characteristics,
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shaping its overall role of doubling our annual investment in infrastructure, from $150 billion a year to $300
billion. First, the role of the infrastructure bank is catalytic rather than managerial. Rather than creating
a large bureaucracy, the bank would assemble a corps of focused professionals: engineers, financiers, economists
and what I term strategic leaders — people who get things done, driven by a vision to make this country more
competitive. Their job will be to set projects in motion, then to make sure that those projects meet or
exceed guidelines. Monitor, not manage; act strategically, not operationally. Move fast, don’t get
bogged down, get the job done. The result will be an elite, rapid, infinitely smaller and infinitely more qualified
leadership team than what we have today, an instructive model for other infrastructure related agencies at every level
of government. Energize Private Sector Second, the function of the infrastructure bank is to guide and energize
the private sector. An infrastructure bank goes into the guts of the process — project selection — and gets at the
frightening issue of cost. Our costs are often twice that of our European brothers for urban mass transit
projects, 10 times those of China. The bank’s day-to-day business will be to invest in ventures and networks of
ventures that serve for 20, 30, 40 even 50 years, providing a competitive return throughout that period. In this sense
the bank will be a welcome, violent change agent, smashing open three areas in the infrastructure
project-creation process that are costing this country a fortune: – It takes more than 10 years on
average for a project to move through the approval process, a period that would need to be reduced
to three years for projects to be bankable. – At least 50 percent of large U.S. projects suffer cost
overruns in the 30 percent-or-greater range. This would be eliminated through bank leadership. –
The selection of projects tends to be willy-nilly, based on political interests. A bank ideally would be
a model of focus, restricting its attention to projects that generate competitiveness. Results Oriented
Lastly, the infrastructure bank will be results oriented and transparent: your bank, investing in your public assets.
The bank will be a great experiment in the Facebook Age, bringing in funds from all over the world
to build our strategic infrastructure. The very nature of the smart-government model is to set goals
and report performance. This new institution will go beyond that, creating knowledge, developing
metrics and pioneering ways of communicating: from project approvals, to performance reporting to
championing new technology. Maybe the Kerry/Hutchison proposal is the opening salvo in a
bipartisan effort to build smart government. Thinking about an American infrastructure bank in this
way makes an attractive experiment that we have to explore. Creating a model in an area critical to
our economic future is a strategic option we can’t ignore. Recognizing that the bank would double our
infrastructure investment and increase the efficiency of each dollar spent is a good deal for every citizen.
Only federal action solves
Halleman ‘11 (Brendan, Business graduate with analytical and program management experience across a range of
transportation and infrastructure issues; Head of Communications & Media Relations at International Road Federation
“Establishing a National Infrastructure Bank - examining precedents and potential”, October 2011,
http://issuu.com/transportgooru/docs/ibank_memo_-_brenden_halleman)
The merits of establishing a National Infrastructure Bank are once again being debated in the wake of President
Obama’s speech to a joint session of the 112th United States Congress and the subsequent introduction of the
American Jobs Act 1 . A review of the Jobs Act offers a vivid illustration of how far the debate has moved under the
Obama Administration. Earlier White House budgets had proposed allocating USD 4 billion as seed funding to a
National Infrastructure Innovation and Finance Fund tasked with supporting individual projects as well as “broader
activities of significance”. Offering grants, loans and long term loan guarantees to eligible projects, the resulting entity
would not have constituted an infrastructure bank in the generally accepted sense of the term. Nor would the Fund
have been an autonomous entity, making mere “investment recommendations” to the Secretary of Transportation2 .
Despite a number of important alterations, the Jobs Act contains the key provisions of a bipartisan Senate bill
introduced in March 20113 establishing an American Infrastructure Financing Authority (AIFA). Endowed with
annual infusions of USD 10 billion (rising to USD 20 billion in the third year), the Authority’s main goal is to facilitate
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economically viable transportation, energy and water infrastructure projects capable of mobilizing significant levels of
State and private sector investment. The Authority thus established: is set up as a distinct, self-supporting entity
headed by a Board of Directors requiring Senate confirmation offers loans & credit guarantees to large scale projects
with anticipated costs in excess of USD 100,000,000 extends eligible recipients to corporations, partnerships, trusts,
States and other governmental entities subjects loans to credit risk assessments and investment-grade rating (BBB-/
Baa3 or higher) conditions loans to a full evaluation of project economic, financial, technical and environmental
benefits caps Federal loans at 50% of anticipated project costs requires dedicated revenue sources from recipient
projects, such as tolls or user fees sets and collects loan fees to cover its administrative and operational costs (with
leftover receipts transferred to the Treasury) Particularly striking are the layers of risk assessment contained in the
BUILD Act. These translate into a dedicated risk governance structure with the appointment of a Chief Risk Officer
and annual external risk audits of AIFA’s project portfolio. At project level, applicants are required to provide a
preliminary rating opinion letter and, if the loan or loan guarantee is approved, the Authority’s associated fees are
modulated to reflect project risk. Lastly, as a Government-owned corporation, AIFA is explicitly held on the Federal
balance sheet and is not able to borrow debt in the capital markets in its own name (although it may reoffer part of its
loan book into the capital markets, if deemed in the taxpayers’ interest). Rationale As a percentage of GDP, the United
States currently invests 25% less on transportation infrastructure than comparable OECD economies 4 . There is broad
agreement that absent a massive and sustained infusion of capital in infrastructure, the backlog of investment in new
and existing transportation assets will hurt productivity gains and ripple economy-wide5 The establishment of AIFA is
predicated on a number of market considerations Dwindling demand for municipal bonds, resulting in significantly
decreased capacity to invest at the State and local level. This scenario is confirmed by recent Federal Reserve data 6
indicating a sharp drop in the municipal bond market for the first two quarters of 2011 despite near-identical ten-year
yields, a trend that can partly be explained by record-level outflows prior to the winding down of the Build America
Bonds program on 31 December 20107 . Considering that roughly 75% of municipal bond proceeds go towards capital
spending on infrastructure by states and localities 8 , this shortfall amounts to USD 135 billion for the first six months
of 2011 alone. Insufficient levels of private sector capital flowing in infrastructure investments. Despite the relatively
stable cash flows typically generated by infrastructure assets, less than 10% of investment in transportation
infrastructure came from capital markets in 2007 8 . By some estimates 9 , the total equity capital available to invest in
global infrastructure stands at over USD 202 billion and investor appetite remains strong in 2011. Federal
underwriting may take enough of the risk away for bonds to achieve investment grade rating on complex
infrastructure programs, particularly if they protect senior-level equity against first loss positions and offer other
creditor-friendly incentives. For instance, the planned bill already includes a “cash sweep” provision earmarking
excess project revenues to prepaying the principal at no penalty to the obligor. Convincing evidence across economic
sectors that Federal credit assistance stretches public dollars further 10 . The Transportation Infrastructure Finance and
Innovation Act (TIFIA) already empowers the Department of Transportation to provide credit assistance, such as fullfaith-and-credit guarantees as well as fixed rate loans, to qualified surface transportation projects of national and
regional significance. It is designed to offer more advantageous terms and fill market gaps by cushioning against
revenue risks (such as tolls and user fees) in the ramp up phase of large infrastructure projects. A typical project profile
would combine equity investment, investment-grade toll bonds, state gas tax revenues and TIFIA credit assistance to a
limit of 33%. TIFIA credit assistance is scored by the Office of Management and Budget at just 10%, representing loan
default risk. In theory, a Federal outlay of just USD 33 million could therefore leverage up to USD 1 billion in
infrastructure funding 11 . To date, 21 projects have received USD 7.7 billion in credit assistance for USD 29.0 billion
in estimated total project cost 12. 32 States (and Puerto Rico) currently operate State Infrastructure Banks (SIBs)
offering an interesting case study for the American Infrastructure Financing Authority. Moreover the BUILD Act
explicitly authorizes the Authority to loan to “political subdivisions and any other instrumentalities of a State”, such as
the SIBs. SIBs were formally authorized nationwide in 2005 through a provision of the SAFETEA-LU Act 13 to offer
preferential credit assistance to eligible and economically viable surface transportation capital projects. A provision of
the Act also authorizes multistate Banks, although such cooperative arrangements have yet to be established. SIBs
operate primarily as revolving loan funds using initial capitalization (Federal and state matching funds) and ongoing
funding (generally a portion of state-levied taxes) to provide subordinated loans whose repayments are recycled into
new projects loans. Where bonds are issued by SIBs as collateral to leverage even greater investment capacity, these
can be secured by user revenues, general State revenues or backed against a portion of federal highway revenues. As of
December 2010, State Infrastructure Banks had entered into 712 loan agreements with a total value of over USD 6.5
billion12. While SAFETEA-LU provided a basic framework for establishing SIBs, each State has tailored the size,
structure and focus of its Bank to meet specific policy objectives. The following table14 illustrates the scales of SIBS
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at the opposite end of the spectrum. These State-driven arrangements warrant a number of observations: The more
active SIB States are those that have increased the initial capitalization of their banks through a combination of bonds
and sustained State funding. South Carolina’s Transportation Infrastructure Bank receives annual amounts provided by
State law that include truck registration fees, vehicle registration fees, one-cent of gas tax equivalent, and a portion of
the electric power tax. Significantly, all SIBs have benefited from the ability to recycle loan repayments – including
interest and fees – into new infrastructure projects, a facility currently not available to the American Infrastructure
Financing Authority under the terms of the BUILD Act. More than 87 percent of all loans from such banks made
through 2008 were concentrated in just five States: South Carolina, Arizona, Florida, Texas and Ohio 14 . As a case in
point, South Carolina’s Transportation Infrastructure Bank has provided more financial assistance for transportation
projects than the other 32 banks combined. Most State banks have issued fewer than ten loans, the vast majority of
which fall in the USD 1-10 million size bracket 14 . This suggests that not all States presently have experience, or
the ability, to deal with capital markets for large-scale funding. States are, by and large, left to define specific
selection criteria for meritorious projects, the SIB’s share of the project as well as the loan fee it will charge. Kansas,
Ohio, Georgia, Florida and Virginia have established SIBs without Federal-aid money and are therefore not bound by
the same Federal regulations as other banks. California’s Infrastructure and Economic Development Bank extends the
scope of eligible projects to include water supply, flood control measures, as well as educational facilities. While
adapted to local circumstances, this patchwork of State regulations can also constitute an entry barrier for private
equity partners and multistate arrangements. Given the structure of their tax base, SIBs are vulnerable to short term
economy swings as well as the longer term inadequacy of current user-based funding mechanisms. SIBs borrow
against future State and highway income. Many States are already reporting declining gas tax revenues and, on current
projections, the Highway Trust Fund will see a cumulative funding gap of USD 115 billion between 2011 and 2021 18
. It is notable that Arizona’s Highway Extension and Expansion Loan Program is currently no longer taking
applications citing “state budget issues”.