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Conflicting and Overlapping Nature of Strategic Objectives in an Opera
House Management: Implications for a New Management Model
(Paper for the ACEI 2006 Conference, Vienna)
Mária Tajtáková1
Abstract
The paper discusses the problematic relationship between artistic objectives and economic
performance of opera organizations and their implications for opera houses management. It
raises a question of whether economic or artistic background is required for the managerial
position in an opera institution. The first part provides a theoretical discussion on main
categories of strategic decisions available for managers of opera companies – comprising
artistic, economic, marketing and social goals – and their mutual interactions. The second part
describes the opera context in Slovakia after the shift to market economy, bringing new
challenges for managements of Slovak opera houses. The main focus is put on difficulties in
achieving a correct balance between artistic excellence, economic stability and audience
response. These problems resulted to the search for a new management model in the
framework of the transformation process that is currently being implemented by the Ministry
of Culture of Slovak republic.
Key words
Opera houses, management model, strategic objectives, artistic excellence, economic stability,
audience response
Introduction
Opera is regarded as the most complex and the most expensive of the performing arts (Saint
Pulgent, 1991; Towse, 2002; King, 2002). American economists Baumol and Bowen (1966)
pointed out the outstanding economic characteristic of opera resulting from the extreme
complexity of its operations and the costliness of its performances. The magnitude of the
operation is suggested by a big size of opera cast, whilst the seating capacity of most opera
houses not exceeding four thousand persons, which provides a maximal audience of 20 persons
per performer. This unique economic nature of an opera production together with different
funding patterns has a substantial influence on management systems adopted by opera
organizations. However, based on case studies of several opera companies, Auvinen (2000,
2001), found that major problems in managing an opera house result from a dual organizational
structure that seems to exist in opera organizations: one official and economic and the other
unofficial and artistic.
1
Mária Tajtáková is a lecturer and researcher at the University of Economics in Bratislava, Slovakia. She did her
PhD. in Arts Marketing and its Application in Opera Houses in Slovakia. Her current research focuses on
management and marketing methods applied in the arts and culture. She worked as a marketing manager of the
Opera and Ballet of Slovak National Theatre in 2003 and 2004. Currently she is involved in the transformation
process of the Slovak National Theatre in Bratislava as a consultant of the Ministry of Culture of the Slovak
republic. Readers are welcome to contact her at [email protected].
1
In the framework of this “artistic-economic dichotomy” (Auvinen, 2001), managers of
opera houses have to cope with a wide range of strategic management decisions, which involve
programming policy and artistic innovation, artists recruitment, funding questions and
economic stability, distribution issues, marketing and audience building strategies, social
programs, etc. Some of these options may overlap in their objectives, for example marketing
and economic issues, on the other hand, some may be of a conflicting nature, like artistic
innovation and marketing strategy. Whether and to what extent managers prioritise certain
strategic choices over others may depend on either internal management factors (organizational
and managerial structure, leadership style and manager’s background), either external
environment forces (government and public bodies, fundraising patterns, competitors and
consumers). Day and Nedunggadi (1994) argue that although each of these factors may affect
the organization performance, managers tend to focus on certain elements to the exclusion of
others.
The purpose of this paper is to look at key issues of opera houses management with the
special emphasis on conflicting and overlapping nature of different kind of strategic
management choices, and the way in which they are reflected in the management model
implemented by an opera organization.
Strategic Choices in Opera Houses Management
Some categorisation of strategic choices available for managers of arts and cultural
organizations suggested Gilhespy (1999) in form of a policy matrix of “top ten” managerial
decisions, and Oki (2005) as a “checklist for management decisions”. Other authors focus on
main groups of strategic options. Chong (2001) explains that three inter-related commitments
of arts and cultural organizations have to be considered: a commitment to excellence and
artistic integrity, commitment to accessibility and audience development and commitment to
accountability and cost effectiveness. Similarly, Sorjonen and Uusitalo (2005) describe
relationships and causal links between product quality, customer satisfaction, and financial
performance.
Following these thoughts, we assume that three main concerns (Figure 1) should be taken
into consideration by an opera house management: the artistic side of opera production
reflected mainly in artistic innovation, the economic side meaning first of all a balanced budget
of an opera house and the market side related to audience development and diversification. By
their very nature, the ‘innovation’, ‘budget’ and ‘audience’ concerns are in conflict with each
other. Thus, prioritising one of them may lead to worse results in others.
2
Figure 1: Strategic Choices of an Opera House Management
BUDGET
INNOVATION
Economic
objectives
Artistic
objectives
Marketing
objectives
Social
objectives
AUDIENCE
In the framework of these three concerns, four main categories of strategic objectives can be
identified: artistic goals concerning a core product decisions, economic goals dealing with
different sources of funding and operational costs, marketing goals, which imply building of a
relationship with current and future audiences and social goals enhancing the access and
understanding the arts by different social groups. The economic objectives may overlap to
certain extent with the marketing ones. Similarly, some marketing objectives may be closely
linked to the social goals. In contrast, the social objectives may be in conflict with economic
goals. On the other hand, the artistic objectives used to contradict to either economic goals,
either marketing ones, and they may be in a neutral relationship with the social objectives.
(a) Artistic objectives
Artistic objectives are related to the core product of an opera organization. Hoegl (2002) argues
that an artistic excellence is the main goal of public professional opera houses and it is
generally considered as the most important success factor for performing arts organizations
(Kotler and Scheff, 1997). Nevertheless, it is very difficult to judge the artistic quality of an
opera company, since a lot of factors – some of them highly subjective – are involved in the
process of artistic creation.
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Boerner (2002) suggests a distinction to be made between two main aspects of opera
houses productions: a profile quality and a performance quality. The profile quality describes a
season program offered by an opera house, consisting of the works selected and the artists
involved. According to Chiaravalloti (2005) programs that offer to the audience a mix between
experiment and convention, premières and repertoire staging, new discoveries, revivals and
repertoire works seem to receive the best acceptance both from the public and professionals.
The performance quality deals with the quality of the performed program, thus with the quality
of the core product of opera houses, that is, the individual performance (Haller, 1975). Three
main criteria can be derived for both profile and performance quality: “program/interpretation
diversity versus specialization” within the individual organisation and “program/interpretation
conformity versus originality” within the totality of organisations from the task of promoting
the repertoire; “program/interpretation modernity versus traditionalism” from the task of
developing the repertoire. (Boerner, 2002, 2004).
The emphasis on artistic goals is reflected in product orientation of the theatre, which
implies mainly seeking out and producing innovative works (Voss and Voss, 2000). Several
models were created by Auvinen (2001) to describe an uneasy relationship of creative freedom
and quality versus the expectations of commercial efficacy and accountability increasingly
faced by opera organizations. Pierce (2000) suggests to view the opera companies’
programming decisions in a strategic sense, however, the difficult objective must be to
maximize quality whilst still supporting its budget. Similarly, other studies have underlined the
difficulty in achieving the correct balance between artistic excellence and the need for
audiences and wider accessibility (Hill and Sillivans, 1997; Chong, 2001). Jones (2000)
emphasizes that ensuring quality of product through peer appraisal, may contradict customer
wants, what can lead to possible conflicts between excellence and accessibility.
Pursuing artistic objectives by an opera house management can be in contradiction with
some economic and marketing goals and according to Gilhespy (1999) may involve a reduction
in attendance and revenue.
(b) Economic objectives
Economic objectives of opera houses could be hardly analysed without mentioning a pioneer
work by Baumol and Bowen (1966) Performing Arts – The Economic Dilemma. The study by
Baumol and Bowen provided the analysis of raising costs of performing arts organizations with
respect to their earned revenues leading to a long-term “income gap”. This phenomenon named
a “Cost-Disease” brought attention to the escalation of real costs that occur in labour-intensive
industries as a result of an economic growth of the industrial society. Towse (1997) explains
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that the labour costs in the arts tend to increase at the same rate as in other industries, but their
scope for utilizing labour-saving technical progress is either small or non-existent. This is the
main reason for economic problems of performing arts organizations in present. Since the opera
is the most expensive of the performing arts, with the highest prices of admission, and the
largest dependence on subsidies (King, 2002), some authors consider it a “privileged domain”
of the tragic Baumol law (Saint Pulgent, 1991; Chabert, 2001).
Although in the 17th century running an opera company was a kind of business activity
bringing a profit (Bukofzer, 1986), nowadays, a majority of opera houses would not survive
without an extra market funding. As a result, opera is now more or less universally subsidized,
often to a very great degree (King, 2002), although, the European opera companies receive
much higher levels of government funding than do American companies. In contrast, the
American opera organizations receive indirect subsidization through tax incentives and
donations from private sources (Pierce, 2000). Comparing figures from the end of 1980s and
nowadays, little has changed in the importance of the state subsidy for the European opera
organizations in the last decades. According to T. Hill and O’Sullivans (1997) the ratio of state
subsidies on the overall budget of opera houses varied from 46 % (Royal Opera House,
London) to 81 % (Opera Berlin) in 1987/1988. Twelve years later, Auvinen (2000) found that
the biggest source of income for all opera organizations in his study were the subsidies,
reaching from 57 % (Opéra National de Paris) to 84.5 % (Deutsche Oper Berlin). In Slovakia,
the public subsidy represents a major part of annual budgets of Slovak opera organizations and
reaches by average 85.21 % of their total revenue (in 2005).
The source of funding is likely to have a substantial influence on the balance between
economic and artistic objectives of opera organizations. Heilbrun (2001) analysed changes in
repertory in US opera houses describing a process of shifting their programming towards a
more popular, less demanding repertory. He found that this process had been presumably done
to wars off the financial pressure. Different kinds of relations between the sources of funding –
state, municipal or corporate – and their influence on programming autonomy of US opera
houses has been described by Pierce (2000). Similarly, Krebs and Pommerehne (1995)
analysed the role of state subsidy in Gemany in encouraging the production of the less known
and more risky repertoire.
Prioritising economic objectives implies an effort to higher a proportion of earned income
from ticket sales. First, it may affect a diversity of repertoire towards performing mainly
popular operas – that used to be called a “box office” repertory. Secondly, it can lead to an
increase in admission prices. However, the economic goals may be closely linked to some
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marketing objectives, such as increasing the number of attendees or creating the augmented
product of an opera house in the form of additional services provided for attendees.
(c) Marketing objectives
Although still restricted by some sectors, a marketing orientation is generally seen as a positive
direction for arts organizations, and marketing theory and market planning have become a
crucial part of arts management (Craeley, 2003). Work by Hirschman (1983) and Colbert
(2000) has clearly defined the necessary differences in the marketing approach of the cultural
institutions, allowing for varying degrees of commercialisation and for different strategies
within the market/product orientation framework (Colbert, 2000).
The essential marketing function in opera houses concerns audience development. The
audience development strategies imply either encouraging current visitors to more frequent
attendance and/or enhancing an audience diversification and increased access to the arts. In this
sense, some of the marketing strategies may include also social objectives. For instance,
educational activities may be regarded either as a marketing or social goal. A distinction could
be made probably by a target group, which is being educated. Mokwa et al. (1980), consider
the education as one of the key promotional objectives in culture and the arts, since the aim of
education is to give consumers tools and codes they need to evaluate the specific features of an
artistic product. The expansion of audiences for the arts requires the development of a level of
understanding, appreciation, and enjoyment sufficient to arouse a desire to attend arts events
(Kotler and Scheff, 1997). The education is particularly important for stimulating an interest in
high arts like opera.
Predominance of marketing objectives may be reflected in customer orientation of an
opera house, which may influence the programming towards performing those operas that are
popular with audiences. Heilbrun and Grey (2001) state that arts managers are faced with a
dichotomy between maximizing dissemination (marketing objective) and identifying the
aesthetic parameters of a performance (artistic objective). Nevertheless, increasing audience
access and enhanced genre credibility have frequently been considered to be mutually exclusive
objectives for arts marketers (Oakes, 2003).
However, Schulze and Ursprung (2000) argue that the consumer behaviour typically is
not a driving force in terms of demand, since an arts organization’s program revenue rarely can
cover operating costs. In addition, Voss and Voss (2002) observe, that frequent theatre-goers
are not interested in having their preferences reflected in product development; rather, they
want the theatre to expose them to what is innovative. Despite the clear imperative to develop a
wider audience, there is an equally pressing need to withstand external pressure to encourage
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modification of the core product in a way that would dilute its artistic integrity (Oakes, 2003).
Sorjonen and Uusitalo (2005) identified that market/customer orientation seems to increase the
performance measured by ticket sales, but is negatively related to the innovativeness of the
organization (measured by the number of first performances).
(d) Social objectives
Social goals are the most intangible policy objectives that the management of a cultural
organization may choose to pursue (Gilhespy, 1999). The aim of pro-social orientation of an
opera house is to enable the access to opera culture for all social groups. Voss and Voss (2000)
argue that non-for-profit theatres have a responsibility to provide community access to their
performances, remove economic and cultural barriers to attendance, and educate audiences in
theatre arts. Changes in social policy in the end of 1990s emphasized the importance of culture
as a tool for achieving wider social inclusion of those on the margins of society such as
physically and mentally challenged, minority ethnic groups, the unemployed and teenagers
(Hayes and Slater, 2002).
There is a strong linkage between the social goals and a community context as well. Gray
(2002) explains that culture is part of a larger system including community goals. As
communities develop, the arts find themselves connected to issues related to economics, urban
development and redevelopment, and policy. According to Carter et al. (2005) a new
management model emerges, calling for a change in the role that arts and cultural organizations
play within the larger economic, primarily urban, context. The model describes a
transformation of these organizations from “advocates” that are seeking to maximize (mostly
governmental) funding to one broadly described as “agents” that are specializing in the
management of infrastructure and resources necessary for the arts and culture to flourish.
The social objectives of an opera house concern first of all an audience diversification
using a price discrimination policy as a main tool. There is a possible overlapping between the
social goals and marketing objectives, especially in educational actions. Eventually, the
audience development is often used to achieve tangential social objectives such as reducing
social exclusion, combating crime levels, and improving health targets related to smoking and
dietary habits (Hayes and Slater, 2002). Pursuing social goals may lead on one hand to the
increased and diversified attendance, however, on the other hand to the decreased revenue from
the box office.
7
Opera Context in Slovakia
There are three professional public opera companies in the Slovak republic: Opera of Slovak
National Theatre Bratislava (1920), Opera of State Theatre Košice (1945) and State Opera
Banská Bystrica (1959). All of them are repertory theatres, which operate during ten months
from September to June. In Slovakia, similarly to Germany, a tradition of three-ensemble
theatres (opera, ballet and drama) has been adopted. Hence, the opera companies operate in the
framework of a larger theatre, sharing the stage and other facilities with ballet ensemble in most
cases.
The most prominent one is the Opera of Slovak National Theatre in Bratislava (879
employees). It is a representative national stage performing universal operatic repertory, which
comprises around 30 different productions. It performs in a historical theatre building with 597
seats in auditorium. Four or five new operas are staged every season. The total number of
performances reaches roughly 165 per annum. Opera of the State Theatre Košice (270
employees) – with the capacity of 555 places in auditorium – is artistically active in the EasterSlovakian cultural context. It focuses largely on the 18th and 19th century repertory performing
around 15 different titles during the season. Usually two or three new productions are prepared
every year. The average number of performances reaches 80 per annum. State Opera Banská
Bystrica (200 employees) with 329 seats in auditorium, operates as a smaller opera ensemble
with regional importance. Its programming is partly traditional, partly novel in the dramaturgic
sense and comprises around 12 different productions. Three new titles are prepared every
season. The total number of performances is around 65 per annum.
Two regional opera organizations – in Košice and Banská Bystrica – stage regularly
operettas and musicals, and each of them has an ensemble of soloist performing both genres. In
1986 the fourth opera company – The Chamber Opera – was established in Bratislava. Its
artistic mission was to develop alternative opera productions and serve as an “opera studio” for
young singers. Nevertheless, this experimental opera organization was closed in 1999, due to
mainly economic reasons.
Management models and strategic choices in Slovak opera houses
We assume that there is a number of internal and external management factors influencing the
strategic decision-making process in an opera house, among which four are of a particular
importance: (1) sources of funding and the income structure, (2) audiences, (3) the
organizational and management structure, and (4) the leadership style and manager’s
background. In the following section we present the situation in Slovak opera houses with
8
respect to changing priorities given to different kind of strategic objectives, in dependence on
changing conditions concerning the mentioned influences.
(1) Sources of funding and the income structure
As in most European countries, there is a strong tradition of government intervention in the arts
and culture in Slovakia. From 1945 to 1989 Slovak opera houses were fully subsidized by the
state through state bodies and later through the Ministry of Culture. Since the funding of opera
companies did not depend on the revenue from box office, tickets were cheap and directors of
the opera houses could afford to ignore audience taste, and instead, put on productions that
enhance their professional reputation including contemporary, Slovak and innovative
repertoire. The emphasis was put first of all on the artistic excellence and innovation (artistic
objective). The financial issues (economic objective) were not considered substantial, since in
case of some financial problems the theatres were allocated extra compensations from the
Ministry of Culture. This supports Auvinen’s (2001) findings that there is a strong correlation
between the artistic policy of an opera house and the resources needed for realising that policy.
After the shift to market economy in 1989, conditions for opera production changed
considerably, especially with regard to the financial situation. Although the state subsidy was
not being cut in absolute terms, in fact, it was decreasing because of inflation. The growing
dependence on the revenue from box office forced Slovak opera houses to look for multiple
sources of funding, including sponsorship, donations, grants, etc. As a result, the economic
objectives started to play more important role in the management of Slovak opera companies.
Currently, all of the three Slovak opera houses are state organizations funded from the
budget of the Ministry of Culture. The revenue from other sources, besides the box-office
income and subsidy, is still minor. The relative weight of public subsidy in the total income
represents 82.48 % in the Slovak National Theatre Bratislava, 81.51 % in the State Theatre
Košice and even 91.63 % in the State Opera Banská Bystrica (in 2005). Ticket sales generate
by average 10.08 % of the total revenue of Slovak opera companies: 13.5 % in the Slovak
National Theatre Bratislava, 10.11 % in the State Theatre Košice and 6.65 % in the State Opera
Banská Bystrica (in 2005).
(2) Audiences
Prior to 1989, marketing functions of Slovak opera houses were ensured in cooperation with
trade union organizations, which distributed tickets within enterprises, organizations and other
employers. The emphasis was put on the accessibility of opera performances for all kind of
publics (social objective). The overall attendance level (marketing objective) was not attached
9
too much importance. In fact, the performances were often sold – mainly in form of corporate
subscriptions – but the auditorium was half empty.
A decline in audiences, which appeared after 1989 was due, on one hand, to the break up
of a subscription system, and on the other hand, probably, to a general preoccupation with more
economic than artistic issues within the society in that period. In order to cope with this
situation, the Slovak opera houses modified their programming in favour of operas popular
with the audiences, which guaranteed at least an average attendance. This was particularly
noticeable in the Opera of Slovak National Theatre where the customer orientation (marketing
objective) was reflected in the increasing attendance rate in the middle of 1990s (from 78,50 %
in 1991 to 93,70 % in 1997). Naturally, this approach gained a lot of criticism from the Slovak
artistic community. Nevertheless, Blahynka (1999) argues that it is likely that all opera
companies in transition countries prioritise popular repertory hand in hand with growing
dependence on the revenues from ticket sales.
A shift to more artistic orientation appeared again in 2002, and was caused mainly by a
change in the position of director of the opera ensemble. The new director presented a new
mission stressing an artistic innovation at the first place. This had a considerable impact on the
programming in the following years. The higher proportion of contemporary, less known and
experimental productions was included into the repertory. However, as a result the opera
company experienced a considerable drop in attendance – from 88,43 % in 2001 to 81,02 % in
2005. Naturally, there are different factors influencing attendance (pricing policy, economic
situation, trends in leisure, etc.), which interact with the programming policy, however, no
important changes were observed in these factors in that period.
The difficult relationship between artistic and marketing objectives experienced by
Slovak opera houses in the last years suggests an important role of education in building the
audiences for the opera genre. However, Slovak opera organizations have not implemented any
important educational actions yet.
(3) Organizational and management structure
Although market conditions have changed substantially since 1989, the management and
organizational structures of three Slovak opera houses have remained – despite several
transformation attempts – almost unchanged till nowadays. The Slovak National Theatre
implements a relatively flat organizational structure consisting of the general director and set of
directors, who are in charge of the artistic ensembles (opera, ballet and drama) and other
departments with financial and organizational duties.
10
Since the artistic ensembles do not have a legal personality, the executive power is
centralized in hands of the general director, who is determined by the Ministry of Culture. GD
chooses directors of the companies after his or her nomination to the function. The major
responsibilities of the directors of opera, ballet and drama companies encompass setting an
artistic policy, preparing dramaturgic and playing plans, recruiting an artistic staff and fixing a
budget of the ensemble. From the point of view of the interaction of different strategic
objectives the positions of the economic vice-gerent (within opera company) and marketing
department seem problematic. First of all, the economic vice-gerent is subordinate to the
director of opera and formally has no decision competences. The role of marketing manager is
still regarded rather from the perspective of tickets sales than from that of building relationships
with existing and future audiences. Moreover, there are two independent marketing
departments in the Slovak National Theatre – one for the opera and ballet and the other for
drama. There are almost no horizontal interactions between these two departments. This leads
to a disintegrated marketing effort and lacking corporate communication of the theatre.
The strong centralization and rigidity of the organizational and management structure of
the Slovak National Theatre may be considered as one of the barriers in achieving better
performance of this organization. Moreover, in such a structure it results very difficult to ensure
a correct balance between different categories of strategic decisions made by an opera house.
(4) Leadership style and manager’s background
A leadership style adopted by an opera house is closely related to its organizational and
management structure. Turbide and Hoskin (1999) argue that starting in the 1960s a shift from
autocracy towards bureaucracy – and so arts administrators – began to appear across a range of
arts sub-sectors. Consequently, a dual leadership – implying a formal arrangement in which
two people have equal rank at the top of an organizational hierarchy (Voogt, 2005) – began to
emerge. The dual leadership system in arts organizations usually involves an artistic manager in
charge of artistic policies and decisions, plus an organizational manager or arts administrator,
responsible for “behind-the-scenes” activities and financial decisions (Turbide and Hoskin,
1999). However, the Slovak opera organizations implement an autocratic leadership style with
an executive power concentrated in hands of a general director and decision competences in
hands of directors of ensembles. Almost no decision-makings are delegated to lower levels of
the hierarchy.
Previous studies (Auvinen, 2000; Voogt, 2005) highlighted the question about a preferred
background of managers of cultural organizations mainly in terms of artistic or economic optics
on management issues. Although, the trend in opera houses management seems to be towards
11
general directors with background in arts administration (Auvinen, 2000), the general directors
of the Slovak theatres as well as directors of opera ensembles have mostly artistic background.
This practice emanates from a tradition before 1989, when the directors of theatres had to be
first so called “cultural authorities” to be offered that position. The tradition was quite
understandable in the previous regime, since the cultural organizations had no other concerns
except the artistic “duties”. However, the situation changed and decision-making in theatres
became much more complex, involving a wide range of economic and marketing questions.
This created a dilemma of whether economic or artistic background is required for the
managerial position in an opera institution. Ranan (2002) argues that opera companies are
complex organizations, labour intensive, run by experienced specialists, with a long (four to
five years) production cycles. Due to this, not only is there little flexibility, but the
professionalism and expertise needed to understand an opera organization, make it very
difficult for outsiders to bring about any effective changes. However, a dual leadership system
advocated by Voogt (2005) seems to be able to solve this dilemma.
Implications for a new management model in the Slovak National Theatre
In this section the current transformation process of management structures of the Slovak
National Theatre will be presented with respect to the limitations and challenges of the old and
a new management model. The starting point of the transformation process were difficulties in
striking a balance between artistic excellence, economic performance and audience response
experienced by the Slovak National Theatre during the last years. However, a driving pulse to
the transformation came from the moving and relocating to a new theatre building planned in
2006.
Currently, the opera company of the Slovak National Theatre performs in a historical
building with 593 seats in auditorium. After the relocation the capacity will be doubled – to 901
places in the hall for opera and ballet plus 160 places in the experimental studio. In addition,
the opera ensemble will be enabled to use the historical building for its performances until its
reconstruction. This makes a big pressure on ensuring marketing and economic functions in a
much more effective and efficient way than it is done nowadays.
In case studies presented by Auvinen (2000, 2001) main managerial problems in running
an opera house seemed to result from inherent tensions inside the organization caused by a coexistence of official (economic) and unofficial (artistic) management structures. It is assumed
that in case of the Slovak National Theatre the fundamental problem lies in the concentration of
an executive power and decision competences in hands of two people in the organizational
hierarchy – the general director and director of an opera ensemble. In such a management
12
structure the appropriateness of strategic management decisions depends to a high degree on
personal managerial and communication skills of the people in these positions. Formally, a
little space is left for the consensus and discussion regarding the interactions between artistic,
economic and audience concerns as viewed from the perspective of other departments. Hence,
it depends only on directors’ decision whether they do accept or not comments and objections
of others. Since, the background of both – general director and opera director – is traditionally
in artistic profession, the domination of artistic issues in management systems is evident.
A new management and organizational model (Figure 2) aims to decentralize decisionmaking processes and create a formal framework for a more collaborative way of leadership.
The main improvement of the suggested model lies in the use of a dual leadership system
consisting of artistic and economic director on the top of each artistic ensemble. Voogt (2005)
suggests that the problem-solving effect of dual leadership of equal rank is one of neutralizing
power. Neutralizing in dual leadership prevents the director from overruling the other partner(s)
in management, either a second-in-command or an entire team. This is the aim of the suggested
introduction of a dual leadership to the management structure of the Slovak National Theatre,
which forces both directors to look for a consensus in interrelated artistic-economic issues.
The role of general director encompasses more managerial than artistic competences, thus
a background in arts administration is preferable for that position. More importance is attached
to the marketing department, which moves from the subordinate position under artistic
directors to the partnership position and is in charge of marketing matters for the three artistic
ensembles (opera, ballet, drama) together. In this way the marketing effort is integrated and
helps to build the corporate identity of the whole theatre.
It is assumed that although the Slovak National Theatre cannot significantly influence
external management factors (like funding patterns, economic conditions, consumer
preferences, etc.), the use of a different management model may enable it to tackle the
management processes more effectively and to ensure better balance between the artistic
excellence, economic performance and audience response.
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Figure 2: Suggested organizational structure for a new management model in the Slovak National Theatre
Ministry of Culture
General Director
Supervisory Bord of
Governors
Economic Vice-Director
Fundraising, Budgeting,
Accounting,Payroll, Human
resources, IT, Commercial
lease of halls
OPERA
(Dual leadership)
1. Artistic director
- Programming, Casting,
Auditions, Artistic personal
Music Director
2. Economic director
- Financial management,
budgeting and control
BALLET
(Dual leadership)
1. Artistic director
- Programming, Casting,
uditions, Artistic personal
DRAMA
(Dual leadership)
2. Economic director
- Financial management,
budgeting and control
1. Artistic director
- Programming, Casting,
uditions, Artistic personal
Production planning
and administration
Production planning
and administration
Marketing Director
- Audience development,
Press, Box office, Education,
Publications, Customer service
2. Economic director
- Financial management,
budgeting and control
Production planning
and administration
Conductors, Orchestra,
Chorus masters, Chorus,
Music administration
14
Director of Artistic-decorative
Manufactory
Director of Technical
Administartion
Costume Designe, Stage
equipement, wings, props,
Stege management,
Stage crew, Light, Sound,
Make-up, Wardrobe,Transport,
Building maintenance, Security
Conclusion
Based on the discussion presented in the paper two conclusions are argued for the strategic
choices in opera houses management. First, four categories of strategic decisions are available
for the managers of opera organizations, comprising artistic, economic, marketing and social
objectives. Second, these four categories have to be considered in the framework of three main
opera houses concerns: ‘innovation’, ‘budget’ and ‘audience’, which, by their very nature
contradict each other, and thus, prioritising one of them may lead to worse results in others.
Nevertheless, certain overlapping may be identified between the economic and marketing
goals, and between the marketing and social objectives.
The strategic decision-making in opera houses is influenced by both internal management
and external environment forces, among which four are of a particular importance: (1) sources
of funding and the income structure, (2) audiences, (3) the organizational and management
structure, and (4) the leadership style and manager’s background. Although opera organizations
cannot significantly influence external management factors (like funding patterns, economic
conditions, consumer preferences, etc.), the use of a convenient management model may enable
them to tackle the management processes more effectively and to ensure better balance
between the artistic excellence, economic performance and audience response.
Acknowledgement
Support for this project was provided by a grant-in-aid from the Ministry of Education of
Slovak republic No. 1/0771201.
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