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Exploring Alternative Possibilities for Metaphysics of Mind
Jaison A. Manjaly
Introduction
Perhaps, the effort to understand human mind remains the most extraordinary quest of human beings. The
pursuit is ancient, yet it is continuing till today. The study undertaken is an attempt to assess some of the most
recent important theoretical endeavors in the western philosophy in this direction. Its final goal is to explore a
possibility: Whether a change in the common metaphysical outlook that these theories share can help to resolve
some of the persistent problems generated by them.
By a change in the common metaphysical outlook, I mean a change in the underlying dualistic
understanding of mind, which has been shared by most of the theories in general. Though many of the theories
claim to refute or discard dualism, their arguments are not completely devoid of dualistic flavor at the very
fundamental level.
Statement of the Problem
As I mentioned above, the quest to understand mind is ancient. However, compared to the ancient and
medieval practice, the nature of the enquiry on mind in western tradition has undergone a significant change. In
the ancient times in the western tradition, a study on mind used to be considered as mystical and supernatural in
nature, and no distinction used to be drawn between mind and soul. In the western context, the term ‘soul’ has an
embedded spiritual and theological connotation. Aristotle used the word anima1 for soul, and treated it as
something extra-physical and endowed with special properties. This Aristotelian tradition of equating mind with the
‘spirit’ or the soul continued through the medieval ages to the post-Renaissance period among western
philosophers.
In sharp contrast, in Indian philosophical tradition, it is an ancient tradition to draw a line between atman,
loosely translated as the soul, and manas or antahkarana on the other. The term manas stands for mind, and
antahkarana for the internal organ. Thus in the Indian tradition philosophy of mind need not contain any reference
to soul. There is however, a hierarchy between mind and soul. In the Upanishadic philosophy, atman repeatedly
has been considered superior to all organs and is at par with the ultimate reality or Brahman. Manas or
antahkarana, on the other hand, is supposed to have only an instrumental value; it is just an organ necessary for
internal experience. As mentioned earlier, a significant change has gone into the nature of enquiry on mind in the
western tradition. Today mind is no longer considered as identical or even akin to soul, and also the spiritual
connotations of a study of mind has been carefully eliminated to make room for a fresh perspective.
The most visible sign of this change perhaps was the separation of psychology from philosophy in the 19 th
century. In sharp contrast to what used to be, psychology proclaimed itself as a “scientific” study of mind. In his
Principles of Psychology William James (1890), for example, systematically presented mind as an information
processing system. Other eminent psychologists who emulated James in this respect are scholars such as E. H.
Weber, G. Fechner, H.V. Helmholts, Ebbinghaus etc. Thus slowly in psychology theories came into being about
mental states such as recognition, mental traits such as intelligence, mental disorders such as schizophrenia and
their treatments, mental strata such as unconsciousness. None of these contains any reference to the human soul.
The need to distinguish itself has occasionally led psychology to the radical extreme, such as behaviorism as
proposed by B.F. Skinner. Skinner considered any reference to mind as inimical to the ‘scientific nature’ of
psychology and focused on a study of human physical behavior in the name of psychology.
While psychology made a conscious effort to break away from theological inquiry into soul, it diverted its
attention to mental activities but did not try to address the question: What is mind? A striking commonality, for
example, in the contemporary psychological endeavors is that each of them takes mind as a presupposition, as a
‘given’. They study mental behavior, states and disorders without asking the central question ‘what is mind?’
In the past few decades, we have seen other serious changes to take place in the study of mind. A new
interdisciplinary field called ‘cognitive science’ has emerged, which has mind as its central topic of inquiry. The
interdisciplinary study of mind is due to a growing belief that mind, because of its variegated nature, which cannot
be investigated through the compartmentalized enquiry, as had been practiced by traditional philosophy or
psychology. The term ‘cognitive’ refers to knowledge or knowing. The new field of study rose from the
convergence on a common set of questions posed by the following disciplines, namely;
1. Philosophy
2. Psychology
3. Neuroscience
4. Computer science
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Aristotle names his treaties as De Anima, roughly translated as “On the soul”.
5. Language/linguistics
Researchers in these five contributing discipline realized that many of their questions about the human
mind were actually the same and that many of their methods of investigation overlap. Thus, cognitive science is a
concerted effort for a better understanding of mind through collaborative research and shared findings. The
interactions among the disciplines have been many and most of the times have been productive.
Each of these disciplines has a distinctive set of enquiry related to mind. Some times these enquiries are
unique, but often they overlap and coalesce. Philosophy is considered as a core topic in cognitive science. It probes
into the nature of mind from a metaphysical point of view and also examines the epistemological issues. On the
metaphysical spectrum of enquiry, one of the most important riddle is mental-physical relation. Epistemological
issues like the nature and functions of acquiring, processing and representation of knowledge arise out of this
metaphysical riddle. However, repercussions from findings of other components of cognitive science are equally
important for philosophical discussion. The cognitive psychological understanding of mind as an information
processing system; neuroscientific understanding of neural functions as the seat of all mental functions; the claim
of creation of artificial intelligence by computer science; etc. are some of the issues that have been posed by the
other disciplines in cognitive science which have changed and affected the philosophical understanding of mind and
its functions.
While philosophy inquires the very existence of mind, cognitive psychology probes into the functions of
information processing and their representation in living organisms. These aspects of cognitive psychology have
influenced cognitive neuroscience in explaining the neuronal functions of the brain and how they simulate an
information processing system.
Cognitive neuroscience mainly examines how brain is associated with mental experience. The research on
localization of the brain functions, for example, by various other scholars especially by Wilder Penfield (1891-1976)
gave positive results for specific cortical substrates of language, memory, emotion and perception. The split brain
experiments of Roger Sperry (1913-1994) showed not only how hemispheres divide their functions, but also
provided a way to control epilepsy. More importantly, these experiments gave rise to possibilities that mental,
particularly cognitive activities can be mapped onto the brain.
Developments in cognitive neuroscience and advances in computer science witnessed the emergence of
Artificial Intelligence (AI) which aims to create intelligent systems and to develop computational models of human
brain. The interest of AI in human mind and its functions is mainly to emulate these in a machine.
Linguistics also contributed to the study of various cognitive functions, especially that of thought and
reason. The emergence of the generative paradigm by Noam Chomsky, which holds that language is basically
computational and a part of the biological endowment, has given new dimension to cognitive science research. It
has shown that language use, which earlier was considered purely as intellectual, therefore mental activity, can be
approached from non-mental perspective also.
Overlapping interests and shared findings have led results of one of these disciplines to affect another
discipline. For instance, linguistic theories have provided very precise information about speech impairment
following a stroke in the left hemisphere of the brain. This information has been very useful in developing
appropriate speech-therapy and computer-aided linguistic prostheses for stoke victims. Similarly, the neuroscientific
experiments of Roger Sperry (1982) on split-brains, or Kandel’s (1981) study of parallel processing done in the
nerve system has not only enriched neuroscience, but also has led to dramatic expansion of efforts to modal
human cognition and ability in both philosophy and psychology.
Literature Survey
Because of the emergence and exchange of new information on human cognitive abilities and capacities
among these five disciplines, several theories on human mind and its nature have recently emerged in western
philosophy. Some of which are mentioned briefly below. The emerging positions show that there are two extreme
kinds. On the one hand, there are the exclusively physicalistic2 theories such as:
 Eliminativism
 Physicalism
 Identity theory
Eliminativism holds that human mind is nothing other than the brain and its states and functions. It
eliminates mind and the mental in favor of brain or neurophysiological phenomena. As it eliminates mind, the
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Physicalistic theories hold that mental can be exhaustively explained or reduced in to physical.
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position is known as eliminativism. Its main proponents in recent times are P. M. Churchland, R. Rorty, P. K.
Feyerabend and S. P. Stich.
The metaphysical view of physicalism is a similar position. It holds that given the monistic metaphysics that
only physical entities are fundamentally real, an elimination of everything non-physical, including the non-physical
mind, follows logically. The main proponents of physicalism, for example, are D. Lewis, J. J. C. Smart and D. M.
Armstrong.
Identity theory first proposed few decades ago by U.T. Place3 and Herbert Feigl4 and later upheld by J.J.C.
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Smart holds that mental states and functions are identical to physical states and functions.
On the other side of the spectrum, there are the non-physicalistic theories that staunchly assert the
existence of extra-physical mind, one that cannot be reduced to brain and its activities. Some of these are:
 Dualism
 Phenomenalism
 Functionalism
Dualism for instance, holds that the real world is made up of exactly two substances, the physical or the
bodily and the mental. It further claims that neither is reducible to the other; because each has its own distinctive
and unique set of properties.
Phenomenalism is the position which appeals to phenomenal experience, or the felt property of our
conscious experience to argue that this extra ‘qualitative experience’ is irreducible in behavioral or physical terms.
In contemporary philosophy of mind D. Chalmers, F. Jackson, T. Nagel, et al. has argued for this position.
Functionalism is a position, which proposes that mind is what mind does. Some of its different forms of
functionalisms are: (a) decompositional functionalism (b) computation-representation functionalism (c)
metaphysical functionalism6.
These western theories, both physicalistic and anti-physicalistic, have come up with various explanations of
mind and its place in the physical world. However, certain persistent problems seem to plague each of the
opposing sides. Against physicalistic theories 7 in general, for example, the main criticism is that they fail to give an
exhaustive explanation of the mental in terms of the physical. The major problem, with their metaphysics is the
identification of two realities - mind and matter - and trying to fuse them together, which in fact commit
physicalistic theories to a dualistic metaphysics.
Similarly, the general complaint with the anti-physicalistic group of theories is their evidential basis is too
subjective. The concepts with which they are operating are highly first-person oriented, like qualia, felt property,
phenomenal experience etc8. Also, critics have found that the eagerness of these theories to confer a special status
to mind often gets translated into an unwarranted bestowal of a kind of supremacy to the mental. It makes antiphysicalistic theories to fall in to a strong dualistic metaphysical frame work. Therefore both physicalistic and antiphysicalistic theories are trapped in dualistic framework of reality.
Although there is a broad division of theories of mind in terms of physicalistic and anti-physicalistic, there
are another group of theories which does not seem to fall in to this categorization. Philosophical behaviorism is one
among these theories, which claims to conceptualize mind according to the observable behavior. Philosophical
behaviorism ignores the metaphysical status of mind. Another theory of this kind is machine functionalism, which
ague for a neutral metaphysics on the basis of multiple realizablity theses9. Though these theories maintain
metaphysical neutrality, the problems of mind are still at large as, many of the features of mind like, the causality
of mental events; holistic nature experience, phenomenal nature of experience etc. are not satisfactorily explained.
.Place, U.T. 1956. Is Consciousness a Brain Process?, British Journal of Psychology, 47, 44-50
Feigl, H. 1967. The 'mental' and the 'physical': Essay and a Postscript, University of Minnesota Press,
Minneapolis, in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 2, pp. 370-497.
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Smart, J. J. C. 1959. Sensations and Brain Processes. The Philosophical Review. 68: 141-156
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Block, N.1980. Introduction: what is functionalism? Readings in Philosophy of Psychology. Ed. N. Block. Harvard
University Press
7
In this regard identity theory fails to fill up the explanatory gap; eliminative materialism is self-refuting and
epiphenomenalism discards the causal efficacy of mental phenomena.
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These concepts are mainly found in the writings of Frank Jackson, David Chalmers, Tomas Nagel, John Searle et
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al.
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Multiple realizability holds that mind is multiply realizable irrespective of the metaphysical status of its substratum.
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Gap Area
It is apparent from the analysis of above western theories of mind that, they necessarily conceptualize
mind within a dualistic framework. By this I mean a framework that carves a sharp boundary between physical and
non-physical. This framework was the contribution of Rene Descartes in 17 th century. Descartes proposed that
there are exactly two kinds of substances or things in the world: Matter, which is inert, unthinking but occupies
space, and Mind, which is the thinking kind, but does not occupy space at all. This sharply dichotomous dualistic
metaphysics was embraced by Galileo and other Renaissance scientists and was inherited by scientists of other
ages. The theories that are mentioned above also follow the same matrix. Their effort is also centered on
explaining mind strictly within that framework. The physicalistic theories identify mind and matter, but argue that
both are same. The non-physicalistic theories, on the other hand, argue for the separate existence of mind and
matter. Even those theories, which claim to be neutral, also operate with a presumed dualistic metaphysics.
Sometimes this has led to Procrustean maneuvers to fit the problem at the cost of distortion to a given mold of
metaphysics. For instance, the body-mind relation is one of the most well-known problems that have resisted
philosophical solutions. It is equally well-known that this problem owes its origin exclusively to the starkly dualistic
metaphysics.
It is not as if the dualistic metaphysics is the only available framework possible. A careful study of certain
Indian philosophical systems reveals interesting experimentations with alternative metaphysics while propounding
theories of mind. For instance, some of the Indian theoretical traditions endorse a ‘continuum metaphysics’ which
does not consider body and mind as polar opposites in the Cartesian manner. Many of them consider mind as
material in nature. Its role is primarily assigned as a tool for internal monitoring. In their ontology, the non-physical
status is reserved only for the ‘self’ or Atman.
For instance, Nyaya-Vaisesika system has theorized mind, or antahkarana, as material, yet not at par with
the purely physical. Thus, Nyaya system does not believe in the western dualism of body-mind, but maintains a
division between gross matter, subtle matter, and the non-physical. Furthermore, the Nyaya system does not
ascribe the properties of the cognition, consciousness etc. to antahkarana or mind, as is the western practice.
Rather, it attributes all those properties to atman, or the self.
The Samkhya system also regards mind as part of the internal organ system (antahkarana) which
comprises of buddhi, ahamkara and manas. This internal system has priority over external sense organs because
the cognition of external objects is possible only through antahkarana. The internal organ facilitates all the
activities of external organs.
In Advaita theory, mind is still the essential internal tool, while the actual knower is the individual self,
which is none other than the Brahman. Interestingly, according to Advaita School also antahkarana is bhauthika or
material because it is composed of all the five physical elements.
My research will attempt to explore whether the metaphysical frameworks used by some eastern
philosophical traditions, especially Indian theoretical traditions, can provide any unique insight or solution by a
restructuring of the existing metaphysics.
Objectives
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To examine some of the important recent western theories of mind.
To discuss their common shortcomings and identify some of the problems that they have created for
contemporary philosophy of mind. (prepare a list of these ‘insoluble” problems, in case someone asks)
To explore whether the dualistic metaphysical framework that they all uncritically share is at the root of
these ‘insoluble’ problems in philosophy of mind.
To find out if a change of metaphysical framework can provide us meaningful resolution of at least some of
these problems and also can provide us a better philosophical understanding of mind.
Hypotheses
1. Dualistic metaphysical framework could be the source for some of the particularly ‘insoluble’ difficulties in
western philosophy of mind.
2. Eastern traditions especially Indian tradition can facilitate the ideas of other alternatives for metaphysical
framework for a theory of mind.
3. An alternative metaphysics may unravel some of the current problems in Philosophy of Mind. It may raise
new questions and offer insights in the research on mind.
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Methodology
A major methodological tool in a philosophical enquiry is: Critical Thinking. Roughly, it is giving reasons for
one’s beliefs and evaluating other’s reasons before accepting or rejecting their beliefs. This includes:
 Definition and meaning analysis
 Mapping of logical possibilities and weighing their feasibility in terms of inference to the best explanation.
 Fallacies and other cognitive error detection
 Argument analysis and evaluation.
Relevance of the Research
The major thrust of my research is to explore an alternative metaphysics in lieu of existing dualistic
metaphysics. Exploring alternative metaphysics of mind, especially taking Indian theories in to account, has not
been very popular in contemporary philosophy of mind. The unexplored alternative is important in contemporary
philosophy of mind, as there have been many unresolved problems of mind revolving around the dualistic
metaphysics. In this pursuit, my research can point out some of the crucial problems of current research on mind,
as well as a different direction for the settlement of the problems of mind. Another importance of my study is
bringing oriental tradition of mind; especially Indian philosophical tradition to explore the alternative metaphysics.
Finally it aims to bring a comparative east-west approach in exploring the new metaphysics of mind.
Reference:
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