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Study Guide for Historical Study B-54
Week 1
Forgotten Armies
Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper: Forgotten Armies: The Fall of British Asia,
1941-1945, pp. 1-69.
PROLOGUE, PART I
-Oct. 4, 1940 : Japanese military alliance with Nazi Germany and fascist Italy
-Japanese push towards modernization, technological development, increasing control of trade in
Asia, and colonial expansion to create a Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere
-1937 – bloody war with China and leader Chiang Kai Shek, whom Japanese saw as
backward and in need of Japanese rule and leadership. U.S. and Britian oppose Japanese
domination and support Chinese nationalists and Chiang Kai Shek via Burma Road.
-summer 1941 – Japanese under U.S. embargo on oil and other war materials; plans for
conquest of oil in Dutch East Indies, minerals and rubber in French Indo-China and British
Malaya.
-anti-colonial movements in SE Asian colonies coincide with Japanese look towards
conquest; radical nationalists turn to Tokyo and new Japanese universities for training
-Japanese increase presence and intelligence networks in colonies, as well as strong Japanese
patriotism
-Colonel Suzuki Keiji – in charge of “offensive strategy” in British Asia
SE Asia independence movements
1) Burma
-rise of the Thakins, party of young radical nationalists in Burma, who despite hostility to
Japanese imperialism, look to Japanese to support Burma Ondependence Army against
British
-Burmese communities and socialist Thakins form National Revolution Party
-Aung San rises as leader; with Thirty Comrades, he flees to Tokyo where, with Japanese
collaboraters, they prepare to enter Burma as Burma Indepencence Army in 1941
2) India
-international Buddhism and cobalt mines become cover for Japanese subversion and intelligence
operations in India
-nationalists Indian groups – Indian Communist Party, Forward Bloc (Subhas Chandras Bose). Bose
flees to Hitler and receives command of Hitler’s Indian Legion
3) China
-philanthropist Tan Kah Kee initiates China Relief Fund and encourages communist Chinese
in China and overseas (Malaya and Singapore) to poor resources into Chinese nationalism,
which becomes a threat to Japanese
-overseas “anti-enemy backing-up societies”
4) Malaya
-Malayan Communist Party supports China, rises up against British colonists
-Union of Malay Youth (founded 1937); leader Ibrahim Yaacob involved in diplomacy with
Japanese
PROLOGUE, PART II
-the Great Crescent (Bengal and Assam through Burma to Malay States and Singapore), weak point of
British Empire – fragmented political units subject to variety of levels of British administration
-white settler societies give rise to mixed races, tensions, divisions
-Malaya –“model colony” underlain by urban chaos
-“industrial diamond” – opium crucial
-“Malayan pastorale” – imperial city of Penang representative of classic colonial port
city – prosperity, order; contrast between wealthy class and enclaved industrial workers
-Kuala Lumpur, industrial center, breeds Chinese anarchists; soviet formedin 1937;
strikes paralyzed industry
-Indian rubber workers in Malaya under harsh labor conditions
-absence of British and sovereignty of Malay rulers contributes to weakness of
British rule
-capitalism; Indian and Arab trade interests
-urbanization; growing sense of nationalism, especially among youth
-Singapore: tropical, luxurious Asian point of attraction to traveling celebrities;
“invisible city” attracts exile; dark side - prostitution rampant
-racism divides cities; Europeans vs. any mixture; European officials vs. Malayan
Civil Service.
-1941 – increasing presence of British soldiers; Malayan Civil Service and British
prepare for war
Week 2
Sourcebook (1)
The Munich Crises
The Hossbach Memorandum (November 5, 1937):
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Considered one of the most important documents of the immediate prewar period
Revisionist historians reject it as of little significance (don’t acknowledge it as a
clear indication of Hitler’s intentions)
The aim of German policy was to make secure and to preserve the racial
community and to enlarge it  question of space (many people, little space)
Lebensraum = living space
Considered autarky (economic independence) vs. increased participation in the
world economy  ruled out autarky because of insufficient ability to meet food
and general economic demands of the nation independently
Considered food security to be the primal concern and the justification for
acquiring new land.
Considered where Germany could achieve the greatest gain at the lowest cost.
British Empire faced weaknesses in the far East, Ireland, India, and faced a threat
from Italy in the Mediterranean
Britain, France, Russia and the smaller states adjoining them all had to be
considered
Considers different time period for action.
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o Case 1: 1943-1945: If the Germans waited until then to act, they would
lose the upper hand (equipment would be obsolete and the enemy would
become stronger)
o Case 2: If France becomes engulfed in a domestic crisis…time to act
against Czechs
o Case 3: If France entangled in external war…first objective = overthrow
Czechoslovakia and Austria (expect Poland to remain neutral)
Believed the French and British had already written off Czechoslovakia; believed
the Italians wouldn’t care about Czech. But unsure about their stance with regards
to Austria
Attack on the Czechs must be accomplished in “lightning speed” to eliminate any
incentives for Russia or Poland to become involved.
Hoped for a prolongation of the war in Spain, therefore would assist the
Italians...who would drag the French and the British into war. In this case, Britain,
already engaged in war, would not interfere with German actions, and without
British support, French action was unlikely (believed France to be the biggest
threat)
Hitler believed that Germany would begin taking action in the summer of 1938
The Munich Agreement (September 29, 1938)
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September 12, Hitler announced that he wanted self-determination for all the
Sudeten Germans in Czech.
H. told Chamberlain that if the Sudeten problem were resolved, Germany would
have no more territorial problems in Europe.
France and Russia were explicitly bound by a treaty to defend Czech. (Britain
indirectly involved through ties with France). Britain and France gave in to Hitler.
Agreed to the terms of the transfer in Munich
On page 8 of the coursepack is a list of the 8 terms of the trade (generally
speaking, formation of an international commission to deal with specific details,
evacuation of territories to be completed between October 1st and October 10th,
plebiscites, etc.)
Hitler’s Response to President Roosevelt’s Peace Message (April 28 1939):
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FDR asked Hitler and Mussolini for a ten year truce, and sent a list of 31 specific
nations not to be attacked
Hitler’s response began with an attack of the “democratic powers” for allowing
the Treaty of Versailles to come into action, crushing the German economy and
embarrassing the German people  believed it to be entirely unjust. Repeats
German grievance several times throughout the speech.
Points out that the U.S. was involved in 6 of the past 26 violent interventions
worldwide while Germany had no part to play in any of them.
H. blamed the press for the spread of “artificial panic”  believed that
governments needed to impose “necessary restraint and truthfulness” on their
press.
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H. pointed out that American constitutional law professors believed that Germany
was no more to blame for WWI than any other nation.
 H. claims he doesn’t like to resort to war.
 Proceeds to discredit many of the points/claims FDR made in his speech
throughout the rest of this speech. Reveals the hypocrisy of some of FDR’s
points.
 FDR said that a nation has a right to take up arms in “self-evident home defense”,
and H. claims that the U.S. entered WWI not in “self-evident home defense”, but
for exclusively capitalistic reasons.
 H. emphasized that Germany was the only nation to comply with the Treaty of
Versailles (and was the one nation truly punished by the treaty…said Germany
would never again enter a conference defenseless and trusting as it did with the
League of Nations (“would never enter another tribunal”)
 To FDR’s request that the German state reveal it’s present and future policy H.
says that no other nations are being requested to do so, so Germany has no
obligation to do so either.
 H. says he will give an assurance to each of the 31 nations listed by FDR, each on
an individual basis. He also claims that he asked them all if they felt threatened by
Germany, and they all responded in the negative.
 In terms of rearmament, Germany began rearming after all the other nations broke
the agreement and began rearming. Told FDR to direct his request to other nations
first.
 H. told FDR to begin restoring international trade by removing the barriers to
trade emanating from the United States. He then compared and contrasted the
German and U.S. economies and resources.
Hitler Reveals his Decision to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht (August 21,
1939)
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Hitler’s diplomacy centered on the Danzig Free State which included parts of
Poland inhabited by German speaking people. He demanded that Poland return
Danzig and a strip of Polish territory that would allow Germany access to East
Prussia (separated from Germany post Treaty of Versailles).
Told his commanders that he had decided that Poland would have to be dealt with
during the past Spring, but he had hoped to deal with the West first
Believed that he and Mussolini were assets to their cause, and that the lack of
outstanding personalities in Britain and France combined with the lack of
authoritarian leadership would place them at a huge disadvantage.
H. said Russia prepared to sign an agreement with Germany (the Allies would
lose her much counted upon support)
Polish destruction was top priority, even if war were to break out in the West.
The Speeches of Adolf Hitler
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Outlines German sacrifices as displaying great loyalty to Europe: ceded lands,
“voluntarily” limited power
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H. claimed that Czechoslovakia was established as a democracy; however, it is
repressing the rights of the 3.5 million Germans under its rules. These Germans
were deprived of their right of self-determination
Claimed that Czech. leader Mr. Benes had fabricated a story about mobilized
German troops en route to Czech. to justify his abuse of the German population in
Czech.
H. requested that the Germans in Czech. be allowed the right to self-determination
He also warned about the regeneration of the Italian-Roman Reich and the
Germanic-German Reich
“Our Consciences are at Rest” (September 3, 1939)
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Speech to the House of Commons
Germany invaded Poland on September 1, 1939 without a declaration of war.
Britain declared war on Germany on September 3rd, followed by France
Churchill said that by entering this war, the British were fighting to save the
whole world from the Nazi pestilence, not just Poland
Told British that they must surrender some rights for the time being in order to
fight for the rights of all individuals
Churchill = New Prime Minister (May 10, 1940  speech given on May 13, 1940):
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Chamberlain’s resignation occurred on the 10th after Germany invaded Holland
and Belgium.
In this short speech, Churchill outlined what he was planning to do in the
government, and he reaffirmed the British of his commitment to the war cause.
Britain’s aim = victory at any cost, otherwise, “there is no survival”
“The News is Very Bad” (June 17, 1940):
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Italy declared war on France and Britain on the 10th
Germans occupied Paris on the 14th
Churchill, in this short broadcast, said that the fall of France made no
difference…the British would fight alone if need be to defend the world and
eventually emerge victorious
Neville Chamberlain, Speech on the Munich Crisis:
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Supported the Munich Agreement
Began by stating that the two points to keep in mind were that
o Britain went to the meeting in Munich already knowing that the German
areas in the Sudetenland were to be passed over to the Germans (not a
debate of whether that should happen or not  Czech. had accepted the
Anglo-French proposal); the conference was to decide on the conditions of
the transfer
o Time was a crucial factor
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Godesberg Memorandum vs. Munich Agreement  Chamberlain claims that the
Munich Agreement is a significantly better compromise than the Godesberg
Memorandum:
o Godesberg was a 6 day ultimatum vs. Munich reverts to the Anglo-French
proposal of a five-stage, 10 day plan of transfer
o Line determining where German troops will enter for occupation will now
be decided by an International Commission as opposed to being
determined by the Germans (Munich vs. Godesberg)
o Plebiscite areas will be defined by the International Commission (Munich)
o Occupation of plebiscite areas by international force rather than German
and Czech. troops
Chamberlain claims that this is a triumph in that four great powers were able to
negotiate such a settlement
Believed that this move would afford Czech. greater security
Credited Hitler and Mussolini for their “contributions”
Winston Churchill, Speech on the Munich Crisis:
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Opposed the Munich Agreement
Believes that the interests of Czech. were not kept in mind…Czech. trusted
Britain and France, and she was let down
Churchill’s view: “maintenance of peace depends on the accumulation of
deterrents against the aggressor, coupled with a sincere effort to redress
grievances.”
His alternative proposal was for Britain, France and other powers to pledge to
guarantee the security of Czech. until an impartial international body could review
the case of the Sudeten Germans.
Believed in third alternative between submission and war that sought out peace
and justice.
These powers could have encouraged Poland earlier in the summer (along with
the help of Russia) to take a stand against German actions, and Germany would
not have been so resolute in her demand for portions of Czech.
Discredits Hitler’s cry for self-determination because it is coming from a
totalitarian state.
Non-German Czechs in the Sudeten will face many hardships (displacement, loss
of primary employment-mines)
Foresaw that the entire Czechoslovak state would be engulfed by Germany (either
by way of despair or revenge)
Warned that the system of alliances in Central Europe that France relied on for its
safety was now destroyed.
Believed the German army was gaining strength and further actions would be
threatened in the near future.
Churchill warned that many believed that the interests of Czech. had been
compromised by this agreement, however, ultimately he believed that all of them
were now deeply compromised.
Churchill’s preparations for eminent German aggressions:
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Creation of an Air Force
Gathering together the collective strength of many nations
Alliances and military conventions
Drastically increased efforts at rearmament and mobilization of industry
Neville Chamberlain, Reply to His Critics:
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Defense of his decision to support the Munich Agreement
Appeal to average person  was looking out for their best interest because war
would have affected them before it affected the armies and the soldiers
Claimed he had received many letters from British people saying they did not
think war over the Sudeten was a cause worth fighting.
Furthermore, Britain had no treaty/legal obligations to Czech.
But obligation to French government, so could not have told Czech. they wouldn’t
support her under any circumstances.
Believe they saved Czech.  gave it a new life as a state.
Recognized that people are universally averse to war  thus tried by all means in
his power to avert it
Believes in peace, but still feels the need for armament until others can be induced
to disarm as well (reconciliation of his message of peace with the current
rearmament of Britain).
Benefit of the Munich Crisis: it brought to light the strengths and weaknesses of
the British defense.
Sourcebook 1.e: Selections from the Times of London, Sept 5-30, 1938, and March 15,
1939.
▪ Sept 5, 1938: an article about the continuation of negotiations over the “CzechGerman problem.”
o Is sympathetic to Sudetens, writes that concessions made by Czech. should
have been made years ago
▪ Sept 7: Nuremberg and Aussig
o Covers Hitler’s address at the annual Nuremberg Nazi rally
o In his speech, Hitler doesn’t mention the Czech problem
▪ Sept 8: The Threat of Force
o Now refers to the situation as a “crisis”
o Writes that Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia have legitimate
grievances; Czech gov’t has made honest attempts to rectify these
▪ Sept 9: Frontiers of Czechoslovakia
o Sir Arnold Wilson, a member of Parliament, says that the frontiers should
be redrawn to exclude from Czech. as many “persons as possible of
German race”
▪ Sept 20: Prague and the Plan
o Summarizing quote: “The hope of those who lay these proposals [of
redrawing the Czech frontiers to exclude Sudeten Germans] before the
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Czech Government will certainly be that they would leave Czechoslovakia,
though smaller in size, stronger by being made more homogenous.”
o The pop of the territory in question is ~2 million ppl (out of 15M in Czech)
o Article hopes that Czech government realizes that ultimate gain is greater
than ultimate sacrifice
Sept 24: Avoiding violence during the negotiations
o Chamberlain has gotten Czechs to agree to hand over areas; Germans don’t
trust this will happen
o Article says if Germans use military force to invade Sudeten area—
disrupting negotiations—Czechs would “undoubtedly” possess right of
armed resistance.
o Has been proved that Sudeten’s problems can be solved w/out war
Sept 26: A Week of Decision
o Praise Chamberlain’s push for peace; his “valour”; “wisdom”
Sept 27-28: Prime Minister’s View of the Crisis
o Chamberlain: German Chancellor has no faith that promises made will be
carried out
o German attitude unreasonable; he has offered British guarantee that
peaceful transfer would occur, w/out need for force; Germans skeptical
o Chamb.: “I am myself a man of peace to the depths of my soul.”
Sept 28: The Issue Defined
o Choice now between the method of reason and of force
 Czechs, persuaded by UK and French, agreed to let Sudetens go
Sept 29: On to Munich
o Times, as it has the whole way so far, very strongly praises Chamberlain
March 15, 1939: Guarantees Worthless
o Churchill says that Nazi invasion of Czecho-Slovak republic is justification
for speech he made in September
Parker, chaps 1-2
Chapter 1: Hitler, Germany, and the origins of the European war
WWII made of two separate wars—European and Asian
US and Britain fought in both; Germany, Japan, and Russia fought on 1 front
Caused by conflicts between actions of Axis leaders and what Ally leaders would allow
Mussolini brings Italy in (1940) b/c he thought the war was already won; similarly, as the
war came to an end, many countries joined the allies to assure themselves spot
in U.N.
Otherwise, other countries who fought had no choice
The German gov’t started the war in Europe
w/out german instigation, Japan would/could not have attacked Britain/US
Hitler’s gov’t was popular yet unrepresentative—still managed to gain support and
acquiescence until the very end of the war
Germans felt economic/political grievances result of predatory foreigners—did not feel
guilty for WWI, and felt Treaty of Versailles was unfair
reparations were blamed for economic collapse and inflation—actually inflation was
result of resistance to reparations and withdrawal of capital by American
investors
Treaty of Versailles (TOV)
Imposition of TOV created xenophobic nationalism
German issues w/ TOV: breakup of German-speaking people
Loss of German colonies
Resentment of treaty limitations on size of army
Nazis in Germany
Nazi expression of hatred towards foreigners was representative of people’s attitudes
Accused socialists of subversion as reason for defeat in 1918
Therefore, mass support came from middle class and peasantry (not from working class)
Middle class felt communist ideas were causing depression (selfish trade unions)
Emphasized classless society, ridiculed successful capitalists (very appealing)
Anti-Semitism alienated more people than not; but did attract peasants who resented
debts to moneyed-men
Nazis encouraged suspicion between classes, while claiming to support classless society
Field Marshall Hindenburg (president) appoints Hitler president to appease interests of
the army and German conservatives
Hitler’s Tactics
Used expanded SA to intimidate civilian politicians
Offered bribes to Hindenburg and the army leadership, promising expansion
Created tension between army and SA; Hitler has 100-200 SA leaders killed in June 1934
(night of the long knives)
Period or normalcy followed—no open brutality, legislation discriminated against Jews
Established himself as arbiter btwn the army and the party; all saw him as their ally
against the others
public works programs, rearmament increased, compulsory military service began
unemployment disappeared
by 1938 most Germans accepted the regime-strong, united Germany
Aims of Hitler
Hitler’s popularity rested on his status of being Germany’s savior—needed an endless
struggle against an enemy to maintain that
difficult to believe that had he tried to pursue desires peacefully, Germans would have
accepted a dictatorship
probably believed he would lead Germany in national & racial struggle—legitimizes
Nazi dictatorship
Particularly stressed the Jewish problem and the need for “living space”
Living space needed for German peasants and raw materials for industry
Jewish solution to preserve racial purity of Germans
Actions
Four Year Plan to make Germany self-sufficient—includes expansion of the army,
economic readiness for war in 4 years time
Hitler’s attitude of an imminent struggle between nations, was certain to bring war
Britain
Willing to accept a dominant, prosperous, Germany in exchange for peace
General appeasement assumed to be means by maintaining peace
As events unfolded appeasement became more scrutinized
Violation of the Treaty
Germany remilitarizes in 1935, move troops into Rhineland 1936
Appeasement culminated in the Munich Crisis—Hitler demanded return of W. Czech.
Which was full of Germans (and natural resources; eg mines)
Essentially, British/French agree to Hitler’s demands—Ally defeat
Results: appeasement questioned, Germany gains resources, neutralizes Czech army
Nazi-Soviet Pact
Signed in August 1939; agreed partition of Poland
Anglo-Polish alliance 2 days later caused postponement of German invasion
Beginning of war
By the time Germany invades Poland, British opinion is that war is almost inevitable
Of all countries, France was most reluctant—WWI meant nothing, not ready, etc
Chapter 2: German conquest of Poland, Norway, the Low Countries, and France
War Begins
Germans planned to conquer before rains came in Poland, France could mobilize
Polish defense tried to hold on to land as long as possible, waiting for French attack
German victory due to air superiority
Time was on Allies side; allies militaries were increasing faster than Germany’s; Hitler
orders quick campaign into France
France felt less optimistic; British felt French were stronger than French did
Germany goes on to take Norway in the midst of Ally discombobulation
Attack on France
Attack assumed to come through Belgium—Maginot Line deterred attack through
Alsace Lorraine
France advanced into Belgium when German attack began
Land forces were equally matched; allies far inferior in the air
German victory came because of tactical surprise and superior organization
Struck to the coast, separating the French army; not expected by allies
After initial strike, inefficiencies and lack of organization of French doomed defense
French could not coordinate open counterattacks
British secretly call for retreat and return of British troops w/out telling the French
Operation DYNAMO brought British Expeditionary Force home from Dunkirk
Franco-German armistice ended the war in France
Italy joins the war soon after; apparently w/out much of a reason except they figured the
war was already won—this hampered allied control of the Mediterranean
Week 3
Sourcebook (3, 4)
Marc Bloch, “Strange Defeat”
• Bloch is trying to explain the defeat which the French suffered from the German
army.
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Argues that the errors of the French high command were the errors of a group of
human beings.
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Suggests that certain conceited soldiers showed contempt to their officers.
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The military bureacracy was highly inefficient and it took a long time before the
High Command's order reached the rank and file soldiers. The blame in this case is on the
method, not on individuals.
• The French leaders were incapable of thinking in terms of a new war. The German
triumph was the triumph of the intellect.
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The Germans were relying on speed on the battlefield, while the French were
much slower in their thinking and their action.
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The Germans relied on improvisation: they did not advance merely through roads,
but through every spot that was open in the field.
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The Germans used modern, specialized equimpent (does not say which), while the
French were short of tanks, aeroplanes, guns, motor vehicles etc.
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The French had relied too heavily on the Maginot Line to protect them
from theenemy, and were not prepared for an attack from the Northern border.
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The French generals made several tactical mistakes in their fighting: (a)
They assumed that the German army would move at nigth, while in fact it advanced
during the day; (b) they believed thar artillery bombardment was far superior to
bombardment from the air; (c) all in all they were thinking in terms of WW1 and not
WW2.
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The Germans used a strategy never used beforehand: they created a high-pitched
whistle when diving with their aeronplanes which led to panic and terror among the
French. This arguably diminished the resistance capacity of the French.
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German military leadership was young and motivated, while the French generals
were old and under-motivated.
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The French parliament had been a weak institution even before the war, so no
wonder it collapsed "like a house of cards" during the war. The army was ill prepared to
the war because of the French ministers.
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The Ministry of Munitions (supplying ammunition to the army) was set when the
war was already going on for several months; that was too late.
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The French elite, educated in lucrative universities, was educated to despise the
system and to serve it half-heartedly. The bourgeoisie were embittered by their declining
economic status in France, and thus effectively separated themselves from France. They
perceived the world dichotomously, as a world of "Left" vs. "Right" and did little to
acquire information about what each term meant.
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Bloch, who is a teacher, blames himself and his colleagues for failing to educate
the young with real values. He refers to French teaching as "poisonous".
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Argues that the French surrendered too early, when they could have still resisted.
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Says that the French were "desparately tired" and "mentally lazy" as a result of
WW1, but this is no good excuse for their failures.
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France did foresee the German urge for revival and its bitterness from the
Versailles Treaty, though it did not see the rise of Nazism.
• There was a "weakness that was slowly undermining the robust health of the
nation".
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Nonetheless, he believes that the vitality of the French will sooner or later lead to
French recovery from the defeat. Argues that Nazism is unsustainable in the long run.
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Commands the young to bring France to thrive again: "France of the new
springtime must be the creation of the young".
History B54 Study Guide
Nick Sapia
“Letters,” Churchill & Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence
 Letters begin May 15 1940, as Germans advance rapidly through France
 Churchill expects to be attacked by enemy from air and by parachute, is preparing for
attack
 Churchill claims “voice and force of the US will count for nothing if withheld for too
long”
 Churchill demands 40-50 destroyers and several hundred aircraft given on loan
 Roosevelt evasive of Churchill’s pleas, saying loan could not be made without approval
from Congress
 Assumed Hitler could be stopped on European soil, until fall of France
 Churchill continues to apply pressure on Roosevelt, states in June 1940 his intentions
to have strong army in France by 1941, as well as reinforcing need for
destroyers/aircraft
 Fall of France surprises both Churchill and Roosevelt, Churchill reports on June 12 that
French general Maxime Weygand (Commander in Chief of French Army) deems it
impossible to offer resistance to Germans. Churchill pleads with Roosevelt to aid
France
 Churchill becomes increasingly concerned about German attack on the Irish coast
(German generals actually had plans for such an attack)
 Churchill says it is “most urgent” for US to give destroyers, is weary of Germans ability
to launch U-Boat attacks on Britain from French coast. Feared that new French
government in Vichy would allow Germans to use French ports because of armistice
that had been reached, Vichy pledged to remain neutral, yet Churchill orders attacks on
French ships in Algeria. Roosevelt impressed by Churchill’s actions
 June 31, 1940…Churchill reaffirms need for destroyers before crisis that will be
reached prior to 1941. Believes war can be won if they can survive the coming three or
four months
 Roosevelt receives reports that are optimistic about Britain’s ability to repel German
invasion in 1940 with adequate supplies
 August 13…Roosevelt formally agrees to supply destroyers and airplanes under 2
conditions:
1) If British waters were controlled by Germany, ships would be sent
elsewhere for continued defense of Empire
2) Authorization for use of British colonies as US bases in event of an
attack
 Roosevelt wary of rumored German-Britain peace, forwards letter from Alexander Kirk
(US Chargé d’Affaires in Berlin), also fearful of anti-interventionist groups in the US
reactions to loan of destroyers as he sought reelection
 Churchill’s letter in December 1940 is strong plea for American aid, concerned about
lack of money needed for war purchases. Churchill drafts 3 versions of this letter.
 Churchill maintains that the security of both nations is dependent on US control of the
Pacific and British control of the Atlantic. Promises that the coming 18 months will be
more dangerous for both the US and the allies than the previous 5
 Dangers: Britain suffered tremendous shipping losses (200,000 tons in one week) in
1940, and entry into Britain was becoming increasingly difficult. Introduces concern of
Japanese advances on Indochina and threat they pose in the Far East. Britain is
operating on a very narrow margin, yet Churchill is confident that victory will be
attained with forthcoming assistance
 Letter includes plans Churchill considers necessary to victory: Obtaining bases in
Ireland, use of US ships as convoys
 Frequency of exchanges concerning Japan increase in the fall of 1941, appear only a
few weeks before the outbreak of Japanese-American war because Roosevelt saw
conflict as only concerning US
 November 25, 1941…Roosevelt informs Churchill that the Japanese have offered a
modus vivendi, calling for removal of Japanese presence in southern Indochina as well
as return to US petroleum exports and removal of freezing measures on Japanese assets,
but all proposed measures are not agreeable according to US principles
 Churchill immediately is skeptical of proposal, showing concern for China. Argues that
danger to both the US and Britain would increase if China were to fall. Also suggests
that US should offer stern warning to Japan that consequences would arise if Japan
were to take additional aggressive measures. Believes such a move could be effective
in adverting war
 Messages sent via third parties on December 4, 5 1941, Roosevelt agrees to joint Dutch,
British and American warning to Japan that any attack on Thailand, Malaya or Dutch
East Indies will have serious consequences
 Phone conversation on December 7, Roosevelt confirms the attack on Pearl Harbor,
communicates his intentions to declare war on Japan, Churchill replies he will do the
same
 Churchill, knowing Germany would declare war on US, concerned that US war with
Japan would take them away from the “Hitler first” strategy of the ABC-1 talks in early
1941, Churchill plans to visit Roosevelt in Washington, advisors to Roosevelt prefer to
delay meeting, skeptical of British intentions
 Roosevelt suggests that Britain should grant independence to India, in hopes that they
would fight against the Japanese more enthusiastically. Churchill’s response is angry
 Defending crucial areas all over the globe put large strain on US/Britain shipping,
public sentiment in US was that should abandon Germany first policy and concentrate
on Japan, agreed with Churchill on the cancellation of GYMNAST- landing of troops
in North Africa
 Churchill’s letter in March 1942 seen as request for US to take strong action to prevent
Japanese from moving into the Indian Ocean. US engaged in a series of piecemeal
attacks on the outer Japanese empire, yet Churchill careful not to support US generals
who advocated a shift of concentration from Europe to Pacific
 Response from Roosevelt carries a number of points: 1) US operating large fleet in
defense of Australia and New Zealand and US bases there. 2) Japan has spread itself
out widely, yet energy of Japanese attack is still very powerful, Pacific situation is still
very grave. 3) US will furnish shipping to move 40,000 men from Britain to Middle
East and India. 4) Air forces will be allocated with maximum in Europe for offensive
against Germany, with enough stationed in pacific for defense of Alaska, Hawaii,
Australia. Churchill also feared a peace between Stalin and Hitler, and planned to take
some action to relieve pressure from the Soviet front. Also reaffirms Indian situation,
as defeats made Churchill’s political position weak at home…thought that if Churchill
was to give independence to India, Churchill’s government could have collapsed
 Roosevelt drafts 2 letters, demanding independence be granted to India because it is
right and will improve fighting against Japan by Indian troops
 Final letter on March 18, 1942, Roosevelt wants use of submarines to defend Pacific
Ocean, while Churchill prefers surface warfare. Also touches upon a “joint attack”
which was small air raids against Germany in Western Europe. Roosevelt was not in
favor of invasion across the English Channel until a week after writing this letter
Overy, chaps 1-2
Richard C. Overy, Why the Allies Won, chaps. 1-2.
Chapter 1
“Unpredictable Victory: Explaining World War II”
I. “Why did the Allies win World War II?”
--challenges the determinism that infects many views of the war.
Victory as the forces of Progress triumphing over despotism
--bolstered by the peace and prosperity in the West after 1945.
--uncomfortable truth: Allied powers included the Soviet dictatorship, which bore the
brunt of the German attack.
Victory from overwhelming material advantages
--151,000 new aircraft for Allies v. 43,000 for Axis in 1943
--uncomfortable truth: doesn’t take into account efforts to deny each other resources
(submarine warfare, etc.)
Victory of democracy over tyranny
--actually, democracy confined to Britain, France, US, and smaller European and
Commonwealth countries
--uncomfortable truth: war made world safer for Communism, which spread throughout
Europe and Asia. Soviet efforts in Eastern Front were decisive.
Shifting material balance
--By 1942, German controlled twice the steel production capability of UK and Russia.
Japan had seized vast tin, oil and rubber resources throughout Asia.
--However, US rearmament and Soviet relocation and revival of production shifted the
balance. (Soviet turned out more tanks than Germany, with one fourth the available
steel.)
--Control of resources =/= use of resources. Japan lost shipping to American submarines.
Germany lost materials to Soviet scorched earth tactics and bombing.
--Also: Axis powers hobbled by incompetence, corruption, and interdepartmental/interservice rivalries.
--Technological development: new T-34 tank produced by Soviet factories in 1942,
failure to produce new aircraft models for German Lutwaffe air force. Continued
German use of horses: one and a quarter million horses in 1944, even when Allied forces
were fully motorized.
--Changes in fighting power: Germany and Japan began with forces that had superior
training and combat ability (Hitler’s confidence in German ability and Japanese bushido
spirit of the warrior), but the Allies quickly caught up while the Axis troops stagnated.
II. Mini-recap of the history of World War II (p. 7-17)
III. Unique scale of Allied victory
“All states, fascist, communist, democratic, shared the common but terrifying assumption
that war had to be ‘total’, what Mussolini called a ‘war of exhaustion’, to win the struggle
for survival.” –Overy, p. 17
Four zones of conflict: at sea, on land on the Eastern Front, in the air and the reconquest
of Europe
War at Sea
--All major arteries of communication and supply
--Up to June 1944, primary means by which Britain and the US could fight
--Primary site of war with Japan in the Pacific
--American supplies shipped to Soviet Union and UK sustained their war efforts
--German submarine warfare and Japanese naval warfare initially successful
War on the Eastern Front
--World’s largest land war
--In 1942, 178 German divisions + 39 additional Axis divisions against Soviets. In
comparison: 4 German divisions for Rommel in Africa
--By December 1941, Red Army lost 4 million men, 8000 aircraft, 17,000 tanks
--Germany controlled agricultural heartlands of Ukraine and western steppe, as well as
industrial cities
--Stalin considered surrender, but Russians responded by relocating factories into Eastern
Russia. Then, in 1943, Soviet victories in Stalingrad and Kursk
War in Air
--British and American leaders did not expect bombing to destroy German economy and
morale
--Bombing did open up “Second Front” in 1942 and 1943 for allies, prevented Germany
from fully developing economy
Reconquest of Europe
--June 1944: Largest amphibious attack ever at Normandy
--Success unprecedented when compared to failed landings at Gallipolli, for Spanish
Armada, Napoleon and Hitler himself regarding Britain
IV. Critical questions:
Balance of material and human resources
--How did Soviet Union recover industrial resilience?
--How did United States re-arm in a year faster than any other state?
--Why did Germany produce less than the Allies?
Fighting power
--Why did Red Army manage to transform its effectiveness in months after 1941?
--Why did Germany and Japan fail to sustain momentum in second half of war?
V. The human factor
Leadership
--Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin all roused their people for war, but also listened to
advice and delegated day-to-day running of war
--Hitler convinced by early victories of his own strategic and operational ability.
--Disillusionment with leadership in Axis countries: unsuccessful assassination attempt
upon Hitler by senior officers in July 1944, deposed Mussolini in July 1943, doubt in
Japanese ranks.
--Terror and propaganda to keep Axis populations fighting: 15,000 Germans shot on
eastern front for “indiscipline, defeatism or dereliction of duty.”
Moral high ground
--Allies fought in self-defense against aggession
--morally troubling strategies, such as bombing, were reconsidered only after the war
--war was more complicated than “good against evil, civilization against DarkAge”
--BUT Allies were able to simplify their message and create favorable consensus
--focus on Hitler as ‘pure unadulterated evil’
Chapter 2
“Little Ships and Lonely Aircraft: The Battle for the Seas”
I. The Atlantic Charter
--August 9, 1941, Placentia Bay off Newfoundland coast. Churchill on Prince of Wales,
Roosevelt on Augusta
--Two leaders with strong naval backgrounds. Churchill, former First Lord of Admiralty
in WWI and first months of WWII, who signed his letters as “Former Naval Person” and
Roosevelt, Asst. Secretary of the Navy from 1913-1920.
--Dire situation
--Britain lost over 2000 ships, 8 million tons of shipping to Axis since 1939
--Japan occupied French Indochina and threatened South Pacific
--Britain relied entirely upon American supplies shipped via Atlantic run
--Churchill: Shipping was “the crunch of the whole war”
--Roosevelt: the war “would be decided in the Atlantic”
--The Atlantic Charter: “public statement of democratic solidarity.” Principles of
democracy, self-determination and open trade.
--Behind the scenes: Churchill and Roosevelt to warn Japan and ship supplies to
Soviet Union
--Tragic ending: Prince of Wales sunk on December 9 on way to Singapore by Japanese
II. Two maritime powers
--By 1941, the US had largest navy in world
--In 1939, Britain had largest navy among fighting powers
--British empire relied on navy to safeguard colonies and protect trade. However, German
navy became a strong source of concern
--United States used navy to maintain overseas possessions as sentry posts to protect the
New World (Monroe Doctrine). Navy to protect American homeland from direct attack
III. Shifting balance of naval power
Initial British advantage
--Britain had French allies in Mediterranean. 22 battleships, 83 cruisers
--Tiny German navy: 3 “pocket” battleships, 8 cruisers. 18 submarines in Atlantic
German gains upper hand
--Axis conquered Denmark and Norway to gain long coastline for free movement
--Conquest of Belgium and Denmark  control of Channel coast and ports
--Loss of French navy, entrance of Italian navy (half a million tons in hostile ships, 100+
submarines) against Britain
Air power vs. sea power
--Focke-Wulf Condor, converted long-range passenger aircraft, extended German attacks
into Atlantic
--By 1940, 580,000 tons of British shipping sunk. 1 million+ sunk in 1941, more than
British ship-making capability
--20 British Swordfish biplanes destroyed Italian fleet at Taranto, Nov. 11, 1940
--German battleship Bismarck sank May 1941
--British Prince of Wales and Repulse sank by Japan in December 1941
Battle of the Atlantic
--German cryptographers crack British codes, sends submarines after convoys.
Submarines evade detection ASDIC by attacking on sea surface at night
--German submarine “wolf-packs” destroyed British trade
--Churchill announces “Battle of Atlantic” against submarines on March 6, 1941
--Cryptanalysts break some of German codes, better air cover for convoys, submarine
Tracking Room focused on anti-submarine intelligence
Japanese Success in the Pacific
--Attack on Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941. Within twelve weeks, Japan wipes out
British and Dutch fleets in East Asia, cripples American Pacific Fleet
--“Victory-drunk” Japanese commanders, such as Admiral Ugaki, Chief-of-Staff of
Japanese Combined Fleet, considered options for moving west towards Middle East and
south towards Australia
--Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto leads Japanese fleet to secure perimeter from Aleutian
islands near Alaska down to Midway Island to islands north of Australia
--Japanese fleets had “Zeke” or Zero fighters that were faster and more maneuverable
and “Long Lance” torpedoes
American Response
--American public demands blood, but Roosevelt promised Churchill to fight against
Germany first
--Ultimately, Admiral Ernest King, Commander in Chief of US Navy, gets most
resources. 400,000 soldiers v. 60,000 against Germans and Italians.
--America in Pacific, British in Indian, both in Atlantic
--General Douglas Macarthur from the Army, Supreme Commander in Southwest
Pacific and Admiral Chester Nimitz, Commander in Chief of Pacific Ocean Area
IV. Turning point in the Pacific War
Battle of the Coral Sea, 1942
--Japanese attempted invasion of Port Moresby, New guinea.
--American Rear Admiral Frank Fletcher v. Japanese Admiral Takagi
--Series of blunders: Japanese mistakenly focused on fuelling ship Neosho. Neither side
really knew where the other was.
--May 7: American aircraft found Japanese carriers by chance, sank Shoho. Fuel-less
Japanese bombers shot down.
--May 8: Aircraft attack ships on both sides. Shokaku severely damaged. Lexington too
damaged and sank by Americans themselves.
--May 12: American submarine sank Okinoshima.
--Result: Turned back Japanese invasion of Port Moresby, shattered aura of victory.
Battle of Midway
--Japanese thought Lexington and Yorktown sunk, had inflexible battle plan, focused on
naval strength rather than air combat.
--Americans only had Hornet and Enterprise. However, “the Unit” led by Rochefort
cracked Japanese JN25 code prior to attack, knew target (“AF” = Midway, not Hawaii)
and approximate timing (June 3, June 4.)
--American shipworkers managed to refit damaged Yorktown in 48 hours to prepare it for
battle.
--Poor reconnaissance for both sides. Japanese thought Americans were ignorant of
attack, aircraft did not spot American fleet.
--June 4: American lose almost all torpedo-bombers, but 54 Dauntless dive-bombers
sink Kaga and Soryu. Akagi scuttled next day. Hiryu damages Yorktown. Enterprise divebombers damage Hiryu.
--June 5: Hiryu sinks from damage. Yamamoto cancels rest of operation.
Aftershocks from Midway
--Japanese lose elite naval pilots, carrier aircraft, psychological edge.
--Japanese only produce 3 aircraft carriers in 1943, 4 in 1944—in comparison to 90 from
the US
--United States drives Japan on to the defensive, sends materials to the German war.
--MacArthur and Nimitz push back Japanese one island at a time
--Without Coral Sea and Midway, much more painful struggle against Japan
--The key were “sound intelligence” and “effective deployment of air power”
V. Development of naval war in Europe
--Torch was the codename for the Allied invasion of north Africa, but relied on shipping
supplies across Atlantic.
--German focus on submarine war of calculated attrition. Strategy of Grossadmiral Erich
Raeder, with Hitler a late convert to the concept. Led by Admiral Karl Donitz.
Commanded to destroy Allied shipping with goals of 4-500,000 a month.
--300 U-Boats in early 1942  400 by end of 1942. 80-90 operational at one time. Type
VII U-boats with 8000 mile radius and 11 torpedoes, plus Type IX boats with 13450 mile
radius and 22 torpedoes.
--Operation Paukenschlag (“Drumbeat) against American eastern coast.
--Americans lose 2.6 million tons of shipping in unescorted, unprotected ships.
Parker, chap 3
Britain Alone
This chapter covers the time period between the spring of 1940 and the summer of
1941 when for the most part Britain was standing alone against the Germans. Four major
issues were addressed; the Battle of Britain, the Battle of The Atlantic, the beginning of
the North Africa campaign, and the Lend Lease Act of 1941.
The Battle of Britain
When planning his invasion of Britain Hitler was aware that British naval
superiority would pose severe opposition. He felt that the best way to combat the British
Navy would be with the Luftwaffe (German Air Force). In order to ensure that Luftwaffe
planes could carry out their mission against British ships the Luftwaffe must first crush
the British fighter planes that would be defending. The British had a small force of about
600 single engine fighters (Spitfires and Hurricanes) to defend against the Luftwaffe’s
900 long range bombers, 250 dive bombers, and 630 single engine fighters. The
Luftwaffe began its attack on the RAF fighter command in late July 1940. By August the
British were on the ropes, however, they were able to increase fighter production despite
the bombing and were actually producing more aircraft than they were losing. The
Germans made a fatal error when they moved from bombing British airfields to inland
targets and the bombing of cities. This allowed the RAF fighter command to regroup and
mount even stronger defenses. The bombing of British cities continued until mid-May
1941 when the Germans switched the attention to the Eastern front. The Bombing did a
great deal of damage to British cities but it was not the decisive weapon that would break
British moral and bring them to negotiations.
The Battle of the Atlantic
The British depended on supplies coming mostly from the U.S. for their survival.
One of the German strategies to win the war was to starve them of those supplies by
cutting off shipping lanes. The pre-war focus had been on surface vessels fighting
surface vessels but the British were superior on the surface and in May, 1940 the British
sunk the most powerful German surface ship the Bismarck. In July of 1940 Hitler had
given priority to his primary anti-shipping weapon U-boat submarines. In that first year
of the war the Germans sunk over a million tons of British shipping. The U-Boats were
very effective until the allies were able to break the enigma code that was used to direct
their operations. By intercepting the German messages convoys could be steered around
the submarines and attackers could be directed towards them. This was by no means fool
proof and the Battle of the Atlantic would continue throughout the war.
North Africa and Lend Lease
The discussion of North Africa is very general. The British had a strong hold in
Egypt and they were fighting back and fourth between Egypt and Libya. Egypt was the
gate to the natural resources of the Middle East which were very valuable but the British
were never really able to use them during WWII because they were two far away. North
Africa was symbolic because it showed that the British would fight until the very end.
The British would be able to stand alone but not without America support.
Churchill was pleading with Roosevelt for supplies. The British needed American
industry to supplement their aircraft and ship production. Quickly the British debt rose to
a level that it would not be able to pay back right now. There was some exchange of
military bases to compensate for supplies but the real victory was after Roosevelt was reelected he passed lend-lease in March 1941 allowing the Americans to send all the
supplies the British needed. America was the “arsenal of democracy.” Lend lease
facilitated American participation in the war that would eventually lead to the full scale
involvement.
Week 4
Akira Iriye, Pearl Harbor and the Coming of the Pacific
War
Notes by Nishchal Basnyat
Preface



December 7th, 1941, one of the most momentous events in history of the twentieth
century, Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor. Set the stage for American war with the
Japanese.
It also served to merge the conflict in Asia where Japan and China had been
fighting for more than ten years and the war in Europe which had begun in 1939.
“Remember Pearl Harbor” became wartime statement and the legacy of Pearl
Harbor is still alive today as the exemplar of surprise attack
Introduction “The day of Infamy”

Japan destroyed US battleships moored in Pearl Harbor and killed more than two
thousand American military and civilian personnel. Several hours after this Japan
officially declared War on the US and UK
War in Europe recap: September 1939 war b/c Germany invaded Poland—One year
earlier Britain and France wanted to “appease” Germany—Soviet Union of no help to
allies because of Nazi-Soviet pact—Spring 1940 Germany seized Denmark and
Norway and then it commenced its blitzkrieg, or lighting attack, on France and the
low countries (Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg) conquering them one by one—
Operation Barbarossa against the Soviet Union on June 1940 failed—Japan, Italy and
Germany signed the Tripartite (Axis) Pact—By summer 1941 US already involved in
European war—Japan had signed a peace pact with the USSR which it was honoring
and US did not think that Japan would be involved in this mainly European war
The War in Asia



September 1931, Kwantung Army took over Manchuria
Japanese brutality in Chinese regions continued and between 1939 and 1941,
Japanese set up a pro-Japanese government in Nanjing. This was not successful
leading to the China quagmire
Japan then adopted “the Great East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere” hoping to
coalesce all Asians in this struggle to rid the region of Western power and
influence
American Dilemma

By 1941, the United States was the richest country in the world. But Roosevelt
didn’t want to take this country into war because he felt it wasn’t ready to fight a
two-front war. However, looking at the events, Japanese aggression and Russian
aggression, Roosevelt knew that it was only a matter of time before the country
headed into war.
Toward Pearl Harbor



Japanese Dilemma, going North (attacking Serbia to help Hitler) or going South
(to take over the South East Asian region)
Roosevelt froze Japanese accounts etc. other nations followed
September 6th Japan’s top leaders met and decided to wage a war against the US
to break the ABCD encirclement
The Documents
Imperial conference: Japan wanted a modus vivendi to keep the trade policy esp. the oil
shipments from the US coming in—Proposal A: withdrawal of troops in China,
nondiscriminatory trade in China, interpretation and execution of the Tripartite Pace—
Proposal B—Japan and US will pledge not to make an armed advance into Southeast
Asia and South Pacific area except French Indochina, Japan and US will make sure that
necessary materials from the Netherlands East Indies will be assured, Japanese and US
governments will restore trade relations to what they were prior to the freezing of assets,
US will not try to hinder peace efforts by Japan and China
Statement by Prime Minister Tojo—We are trying to break the impasse by means of
diplomacy
Statement by Foreign Minister Tojo—US is aiding Britain and supplying oil to Russia
against our interests
Statement by President of the Planning Board Suzuki—Details about how much steel
and iron is needed for the building of these ships
Statement by Finance Minister Kaya—Says that Japan has enough money for now but
questions if she can have enough expenditure for war
Statement by Chief of Army Staff—States the importance of: timing of the
commencement of war, prospects of the operations, on the situation in the North resulting
from operations in the South, on relationship between operations and diplomacy
Plan A and Plan B- Last ploy by the Japanese to avoid war, in November 1941,
dispatched a special envoy to Washington
 Plan A—Stationing of Japanese forces in China and the withdrawal thereof
 Plan B—Both governments not to make advancements into French Indo-China,
Japanese government gradually withdraws troops from Indo-China, Japan and US
to slowly negotiate over land in Netherlands East Indies, Government of US to
supply Japan with a required quantity of oil, US doesn’t interfere in the peace
process between China and Japan
Washington discussions on China and the Tripartite (Axis) Pact

Japan had encoding messages in a system called PURPLE which the US had
deciphered
Cordell Hull Memorandum—Japan insisted that the two must not fight, asked if US
wanted to be aggressive in the Pacific and the US blamed Japan for wanting to be
aggressive.
Joseph W. Ballantine Memorandum—Questioned Japan’s relationship and
involvement in the Axis and declared that Japan cannot have a simultaneous relationship
with the US and the Axis at the same time—Secretary frankly said that the US didn’t
know if it could really have a peace deal with Japan and the Japanese Ambassador said
that he desperately wanted a peace plan with the US
Discussing Plan B—(This was Japan’s pledge not to invade regions in Southeast Asia in
return for American oil)
 The American Secretary (Joseph Ballantine) wanted proof that the Japanese
intentions were indeed peaceful
 The Japanese ambassador said that although the Japanese troops were firebrand
they were still happy to let go of Chinese territory
Draft of Proposed Modus vivendi with Japan


Japanese delegation insisted that it was doing much as possible to reach a peace
agreement with the US, but that it would need a considerable amount of time to
persuade the people’s opinion back home.
Hence a modus vivendi was chosen by the US and Japan
Modus Vivendi
1. Peace in the Pacific
2. Japanese government will gradually withdraw troops from the southern part of
French Indochina
3. Remove money frozen on both sides
4. UK and Dutch government will also have same deal with Japan
5. US government will not look with disfavor upon the inauguration of
conversations between the Government of China and the Government of Japan
6. Modus Vivendi is temporary in nature
Churchill’s response to Roosevelt’s message about the modus vivendi was lukewarm and
Churchill felt that Chinese were left out and betrayed in this process
The Hull Note

Hull was the Secretary of State and he declared the end to the Modus Vivendi and
the disconnection of the temporary truce with the Japanese, setting the condition
that if the Japanese wanted an authentic and permanent peace deal, they would
have to go back to the geo-political situation of the 1920s
Japan’s reaction to the Hull Note:

Japan reacted with extreme distress and this, at least for the Japanese, was the
ultimatum that signaled the shattering of the truce between the US and Japan and
indicated that that war with the US was imminent. However, the Japanese
diplomats in their US mission, did not believe that Japan would actually be going
to war against the US.
Pearl Harbor & The Coming Of The Pacific War
86-158
Imperial Conference – 12/1/41
*Prime Minister: USA has not conceded on any terms; has worked with Britain, China
and The Netherlands to increase pressure on Japan. Consequently, Japan has no choice
but to declare war on the America, Britain and The Netherlands.
*Foreign Minister: Conceding to US terms means forfeiting Japanese position to what it
was before the Manchurian incident. Essentially, Japan feels it would forfeit all stake in
China and weaken its status as an East Asian empire.
*Chief Of Staff: Allies are getting more prepared for combat in the region, but they don’t
appear stronger than anticipated. Soviet Union does not pose immediate threat.
*Minister Of Home Affairs: People understand what Japan is facing; support action
against the Allies. He lays out a plan to “control” antiwar movement (including
preventive arrest), detain foreigners until it is safe to release them and deploy police to
maintain order.
Japan’s December 7 Note
*Not a war declaration, but a memo ending negotiations with the US. Goal was to get it
to US before Pearl Harbor attacks but not so far in advance that attacks would not be
“surprising.” Ended up being delayed and reached US after attack had begun, but US
intelligence had intercepted and decoded the memo and knew of its content before the
attack (FDR referred to it as “this means war” – conspiracy theorists question him,
therefore, for not acting on the intelligence).
*Memo itself accuses US of blocking potential peace between China and Japan.
Summarizes failed negotiations (and says US’ policy “imposes one’s selfish views upon
others” and that US “may be said to be scheming for the extension of the war”). Japanese
government “cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through
further negotiations.” The specific contention is with policy towards China; Japan finds
proposal regarding trade and commerce to be “acceptable.”
War Declaration That Was Never Sent
*Japanese drafted declaration of war before Pearl Harbor attack but never sent it to the
US.
*Criticizes Allies for attempt to interfere in Japan’s new vision for a peaceful Eastern
Asia. And, despite Japan going “to the last possible limit of concessions, short of
compromising the honor and prestige as a great Power,” the US has not made any attempt
for settlement.
Intro On Pearl Harbor Attacks
*China: Had been in full-fledged war with Japan since 1937; was divided into three
regions. Had Soviet support until it signed treaty with Japan in early 1941, was then
reliant on US for assistance. China feared successful negotiations between US and Japan
for that reason.
*Soviet: Signed treaty to preserve peace on Eastern front (expected and eventually
engaged in conflict with Germany on the west). Fine with US-Japan conflict, assuming it
stayed in Southeast Asia (away from Soviet Union).
*Great Britain: Working relationship with US (Atlantic Charter); benefited from Pearl
Harbor attacks since they assured Britain a strong ally in the war. Pushed US not to relax
its demands regarding China (which ultimately resulted in Japan’s attack).
*British Commonwealth: Question of loyalty to Britain (some might view the war as a
chance for liberation), as well as the colonies’ ability to defend against Axis Powers.
Asian colonies (such as Burma, India, etc) were most likely to refuse instant support for
Britain in war effort – Australia and New Zealand did so more readily (although it
became clear that the US was needed to properly defend them).
*Dutch East Indies: Some talk of independence movement, but the colonies (basically
Indonesia) didn’t align with Japan (who clearly only cared about exploiting the vast
natural resources).
*Philippines: More loyal to US than British colonies were to Britain because US had
already given them autonomy (and formally promised eventual independence).
Nonetheless, they did need support in the war and were cooperative with the US (despite
the lingering question of whether they’d need to align with Japan if Japan defeated the
US).
*French Indochina (Vietnamese region): Supported France even through loss to
Germany, but (with French cooperation) eventually turned its military authority over to
Japan since this was preferable to France completely losing its colony (it still governed
the indigenous population). Meanwhile, Ho Chi Minh was leading a radical movement to
expel both France and Japan from the colony; it sided with Chinese Communists and, to a
lesser extent, the US, since America was more sympathetic to its cause.
*Germany: Alliance with Japan was loose, but it had a lot to benefit from US-Japanese
war (diverting American efforts from Europe). It also urged Japan to attack British
colonies in Asia and the Soviet Union as a way of weakening its European enemies.
Japan never really complied.
Japan’s Occupation Of Indochina
*Japanese moved into Indochina in 9/40. Peace negotiations with Chungking then
collapsed, forcing Japan to recognize the Wang Ching-wei regime and abandon a
bilateral settlement of the China war. Meanwhile, Japan agreed to intervene in
Indochina’s dispute with Thailand in order to gain regional military power.
*Japanese intelligence suggested that hostile efforts in the region (or a movement into the
Dutch East Indies) would provoke a war reaction from the US and Britain. The army and
navy soon agreed with this rationale and deemed negotiation the only way to get
resources from the Dutch East Indies. However, the two also adopted a policy of using
military measures in the region if “imperative” (if the US threatened Japan with an all-out
embargo).
*Some within Japan, including foreign minister Matsuoka, believed negotiating with
America (and refraining from military movements in Southeast Asia) was a mistake; he
advocated including Soviet Union in the Tripartite Pact as a power play against the US.
This fell through when Hitler attacked the Soviets.
*After Barbarossa, The First Committee in Japan began pushing for an immediate
military buildup in Indochina (Japan believed Germany would dominate the Russians).
Matsuoka suddenly disagreed with this, arguing that Japan should focus its effort on
helping Germany’s fight against the Soviet Union (and later arguing he feared a war with
the US). On July 28 1941, Japanese troops “peacefully” marched into southern
Indochina (with permission to advance violently, should the situation require it). US
found out about the move via MAGIC and ordered an embargo; Britain followed suit,
even though it was unsure the US would enter the war if Japan retaliated by attacking
British or Dutch colonies.
*Japan took embargo as proof that America was ready and willing to go to war.
Petroleum Question
*Japanese road to war: National Defense Policy of the Japanese Empire (certain countries
were enemies), Force Of Arms Necessary For National Defense (targets for national
defense arrangements), Principle for Operations of the Imperial Armed Forces (plans for
war against each enemy).
*Military High Command had power over military – worked with cabinet on National
Defense Policy (political argument within Japan over whether cabinet should have any
role in policy – Principle for Operations was, therefore, kept from the cabinet).
*1941: enemies were ABCD. Operations in the event of war involved attacks on ABCD
colonies in Southeast Asia, with an initial, surprise attack on Wake Island. Plan included
taking out colonies, forcing the Chiang Regime into surrender and working with the Axes
to force Britain to surrender, which would result in America’s surrender.
*Petroleum is vital. Based on assumption that Japan would control Dutch East Indies at
start of war, it estimated it would have enough oil to last for two full years of combat.
Japan figured it could cover shortages via synthetic production, improvement in
petroleum extraction machinery, supplies from the East Indies and purchases from USSR.
*Japan could not negotiate for oil from East Indies; used military pressure, which resulted
in an embargo by United States, Britain and Netherlands. Revised estimates were that oil
crisis would come at end of year 2.
*Oil crisis was fatal to Japan – drastically impacted war strategy.
US-Japan Crisis
*About ambassador Joseph Grew, who unsuccessfully urged FDR to meet with Konoe in
Tokyo.
*Believed details of settlement on China should not have been a major obstacle– if
America developed a relationship with Japan, Japan would work hard on a deal to avoid
war (Grew believed Japan of August 1941 was “moderate” – incorrectly assumed
moderates had more influence than they did; Japan was probably not willing to give up
its most basic objectives in China).
*Grew was not as afraid as most Americans when Tojo took over, but he did realize that
a peace agreement appeared far less likely.
*In November 1941, he warned Washington that the embargo would not cause Japan to
collapse; the nation would very much go to war with America if it could not reach an
agreement. Also warned America that its embassy in Japan might prove unable to
provide a substantial warning of attack plans.
*After the Pearl Harbor attack commenced, Grew obviously knew it was too late, but still
held firm that war could have been avoided if a deal were struck in the summer before
Pearl Harbor. It would have hinged on Japan proving, beyond all reasonable doubt, that
it truly was interested in a peaceful China. Argued later that although America showed
concern for the threat of war, it was indifferent to the Japanese perspective regarding
what caused the confrontation. Essentially, he criticized America for being too
concerned with its self-interest.
Parker, chaps 5-6, 8
Chapter 5: Japan Attacks
 Japan’s increasing population and lack of resources necessitated increased foreign
trade or emigration
o In the 1920s they tried but failed to achieve these goals through peaceful
policies
o In the 1930s the military gained power and tried to achieve the goals
through force
 Two events marked the change in policy
o Sept 18 1931: bomb explodes near Mukden on Japanese-owned South
Manchurian railway; Japan begins to seize Manchuria
 The Japanese government wanted peace, but local military leaders
disobeyed them
o December 1931: abandonment of gold standard
 Yen fell by 40 percent
 Newfound lack of high exchange rates meant government spending
could be increased
 Vigorous economic growth, increased employment, and increased
military spending resulted
 1933 truce broken by 1937 fighting at Marco Polo Bridge near Peking
o Extended action against Chinese began, Rape of Nanking (1937)
o Japan controlled all major Chinese ports by end of 1938
 French Indo-China was strategically important to the Japanese in their war against
China, and the Dutch East Indies had lots of resources (especially much-needed
oil)
 September 1940- Tripartite Pact- Alliance with Germany and Italy
 Summer 1941: Choice for Japan
o Northern option: Join Germany in attacking the Soviets
o Southern option: advance into southern Indochina and then Malaya, the
Philippines, and East Indies
 Japanese forces moved into Southern Indochina, so the US froze
Japanese assets and imposed an embargo on the export of oil to
Japan. The British and Dutch did the same.
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Without oil, the Japanese faced a choice between
withdrawing from China or going to war to get oil
Negotiations between Japan and the US
o Neither wanted war, but they had incompatible aims
o Japan wanted to control economic and political arrangements in China,
and wanted resources
o The US wanted Japan to restore China’s independence
Japanese rationale for attack
o No time to lose—oil resources dwindling already
o Germany would defeat Britain
o Japan wanted to seize a large, economically self-sufficient area and
establish a defensive perimeter around it
o This defense would eventually make the US give up
December 7: Pearl Harbor bombed
o In half an hour, the US fleet was out of action
o Secretary of State given declaration of war one hour late by accident
December 11: Hitler and Mussolini declare war on the US
Chapter 6: Japanese victories and disappointments: December 1941 to August 1942
 Japan conquered Malaya and Singapore more quickly than they expected to
o Japan dominated the air and sea
o Singapore and Malaya were not high on the list of British priorities
o Japanese military was far better-trained and experienced than the British
and Indian defenders
 Defending army had to rely on loyalty to an artificial community
o 15 January 1942—British commander surrenders at Singapore
 Largest numerical capitulation in British history
o Spoils of victory in Malaya and Dutch East Indies: tons of rubber, tin, and
oil
 Setbacks
o Successes inspired the Japanese to push their perimeter outward
o Port Moresby—Battle of the Coral Sea
 The Americans intercepted Japanese cables specifying the target
 They then assembled a task force to intercept
 The battle was a new type of naval battle—conducted entirely by
aircraft
 Japanese forced to postpone attack on port until American fleet
was weaker (which never happened)
o Battle of Midway: June 4-5, 1942
 American intelligence again figured out that Japan was about to
send a large force to capture Midway Island
 The American counterstrike was planned to coincide with Japanese
refueling and rearming
 All four Japanese aircraft carriers were destroyed and they were
forced to withdraw
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Japan was now on the defensive, and would remain so for the rest
of the war
Chapter 8: Anglo-American strategies for victory
Fundamental Anglo-American strategic disagreement: “the Americans wanted to
concentrate forces as quickly as possible for a decisive encounter with the German army;
the British wished to postpone this”
3 points of agreement (circa early 1942):
 Priority for European war
o if Germany was beaten, Japan would follow
o European war could be won if Soviets kept fighting
 British emphasis on strategic air attack on Germany was well received
 Anglo-American ground forces should begin a new campaign against
Germany before end of 1942
Eisenhower’s Plan of Feb 1942: Essential tasks of American strategy were:
 to maintain Britain (by safeguarding Atlantic sea lanes)
 to keep Russia in the war
 to prevent the junction of Germany and Japan
TORCH (formerly GYMNAST): American plan to invade French North Africa, adopted
in mid-1942
TRIDENT conference: May 1943. American and British strategic differences were
mostly resolved.
Week 5
Catherine Merridale, Ivan’s War
Disaster Beats Its Wings (pp. 82-116 of Ivan’s War)
Chapter describes the beginnings of the German invasion of the U.S.S.R.
 Initial Invasion
In June of 1941, Red Army Officers did not believe that the Germans would invade
Russia. In response to eyewitness reports of German mobilization of motorcycle
regiments one Soviet officer said “’Just try to worry less and don’t panic.” Though
there were examples of German deserters coming into the Russian controlled sector
of Poland and explaining Operation Barbarossa, these soldiers were not believed and
were sometimes shot. By the time the Germans attacked Russian troops, the Russians
were completely unprepared and were mowed down. By midday on June 22 (one day
after the attack) the Soviets had already lost 1,200 planes. The Soviet public was
totally shocked by the attacks and rumors quickly spread across the country as to
what was happening to the Red Army. Officers saw counterattacks as futile but had to
order their men to stay strong so that none of them would be seen as deserters.
Regiments who retreated were seen as guilty of “lack of resolve, panic mongering
disgraceful cowardice…”
 Soviet Public Reaction to Invasion
Radios were banned in the USSR and citizens had to gather in public squares to hear
first official news about the events on June 22. Crowds were told that there were now
“more than 200 dead”- a gross, deliberate underestimate. The public statement
inspired lots of patriotism amongst the public, though Stalin did not make a single
statement until July 3. The Soviet government were pleased with the outpouring of
patriotism. Older people and non-Russians were more likely to sympathize with
Germany because they did not like Bolshevism as much. Loyal Soviet masses
however threw themselves into a surge of volunteering for the Red Army. Most
recruitment stations were schools and once a citizen signed his papers he was no
longer free and therefore had to just sit in the school for several days until he got
orders to go somewhere.
Stalin’s statement conveyed a perfect combination of nervousness, humanity and
resolve to rally the Soviets behind him. One Moscow factory worker said “[Stalin]
does not hide the difficulties that lie ahead for his people. After this speech I want to
work even harder. It has mobilized me for great deeds.” The speech even gave the
Red Army a lift.
 Why the Red Army fought so poorly
Nonetheless the Red Army fought miserably against the Germans in the first few
weeks of the war and morale was very low. There was poor training, incompetent
leadership, and fear of punishment by the communist party for deserting or not
fighting hard enough. Tank fright was coined as a term to describe soldiers buckling
as German tanks rolled onto the battlefield. The Soviet tanks were just not very good
and most were lost to mechanical problems. They lost 6 to every one Germany lost in
1941. Soviet artillery was pretty abysmal too and was usually pulled by horses. The
Soviets also did not use much radio telecommunication devices so battlefield
communication was very bad. The Soviets also had not developed any way to treat
injured soldiers because they had to withdraw so quickly.
 USSR’s policy on desertion
Desertion rates were very high for the USSR. The method of counterattack was just to
throw men into the German attack and have them all mowed down. Eventually
officers gained the right to execute any soldier that did not fight hard enough.
Officers could be executed for not leading troops into battle. If a soldier went MIA,
even if his plane was shot down or his body had just decomposed beyond recognition,
the soldier was presumed to have deserted and families of soldiers were gravely
punished as retribution.
Pages 173-262
“Stone by Stone,” pages 173-186, “A Land Laid Waste,” pages 187-225, “May
Brotherhood Be Blessed,” pages 226-262
 chastushki – short folk poems that peasants had been composing for generations,
were memorized and recited by soldiers at the front; they were part of the larger
appreciation for songs and limerick-style poetry among soldiers in the Red Army
 shtrafniki – the members of the punishment units, were ex-convicts who were
offered a choice between the Gulag and the front; they received roughly one tenth
of the regular rations and carried out some of the most dangerous missions and
tasks at the front
 Evacuation of Kursk region in 1942
o populations needing evacuation were suspicious of the Red Army soldiers
and assumed it was a trick or another attempt at collectivization
o some armed uprisings against the troops eventually resulted in brutal
methods on the part of the Red Army to subdue locals
o the NKVD took over evacuation procedures but it took a string of real
victories, beginning with Stalingrad, to begin repairing the damaged trust
in the Red Army as liberators of the Russian people
 Preparation for the Battle of Kursk
o the Wermacht had new designs and technological innovations that even
the playing field in terms of military technology, for example the Panther,
the Tiger I, and the German 88mm antiaircraft gun
o Russia stuck with the T-34s and heavy KVs instead of devoting already
scarce resources of evacuated tank factories to new designs or innovations
o “the Red Army’s approach to technology was to churn it out and keep it
simple” (213)
o also important for the Red Army
 self-sacrificial, almost suicidal courage
 greater numbers of tanks, armor, soldiers
 troops’ increasing mastery of way, specifically the creation of
specific tank armies and the narrowed training that went with them
 partiinost’ – the Soviet word for party spirit that connoted the collective power of
the Red Army as an instrument of collective redemption, the country’s undoubted
savior, the protector against Fascism, and the complete and successful mobilization
of the military and the home front to carry the country to victory
 frontovnik – the soldiers at the front; the army in the end set up the soldier against
the civilian, the frontovnik against the “rats” (those who followed in the rear, i.e.
the supply teams, staff officers, and caravans of reservists); battle separated frontline soldiers from those who had not experienced the war in the same capacity, and
when these men and women returned home they were allowed to speak of victory,
but never of defeat or difficulty in the struggle against the Germans
 Difficulties on the home front
o many soldiers felt betrayed by their country to learn that their mothers and
wives and children suffered from intense starvation and poverty, and that
the government was not providing for them while they fought at the front
o very few families received the pensions and supplies of food that they
were entitled to receive
o families of decorated soldiers were supposed to get extra help, which was
often a successful incentive for soldiers, but these soldiers were even more
outraged to learn about the government’s negligence
Changes in morality
o many soldiers had “marching field wives” who were mistresses with
fictitious staff roles that allowed them to follow the front
o “wives” at the front were a perk of rank
o the war created a looser attitude towards sex and marriage than existed in
the prewar years, and this increased promiscuity resulted in an explosion
in the number of cases of venereal diseases
o the Soviet wartime myth cultivated by Stalin and the government
overlooked the causes and effects of divorce, promiscuity, and venereal
disease
Morale for the soldiers
o letters from civilians back home who had adopted a regiment
o parcels sent from the home front to soldiers
o private gifts and donations, for example a war widow’s donation of her
entire savings to purchase a T-34 tank
o “sons of the regiment”
 the Red Army picked up children along the way as the front moved
westward
 one estimate suggests that as many as 25,000 children between the
ages of six and sixteen marched with the Red Army at some point
during the war
 these children did wonders for troop morale, because it gave
soldiers something to care for other than themselves and the
children often had a remarkable level of loyalty to the regiments
they joined
o animals, including livestock and puppies in one example
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Parker, chap 4&7
Parker Chapter 4: Operation Barbarossa
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Hitler had decided to attack Russia since the writing of Mein Kampf
The unexpected resilience of the British during the months between 1940 and
1941, when the British were fighting alone, forced Hitler to decided between a
continued cooperating with the Soviet Union, or a fighting a two-front war
Since the Americans were rapidly gaining strength, and the Germans predicted
that the US would become a formidable force by 1942. Hitler decided on war with
Russia because he believed that if he could knock out Russia by 1941, the US
wouldn’t have time to prepare an adequate counter-attack. By that time, Germany
would have dominated continental Europe.
Initially, the Germans were far better than the Russians, and swept through with
great strength during the initial stages of the war. The initial starting date was
June 22, 1941. During the first six months, however, although the Germans were
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superior, they just weren’t good enough to achieve the wild expectations of
Barbarossa.
The Russians resisted, and the Germans were stopped at Moscow
German army commanders wanted a united front against Moscow, but Hitler
wanted to take the oil in the south, and went towards Stalingrad
On October 14, 1941, Moscow was encircled. However, the autumn rains turned
most Russian roads into mud, which delayed supplies. Because of heavy infantry
and tank losses, and the fact that Russians were continually supplying fresh troops
from the east, the German offensive ended on December 5, 1941.
Parker Chapter 7: The end of German expansion: the Atlantic, North Africa, and Russia,
1942-43
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Between 1941 to 1943, US shipbuilding greatly exceeded that of the sinkings
accomplished by the U-boats. Shipping to the UK was too much for U-boats to
sink
During the beginning of the war, German U-boats had great success. However,
after the introduction of escorted convoys, America’s overwhelming shipping,
and code-breaking, the German U-boat force dwindled, and became insignificant
by 1943
Unfortunately for the British, the Germans were good in the desert, and the
British did badly; the Germans cooperated between their artillery, tanks, and
infantry better than did the British
German equipment was also better; however, British supplies were better, by way
of Malta
In the battle at El Alamein in the summer of 1942, the British position was better
because of better equipment from the US, and decisive code-breaking. The British
also bombed a lot of German shipping to North Africa. At this point, Rommel was
defeated by November 7, 1942, when American and British forces encircled the
German 8th army
The Russo-German land battle determined the whole course of the war; had the
Germans not decided to invade Russia, it is doubtful that the allies could ever
have returned to continental Europe (refer to my summary of chapter 3 for events
during 1941)
Despite the heavy soviet losses of 1941, the red army was still numerically
superior, with four million men against three million Germans. However, the
German guns and tanks were superior.
In the summer of 1942, Hitler decided to take Army Group South, and go south to
take the oil fields
However, in September of 1942, the German advance reached its limits. German
supply lines were growing really long and weak, and in street fighting, Germans
lost most of their benefit of superior tactics and organization
On November 23, 1942, 200,000 German soldiers were trapped in the Stalingrad
cauldron
On February 1, 1943, Paulus and his men surrendered, with 100,000 captured
German soldiers. Only about 5,000 returned home.
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German soldiers were trapped not because of numerical superiority, but because
of better trained Russian soldiers, better Russian equipment (like T-34 tanks),
inadequate German supplies and communication lines, and ability of red army to
reinforce critical sectors quickly.
Hitler launched another offensive at Kursk on July 4, 1943, but the Russians were
very prepared, with 6 million men, compared with 3 million Germans. The
Russians won.
Richard Overy: Why the Allies Won: Chapter 3 – Deep War, Stalingrad and Kursk
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During the Russian Civil War, Stalin was in charge of defending a small trading
town, Tsaritsyn. He valiantly defended this town, which cost many Soviet lives.
24 years later, he finds himself in the same predicament, this time against Hitler.
In both the summers of 41 and 42, the Germans punched big holes in Russian
defenses, and won great victories. By the summer of 42, Hitler became impatient
for absolute victory, and divided his forces into Army Groups A and B. Army
Group B, led by Paulus, was to advance to Stalingrad. According to Overy, the
decision to break up the Army was the critical mistake on Hitler’s part.
When Hitler’s advisers complained, he criticized them for timidity and defeatism.
Initially, Stalin was reluctant to send forces from Moscow, which contained the
bulk of the Russian forces, to the south, to protect Stalingrad.
Once it was clear that Hitler’s goal was the oil fields in the South, Stalin decided
to send reinforcements.
Stalin also appointed Zhukov, a great general, to defend Stalingrad, which was a
really important decision, because Stalin was a terrible military tactician.
Fighting in Stalingrad was very different from what the Germans were used to;
consequently, the Russians had an advantage in street fighting.
Paulus failed to take Stalingrad because of high casualty rates, very low morale,
and the Russian strategy to keep very close to the Germans, so that they couldn’t
use artillery or tanks.
Russians also kept very good daily intelligence on German positions and strength.
On November 23, 1942, Paulus, with 240,000 Germans, were trapped.
Hitler’s plan for air-lifted supplies completely failed, and Stalingrad was taken on
February 1, 1943.
Because of better Russian intelligence, and Stalin’s willingness to take advice
after two years of disastrous failure, the Russians prepared extensively at Kursk.
On July 4th, 1943, the Russians anticipated the German attack, and pre-empted
them. When the Germans tried to advance, heavy Russian fortifications prevented
them from doing so.
Russian preparations paid off. Russian tanks knew to fire at German tanks from
the side, and Russian reinforcements prevented a German pincer encirclement.
As the Germans retreated from Kursk, Zhukov executed a very well planned out
strategy, which led to the eventual liberation of many Russian cities.
Stalin was presented with a sword by the Americans and British for his victory at
Stalingrad.
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Stalingrad and Kursk effectively determined the outcome of the war. Russia won
because they mobilized quickly, and towards the end, had better equipment,
manpower, and morale. Soviets also had the ability sustain “deep war”, which is
to say, they could endure long, drawn-out war, in bitter cold.
Overy, chap 3
Chapter 3 Why the Allies Won
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Deep War: Stalingrad and Kursk
Tsaritsyn was attacked during the Russian Revolution in 1917, and the local
chairman of the military committee (Josef Djugashvili, who changed his name to
Stalin or ‘steel’) urged his comrades on to save the town, named Stalingrad in his
honor
Autumn 1942: Stalin refuses to believe reports that Germany will invade the
south, assuming they will renew their offense on Moscow
o Even ignores the detailed attack plan found in a downed German plane,
regarding it as misinformation
o Refuses to send reinforcements from farther north to southern front until
he was sure Germany would attack there
Hitler’s “decisive misjudgment” is to divide German forces to attack the Caucasus
o The further German forces pushed into southern front, more dispersed
they became
o At first Germany seemed victorious, moving quickly toward Stalingrad
o Order “No. 227” from Stalin himself: the Red Army was to stand firm or
be treated as criminals or deserters
Georgi Konstantinovich Zhukov: second to Stalin in the Soviet war effort
o Important in Stalingrad was Stalin’s allowance of Zhukov taking the
initiative
o Zhukov came up with the plan to maintain the defense in Stalingrad itself,
while bringing in reserve forces to the north and Southeast to mount a
counter-offensive against the dispersed German forces, encircling the
Germans
 Had to convince Stalin of this plan (Operation ‘Uranus’)
Fighting in Stalingrad: difficult to maneuver around Stalingrad, especially with
tanks, as the city was mostly rubble
o Slowed German advances
o Also, city was 40 miles long down the river bank, too large to be seized
quickly
o By mid-Sept, Stalin was desperate, added the only reinforcements left, the
13th Guards division led by Hero of the Soviet Union Alexander
Rodimtsev
 These men sent to central area of city, heart of the fighting
 Managed to bring time for more reserves to be brought in, but
suffered almost 100% casualties, had to be withdrawn
Stalingrad was constantly short of supplies, suffered many losses, and was
dangerously located next to the Volga river, but Germany still failed
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German forces declined in fighting power as they moved further east
Armory difficult to maintain
Morale of German forces slumped when battle got more competitive
Soviet forces used the urban battlefield to full advantage
 Knew German warfare very well (incl. their reliance on artillery/air
attacks, and reluctance to engage in close combat)
 Hand-to-hand fighting favored the Soviets
 Sniper battalions did well in the rubble
o equipment and tactics improved on the Soviet side as battle went on
Operation “Uranus”
o Planned ahead for possible German attempts to rescue General Paulus, and
made sure that they had enough forces to counterattack any German thrust
o After rescue attempts failed, Soviets turned to the offensive, succeeding
because for the first time their troops were coordinated
o By late December Paulus’ troops were beyond rescue, without
food/supplies
o Paulus was given the chance to surrender in January, and refused
o The attack came two days later, and lasted only a few days
o Paulus still refused to meet face to face with his captors
 Was taken captive with 23 German generals
 Ended up living in Dresden, in Communist East Germany, and
recanted his misdeeds
o Toward the north of the city Germans kept fighting until the beginning of
February when they were finally without anything to fight with, and the
Battle of Stalingrad was over.
Stalingrad as “Turning Point” of war
o Afterwards, Stalin much more receptive to advice
o However, while indicative of improvements in operational skills and
battle-worthiness of Soviet soldiers and weapons, this victory was not a
decisive one on its own
o It had a moral/psychological impact beyond the strategic victory, as it laid
foundations for Soviet self-belief for battles in 43 that really were decisive
Week 6
Sourcebook (4,5)
The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, The Effects of Strategic Bombing on
the German War Economy
3 Main Considerations to Keep in Mind
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phenomenal increase in the weight of attack that could be brought against the
enemy (1940: 1,128 tons of bombs dropped monthly, 1945: 170,000 tons of
bombs dropped monthly)
Improvements in operational technique. The most important change was the
development of the P-51 fighter (had the range to provide continuous fighter
escort for the bombers), and the introduction of radio direction devices like
OBOE and H2X (made it possible to bomb through cloud cover and at night).
Other operational developments were the improvement of bomb-aiming
techniques and the improved quality and weight of bombs.
throughout most of the period of the air war the choice of targets was greatly
influenced by the requirements of the immediate military situation.
Author divides the air war against Germany into four phases:
1940 to December 1942: First concentrated on oil, aluminum and aero-engine plants and
then switched to concentrate on marshaling yards in 1941. Area bombing came into
being out of necessity until the precision of night attacks could be improved. Strategy
took off with the appointment of Arthur Harris as Chief of Bomber Command . Under
Harris’ leadership the greater area offensive was launched in the summer of 1942, to
continue through subsequent years until April 1944
January 1943 to January 1944: New period for the air offensive began with the
Casablanca conference of January 1943, which established for the first time a joint plan
of operations for the Allied forces (“progressive destruction and dislocation of the
German military, industrial and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of
the German people to appoint where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally
weakened). In June of 1943 a narrower directive was issued ordering the assault on
Germany’s fighter strength “Pointblank.” This offensive was slow to start because few of
the bombers could carry enough gasoline. Concentrated on ball bearing factories. Heavy
losses led to the abandonment of unescorted bombing raids.
February 1944 to June 1944: A reexamination of target potentialities by the US Strategic
Air Forces led to the recommendation on March 5 that oil should henceforth be given top
priority since by that time the reduction of this target was in the air force's capabilities.
Preparations were made for DDay....bombing railroad lines to limit German mobility
July 1944 to April 1945: Full scale offensive started in July. The ops of the three main
air forces were for the first time fully coordinated, with the RASF as a full scale partners
in prevision attacks both by night and day. The great bulk of the offensive was
concentrated on oil and transportation, with munitions as a secondary target.
Overall Effects of the Air Offensive:
Prior to the summer of 1943, air raids had no appreciable effect either on German
munitions production or on the national output in general. The area attacks by the RAF
did considerable damage to buildings and caused local delays in production by diverting
labor to repair work and debris clearance, and by causing absenteeism and local
disorganization. The effects of air raids became more noticeable from the summer of
1943 onward. This was partly due to the heavier weight of the RAF attacks and partly to
the appearance of the AAF in major strength. The attacks on panzer production set back
an ambitious expansion program and cause a 20% loss of output in the latter half of 1944.
For the first four months of 1944, the AAF was capable for the first time of
carrying out repeated attacks deep into Germany. During these incursions about 90% of
German fighter production capacity was attacked and 70% was destroyed. The
offensives that started against oil and nitrogen plants, transportation system in May and
June, against the Ruhr steel producing area in October, all achieved results fully up to
expectations or above them.
As to the effects of bomb damage on the civilian economy, there is no evidence
that shortages of civilian goods ever reached a point where the German authorities were
force to transfer resources from war production in order to prevent disintegration on the
home front. The most that can be said is that bombing destroyed a substantial part of the
consumer goods cushion and thereby prevented the further conversion of the civilian
economy to war production in 1944. From December 1944 onwards, all sectors of the
German economy were in rapid decline.
German Economy:
Overall: Germany did not plan for a long war, nor were they prepared for it. Hitler’s
strategy contemplated a series of separate thrusts and quick victories over enemies who
were less prepared to fight; he did not expect to fight a prolonged war against a
combination of major world powers. “Guns and Butter” mentality.
Capital Equipment: German economy does not appear to have suffered from shortages of
machine tools, general machinery, or plant facilities. In many cases machine tools and
machine capacity were in excess of needs.
Labor: Germany, unlike the allies, had full employment in 1939. Armed forces
mobilization 11.5 million troops up to 1944 which caused a 10% drop in the labor force.
This loss was never really filled despite the fact that Germany did not exhaust her
reserves of manpower. Never really utilized female workforce.
Raw Materials: Germany struggled throughout the war in this area…always regarded as
the main weakness of her war potential. The Four Year Plan of 1936 which was designed
to resolve this weakness but the plan failed to make Germany self sufficient. When war
started Germany hold had stocks for nine months in many areas…stocks were expanded
through victories but economy struggled at end of war.
Summary of Michael Waltzer’s Just and Unjust Wars
Just and Unjust Wars, by Michael Waltzer, #5, p. 167-284 in the sourcebook.
Summary: Waltzer’s reading is divided into two main categories, each with their own
subcategories his article on “The Rules of War,” and his article on the term “Supreme
Emrgency” coined by Winston Churchill.
“The Rules of War”—
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The Moral Equality of Soldiers
o Wlatzer talks about how chivalry died with the aristocratic state, and how
chivalry was “the victim of democratic revolution”
o Soldiers don’t fight for themselves anymore (like the great knight of
Medieval times), but rather out of necessity for their states—their lives are
nationalized.
o The death of chivalry does not mean we can be immoral in war
 WWI aviators considered themselves “airborne knights”
 Anecdote of German and French troops partying together in “No
Man’s Land” on Christmas, 1914.
o Idea that soldiers on enemy side are somehow personally responsible for
war leads to immorality in war.
o “War is not a relation between persons but between political entities
and their human instruments” (168).
o Entitlement of war—killing is not murder—have a “license to kill”
o Soldiers who fight “without freedom,” meaning they are only fighting
because the politicians who run their country have gotten them into war,
fight a war that is not their crime, but that of the politicians.
The Case of Hitler’s Generals
o Idea that defeated generals should be allowed to visit the generals who
defeated them.
 Von Ravenstein was brought in to see the British General
Auchinleck
 Eisenhower refused to let von Arnim see him, as he believed
WWII was too personal to allow it.
o Rommel was chivalric
 Burned the Cammando Order issued by Hitler which stated that all
enemy soldiers be killed at once
 Display of morality
o Jus ad bellum versus jus in bello—A soldier, while not responsible for the
war, is responsible for his actions.
 Soldiers have rights and obligations, which have been defined in
international law.
o “War is a ‘legal condition which equally permits two or more groups to
carry on a conflict by armed force” (170).
Two Sort of Rules
o War consists of two sets of principles:
 When and how soldiers can kill
 Whom soldiers can kill
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o “War is distinguishable from murder and massacre only when restrictions
are established on the reach of battle” (171).
o Idea that war is a combat between combatants and civilians should not be
attacked.
o War is a social creation, we set the rules, yet we also easily change them
as we see fit
The War Convention
o The war convention is the “set of articulated norms, customs, professional
codes, legal precepts, religious and philosophical principles, and
reciprocal arrangements that shape our judgments of military conduct.
o The convention “sets the terms of a moral condition,” essentially the war
convention is the only thing that holds us back from using all out war
without any boundaries against an enemy.
o The convention serves as a boundary for what can happen and what tactics
can be used in war.
o War is hell, however even when these rules are obeyed
The Example of Surrender
o “A soldier who surrenders enter into an agreement with his captors: he
will stop fighting if they will accord him…’benevelon quarantine’” (173)
o Essentially, when a soldier surrenders he forfeits his right/license to kill,
and all killing on his part after this point is considered murder.
o If war is hell, than victory, for either side, is considered an escape from
hell.
 Thus, impatience with the war convention.
 Idea that if we win faster the war will be shorter, so who needs war
convention—do anything to end the war sooner—Waltzer says this
is wrong.
o The war convention often stands in the way of victory/peace
“Supreme Emergency”—
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
Nature of Necessity
o Chruchill’s use of the term “supreme emergency” is a ploy that serves to
lessen the resistance to an all out war that would override the war
convention.
o Back-to-the-wall argument: when conventional means of resistance are
hopeless, any measure can be used to save it
o Nazism forced Britain into one of these “back-against-the-wall” situations
as it threatened their entire lifestyle
 they were not only fighting for themselves, but for their society
and its future as well.
 The consequence of a Nazi victory would be “immeasurably
awful” (175)
o Men might sacrifice themselves for a moral cause in war, yet he could not
sacrifice his country men, he will do what he can to save his country man
Overriding the Rules of War: The Decision to Bomb German Cities

o Waltzer seems to accept the use of terror bombing of the Germans in
accordance to the point that there was no other option however he is
extremely opposed to the later bombings when the allies clearly had the
upperhand
 Bombing wasn’t that accurate so terror bombing was a common
side effect, Waltzer thinks there should always have been a
military target though.
 “If one is forced to bomb cities, it seems to me, it is best to
acknowledge that one has also been forced to kill the innocent”
(179)
o The argument that ending the war quickly will save lives is illegitimate in
Waltzer’s eyes: we could instead preserve the quality of lives, our
civilization and morality, and our collective abhorrence of murder, and
leave the fighting merely to the combatants.
o Destruction of innocents is a blasphemy against our deepest moral
commitments.
The Limits of Calculation: Hiroshima
o He is also horrified of the Americans use of fire-bombing and the atomic
bomb on Japan.
o Atom bomb was willingly created by scientists out of fear that Germany
would develop one and the implications of a Nazi atom bomb, not in the
hopes of ending the war: Albert Einstein said “‘If I had known that the
Germans would not succeed in constructing the atom bomb, I would have
never lifted a finger’” (180).
o Japan never posed as much of a threat to peace and freedom as the Nazis
had, there was no reason to use the atom bomb on them, but rather should
have sought out available alternatives.
 The inhabitants of Hiroshima were noncombatant, and thus should
not have been a target of attack, especially when alternatives were
available.
 By the time of the attack, the Japanese had already lost the war.
o The attack on Pearl Harbor was a military attack, and thus, revenge for
this attack is no excuse for the vanquishing of civilian lives.
o The non-aggressors in a war, those who are defending themselves, seem to
have a relaxed sense of moral restraint.
o Unconditional surrender was a ridiculous demand, and should never been
asked for.
 If the slaughtering of civilians was required for unconditional
surrender, “then it was morally necessary—in order not to kill
those people—to settle for something less” (183).
o The Americans forced the Japanese to fight the war past the point at which
it could have been justly concluded, making America in fact a reaggressor.
 Waltzer terms the use of the atom bomb as a “double crime.”
o We can only break the rules of war when we are face-to-face with not
merely defeat, but a defeat that is likely to bring about political,
economical and social disaster to the defeated community, such as a Naziruled world most likely would have done, otherwise we are responsible for
the war crimes we commit in breaking the rules of war and the war
convention.
Parker, chaps 9-11
Ch9 Economies at War
“Superior resources won the war”
superiority of Brit/French empires – Brit Commonwealth through Canada, Aus, New
Zealand, South Africa, India.
Better education facilitating greater industrial production – US, Japan high, less so in
Germany but high Nazi standards.
Another measure is infant mortality rate
Production of aircraft best single measure of industrial competency in war
Tanks, artillery, trucks, cargo ships, warships biggest things needed to be produced.
American main, strongest industries– motor industry and shipbuilding.
GERMANY: idea that maybe Hitler did not try to max war production before 1942 – in
keeping with short, Blitzkrieg style – not anticipating need for long term supply build up.
Different sectors competing/ overlapping for resources.
Trying to get more Germans to work to increase prod – worried about domestic
discontent like ww1
Thus not so much emphasis as on bringing german women into workforce
Instead – prisoners of war and foreigners of occupied countries.
Lacking in natural resources like metals and minerals
For 2 front war: needed longer prep and more stock – didn’t have
RUSSIA: resistance proved Germany’s lack of resources
Forward defense – Germans advance, factories get moved East, beyond Volga river and
Ural mts
Huge decline of civilian consumption to fuel prod
Lots of women included/absorbed, some going back to coercion
BRITAIN: reliance upon American support
Also increased women working, not enough men
Minister of labour –Ernest Bevin – “Bevin’s Boys” – directing young men into coal
mines instead of military.
By 1943 limit reached so that more servicemen meant less prod and vice versa
Could not employ foreigners and prisoners like germans
US: high productivity, mass production
Average standard of living increased, decrease in industrial prod of civilian goods
Restricted motoring to ration rubber and petrol
Met demands because of Red Army success against Germans – didn’t need as much as
they had planned for in production
[In all countries, need to counter inflation – workers have more money but less to buy,
prices increase]
JAPAN: relied largely on imports, eventually curtailed ship and aircraft building and
fueling
Less training for pilots as result of lack of fuel – led to kamikaze tactics – less training
and fuel for one way
American submarine attacks on Japanese shipping most detrimental
Ch10: Strategic bombing:
Used to destroy the economy and the will to fight of the enemy
Self-confidence of RAF leaders in its success, but Churchill’s refusal to put too much
confidence in it
Also to weaken enemy morale
First daylight attacks used, but too many casualties, so then night attacks- illuminated
targets first with fire attacks
“terror bombing”
area bombing (as opposed to precision bombing in daylight) becomes main Brit tactic
1942 – Harris, Commander in Chief of Bomber Command, plus Portal, British Chief of
Air Staff
they need American planes and crews to carry out magnitude of plan – USAAF favors
daylight precision bombing though
While Churchill still hesitant, nevertheless knows that using USAAF could help put
Europe as increased American priority as opposed to the Pacific
Thus, “Combined Bomber Offensive” starting in 1943
British dropping more than Americans
Fire bombing of Hamburg, July 1943 – 40,000-50,000 dead
However, Germans defending successfully – rate of bombers lost increased at beginning
of 1944
US 8th Air Force – bombing into Germany beyond range of fighter escorts –Spaatz,
commander of US strategic bombing in Europe
German fighter strength obviously increasing, and daylight precision bombing not the
way without escorts
P-51 Mustangs introduced – built in US, Rolls Royce with Packard-Merlin engine – long
range fighter
1944 – February 20-25 = “Big Week” of precision daylight bombing using help of P-51s
Successful, German fighter force never recovers from Feb and March 1944 losses
April 1944, focus of RAF and USAAF was prep for Europe invasion
Because of air battles over Germany, very limited german fighters and few trained pilots
against allied invasion in Normandy
Apparent lack of training of pilots in Germany compared to Britain/US
After June 1944 bomber efforts returned to Germany – new reliance upon electronics.
German plane lands by accident in Britain in July 1944, allowing allies to correct their
electronic mistakes which had allowed German fighters to locate them. No more German
fighter victories – more daylight bombing and focus on oil and transport
Moral issue – Feb 1945 bombing of Dresden – more deaths than even Hiroshima
For civilians who can sense end of war + artistic background of Dresden, this bombing
signals new outlook on morality of area bombing.
Before, Churchill says ok because: 1) Germans had started civilian bombing, 2) Germans
deserved punishment for doing so, 3) bombing towns could help win war more quickly.
After Dresden changes his mind. Precision bombing supposedly had more effect than
Harris’ area bombing anyways.
Made Germans focus more on defense – men and artillery (88 mm guns) away from front
to fend off bombers
But less effect on morale than thought – actually pulled people together and eliminated
social barriers
Climax of strategic bombing in WW2 – Japan 1945
B-29s – Superfortresses, long range bombers – secured Iwo Jima so P-51s and B-29s
could land/takeoff there
More area bombing by US than in Europe – less moral inhibitions against Japanese b/c of
Pearl Harbor, POW brutality, and racial stereotypes
However, innovation of dropping warning leaflets before dropping bombs. More
successful at weakening Japanese moral.
6 August 1945 – Hiroshima/ 9 August – Nagasaki ----atomic bombs
Morale
Parker describes the essentiality of morale in a war.
Two different morale-drivers found between civilians and servicemen: long-term purpose
and short-term survival.
For civilians, long term purpose – hoped for a better world; Beveridge report of 1942,
called for attack on ‘five giants’ of Want, Disease, Ignorance, Squalor, Idleness
In WW2, morale also enhanced by inspiring films, as well as indulging in more forms of
escapism, like increased smoking.
Forcing morale to an extent – threat of execution for desertion, or even for retreat (in Red
Army)
Most important part of morale for servicemen – feeling of inclusion and value in a group.
Surprisingly large number of ‘psychiatric casualties’ in WW2
Parker argues that Japanese and Germans had better morale than allies – more of a sense
of “solidarity and obligation”
Brits and American – came from society not favorable of military careers in peace
Russia – too much diversity of national origins and educational variance to foster
cohesion
But Allies had superior numbers and materials which won over superior morale.
Week 7
Sourcebook(6-9)
Problems of Social Policy
“Evacuation: Second Movement”
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Bombing of London 1940 catalyzed second exodus
Since beginning of war, mostly mothers and children evacuated from cities
Three waves: outset of war, 1940 and 1944
Care of evacuated children voluntarily undertaken
To lessen resentment of evacuated mothers in reception areas, created policy of
free travel vouchers for those who would find own accommodations
Two possible options for parents: 1) Could send children away with official party
to unknown destination to live with stranger 2) Make independent arrangements;
in either case, gov provided for railway fare and some or all of lodging
Perpetual problem of where to house evacuees
o Migrant groups competing for house-room include evacuees, homeless
people, war workers and others
o After surveying congested towns in 1940-1, Ministry of Health limited
overcrowding by closing some towns to immigration
“Families in Trouble”
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
Conflation of “social welfare agency” and evacuation scheme
Increase in complaints of ill-behaved children from hosts as scheme continued.
Potential reasons:
o Lack of “civilizing” effect of school:
 Children absent from school: due to family illness, need to work,
lack of shoes/clothing
 Inflated class size:
 Fewer and older teachers due to military recruitment
 Some schools closed because couldn’t find cleaners and
caretakers
 Overcrowded school environment perhaps negatively
influenced behavior of children evacuated to country-side;
deemed ill-mannered, spoiled
o Those sent away in later years (late months of ’41-43) most likely sent
away because parents could not care for them, not safety
 Lack of decent housing in London, other cities
o Reduction in number of available adults—working in munitions factories,
enlisted—therefore unable to tend children
o Withdrawal form home disrupted routine for children
o Lack of familial ties and support networks
“Unfinished Business:


Universality of evacuation scheme stimulated development of social welfare
programs—evacuations not based on class—change in attitude around
programming
o Better pensions for elderly
o 1940 increase in milk and meals supplied to school children (regardless of
class)
o National milk and vitamin schemes
o Abolition of household means test for social service payments
Public Health
o Deterioration 39-41
o Sharp increase 1941 in health
 1941:
 Benefits of social programs—milk scheme etc.
 Nearly full employment
 Government takes control of cost of living
 1942:
 Food rationing governed more nutritionally sound
o War had no appreciable effects on health of population long-term
o Little disease due to clean water provided by public service
o Children born in years after war born into more favorable circumstances
than their mothers
Social Insurance and Allied Services
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
Presented 11/20/1942 by W.H. Beveridge
Interdepartmental Committee on Social Insurance and Allied Services appointed
June, 1941 “to undertake…a survey of the existing national schemes of social
insurance and allied services, including workmen’s compensation and to make
recommendations.”
Committee’s Survey and Its Results:
o Britain unsurpassed in all services except medical provisions, cash
benefits for maternity and funerals, workmen’s comp
o Call for remedy of social security system:
 Principles:
 Goal of abolition of Want
 New proposals should not be limited by sectional interests
 Reform of Social Insurance should be part of
comprehensive program of social reform: (Freedom from
Want, Disease, Ignorance, Squalor and Idleness)
 Social Security must be a cooperation between individual
and the State


Proposal:
 Double re-distribution of income necessary—through
social insurance and by family needs
 To prevent interruption of earning power: 1) extend to
persons not included, 2) extend to include] risks excluded,
3) raise rates of benefit
 Three measures: A—children’s allowances, B—health and
rehabilitation, C—maintenance of employment
 Pensions w/o means test over transition period of 20 years,
also supplying immediate pensions to those in need
 All citizens w/o upper income limit
 Every citizen of working age will contribute according to
security he/she needs
 Everyone should contribute equally
 Plan for Security designed to establish national set point of
living
Why during war?
 Keep men fit for service
“Waiting for the Captive Sons of France: Prisoner of War Wives, 1940-1945”
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790,000 French POWs left wives in France, 616,200 left children
Women dealing with food shortages had to work, move in with in-laws and
parents
Vichy France promoted traditional roles for women
o France demoralized by defeat—blamed weakness of previous regime
o Catholic conservatism in government propaganda
o Family lifted up as building block of state
 Encouraged early marriage, mothering, maternity
o Divorce more difficult to obtain—hope of holding families together
o Booklets sent to POWs on value of family
Two service groups of wives of POWs: Fédération de Associations de Femmes de
Prisonniers (FAFP) in south and Service des Femmes de Prisonniers in north
Women encouraged to “live as if he were there”
Simultaneous confusion and comfort of raising children with absent father
Moeller, Robert. ‘Protecting Motherhood" Emerging from the Rubble,
Chapter 1; sourcebook pages: 235-250.
In this chapter, Moeller examines the social, economic, and political status of
women in West Germany after World War II and how the examination of gender
relations postwar served as an essential part of understanding Germany’s social
reconstruction.
In Emerging from the Rubble, Moeller tries to convey German women’s
experiences in the 30s and 40s using two specific focuses: 1) The transition from
war to post-war; and 2) women’s personal memories of the war. Moeller uses the
story/example of “Frau F” to illustrate some of his underlying points. Frau F is a
middle class German woman whose husband was drafted into the war, leaving her
with two children. At first, Frau F. and her children managed to survive quite
easily—she worked as a postal carrier and received military checks in the mail
which kept them financially satisfied. However, as soon as the Allied bombs
started dropping in 1944 everything changed  their apartment building was hit
directly, one of her children was lost during an air raid (presumed killed), and Frau
F and her son were forced to move from home to home and shelter to shelter until
they finally received permission to return back to the city (Darmstadt) where they
started living in an abandoned basement. When the war ended, there was no
noticeable change except that Frau F’s husband returned home an irritable chainsmoker who would force her to have sex with him despite her professions
reluctance. She proposed divorce but her husband would not hear of it.
Economically dependent on her children and her husband, Frau F was forced to
remain in the marriage.
Moeller goes on to discuss how Frau F’s experience was similar to numerous other
German women at the time and how their experiences provided a basis for an
extensive investigation of the perceived “crisis of the family” in Germany after the
war. He also discusses the fact that the end of the war meant very little to the
women in terms of how it influenced their day to day struggles (“The majority of
German women who met the racial and political criteria of National Socialism but
for whom the politics of the Nazis had been of little or no direct interest, the war’s
end constituted no such clear break, neither liberation nor collapse” p. 11). One
event that did stand out as a turning point in the minds of the women, however,
was the introduction of the new currency:
“The reform of the West German currency in June 1948 was the
response deemed essential to establish solid bases for economic recovery.
Many Germans believed that a stable new Mark was the prerequisite for a
fresh start, a conviction based in part on memories of how currency
stabilization in November 1923 had ended the post-World War I
hyperinflation and ushered in a period of relatively prosperous economic
times” (p.35).
Another important issue addressed by Moeller was the way in which women
began idealizing the past as they struggled to survive because their prosperity in
the 1930s was about as close to happiness and stability as many of the German
women could get:
“Imagining a past in which ‘we had it better with Adolf’ was
indeed ‘remarkable,’ but it was not surprising. Seen from the forties, the
thirties constituted a vision of normalcy that could look quite appealing.
(pg 14-15).
Overall, Moeller’s article focuses on the concerns with women and the family that
permeated sociological investigations of the postwar era and lived on in the
memories of Germans interviewed years later. These investigations and interviews
indicate how ubiquitous these issues were as Germans in the western zones of
occupation moved toward becoming citizens of a Federal German Republic in the
summer and fall of 1948. Wives of Rhur miners found common ground with
academic sociologists in their view that the war and postwar periods had brought
about dramatic shifts in gender relations and that the reconstruction of postwar
West German would include the reconstruction of the family and “woman’s place”
(p.37).
Overy, chaps 6-7
WHY THE ALLIES WON – Richard Overy
Chapter 6. A GENIUS FOR MASS-PRODUCTION: Economies at War
 September 1941, German forces were only 150 miles from Moscow when the entire
Yak-1 fighter plant was dissembled and shipped by rail to Western Siberia
o Production began again within six days; plant reassembled and operating in subzero temperatures
Analogy for the evacuation that saved the Soviet war effort from certain disaster in
1942
 July-December 1941: 1,523 enterprises moved to the Urals, the Volga region,
Kazakhstan, Eastern Siberia: 16 million people escaped German net, many the factory
workers, engineers, plant managers need to keep the uprooted industries going; frozen
earth floors with no roofs
o By the end of ’41, production a mere fraction of previous; what could not be
shipped was destroyed
o By ’42 the eastern zones supplies ¾ of Soviet weapons/virtually steel/iron
Restoration of Soviet economic order from the chaos was as remarkable as the
victory at Stalingrad and equally crucial to Allied victory.
 Middle-years of the war: Britain overshadowed by economic potential of Germany &
European Axis states; improved when Russia entered the war but short-lived as
Germany soon captured rich iron, coal and steel region in Western Russia and the
Ukraine (2/3 of Soviet coal and steel)
o During crisis months of ‘42/’43 when tide turns on Eastern front, balance still
towards Germany; diplomats report to Berlin it will take years to mobilize US
economy
Reality: US economy mobilizes in months, by ’43 substantially giving resources to
allies
 By 1944, balance of weapons swings massively to allies favour; not simply resources
though
o ’43 Soviets turn 8M tons of steel and 90M tons of coal into 48k heavy artillery
pieces and 24k tanks; Germany 30M steel and 340M coal into 27k heavy guns and
17k tanks
o Germany failed to maximize economic potential; also hindered by economic
warefare: oil deprivation and then massive bombing starting in 1943 to restrict
scope of production
Key years earlier: ‘42/43 Soviet industrial revival/American rearmament occur
RUSSIA
 1941 Russian economy faced total collapse: rich grain-lands of the west were captured,
halving supply in 1942; 1/3 of rail network was lost, 40% of electrical generating
capacity, ¾ of iron ore, coal and steel crucial to modern industry and weapons
materials, aluminum, manganese and copper, fell by 2/3
o Soviet economy goes from 3rd largest in the world to the rank of smaller powers
(France, Italy); once resource-rich, now lacking almost everything except timber,
oil and lead
o Confused mass of workers, officials, equipment flees east to rebuild Soviet
industry
 Miraculously, Soviet produce more in 1942 than the year before and then the Germans
o Quality of weapons also improves, factories producing 3-2 aircraft, 2-1 tank, 3-1
heavy artillery versus Germany
o All available resources were used for the war effort
 Simple answer: COMMAND ECONOMY
o Coercion helped but the most remarkable part was the planning
 Planning introduced in the 1920’s, ’28 five-year plans begin
o Economists and officials well-accustomed to skills require in war economy
 Economy had a solid base for war in 1942 but this fell apart after occupation of western
resources
o July 1941, head of Gosplan, Soviet economic planning agency, draws up plan for
war economy based out of Urals-Volga-Siberia hinterland
o Military planners, industrialists and scientists group to tackle technical problems
thrown up by poorly-resourced, improvised production: necessity of using
everything for the war
o Competition between army and industry for manpower: November 1942
Manpower Committee takes control of labor resources
1943 Soviet Union is again ready for a single national-scale plan
 Strength of Soviet planning: scale and simplicity
o 5 aircraft models, 3 fighters, 1 bomber, 1 bomber-fighter
o Technical development confined to improving current model; eases massproduction
o U-V-S supposed to produce 22k tanks and aircraft in 1942 but does 25k of each
 Factories displayed the same scale and simplicity; industrial cities like Magnitogorsk,
begun in 1928, a single steel-works capable of producing more than all of pre-1917
Tsarist Russia
o Helped by American engineering and German machinery; added to with evacuated
machinery, Magnitogorsk employed 45,000 people
o Not very productive by American/European standards but a constant bustle and
drive
o Although Soviet economy remained stunted at ’41 levels, war output productivity
increased three-fold over the war
o Tractor works converted, Leningrad and Kharkov, “Tankograd”, produced 2/3 of
all tanks in 3 giant factories
o “Uralmash”, houses 1 M people and was a massive machine tool production center
Mass-production, borrowed from Americans in the 1920 and used to accelerate
Soviet economic development in the 1930 was the key to the wartime record
 Real heroes were people themselves: appalling work conditions; men 18-50
conscripted; 1 million women also fought; laborers were mainly women, teenagers and
old men
o Large section of the workforce placed under military law, 12-16 hour workdays,
absenteeism treated like desertion -> labor camps
o Food was also scarce; 1 or 2 pounds of bread a day, anything more than scarps of
meat reserved for the hardest working (miners and metalworks); ¼ German, 1/5
British rations
o 7 M cottage gardens kept workers alive; vegetable and potatoes from all plots of
land
o Rural laborers allotted even less food, equipment gone to the front: oxen or even
people pulling ploughs.
no other people were asked to make this kind of sacrifice
 Will came from Russians being used to terrible conditions since the 19th century, from
bitterness about losing loved ones to the Germans and “socialist emulation”
o The most productive workers were lauded; culture of competition to exceed work
norms
o Factories also rewarded exceptional effort with food and fuel, depriving the
holdouts
o Link between food supply and work crucial, but ideological enthusiasm also
necessary: Young Communists, Soviet patriotism (if not that into communism),
hatred of Germany
Stalin able to create “single war camp”: planning, mass production and mass
mobilization
AMERICA
 British had longed for American resources; Sir William Layton to an American
audience claims the 3-1 ratio of Germany’s steel output can overcome by the 50-60 M
tons of the US
o 1941, America produces more steel, aluminum, oil and motor vehicles than all
other major states put together
 However, US has no military-industrial complex, intervention in WWI too late to amass
any forces; 30’s are a period of disarmament and detachment, geographic and political
isolationism
o Richest economy: 1700 obsolescent aircraft, 20k men, 2% of GNP to military
o 1937 US passes neutrality legislation designed to keep it out of war, regretted 1917
 Other political issue: free-market just emerging from depression, enjoying economic
boom
o Business/Labor distrusted government: FDR’s New Deal in ‘30s brought bitter
disputes
o Even after Pearl Harbor, no threat to American soil, no popular commitment to
war production and accompanying economic sacrifice.
 Hence, American rearmament slow before 1942; some navy build-up because navy seen
as purely defensive; still FDR, with 3rd election behind him, orders “Victory
Programme” from army and navy: comprehensive plan of all resources needed to defeat
potential enemies
o Plan held up by British and Soviet inputs and so was barely ready by war with
Jap/Ger
o No massive movement as a result, little uncoordinated efforts at the start of war,
despite “arsenal of democracy” claim in 1940, military expenses in 1941 were 4%
of ’41-45 total
 Breakout of war: US facing nations with half of GNP going to war for eight or nine
years
o Giant plans approved by FDR and Congress in first weeks of war: fear of military
inferiority; in 4 years, American industry would provide 2/3 of all Allied war
materials
o Every power to 4-5 years to develop war economy, US took one year; every
power’s economy suffered during war, US economy doubled; 1:16 Japan:US naval
productivity
 this scale of production made victory possible
 Industrialists, most familiar with mass-production, crucial to the effort
o US strategy was to allow business as much involvement as possible; little choice
but to rely on initiative and technical flair of American business
o Many corporate bosses put in charge of planning and coordination
o New agencies were created only where the market would not work in a war
context: allocating controlled materials, manpower etc.—still run by business-men
o Scramble of volunteers for war contracts; 4/5 of military orders contracted to
biggest 100 companies; General Motors alone supplied 1/10 of all war production,
hired ¾ M workers
o Liberty Ship story exhibits this “genius for mass production” that Roosevelt
conjured
o Original British order for 60 swelled to 2700, U-boats taking their toll; process
revolutionized by assembling ships from pieces rather than building them up from
the hull
o At start 1.4 M man-hours and 335 days to build, down to 500k man-hours and 41
days
 Motor industry was the benchmark; produced 3.5 M passenger cars in 1941; only 139
42-45
o Detroit supplies 1/5 of all military equipment, almost all vehicles and tanks, 1/3
machine guns and 2/5 of aviation supplies
o Carmakers had resisted to the last minute due to extraordinary demand and sales;
unprepared for changeover; weapons more complex but conversion still went well
o Ultimate challenge: produce aircraft like cars; aviation mass-production not
believed in at the time; cars have 15k parts, planes have about 1.5M; Ford pushed
forward with the “Willow Run” factory the “Grand Canyon of the mechanized
world”; project had many snags but ultimately produces a bomber every 63
minutes
Across industry, America was quick to move to mass-production scales for war
wares
 Better fed, better paid workers also faced some discomfort from rising inflation,
housing market woes, strikes, racial tension but ultimately salaries rose even higher and
quality of life generally improved.
 Like Soviet overachievers, American entrepreneurs were praised at home
o US substituted Soviet raw desperation with economic opportunism
 Capacity, resources, mass-production techniques all there but it would be wrong to
ignore will
GERMANY
 By ’43 disparity in weapons far to Allies favor; of Axis nations only Germany had the
resources, skilled manpower and expertise to support a war effort
o German economy feared as a war engine in the West; no question it
underproduced
o Disparity always wider than crude resources check; smaller British economy
outproduced Germany in almost all respect until 1943, hobbled Soviet Union
produces ½ of German production in 1942-45 in 1942 alone
o Irony: Germany has been preparing a war economy since the ‘30s; German public
still embarrassed with WWI and wanting to commit to German concept of “total
war”
o By ’39, ¼ of workforce devoted to military production and 2/3 of industrial
investment comes from German Government since the mid-30s
o By ’39, Germany has military-industrial complex of the two superpowers in the
Cold War
o Hitler emphasized superpower weapons: airforce, battlefleet, rockets, jets, nerve
gas and even nuclear research
o However, the industrial foundation and its intended military superstructure took far
longer than expected: Germany still not ready at the outbreak of war
 Economy was conscripted at once; descent of military and civilian bureaucrats
o Shortages, rationing, queuing, terrible diet, business converted to war purposes
o By summer 1941, ½ of industrial workforce working in war, higher than Britain at
the time and the USA throughout the war
o 1941 should have had huge dividends from the capturing of most of Europe’s coal
and steel industry but rather production barely increased; crucial for Russian
survival of Barbarossa
 Organizational structure was the problem; Hitler had gathered control over all the
necessary means but directives filtered through a poorly coordinated system
o web of ministries and corrupt party officials, military all led to bureaucratic inertia
o The military (most guilty) took over industry; unlike simplicity of
Soviet/American way, military control led to constant refinements spurned by cries
from the battlefield
o Changes to design are not easily implemented on mass-production systems;
weapons were of extremely high quality and revered but were costly: time,
materials and skilled labor
o 425 aircraft models, 151 trucks, 150 motorcycles…
o Military wagged the tail of industrial dog; preferred German tradition of
craftsmanship
o Industrialist complained and Hitler relayed but military didn’t much change
o German car industry a good example; huge potential wasted, Hitler plans
Volkswagen with Ferdinand Porsche; massive plant capable of 1.5 M cars a year is
built right before war; 1/5 of capacity ever utilized; systematic conversion of
automobile plants starts far tool late in 1942/43; postwar studies show at most 50%
of largest mass-producing industry in Germany’s capacity is ever used (at the
peak!)
 Hitler breaks logjam with December 1941 Fuhrer decree on ‘Simplification and
Increased Efficiency in Armament Production’; real turning point a few months later
with appoint of Albert Speer as the Minister of Armaments
o Central planning of resources finally occurs; aircraft models cut to 42, dozen antitank guns down to one; weapons output trebled in three years
o Goring held on to aircraft until bitter end in 1944; Speer dramatically ups
production
 Centralization comes to late: USSR and US had beat Germany to the punch and begin
bombing
o Bombing forces measure counter to mass-production; smaller, hidden, even
underground
o Momentum of Speer takeover carries through to peak economic performance in
September 1944 but full potential never reached as bombing wipes out plants
 By autumn ’44, industries living of materials and components stockpiles
o Workers living in increasingly squalid condition, 7 M slave laborers augmented by
forcing the concentration/extermination camp
o Work continued on basis of fear but situation hopeless
 German wartime economy paradox; wealth of resources, entrepreneurs, engineers and
highly skilled workforce along with an authoritarian system with no opposition
o Ultimately, Nazi-regime not enough of a command economy to do what the Soviet
had done and not capitalist enough to rely on private enterprise as in America
o Ruling of highly professional military elite had stifling, decisive effects on the war
effort
WHY THE ALLIES WON – Richard Overy
Chapter 7. A WAR OF ENGINES: Technology and Military Power

At the start of the war, Germany had complete military superiority as German use of
airpower and ground mobility was irresistible. Given the extraordinary success of
German arms, Allied learning curve had to be small. As the war continued, Allies
developed more quantity and quality, while also adopting Germany’s successful
deployment techniques. By contrast, the military effectiveness of German and
Japanese forces first stagnated, then declined.
Japan
 Poorly armed. Made up for it by high level of training and endurance.
o For every American soldier in pacific War, there were 4 tons of supplies;
for every Japanese soldier, there were 2 pounds
 Huge shortages of raw materials and supply
o Supply lines for materials were cut off by bombers and submarines
 Army remained based on infantry, replying largely on horses
o Couldn’t develop anti-tank weapons either
o Tried to suicide bomb allied tanks
 Used really old models for their guns and artillery (from early 20th century)
 Didn’t produce many of its own vehicles
 Their greatest resource was their endurance and level of commitment
o Extremely harsh training
o Very well tactically trained
o Allowed them to resist strongly in the Pacific even after their defeat was
apparent
Germany
 Germany experienced a progressive ‘demodernization’ esp. on the eastern front
 Problem in lack of technological progress lies with Germany itself
 In 1930s, Hitler choose to establish a core of heavily-armored mobile divisions, the
Panzer divisions
o Resulted in one highly armored army, and a vast old-fashioned army
reliant on horse and rail
o 600,000 vehicles mobilized, mostly for Panzers; 700,000 horses used
 Tanks
o Cold weather forced guns and turrets to freeze, engines to freeze
o Couldn’t be serviced and repaired as easily
o Hitler insisted on producing heaving tanks, that were immobile and easily
ambushed
 Ultimately resulted in a more defensive stance by germany after
1943 with these bigger tanks
 Hundreds of miles of supply lines breaking down
o Severe shortages of spare parts and replacement engines
o

Aircraft
o Weren’t equipped to fly in cold weather
o Commander in charge of aircraft production insisted of diving abilities
 No effective long-range bombers built
 Every one of his aircraft chosen was a failure
USSR
 Almost complete destruction of Soviet mechanized corps in 1941 allowed them to
start from scratch
 Tank Strength
o Low point in 1941, Twice as many as Germany by end of 1942, Three
times as many by end of 1943
o Designed like German armour to punch hard at weakest point in enemy
lines, and then sweep in pincer movements
o Tanks better able to cope with muddy and winter terrain (wider belt)
o Introduction of radio enhanced communication
o Only 2 tank models allowed for easy repair and maintenance
o Crew of engineers traveled with the divisions
 Replace almost 30% of tanks at Kursk within hours
o d
 Air force
o Learned from Germany’s strength in using air support for ground
operations
o Concentrated air force at critical points, not spread out like in 1941
o Made up of fighters, bombers, and ground-attack aircraft
o Under direct command of local front commanders to synchronize with
ground forces
o Each of 17 air armies had 800 planes in 1942, 1500 in 1943, 2500 in 1945
o Built temporary airfields, provided camoflouge for storing airplanes in
forests and farm buildings
 US provided lots of help for Russian modernization under Lend-Lease
o 78,000 jeeps & 151,00 light trucks & 200,000 army trucks
o 956,000 miles of telephone cable & 35,000 radio stations & 380,000 field
telephones
America
 Abundant use of military technology reflective of a culture fascinated by
technological progression and invention
 Leader in application of internal combustion engine
 Thought Germany was producing 10 times more than they actually were
o Became most modern army in the world in 2 years
 Tanks and vehicles
o Only had one mechanized division at the start of the war
o Built division that used combination of tanks, artillery, and infantry each
supporting each other, instead of a heavily armed one
o Could produce 4.8 million vehicles in 1937, Germany produced 331,000
o Standardized design for easier production and repair
Oil and resources
 Allies controlled 90% of World’s output, Axis controlled only 3%
 Germany
o Oil considered to be Germany’s Achilles heel by the Allies
o Tried to synthetically produce oil
 Very expensive and still couldn’t meet demands of army and
industry
o Invaded sotuerh Russia to get caucus oil fields
 This area alone produced many times more oil than germany
needed every year
 When German army captured some oil fields, they had been
burned
 Didn’t prepare to set up their own drilling operations in these
places
o By 1944, life-blood of German armored divisions and air force drained
 Every German front line complained of lack of oil
 Tanks were dug in as artillery
 Shortage of aviation fuel meant no training missions for new pilots
 Japan
o How to transport oil from their southern conquests
 American bombers and submarines destroyed almost all tankers
and oil supply convoys
 Ships had to travel slowly, aircrafts couldn’t fly training missions
 By 1945, imports were zero, and stocks fell so low that fleet
couldn’t operate
 US
o California produced more oil than USSR but no transport to the eastern
industry, only provided for the Pacific war.
o Created 1,300 mile pipeline from texas to Pennsylvania
o Created vast amounts of 100-octane fuel for airplanes
 Resulted in longer range, greater maneuverability
The “GREAT” Weapon
 Only way Axis would win and reverse the technological imbalance
 Japan thought the A-bomb was impossible, esp. the creation of enriched uranium
 Germany had the best theoretical physicists
o Knew fission of uranium could be a new source of fuel and also create an
explosion
o Theoretical scientists not good at applying the concepts practically
 Choose an inferior way to enrich the uranium
o Prospect of finishing the bomb in time seemed remot so it was ditched by
Hitler who didn’t like it in the first place, though it was a product of
Jewish ‘pseudo-science’
o Tried a rocket program
 Had too many technical failures



Took up too many resources and manpower that could have been
used to make conventional aircraft and tanks
Spent billions of marks on projects at the very frontier of military
science which brought no strategic advantage whatsoever
America
o Only with enough resources to properly pursue the creation of an A-bomb;
labeled the “Manhattan” Project
o Tested on July 16, 1945 in new Mexico
o After seeing it, one man said “The War is Over”
o However, war was already over and the A-bomb did not play a deciding
role of any kind