The errors, insights and lessons of famous AI predictions
... predictions are all over the map, with no pattern of convergence, and no visible difference between expert and non-expert predictions. These results were detailed in a previous paper [AS12], and are summarised here. The key part of the paper is a series of case studies on five of the most famous AI ...
... predictions are all over the map, with no pattern of convergence, and no visible difference between expert and non-expert predictions. These results were detailed in a previous paper [AS12], and are summarised here. The key part of the paper is a series of case studies on five of the most famous AI ...
How to Pass a Turing Test: Syntactic Semantics, Natural
... The Turing Test, as the computer version of the imitation game has come to be called, is now generally simplified even furtherto a 2-player game: Can a human conversing with an unknown interlocutorthrougha computer "chat"interface determinewhetherthe interlocutoris a humanor a suitably programmedcom ...
... The Turing Test, as the computer version of the imitation game has come to be called, is now generally simplified even furtherto a 2-player game: Can a human conversing with an unknown interlocutorthrougha computer "chat"interface determinewhetherthe interlocutoris a humanor a suitably programmedcom ...
Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness - Computer Science
... surpass humans in intelligence, and that consciousness will be an inevitable consequence. The only argument offered is that the computers will talk as though they are conscious; what more could we ask? I believe a careful statement of the argument might go like this: 1. Computers are getting more an ...
... surpass humans in intelligence, and that consciousness will be an inevitable consequence. The only argument offered is that the computers will talk as though they are conscious; what more could we ask? I believe a careful statement of the argument might go like this: 1. Computers are getting more an ...
Symbol Grounding and its Implications for Artificial
... Consider, for example, a child (or a newly built, “intelligent” robot). A child starts out in the world with no grounded symbols because groundedness can only arise as a consequence of experiences, and a child initially has no experience of the world. Admittedly, the child may possess a handful of i ...
... Consider, for example, a child (or a newly built, “intelligent” robot). A child starts out in the world with no grounded symbols because groundedness can only arise as a consequence of experiences, and a child initially has no experience of the world. Admittedly, the child may possess a handful of i ...
Meaning in Artificial Agents: The Symbol Grounding Problem
... Agents with the necessary means to autonomously create internal representations that link their manipulated symbols to their corresponding referents in the external world. These representations should arise through the agents own sensory motor capabilities, by grouping in general categories the inva ...
... Agents with the necessary means to autonomously create internal representations that link their manipulated symbols to their corresponding referents in the external world. These representations should arise through the agents own sensory motor capabilities, by grouping in general categories the inva ...
A Cognitive Computation Fallacy?
... a fortiori neither does the system, because there is nothing in the system that is not just a part of him. But others are left equally unmoved by Searle’s response; for example in [39] Haugland asks why should we unquestioningly accept Searle’s conclusion that ‘the internalised Chinese room system d ...
... a fortiori neither does the system, because there is nothing in the system that is not just a part of him. But others are left equally unmoved by Searle’s response; for example in [39] Haugland asks why should we unquestioningly accept Searle’s conclusion that ‘the internalised Chinese room system d ...
The Symbol Grounding Problem Remains Unsolved
... inside the robot who doesn’t understand any Chinese, but who can deftly follow (à la a computer program) the rulebook and thereby give outside observers the impression that the robot understands Chinese.5 As Harnad puts it when summarizing the CRA for purposes of presenting SGP: Searle’s simple dem ...
... inside the robot who doesn’t understand any Chinese, but who can deftly follow (à la a computer program) the rulebook and thereby give outside observers the impression that the robot understands Chinese.5 As Harnad puts it when summarizing the CRA for purposes of presenting SGP: Searle’s simple dem ...
- CRISP Repository
... patient. The moment this person puts herself and others at risk, cannot reason logically, does not understand a thing, shows little empathy with fellow patients or family, in pursuit of anything but health goals (cookies!), and hardly aware of doing it, the care robot might hold the patient for a du ...
... patient. The moment this person puts herself and others at risk, cannot reason logically, does not understand a thing, shows little empathy with fellow patients or family, in pursuit of anything but health goals (cookies!), and hardly aware of doing it, the care robot might hold the patient for a du ...
History of AI - School of Computer Science
... In fact, such an impact did the program have that some psychiatrists saw it as a means of allowing the profession to deal with many more patients. There was talk about using Eliza as a front end with the most serious patients would be referred to a human psychiatrist. Despite Weizenbaum’s insistence ...
... In fact, such an impact did the program have that some psychiatrists saw it as a means of allowing the profession to deal with many more patients. There was talk about using Eliza as a front end with the most serious patients would be referred to a human psychiatrist. Despite Weizenbaum’s insistence ...
The Chinese Room Argument
... The heart of the argument is an imagined human simulation of a computer, similar to Turing's Paper Machine. The human in the Chinese Room follows English instructions for manipulating Chinese symbols, where a computer “follows” a program written in a computing language. The human produces the appear ...
... The heart of the argument is an imagined human simulation of a computer, similar to Turing's Paper Machine. The human in the Chinese Room follows English instructions for manipulating Chinese symbols, where a computer “follows” a program written in a computing language. The human produces the appear ...
Searle, Subsymbolic Functionalism and Synthetic Intelligence
... is to somehow emulate the workings of the human mind, whether it be with the intent of simply gaining a better understanding of the brain or with the intent of passing the Turing test or with the much more ambitious desire to eventual build the sorts of perfect androids that are popular in science f ...
... is to somehow emulate the workings of the human mind, whether it be with the intent of simply gaining a better understanding of the brain or with the intent of passing the Turing test or with the much more ambitious desire to eventual build the sorts of perfect androids that are popular in science f ...
Lecture 28: Physical symbol system
... Searle, John, “Minds, Brains and Programs”, Minds I, Ed. Douglas Hofstadter, ...
... Searle, John, “Minds, Brains and Programs”, Minds I, Ed. Douglas Hofstadter, ...
Physical symbol system
... to perceive, move, survive and deal with the world. They argued that these sensorimotor skills are essential to higher level skills like commonsense reasoning and that abstract reasoning was actually the least interesting or important human skill (see Moravec's paradox). They advocated building inte ...
... to perceive, move, survive and deal with the world. They argued that these sensorimotor skills are essential to higher level skills like commonsense reasoning and that abstract reasoning was actually the least interesting or important human skill (see Moravec's paradox). They advocated building inte ...
The Turing Test Turing`s own objections
... useful and predictive way, for the designer went on to say one can usually count on chasing that queen around a board. But for all the many levels of explicit representation to be found in that program, nowhere is there anything roughly synonymous with ‘I should get my queen out early.’ explicitly t ...
... useful and predictive way, for the designer went on to say one can usually count on chasing that queen around a board. But for all the many levels of explicit representation to be found in that program, nowhere is there anything roughly synonymous with ‘I should get my queen out early.’ explicitly t ...
Could a machine think? - Alan M. Turing vs. John R. Searle
... The PSSH dictates that symbol manipulation and thinking are processes of a fundamentally alike type. They are both physically realised and governed by rules and representations. 6 A computer is a physical apparatus. Therefore, the performance of a computer can be described by the causal structure of ...
... The PSSH dictates that symbol manipulation and thinking are processes of a fundamentally alike type. They are both physically realised and governed by rules and representations. 6 A computer is a physical apparatus. Therefore, the performance of a computer can be described by the causal structure of ...
Searle`s Chinese Room Argument and its Replies
... Mariano de Dompablo Cordio Philosophy University of Wisconsin, La Crosse __________________________________________________________________ Abstract This paper treats the philosophy of John R. Searle in his article "Minds, Brains, and Programs". It shows, using Searle's Chinese room argument (CR), t ...
... Mariano de Dompablo Cordio Philosophy University of Wisconsin, La Crosse __________________________________________________________________ Abstract This paper treats the philosophy of John R. Searle in his article "Minds, Brains, and Programs". It shows, using Searle's Chinese room argument (CR), t ...
Mind Lectures 2
... Conscious experience as unified is a feature of normal functioning brains. It is not a claim about abnormal or degenerate cases of experience. A central question in the philosophy of mind is what explains the unity of conscious experience. In virtue of what is our conscious field bound together as a ...
... Conscious experience as unified is a feature of normal functioning brains. It is not a claim about abnormal or degenerate cases of experience. A central question in the philosophy of mind is what explains the unity of conscious experience. In virtue of what is our conscious field bound together as a ...
Intentionality and artificial intelligence
... within the system are not just causal, but Intentional. The last 35 years have seen large research programmes attempting to develop an account of the necessary causal network. Intentional states ‘represent’ the world. We can understand this in terms of information. So philosophers have started from ...
... within the system are not just causal, but Intentional. The last 35 years have seen large research programmes attempting to develop an account of the necessary causal network. Intentional states ‘represent’ the world. We can understand this in terms of information. So philosophers have started from ...
AI`s Half-Century1
... to its specific material stuff. As for his claim that syntax alone cannot give us semantics, I agree. Meaning, purpose, and understanding require certain sorts of causal relationship between a system’s internal processing and its environment, plus a historical grounding in evolution. Intentionality ...
... to its specific material stuff. As for his claim that syntax alone cannot give us semantics, I agree. Meaning, purpose, and understanding require certain sorts of causal relationship between a system’s internal processing and its environment, plus a historical grounding in evolution. Intentionality ...
LECTURE SEVEN
... artificial intelligence research has succeeded in constructing a computer that behaves as if it understands Chinese. It takes Chinese characters as input and, by following the instructions of a computer program, produces other Chinese characters, which it presents as output. Suppose, says Searle, th ...
... artificial intelligence research has succeeded in constructing a computer that behaves as if it understands Chinese. It takes Chinese characters as input and, by following the instructions of a computer program, produces other Chinese characters, which it presents as output. Suppose, says Searle, th ...
LECTURE SEVEN
... artificial intelligence research has succeeded in constructing a computer that behaves as if it understands Chinese. It takes Chinese characters as input and, by following the instructions of a computer program, produces other Chinese characters, which it presents as output. Suppose, says Searle, th ...
... artificial intelligence research has succeeded in constructing a computer that behaves as if it understands Chinese. It takes Chinese characters as input and, by following the instructions of a computer program, produces other Chinese characters, which it presents as output. Suppose, says Searle, th ...
2101INT – Principles of Intelligence Systems
... "Suppose we design a program that doesn't represent information that we have about the world, but simulates the actual sequence of neuron firings at the synapses of the brain of a native Chinese speaker when he understands stories in Chinese and gives answers to them. The machine takes in Chinese st ...
... "Suppose we design a program that doesn't represent information that we have about the world, but simulates the actual sequence of neuron firings at the synapses of the brain of a native Chinese speaker when he understands stories in Chinese and gives answers to them. The machine takes in Chinese st ...
Artificial Intelligence: Computers do not think
... the upper level of mental life of which the person is aware as contrasted with unconscious processes ...
... the upper level of mental life of which the person is aware as contrasted with unconscious processes ...
Can computers think? In attempt to make sense of this question Alan
... any mental content with meaning (as opposed to purely symbolic manipulation), Searle asserts that X does not have a mind. While I’m not going to discuss this point in detail, I think that this definition of the mind could possibly be challenged by Alan Turing and other machine functionalists. Additi ...
... any mental content with meaning (as opposed to purely symbolic manipulation), Searle asserts that X does not have a mind. While I’m not going to discuss this point in detail, I think that this definition of the mind could possibly be challenged by Alan Turing and other machine functionalists. Additi ...
John Searle
John Rogers Searle (/sɜrl/; born July 31, 1932) is an American philosopher and currently the Slusser Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley. Widely noted for his contributions to the philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and social philosophy, he began teaching at Berkeley in 1959. He received the Jean Nicod Prize in 2000; the National Humanities Medal in 2004; and the Mind & Brain Prize in 2006. Among his notable concepts is the ""Chinese room"" argument against ""strong"" artificial intelligence.