De Finetti on uncertainty - Oxford Academic
De Finetti on uncertainty - Oxford Academic

... it is not. In the latter case individual agents formulate estimates, which do not have the status of a probability measure, as there is nothing ‘objective’ in their determination. Obviously, the subjectivist might respond by saying that there is no barrier to estimates corresponding to numerically d ...
Math Fundamentals for Statistics (Math 52) Unit 3: Addition and
Math Fundamentals for Statistics (Math 52) Unit 3: Addition and

... Anytime we add 0 to a number, or a number to 0, the result is just the original number. For addition, the number zero has a very special place in mathematics and is called the Additive Identity Element. One way to picture this property is to think that each number has an identity, like people do. Wh ...
4 Combinatorics and Probability
4 Combinatorics and Probability

Probability and Chance
Probability and Chance

T R ECHNICAL ESEARCH
T R ECHNICAL ESEARCH

Does Deliberation Crowd Out Prediction?
Does Deliberation Crowd Out Prediction?

When Fully Informed States Make Good the Threat of War: Rational
When Fully Informed States Make Good the Threat of War: Rational

The Unity of Fitness - Philsci
The Unity of Fitness - Philsci

Optimal Illusion of Control and Related Perception Biases - cerge-ei
Optimal Illusion of Control and Related Perception Biases - cerge-ei

The Applicability Problem for Chance
The Applicability Problem for Chance

Specification: The Pattern That Signifies Intelligence By William A. Dembski
Specification: The Pattern That Signifies Intelligence By William A. Dembski

Cryptography and Network Security - Text of NPTEL IIT Video Lectures
Cryptography and Network Security - Text of NPTEL IIT Video Lectures

15. Games of Chance - University of Vermont
15. Games of Chance - University of Vermont

Document
Document

De Finetti and Savage on the normative relevance of imprecise
De Finetti and Savage on the normative relevance of imprecise

Probability - OnlineStatBook
Probability - OnlineStatBook

Minireview - Psychology
Minireview - Psychology

Arguments for–or against–Probabilism?
Arguments for–or against–Probabilism?

New Content
New Content

Theory of Decision under Uncertainty
Theory of Decision under Uncertainty

Examining issues in traditional behaviour support practices
Examining issues in traditional behaviour support practices

Information Security and Risk Management
Information Security and Risk Management

Interpretations of Probability.pdf
Interpretations of Probability.pdf

The Optimal Draw-down for a Charity
The Optimal Draw-down for a Charity

2. Criteria of adequacy for the interpretations of
2. Criteria of adequacy for the interpretations of

Risk aversion (psychology)

Risk-aversion is a preference for a sure outcome over a gamble with higher or equal expected value. Conversely, the rejection of a sure thing in favor of a gamble of lower or equal expected value is known as risk-seeking behavior.The psychophysics of chance induce overweighting of sure things and of improbable events, relative to events of moderate probability. Underweighting of moderate and high probabilities relative to sure things contributes to risk-aversion in the realm of gains by reducing the attractiveness of positive gambles. The same effect also contributes to risk-seeking in losses by attenuating the aversiveness of negative gambles. Low probabilities, however, are overweighted, which reverses the pattern described above: low probabilities enhance the value of long-shots and amplify aversion to a small chance of a severe loss. Consequently, people are often risk-seeking in dealing with improbable gains and risk-averse in dealing with unlikely losses.