• Study Resource
  • Explore
    • Arts & Humanities
    • Business
    • Engineering & Technology
    • Foreign Language
    • History
    • Math
    • Science
    • Social Science

    Top subcategories

    • Advanced Math
    • Algebra
    • Basic Math
    • Calculus
    • Geometry
    • Linear Algebra
    • Pre-Algebra
    • Pre-Calculus
    • Statistics And Probability
    • Trigonometry
    • other →

    Top subcategories

    • Astronomy
    • Astrophysics
    • Biology
    • Chemistry
    • Earth Science
    • Environmental Science
    • Health Science
    • Physics
    • other →

    Top subcategories

    • Anthropology
    • Law
    • Political Science
    • Psychology
    • Sociology
    • other →

    Top subcategories

    • Accounting
    • Economics
    • Finance
    • Management
    • other →

    Top subcategories

    • Aerospace Engineering
    • Bioengineering
    • Chemical Engineering
    • Civil Engineering
    • Computer Science
    • Electrical Engineering
    • Industrial Engineering
    • Mechanical Engineering
    • Web Design
    • other →

    Top subcategories

    • Architecture
    • Communications
    • English
    • Gender Studies
    • Music
    • Performing Arts
    • Philosophy
    • Religious Studies
    • Writing
    • other →

    Top subcategories

    • Ancient History
    • European History
    • US History
    • World History
    • other →

    Top subcategories

    • Croatian
    • Czech
    • Finnish
    • Greek
    • Hindi
    • Japanese
    • Korean
    • Persian
    • Swedish
    • Turkish
    • other →
 
Profile Documents Logout
Upload
Cichon`s diagram, regularity properties and ∆ sets of reals.
Cichon`s diagram, regularity properties and ∆ sets of reals.

13. Acting under Uncertainty Maximizing Expected Utility
13. Acting under Uncertainty Maximizing Expected Utility

Hedonic adaptation and the role of decision and experience utility in
Hedonic adaptation and the role of decision and experience utility in

... (Angrist et al., 2006) all assume these behavioral changes are desirable for people who would not spontaneously enact them if left to their own devices.1 Clearly, there is a new openness to paternalism among a growing segment of economists. However, wary of abridgments to individual liberties, sever ...
Document
Document

... is true under all interpretations. • Herbrand (1930) developed an algorithm to find an interpretation (if it exists) that can falsify a given formula. • If the given formula is indeed valid, no such interpretation can exist and Herbrand’s algorithm halts after a finite number of trials. ...
Choosing among risky alternatives
Choosing among risky alternatives

... [u(x) ( F(x) - G(x))] -   u' (x) ( F(x) - G(x) ) dx ...
From local to global additive representation
From local to global additive representation

... explicitly derived results for rank-ordered sets within connected topological spaces. Primarily to help correcting the results of Chew and Epstein (1989b), Segal (1991) gave results for connected domains which satisfy some additional connectedness conditions [(2) and (3) below], for the special case ...
Law and Preferences
Law and Preferences

... outcome of the renegotiation process and on the seller’s decision whether to perform, or rather breach the contract. Into this framework we introduce preferences for fairness. We allow for the possibility that individuals wish to be treated fairly, and that they experience disutility whenever they a ...
Utility Theory
Utility Theory

... John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern showed in 1947 how simple rationality assumptions could imply that any decision-makers' risk preferences should be consistent with utility theory. In this section, we discuss a simplified version of their argument, which justifies our use of utility theory. To ...
Congruent Supplements and Complements
Congruent Supplements and Complements

... • After studying this section you will be able to… – Prove angles congruent by using four new theorems that you will learn in this section ...
Economic Policies of Heterogeneous Politicians ∗ ODILON C ˆ AMARA
Economic Policies of Heterogeneous Politicians ∗ ODILON C ˆ AMARA

... These results cannot be derived in standard theoretical or empirical one-dimensional valence models (e.g., Bernhardt, Câmara and Squintani (2011)). They highlight the fact that one needs to consider the heterogeneous effects of different ability dimensions on budget constraints, and their interacti ...
Mining Personal Context-Aware Preferences for Mobile Users
Mining Personal Context-Aware Preferences for Mobile Users

... individual user usually does not contain sufficient training information. Therefore, we propose a novel crowd wisdom based approach for mining the personal context-aware preferences for mobile users, which can enable the building of personalized context-aware mobile recommender systems. The contribut ...
Interactive Theorem Proving with Temporal Logic
Interactive Theorem Proving with Temporal Logic

... reasoning about time is important for ensuring correctness. These logics are mainly used to formalize and express properties about future or possible behaviors in such systems. For example, linear temporal logics have been successfully used to express and prove properties of concurrent and reactive ...
On the Construction of Analytic Sequent Calculi for Sub
On the Construction of Analytic Sequent Calculi for Sub

... is generalized in the current paper: (1) here we also consider derivations from assumptions (also known as “non-logical axioms”); and (2) we use a more general parametrized notion of a subformula. A particular well-behaved subfamily of pure calculi, called canonical calculi was studied in [4]. For t ...
the nekhoroshev theorem and long–term stabilities in the solar system
the nekhoroshev theorem and long–term stabilities in the solar system

... Under suitable hypotheses, the KAM theorem proves perpetual stability of a large measure set of initial conditions; Nekhoroshev’s theorem proves the long– term stability for open sets of initial conditions, including the resonant chaotic motions. The possibility of proving the long–term stability of ...
Social Judgment in Multiagent Interactions
Social Judgment in Multiagent Interactions

... lays out a computational model of forming social judgment based on psychological attribution theory. Attribution theory identifies key variables used to explain agents’ behavior, and the variable values are applied in the evaluation process to form the judgment. In the remainder of the paper, we fir ...
A PRIMER OF SIMPLE THEORIES Introduction The question of how
A PRIMER OF SIMPLE THEORIES Introduction The question of how

... model theory. The most basic question that one may ask in this direction is whether a given first order theory has only one model up to isomorphism in a given cardinal. Erwin Engeler, CesÃlaw Ryll-Nardzewski, and Lars Svenonius (all three independently) published in 1959 a complete characterization ...
PDF
PDF

... can mean a proposition. They argue that propositions must have truth values and that the claim made by "x is a good", like the claim made by the statement "x should be done", does not have any.2 I wish to keep the issues open in this paper, so I will adopt the not entirely conventional stance that t ...
Research Articles Least convex capacitiesw
Research Articles Least convex capacitiesw

... Debreu's analysis is formulated within the expected utility framework and thus presumes that only risk matters to the decision-maker. This is contrary to evidence, such as the Ellsberg Paradox, that people also dislike `ambiguity' or `vagueness', and in that case beliefs about the state space cannot ...
Preferences and Unrestricted Rebut
Preferences and Unrestricted Rebut

... Theorem 2. Let E be the grounded extension of (Ar , def ). E is closed under subarguments. That is, if A ∈ E, then ∀A0 ∈ Sub(A), A0 ∈ E. Proof. Let A ∈ E and A0 ∈ Sub(A). Since E is admissible and A ∈ E, then every defeater B of A is defeated by an argument in E. Now, let B be an arbitrary defeater ...
An Asymmetric Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
An Asymmetric Kalai-Smorodinsky solution

... Proposition 2 A solution F satisfies SI, IM, PO, C and RIIA on Σc if and only if for all S ∈ Σc F (S) = KS(S) Proof : For any S ∈ Σc , pick a sequence of strictly comprehensive sets {Sn }∞ 1 , that converges to S. Since for all n, W P (Sn ) = P (Sn ), F (Sn ) = Dλ(Sn ) for some fixed λ ∈ R+ ∪ {∞} . ...
Studying Sequent Systems via Non-deterministic Multiple
Studying Sequent Systems via Non-deterministic Multiple

... 3. We formulate the two kinds of three-valued valuation semantics inside the well-studied framework of (three-valued) Nmatrices, exploiting some known general properties of Nmatrices. 4. In [8], it seems that the two dual kinds of three-valued valuation semantics cannot be combined. However, in this ...
12.2 Utility Functions and Probabilities
12.2 Utility Functions and Probabilities

... If the consumer ha.srea.sonablepreferencesabout consumption in different circumstances,then we will be able to usea utility function to describethese preferences,just a.swe have done in other contexts. However,the fact that we are considering choice under uncertainty does add a special structure to ...
Mechanism Design and Truthful Algorithms
Mechanism Design and Truthful Algorithms

... Mechanism Design Mechanism design is about designing games in which some desired objective is achieved when all players play selfishly. Reverse game theory: Rather than analyzing a given game, design one that fits your needs. In this talk, we will see several mechanisms where the best strategy is t ...
The Logic of Provability
The Logic of Provability

pdf file
pdf file

... 2. Preliminary results First, we prove some preliminary results. Lemma 2.1. Let a, b ∈ Z. Then a = b if and only if b = a + kn for some k ∈ Z. The previous lemma follows easily from the definition of Z/nZ, and we omit its proof. Lemma 2.2. Let a, b ∈ Z. Suppose a = b in Z/nZ. (1) Then gcd(a, n) = gc ...
< 1 2 3 4 5 6 ... 11 >

Arrow's impossibility theorem

In social choice theory, Arrow’s impossibility theorem, the General Possibility Theorem, or Arrow’s paradox, states that, when voters have three or more distinct alternatives (options), no rank order voting system can convert the ranked preferences of individuals into a community-wide (complete and transitive) ranking while also meeting a pre-specified set of criteria. These pre-specified criteria are called unrestricted domain, non-dictatorship, Pareto efficiency, and independence of irrelevant alternatives. The theorem is often cited in discussions of election theory as it is further interpreted by the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem.The theorem is named after economist Kenneth Arrow, who demonstrated the theorem in his doctoral thesis and popularized it in his 1951 book Social Choice and Individual Values. The original paper was titled ""A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare"".In short, the theorem states that no rank-order voting system can be designed that always satisfies these three ""fairness"" criteria: If every voter prefers alternative X over alternative Y, then the group prefers X over Y. If every voter's preference between X and Y remains unchanged, then the group's preference between X and Y will also remain unchanged (even if voters' preferences between other pairs like X and Z, Y and Z, or Z and W change). There is no ""dictator"": no single voter possesses the power to always determine the group's preference.Voting systems that use cardinal utility (which conveys more information than rank orders; see the subsection discussing the cardinal utility approach to overcoming the negative conclusion) are not covered by the theorem. The theorem can also be sidestepped by weakening the notion of independence. Arrow rejected cardinal utility as a meaningful tool for expressing social welfare, and so focused his theorem on preference rankings.The axiomatic approach Arrow adopted can treat all conceivable rules (that are based on preferences) within one unified framework. In that sense, the approach is qualitatively different from the earlier one in voting theory, in which rules were investigated one by one. One can therefore say that the contemporary paradigm of social choice theory started from this theorem.
  • studyres.com © 2025
  • DMCA
  • Privacy
  • Terms
  • Report