An Infinitely Farsighted Stable Set

... coalition with 1 and divide their joint profit of $15,000 as $4,000 for firm 1 and $11,000 for firm 2 such that they would each be better-off. But this is not the end of the story either. As Aivazian and Callen (1981) argue, the re-contracting process will continue endlessly and, therefore, the gran ...

... coalition with 1 and divide their joint profit of $15,000 as $4,000 for firm 1 and $11,000 for firm 2 such that they would each be better-off. But this is not the end of the story either. As Aivazian and Callen (1981) argue, the re-contracting process will continue endlessly and, therefore, the gran ...

average equilibrium points

... optimization and the stability. The concept of equilibrium point takes in consideration only the first one. However, the second aspect to be considered of stability, perhaps it is the most important. Assuming for any reason a player j 6= i changes his strategy σj to lower one, in such a situation th ...

... optimization and the stability. The concept of equilibrium point takes in consideration only the first one. However, the second aspect to be considered of stability, perhaps it is the most important. Assuming for any reason a player j 6= i changes his strategy σj to lower one, in such a situation th ...

Let me suggest, then, that a theory of justice may be - Philsci

... impartiality, when these are understood as described above? And what would such a conception look like? I suggest that one possible strategy would be to make use of Barry’s suggestion that different theories of justice specify or make use of different motives for acting justly. In particular we migh ...

... impartiality, when these are understood as described above? And what would such a conception look like? I suggest that one possible strategy would be to make use of Barry’s suggestion that different theories of justice specify or make use of different motives for acting justly. In particular we migh ...

A Consistent Bargaining Set

... In other words, the core is “internally consistent”. However, the above argument does not apply to the credibility of an objection in relation to coalitions which are not subsets of the original objecting coalition. Indeed, the bargaining set can be seen as a solution concept which attempts to modif ...

... In other words, the core is “internally consistent”. However, the above argument does not apply to the credibility of an objection in relation to coalitions which are not subsets of the original objecting coalition. Indeed, the bargaining set can be seen as a solution concept which attempts to modif ...

text - WWW4 Server

... moves in a finite game is always one less than the number of nodes.) Such a game is necessarily a finite horizon game. Games in extensive form with complete information are good models of situations in which players act one after the other; players understand the situation completely; and nothing de ...

... moves in a finite game is always one less than the number of nodes.) Such a game is necessarily a finite horizon game. Games in extensive form with complete information are good models of situations in which players act one after the other; players understand the situation completely; and nothing de ...

Computing the Nondominated Nash Points of a Normal Form Game

... proposed by Sandholm et al. [24] for finding a single Nash equilibrium of a normal form game with two players. The modification, even though relatively minor, resulted in a significant reduction in computing time across a wide variety of instances (generated using GAMUT, see http://gamut.stanford.ed ...

... proposed by Sandholm et al. [24] for finding a single Nash equilibrium of a normal form game with two players. The modification, even though relatively minor, resulted in a significant reduction in computing time across a wide variety of instances (generated using GAMUT, see http://gamut.stanford.ed ...

Third Party Intervention to Prevent Atrocities

... state authority. The prospect of intervention from the international community may encourage such rebellion from groups too weak to succeed on their own. Kuperman argues this dynamic was at work in the Kosovo conflict in 1999, in that Kosovo rebels realized they were too weak to successfully confro ...

... state authority. The prospect of intervention from the international community may encourage such rebellion from groups too weak to succeed on their own. Kuperman argues this dynamic was at work in the Kosovo conflict in 1999, in that Kosovo rebels realized they were too weak to successfully confro ...

Gambit Documentation

... game theory. However, games that are not finite, that is, games in which players may choose from a continuum of actions, or in which players may have a continuum of types, do not admit the same general-purpose methods. Gambit is for noncooperative game theory only. Gambit focuses on the branch of ga ...

... game theory. However, games that are not finite, that is, games in which players may choose from a continuum of actions, or in which players may have a continuum of types, do not admit the same general-purpose methods. Gambit is for noncooperative game theory only. Gambit focuses on the branch of ga ...

coalitions

... • Players agree on three points: – Each partner must be remunerated at the level of her contribution (her incremental value). – Problem: this incremental value depends on the group the player joins. We need to calculate a kind of average of the different incremental values. – Each one of the n! orde ...

... • Players agree on three points: – Each partner must be remunerated at the level of her contribution (her incremental value). – Problem: this incremental value depends on the group the player joins. We need to calculate a kind of average of the different incremental values. – Each one of the n! orde ...

Epistemic Models of Shallow Depths and Decision

... what I would choose. For example, player 2 might choose his second strategy s22 under the prediction that I would choose the dominant strategy s12. In this case, we need to add B2B1 (2) to B1( 2) and B2(^2). Thus, we have nested occurrences of belief operators only of the form B1B2(') to describe th ...

... what I would choose. For example, player 2 might choose his second strategy s22 under the prediction that I would choose the dominant strategy s12. In this case, we need to add B2B1 (2) to B1( 2) and B2(^2). Thus, we have nested occurrences of belief operators only of the form B1B2(') to describe th ...

... game theory. However, games that are not finite, that is, games in which players may choose from a continuum of actions, or in which players may have a continuum of types, do not admit the same general-purpose methods. Gambit is for noncooperative game theory only. Gambit focuses on the branch of ga ...

The Stochastic Response Dynamic: A New Approach to Learning

... assured to uniquely converge. The convergence however is no longer to a single state of the game, but rather to a probability distribution over the possible states of the game. In the language of Markov chains, the stochastic response dynamic is uniquely ergodic and converges strongly (in total var ...

... assured to uniquely converge. The convergence however is no longer to a single state of the game, but rather to a probability distribution over the possible states of the game. In the language of Markov chains, the stochastic response dynamic is uniquely ergodic and converges strongly (in total var ...

Stochastic stability in a learning dynamic with best

... response to noisy play that introduces an element of caution into standard learning dynamics. In this model, players not just best respond to samples of past play but to distributions that have full support in the other players’ set of strategies and converge – in the limit of vanishing “noise” – to ...

... response to noisy play that introduces an element of caution into standard learning dynamics. In this model, players not just best respond to samples of past play but to distributions that have full support in the other players’ set of strategies and converge – in the limit of vanishing “noise” – to ...

Overdetermined causation cases, contribution and the Shapley value

... Causation is one of the most intricate and complex issues in the law. As Wright stated "in all of tort law, there is no concept which has been as pervasive and yet elusive as the causation requirement".1 Among the issues raised by causation requirement, over-determination is, at least conceptually, ...

... Causation is one of the most intricate and complex issues in the law. As Wright stated "in all of tort law, there is no concept which has been as pervasive and yet elusive as the causation requirement".1 Among the issues raised by causation requirement, over-determination is, at least conceptually, ...

Potential Games

... 2.2 Fundamental Properties of Potential Games In this section, we discuss the properties possessed by potential games. These include two results of paramount importance, which are the existence of purestrategy Nash equilibria and the convergence to these equilibria in potential games. In the literat ...

... 2.2 Fundamental Properties of Potential Games In this section, we discuss the properties possessed by potential games. These include two results of paramount importance, which are the existence of purestrategy Nash equilibria and the convergence to these equilibria in potential games. In the literat ...

Section 9

... (primarily, finding the mean, or expected value, of a discrete random variable). If you have ever heard someone refer to a situation as being a “zero-sum game”, that terminology comes from this theory. It can effectively model actual recreational games, like Rock/Paper/Scissors or Tic Tac Toe, as we ...

... (primarily, finding the mean, or expected value, of a discrete random variable). If you have ever heard someone refer to a situation as being a “zero-sum game”, that terminology comes from this theory. It can effectively model actual recreational games, like Rock/Paper/Scissors or Tic Tac Toe, as we ...

coalitional approaches to collusive agreements in oligopoly games

... a Stackelberg behaviour for all deviating coalitions (see Currarini & Marini, 2003). In this way, we are able to see that some classical results on merger stability contained, for instance, in Rajan (1989), can be easily extended. In particular, this author considers a linear and symmetric Cournot o ...

... a Stackelberg behaviour for all deviating coalitions (see Currarini & Marini, 2003). In this way, we are able to see that some classical results on merger stability contained, for instance, in Rajan (1989), can be easily extended. In particular, this author considers a linear and symmetric Cournot o ...

Coalition Formation and Price of Anarchy in

... latency functions [23]. This can be viewed as a positive result. However, many settings have a drastically large price of anarchy, e.g., Cournot oligopoly games, which model competition between firms, have a linear price of anarchy for certain production functions [16]. The pursuit of self-interest ...

... latency functions [23]. This can be viewed as a positive result. However, many settings have a drastically large price of anarchy, e.g., Cournot oligopoly games, which model competition between firms, have a linear price of anarchy for certain production functions [16]. The pursuit of self-interest ...

Perfect Correlated Equilibria

... equilibrium by the direct device, it would be much more complexusing private signals, etc.and as seen above we would lose the perfection. It is thus by insisting on representing any correlated equilibrium only by the direct device (much more complex and less natural in cases like this), and by i ...

... equilibrium by the direct device, it would be much more complexusing private signals, etc.and as seen above we would lose the perfection. It is thus by insisting on representing any correlated equilibrium only by the direct device (much more complex and less natural in cases like this), and by i ...

Evolutionary Game Theory and Population Dynamics

... Many socio-economic and biological processes can be modeled as systems of interacting individuals; see for example econophysics bulletin [16] and statistical mechanics and quantitative biology archives [13]. One may then try to derive their global behaviour from individual interactions between their ...

... Many socio-economic and biological processes can be modeled as systems of interacting individuals; see for example econophysics bulletin [16] and statistical mechanics and quantitative biology archives [13]. One may then try to derive their global behaviour from individual interactions between their ...

How patient the players need to be to obtain all the relevant payoffs

... In pure strategies, Berg and Kitti (2012, 2013) have developed a novel method for producing the equilibrium paths beside the payoffs, i.e., the method also finds the possible action sequences that can be played in the game. However, it faces the same problem as the earlier methods; it is possible to ...

... In pure strategies, Berg and Kitti (2012, 2013) have developed a novel method for producing the equilibrium paths beside the payoffs, i.e., the method also finds the possible action sequences that can be played in the game. However, it faces the same problem as the earlier methods; it is possible to ...

Complexity of Finding a Nash Equilibrium

... assignment chosen by the players before playing the BWGRPSn game does not satisfy the original Boolean formula ϕ, then randomizing uniformly on literals of this truth assignment does not give a Nash equilibrium, since player 2 has an incentive to play a clause. However, if the chosen truth assignmen ...

... assignment chosen by the players before playing the BWGRPSn game does not satisfy the original Boolean formula ϕ, then randomizing uniformly on literals of this truth assignment does not give a Nash equilibrium, since player 2 has an incentive to play a clause. However, if the chosen truth assignmen ...

iese07 VanZandt 5034778 en

... σ of the equivalence class is an “almost everywhere” interim BNE, meaning that, for every player i and µ -a.e. type ti ∈ Ti , σi (ti ) is a best response to σ−i (whereas for an interim BNE, this should hold for every ti ∈ Ti ). Remark 1. The important commonality of a common prior is that players ag ...

... σ of the equivalence class is an “almost everywhere” interim BNE, meaning that, for every player i and µ -a.e. type ti ∈ Ti , σi (ti ) is a best response to σ−i (whereas for an interim BNE, this should hold for every ti ∈ Ti ). Remark 1. The important commonality of a common prior is that players ag ...

modeling travel behavior in times of congestion – a game

... common “user equilibrium” (UE) concept, also known as “Wardrop’s first principle” or “Wardrop‘s equilibrium” (Wardrop, 1952), used for traffic assignment. These two concepts were developed separately in the 1950s, but their implication is identical. That is, under non-cooperative situation, a stable ...

... common “user equilibrium” (UE) concept, also known as “Wardrop’s first principle” or “Wardrop‘s equilibrium” (Wardrop, 1952), used for traffic assignment. These two concepts were developed separately in the 1950s, but their implication is identical. That is, under non-cooperative situation, a stable ...

Continuous Time Contests with Private Information

... The analysis proceeds as follows. Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 establish existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium distribution of the value of the stopped process. To do so, we first characterize the candidate equilibrium distribution uniquely up to its endpoints. In a second step, we use a re ...

... The analysis proceeds as follows. Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 establish existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium distribution of the value of the stopped process. To do so, we first characterize the candidate equilibrium distribution uniquely up to its endpoints. In a second step, we use a re ...