The Monopolistic Competitor:
... do not choose the same thing because if they choose the same thing, you do the game again. e. There is no pure strategy in Rock, Paper, Scissors that’s a Nash Equilibrium GT-5) In game theory, a “mixed strategy” means the player should a. choose a different strategy than your opponent b. choose the ...
... do not choose the same thing because if they choose the same thing, you do the game again. e. There is no pure strategy in Rock, Paper, Scissors that’s a Nash Equilibrium GT-5) In game theory, a “mixed strategy” means the player should a. choose a different strategy than your opponent b. choose the ...
An Introduction to Game Theory
... isolation, for convenience if not for anything else. In other words, they assume that to understand ...
... isolation, for convenience if not for anything else. In other words, they assume that to understand ...
How much would you pay to change a game before
... is unobserved by all other players, DM’s willingness to pay to change the parameter values is given by the sum of two factors. The first factor is how the change directly affects DM’s payoffs, holding the strategies of all players constant (including DM’s). The second factor is how DM optimally adju ...
... is unobserved by all other players, DM’s willingness to pay to change the parameter values is given by the sum of two factors. The first factor is how the change directly affects DM’s payoffs, holding the strategies of all players constant (including DM’s). The second factor is how DM optimally adju ...
Lecture Notes on Adverse Selection and Signaling
... decision depends on her unobservable characteristics in a manner that adversely affects the uninformed agents in the market. In the labor market context, adverse selection arises only relatively less capable workers accept a firm’s employment offer at any given wage. From our illustration in last se ...
... decision depends on her unobservable characteristics in a manner that adversely affects the uninformed agents in the market. In the labor market context, adverse selection arises only relatively less capable workers accept a firm’s employment offer at any given wage. From our illustration in last se ...
Subsidization to induce tipping
... primary result of this paper is that asymmetric subsidy programs will eliminate the inferior equilibrium at less expense to the government agency than a uniform subsidy program, whether or not all agents are identical and even if private values are anonymous. The asymmetric subsidy scheme which we d ...
... primary result of this paper is that asymmetric subsidy programs will eliminate the inferior equilibrium at less expense to the government agency than a uniform subsidy program, whether or not all agents are identical and even if private values are anonymous. The asymmetric subsidy scheme which we d ...
Chapter 9: Reflective Reason and Equilibrium Refinements
... this the local best response (LBR) criterion. The LBR criterion appears to render the traditional refinement criteria superfluous. The traditional refinement criteria are all variants of subgame perfection, and hence suffer from the fact that there is generally no good reason for rational agents to ...
... this the local best response (LBR) criterion. The LBR criterion appears to render the traditional refinement criteria superfluous. The traditional refinement criteria are all variants of subgame perfection, and hence suffer from the fact that there is generally no good reason for rational agents to ...
Walrasian Analysis via Two-Player Games
... The extension of the Cournot tradition to general equilibrium was pioneered by the already cited works by Shubik (1973), Shapley (1976) and Shapley and Shubik (1977). In order to overcome the difficulty that an agent might want to sell in one market and buy in another, Shapley and Shubik explicitly ...
... The extension of the Cournot tradition to general equilibrium was pioneered by the already cited works by Shubik (1973), Shapley (1976) and Shapley and Shubik (1977). In order to overcome the difficulty that an agent might want to sell in one market and buy in another, Shapley and Shubik explicitly ...
Stochastically stable states in an oligopoly with differentiated goods
... assumptions about the behavior of firms, the quantity setting or Cournot approach and the price setting or Bertrand approach. It is well understood that in an oligopoly with substitutes, the Bertrand equilibrium is more efficient than the Cournot equilibrium ŽSee Singh and Vives, 1984; Cheng, 1985; ...
... assumptions about the behavior of firms, the quantity setting or Cournot approach and the price setting or Bertrand approach. It is well understood that in an oligopoly with substitutes, the Bertrand equilibrium is more efficient than the Cournot equilibrium ŽSee Singh and Vives, 1984; Cheng, 1985; ...
Context$Dependent Forward Induction Reasoning
... cannot play.) In particular, the convention corresponds to a type structure, where each type of Bob assigns probability one to Ann’s playing Up. (In Section 3, we formally describe the type structure corresponding to the lady’s choice convention.) Under this convention, a rational Bob plays Out, thi ...
... cannot play.) In particular, the convention corresponds to a type structure, where each type of Bob assigns probability one to Ann’s playing Up. (In Section 3, we formally describe the type structure corresponding to the lady’s choice convention.) Under this convention, a rational Bob plays Out, thi ...
Coalition-Proof Equilibrium
... strategy equilibrium consists of players 1 and 2 each choosing heads Žtails. and player 3 choosing tails Žheads.. In the mixed strategy equilibrium each player chooses heads with probability 12 . The game does not have a CPNE, as each of the Nash equilibria is upset by a deviation of the coalition o ...
... strategy equilibrium consists of players 1 and 2 each choosing heads Žtails. and player 3 choosing tails Žheads.. In the mixed strategy equilibrium each player chooses heads with probability 12 . The game does not have a CPNE, as each of the Nash equilibria is upset by a deviation of the coalition o ...
On extensive form implementation of contracts in differential
... A PBE consists of a set of players’ optimal behavioral strategies, and consistent with these, a set of beliefs which attach a probability distribution to the nodes of each information set. Consistency requires that the decision from an information set is optimal given the particular player’s beliefs ...
... A PBE consists of a set of players’ optimal behavioral strategies, and consistent with these, a set of beliefs which attach a probability distribution to the nodes of each information set. Consistency requires that the decision from an information set is optimal given the particular player’s beliefs ...
Stochastic Learning Dynamics and Speed of Convergence in
... Nash equilibrium is the central solution concept for noncooperative games, but many natural learning dynamics do not converge to Nash equilibrium without imposing strong conditions on the structure of the game and/or the players’ level of rationality. Even in those situations where the learning dyna ...
... Nash equilibrium is the central solution concept for noncooperative games, but many natural learning dynamics do not converge to Nash equilibrium without imposing strong conditions on the structure of the game and/or the players’ level of rationality. Even in those situations where the learning dyna ...
b strategic interaction in static industries: oligopolistic competition
... maximization. Moreover, players' rationality is common knowledge. An event E is defined to be common knowledge if all players know E, all players know that all other players know E, all players all players know that all other players know that all other players know E, ad infinitum. The second basic ...
... maximization. Moreover, players' rationality is common knowledge. An event E is defined to be common knowledge if all players know E, all players know that all other players know E, all players all players know that all other players know that all other players know E, ad infinitum. The second basic ...
The Complexity of Partial-observation Stochastic Parity Games With
... and an action in A1 gives the next state in S2 (which belongs to player 2); and δ : SP → D(S1 ) given a probabilistic state gives the probability distribution over the set of player-1 states. The set of edges is as follows: E = {(s, t) | s ∈ SP , t ∈ S1 , δ(s)(t) > 0} ∪ E ′ , where E ′ ⊆ S2 × SP . T ...
... and an action in A1 gives the next state in S2 (which belongs to player 2); and δ : SP → D(S1 ) given a probabilistic state gives the probability distribution over the set of player-1 states. The set of edges is as follows: E = {(s, t) | s ∈ SP , t ∈ S1 , δ(s)(t) > 0} ∪ E ′ , where E ′ ⊆ S2 × SP . T ...
