CHT. 5 DATABASE MANAGEMENT
... row strategies A and B: If A has a better (larger) payoff than B for any column strategy, then B is dominated by A. For column strategies X and Y: if X has a better (smaller) payoff than Y for any row strategy, then Y is dominated by X. A dominated decision can be removed from the payoff table t ...
... row strategies A and B: If A has a better (larger) payoff than B for any column strategy, then B is dominated by A. For column strategies X and Y: if X has a better (smaller) payoff than Y for any row strategy, then Y is dominated by X. A dominated decision can be removed from the payoff table t ...
Kin selection and Evolution of Sympathy
... • Selection is for utility and sympathy, not strategies (as in Alger-Weibull theory). • Individuals cannot determine sympathies of others, can only observe actions. • Mutants act as if probability that their opponent is like them is r. • Normals almost never see mutants. They act as if opponent is s ...
... • Selection is for utility and sympathy, not strategies (as in Alger-Weibull theory). • Individuals cannot determine sympathies of others, can only observe actions. • Mutants act as if probability that their opponent is like them is r. • Normals almost never see mutants. They act as if opponent is s ...
Planning, Learning, Prediction, and Games 4 Two–Player Zero
... that for any mixed strategy p, q of one of the players, the other player has a pure strategy that constitutes a best response. Yao’s Minimax Principle states that, for finite sets of algorithms and inputs, the best worst-case running time achievable by any randomized algorithm (the right hand side), ...
... that for any mixed strategy p, q of one of the players, the other player has a pure strategy that constitutes a best response. Yao’s Minimax Principle states that, for finite sets of algorithms and inputs, the best worst-case running time achievable by any randomized algorithm (the right hand side), ...
Lecture 8: (More about) Oligopoly
... In general, cooperative outcomes are easiest to attain when: (a) it is easy to tell when defection has taken place, (b) it is easy to tell who defected, and (c) the short-run gain is relatively small compared to the difference between the cooperative and uncooperative outcomes. The factors that make ...
... In general, cooperative outcomes are easiest to attain when: (a) it is easy to tell when defection has taken place, (b) it is easy to tell who defected, and (c) the short-run gain is relatively small compared to the difference between the cooperative and uncooperative outcomes. The factors that make ...
Section 11 - Harvard University
... Before the allocative decision if the elite is in power, they have the possibility of transferring power forever to the citizens (democratization). Therefore the timing of the stage game with the elite in power at the start is as follows: – The elite can decide whether to democratize. – Whoever is ...
... Before the allocative decision if the elite is in power, they have the possibility of transferring power forever to the citizens (democratization). Therefore the timing of the stage game with the elite in power at the start is as follows: – The elite can decide whether to democratize. – Whoever is ...
Homework 2
... cost is the same, she flips a coin to choose the store to buy.) (a) Compute the revenue for each firm, as a function of price vector ( ). The revenue is price times the total mass of the kids who buy from the given store. (b) Assume that each store set their own price simultaneously and try to max ...
... cost is the same, she flips a coin to choose the store to buy.) (a) Compute the revenue for each firm, as a function of price vector ( ). The revenue is price times the total mass of the kids who buy from the given store. (b) Assume that each store set their own price simultaneously and try to max ...
INF-MAT3370 Linear optimization: game theory
... Theorem The game has a value, player R has a pure minmax strategy r and player K has a pure maxmin strategy s if and only if (r , s) is a saddlepoint in A. In that case the value is V = ars . Proof. (i) Assume the game has a value V , player R has a pure minmax strategy r and player K has a pure ma ...
... Theorem The game has a value, player R has a pure minmax strategy r and player K has a pure maxmin strategy s if and only if (r , s) is a saddlepoint in A. In that case the value is V = ars . Proof. (i) Assume the game has a value V , player R has a pure minmax strategy r and player K has a pure ma ...
Game Theory Lecture 2: Strategic form games and NE
... we call a = (ai )i∈N with ai ∈ Ai an action profile (and sometimes an outcome), i.e. each player takes one of his actions; sometimes it is convenient to denote an action profile by (ai , a−i ) A = ×i∈N Ai the set of all action profiles/outcomes each player i has a preference i over the outcomes in ...
... we call a = (ai )i∈N with ai ∈ Ai an action profile (and sometimes an outcome), i.e. each player takes one of his actions; sometimes it is convenient to denote an action profile by (ai , a−i ) A = ×i∈N Ai the set of all action profiles/outcomes each player i has a preference i over the outcomes in ...
Game Theory
... Simultaneous, one-shot move at making a deal. Successful negotiations lead to $600 million in surplus (to be split among the parties), failure results in a $100 million loss to the firm and a $3 million loss to the union. • Experiments suggests that, in the absence of any “history,” real players typ ...
... Simultaneous, one-shot move at making a deal. Successful negotiations lead to $600 million in surplus (to be split among the parties), failure results in a $100 million loss to the firm and a $3 million loss to the union. • Experiments suggests that, in the absence of any “history,” real players typ ...
Bayesian-Nash games ∗ Sergei Izmalkov
... mind, a player needs only to tell the trusted party her type. If a trusted party for each type of player i follows an equilibrium strategy of that type, σ ∗i (ti ), then it is optimal to make a truthful announcement. Indeed, if player i of type ti tells the truth, she trusts the trusted party to sel ...
... mind, a player needs only to tell the trusted party her type. If a trusted party for each type of player i follows an equilibrium strategy of that type, σ ∗i (ti ), then it is optimal to make a truthful announcement. Indeed, if player i of type ti tells the truth, she trusts the trusted party to sel ...
1 - contentextra
... profits or losses that will result from a particular economic decision made by itself and its competitors) then it will be better able to make a rational, profit-maximizing (or loss minimizing) decision based on the likely actions of its competitors. The outcome of such a situation, or game, can be ...
... profits or losses that will result from a particular economic decision made by itself and its competitors) then it will be better able to make a rational, profit-maximizing (or loss minimizing) decision based on the likely actions of its competitors. The outcome of such a situation, or game, can be ...
Nash equilibrium
... act strategically. Each firm knows that its profit depends not only on how much it produces but also on how much the other firms produce. ...
... act strategically. Each firm knows that its profit depends not only on how much it produces but also on how much the other firms produce. ...
EXERCISE 9: GAME THEORY AND OLIGOPOLY
... There are various variants that you can play on this game: change the payoffs while keeping the structure of a Prisoner’s Dilemma; play it once without or with communication; play it a fixed number of times without or with communication; play it a random number of times without or with comm ...
... There are various variants that you can play on this game: change the payoffs while keeping the structure of a Prisoner’s Dilemma; play it once without or with communication; play it a fixed number of times without or with communication; play it a random number of times without or with comm ...
Applications of Game Theory in the Computational Biology Domain
... • The fitness of a phenotype is determined by its frequency in the population • The genetic code of a player can’t change, but their offspring can have mutated genes (and therefore a different strategy). ...
... • The fitness of a phenotype is determined by its frequency in the population • The genetic code of a player can’t change, but their offspring can have mutated genes (and therefore a different strategy). ...
Nash flow
... But the more a link is used, the more is slower, and there is no central authority “optimizing” the data flow… So, why does Internet eventually work is such a ...
... But the more a link is used, the more is slower, and there is no central authority “optimizing” the data flow… So, why does Internet eventually work is such a ...