PPT - UNC Computer Science
... – A group of people go out to eat and agree to split the bill equally. Each has a choice of ordering a cheap dish or an expensive dish (the utility of the expensive dish is higher than that of the cheap dish, but not enough for you to want to pay the difference) – Nash equilibrium is for everybody t ...
... – A group of people go out to eat and agree to split the bill equally. Each has a choice of ordering a cheap dish or an expensive dish (the utility of the expensive dish is higher than that of the cheap dish, but not enough for you to want to pay the difference) – Nash equilibrium is for everybody t ...
Kin selection and Evolution of Sympathy
... • Selection is for utility and sympathy, not strategies (as in Alger-Weibull theory). • Individuals cannot determine sympathies of others, can only observe actions. • Mutants act as if probability that their opponent is like them is r. • Normals almost never see mutants. They act as if opponent is s ...
... • Selection is for utility and sympathy, not strategies (as in Alger-Weibull theory). • Individuals cannot determine sympathies of others, can only observe actions. • Mutants act as if probability that their opponent is like them is r. • Normals almost never see mutants. They act as if opponent is s ...
Introduction to Game Theory, Behavior and Networks
... – for every player i, their distribution is a best response to all the others • i.e. cannot get higher (average or expected) payoff by changing distribution • only consider unilateral deviations by each player! ...
... – for every player i, their distribution is a best response to all the others • i.e. cannot get higher (average or expected) payoff by changing distribution • only consider unilateral deviations by each player! ...
gt2 - Carnegie Mellon School of Computer Science
... • Given y, player 1’s best response maximizes xTAy • Given x, player 2’s best response maximizes xTBy • (x,y) is a Nash equilibrium if x and y are best responses to each other ...
... • Given y, player 1’s best response maximizes xTAy • Given x, player 2’s best response maximizes xTBy • (x,y) is a Nash equilibrium if x and y are best responses to each other ...
GEK1544 The Mathematics of Games Suggested Solutions to
... equilibrium. This is because the first traveler can gain by changing the quote to, say x−1, while the second traveler stays at x. Any two different numbers (x, y) with 2 ≤ x ≤ 100 and 2 ≤ y ≤ 100 , cannot be a Nash equilibrium. This is because, say x < y, then the situation (x, x) will give the second ...
... equilibrium. This is because the first traveler can gain by changing the quote to, say x−1, while the second traveler stays at x. Any two different numbers (x, y) with 2 ≤ x ≤ 100 and 2 ≤ y ≤ 100 , cannot be a Nash equilibrium. This is because, say x < y, then the situation (x, x) will give the second ...
Level-K Reasoning - Columbia University
... In the case of the p-beauty contest game this type of reasoning will converge to the Nash Equilibrium This is not always true ...
... In the case of the p-beauty contest game this type of reasoning will converge to the Nash Equilibrium This is not always true ...
Static Games
... σ is a Nash equilibrium profile if for each i ∈1,! N ui (σ ) = max σ ’i ui (σ’i , σ − i ) ...
... σ is a Nash equilibrium profile if for each i ∈1,! N ui (σ ) = max σ ’i ui (σ’i , σ − i ) ...
notes
... sufficient to reach a contradiction. Hence, we know that the infimum must be less than or equal to 0 but does the minimum exist? Since we have a continuous function over p, the compact space of probability distributions, we must attain the infimum, so the minimum is in fact ≤ 0, so a coarse correlat ...
... sufficient to reach a contradiction. Hence, we know that the infimum must be less than or equal to 0 but does the minimum exist? Since we have a continuous function over p, the compact space of probability distributions, we must attain the infimum, so the minimum is in fact ≤ 0, so a coarse correlat ...
Homework 2
... cost is the same, she flips a coin to choose the store to buy.) (a) Compute the revenue for each firm, as a function of price vector ( ). The revenue is price times the total mass of the kids who buy from the given store. (b) Assume that each store set their own price simultaneously and try to max ...
... cost is the same, she flips a coin to choose the store to buy.) (a) Compute the revenue for each firm, as a function of price vector ( ). The revenue is price times the total mass of the kids who buy from the given store. (b) Assume that each store set their own price simultaneously and try to max ...
