Corporate Actions Policy 5.0
... In cases where it is inappropriate or impossible to adjust contracts in line with the below methodologies, or in cases where the Corporate Action is an event other than those listed in section 6 of this Policy Document, NYSE Liffe will have regard, as far as practicable, to the principle detailed in ...
... In cases where it is inappropriate or impossible to adjust contracts in line with the below methodologies, or in cases where the Corporate Action is an event other than those listed in section 6 of this Policy Document, NYSE Liffe will have regard, as far as practicable, to the principle detailed in ...
water utilities management contracts – eca
... RFP 4.5.5. If the individual company or any of the Consortium partners constituting the Successful Bidder have submitted data, credentials, or any other information in their Technical Proposal Part VII (Information Forms of Annex E to this RFP) that are those of a parent company, the Company Managem ...
... RFP 4.5.5. If the individual company or any of the Consortium partners constituting the Successful Bidder have submitted data, credentials, or any other information in their Technical Proposal Part VII (Information Forms of Annex E to this RFP) that are those of a parent company, the Company Managem ...
Standard Oil Co. v. United States (Standard Stations)
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949), more commonly referred to as the Standard Stations case (because that was the brand name of the company whose exclusive dealing contracts were held unlawful in the case. and also because there is a 1911 case with the same caption Standard Oil Co. v. United States), is a 1947 decision of the United States Supreme Court in which requirements contracts for gasoline stations (Standard Stations) were held to violate section 3 of the Clayton Act. That statute prohibits selling goods on the condition that the customer must not deal in the goods of a competitor of the seller, such as in a requirements contract, if the effect is to ""substantially lessen competition"" or ""tend to create a monopoly."" The doctrine of this case has been referred to as ""quantitative substantiality,"" and its exact contours were unsettled and controversial for many years until the Supreme Court authoritatively explained it in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank (Philadelphia Bank case), 374 U.S. 321 (1963).The importance of the decision and its place in antitrust jurisprudence have been characterized in these terms:Standard Stations is the richest and the most difficult of all the vertical integration cases. Each of the tensions that has been mentioned within the structure of antitrust is revealed in the Standard Stations decision. As the leading case on integration by contract, it has been the subject of extensive commentary and controversy. The decision may raise as many problems as it settles, but the rule of Standard Stations is one which must be reckoned with in all vertical integration cases, and comprehension of this rule is essential to evaluation of the impact of antitrust upon integration.The case has been the subject of extensive scholarly commentary.