Publication: Platypus and Parliament
... could not have hoped to receive the Fulbright award. I happily express my appreciation to Professor Marian Sawer and to Mary Hapel of the Political Science Program of the Research School of Social Sciences at the Australian National University for welcoming me as a Visiting Fellow and allowing me ac ...
... could not have hoped to receive the Fulbright award. I happily express my appreciation to Professor Marian Sawer and to Mary Hapel of the Political Science Program of the Research School of Social Sciences at the Australian National University for welcoming me as a Visiting Fellow and allowing me ac ...
Weak Presidents, Treaty Ratification, and Presidential Leadership
... decision making (Powlick and Katz 1998; Sobel 2001). This potential for the public’s views to become active during an especially salient decision serves to set boundaries or to exclude certain policy options. Policies that are deemed extreme or overreaching may not be considered because of this. It ...
... decision making (Powlick and Katz 1998; Sobel 2001). This potential for the public’s views to become active during an especially salient decision serves to set boundaries or to exclude certain policy options. Policies that are deemed extreme or overreaching may not be considered because of this. It ...
Between Reconstructions: Congressional Action on Civil Rights
... in a partisan realignment throughout the country; “Bryanism” was summarily rejected outside of the South and parts of the West, as the Republicans made strong inroads throughout the country, even in former Democratic strongholds like the Border South.11 As a result, Republican leaders in Congress be ...
... in a partisan realignment throughout the country; “Bryanism” was summarily rejected outside of the South and parts of the West, as the Republicans made strong inroads throughout the country, even in former Democratic strongholds like the Border South.11 As a result, Republican leaders in Congress be ...
US presidents and the failure to ratify multilateral environmental
... because any debated motion before the Senate can be subject to a ‘filibuster’ (i.e. an attempt to block or delay it by extended debate). For example, in a bill’s life, a senator can filibuster a motion during (as many as) six stages (Evans and Lipinski, 2005, p. 229). Another obstructive instrument ...
... because any debated motion before the Senate can be subject to a ‘filibuster’ (i.e. an attempt to block or delay it by extended debate). For example, in a bill’s life, a senator can filibuster a motion during (as many as) six stages (Evans and Lipinski, 2005, p. 229). Another obstructive instrument ...
congress - Cloudfront.net
... Has the force of law May be used to appropriate money & propose constitutional amendments ...
... Has the force of law May be used to appropriate money & propose constitutional amendments ...
Legislative Committees
... party with powerful Rules Committee (controls time of debate, amends., etc) ...
... party with powerful Rules Committee (controls time of debate, amends., etc) ...
Filibuster in the United States Senate
A filibuster in the United States Senate is a dilatory or obstructive tactic used to prevent a measure from being brought to a vote. The most common form of filibuster occurs when a senator attempts to delay or entirely prevent a vote on a bill by extending the debate on the measure, but other dilatory tactics exist. The rules permit a senator, or a series of senators, to speak for as long as they wish and on any topic they choose, unless ""three-fifths of the Senators duly chosen and sworn"" (usually 60 out of 100 senators) brings debate to a close by invoking cloture under Senate Rule XXII.According to the Supreme Court ruling in United States v. Ballin (1892), changes to Senate rules could be achieved by a simple majority. Nevertheless, under current Senate rules, a rule change itself could be filibustered, with the votes of two-thirds of those senators present and voting (as opposed to the normal three-fifths of those sworn) needed to end debate. Despite this written requirement, the possibility exists that the Senate's presiding officer could on motion declare a Senate rule unconstitutional, which decision can be upheld by a simple majority vote of the Senate.