Hobbes, Signification, and Insignificant Names
... naming (the things they name) and reminding (the user of the things they name). Meanwhile, “[t]hings named, are either the objects themselves, as man; or the conception itself that we have of man, as shape or motion; or some privation [e.g., when we call someone unjust]”.19 This introduces names, an ...
... naming (the things they name) and reminding (the user of the things they name). Meanwhile, “[t]hings named, are either the objects themselves, as man; or the conception itself that we have of man, as shape or motion; or some privation [e.g., when we call someone unjust]”.19 This introduces names, an ...
6 S Being and Being Grounded
... without reason.11 While Leibniz seems to think that the principle of sufficient reason, together with the principle of contradiction, holds for all true propositions, he distinguishes the scope of what depends upon it from the scope of what depends upon the principle of contradiction. Thus, in The P ...
... without reason.11 While Leibniz seems to think that the principle of sufficient reason, together with the principle of contradiction, holds for all true propositions, he distinguishes the scope of what depends upon it from the scope of what depends upon the principle of contradiction. Thus, in The P ...
Beeckman, Descartes and the force of motion
... philosophers” understand it, but as the geometers do, when the motion of a point traces out a straight line or a circle. But “motions such as these,” Koyré asserts, “in contrast to physical motions, have no speed and do not take place in time” (91). They are static. Motion is therefore a state and n ...
... philosophers” understand it, but as the geometers do, when the motion of a point traces out a straight line or a circle. But “motions such as these,” Koyré asserts, “in contrast to physical motions, have no speed and do not take place in time” (91). They are static. Motion is therefore a state and n ...
Modaaliteoria
... being F, then x necessarily has F at t. Because Spinoza is a substance monist what he has to prove is that his only substance God exists necessarily and that God has all its properties necessarily. Spinoza attributes necessary existence to God in 1p11. God exists necessarily because God is a substan ...
... being F, then x necessarily has F at t. Because Spinoza is a substance monist what he has to prove is that his only substance God exists necessarily and that God has all its properties necessarily. Spinoza attributes necessary existence to God in 1p11. God exists necessarily because God is a substan ...
HOBBES AND THE WOLF MAN: MELANCHOLY AND ANIMALITY
... contemporaries saw in his work an animalization of man that was, to them, provocative. Why is it so no longer provocative to us? I will suggest that the threshold between humanity and animality should continue to be thought provoking not because this threshold has to be secured but because it might ...
... contemporaries saw in his work an animalization of man that was, to them, provocative. Why is it so no longer provocative to us? I will suggest that the threshold between humanity and animality should continue to be thought provoking not because this threshold has to be secured but because it might ...
2.1.1 Spinoza on the extreme subtlety called “possibility”
... the end of this metaphysical presentation for declaring his view about ends in nature. It is, in an important sense, the apex of his ontology, the locus where its central principle and insight are expressed against the background of his already presented ontology. His position about teleology was, i ...
... the end of this metaphysical presentation for declaring his view about ends in nature. It is, in an important sense, the apex of his ontology, the locus where its central principle and insight are expressed against the background of his already presented ontology. His position about teleology was, i ...
A reply on Spinoza`s behalf
... Herder preferred to think of God as unified active force itself, rather than an active substance. But for Spinoza, this merely invites the question “in virtue of what are all exercises of active force exercises of the same active force?” Herder appeals specifically to living force to account for the s ...
... Herder preferred to think of God as unified active force itself, rather than an active substance. But for Spinoza, this merely invites the question “in virtue of what are all exercises of active force exercises of the same active force?” Herder appeals specifically to living force to account for the s ...
PDF, 135kb - Early Modern Texts
... is necessary for doing philosophy ·and science· properly. No-one can claim to have properly understood the nature of body unless he has •thought about such things, and has •understood what is incomplete and false in a certain crude notion of bodily substance. The one I mean is based entirely on sens ...
... is necessary for doing philosophy ·and science· properly. No-one can claim to have properly understood the nature of body unless he has •thought about such things, and has •understood what is incomplete and false in a certain crude notion of bodily substance. The one I mean is based entirely on sens ...
Thomas Hobbes: Apologist for Absolutism
... century, turned to reason and empirical observation to find an explanation for social institutions. Hobbes was an urbane and much-traveled man who enthusiastically supported the new scientific movement. He visited Paris and made the acquaintance of Rene Descartes. He spent time in Italy with Galileo ...
... century, turned to reason and empirical observation to find an explanation for social institutions. Hobbes was an urbane and much-traveled man who enthusiastically supported the new scientific movement. He visited Paris and made the acquaintance of Rene Descartes. He spent time in Italy with Galileo ...
Conatus
In early philosophies of psychology and metaphysics, conatus (/koʊˈneɪtəs/; Latin for ""effort; endeavor; impulse, inclination, tendency; undertaking; striving"") is an innate inclination of a thing to continue to exist and enhance itself. This ""thing"" may be mind, matter or a combination of both. Over the millennia, many different definitions and treatments have been formulated. Seventeenth-century philosophers René Descartes, Baruch Spinoza, Gottfried Leibniz, and Thomas Hobbes made important contributions. The conatus may refer to the instinctive ""will to live"" of living organisms or to various metaphysical theories of motion and inertia. Often the concept is associated with God's will in a pantheist view of Nature. The concept may be broken up into separate definitions for the mind and body and split when discussing centrifugal force and inertia.The history of the term conatus is that of a series of subtle tweaks in meaning and clarifications of scope developed over the course of two and a half millennia. Successive philosophers to adopt the term put their own personal twist on the concept, each developing the term differently such that it now has no accepted definition. The earliest authors to discuss conatus wrote primarily in Latin, basing their usage on ancient Greek concepts. These thinkers therefore used ""conatus"" not only as a technical term but as a common word and in a general sense. In archaic texts, the more technical usage is difficult to discern from the more common one, and they are also hard to differentiate in translation. In English translations, the term is italicized when used in the technical sense or translated and followed by conatus in brackets. Today, conatus is rarely used in the technical sense, since modern physics uses concepts such as inertia and conservation of momentum that have superseded it. It has, however, been a notable influence on nineteenth- and twentieth-century thinkers such as Arthur Schopenhauer, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Louis Dumont.