COMPOSITION, IDENTITY, AND EMERGENCE
... molecules in the Atlantic, but the hydrogen atoms in question are members of that plurality. Cotnoir [2013] develops an account of composition as generalized identity which actually allows for this. However, Composition as Generalized Identity, as Cotnoir develops it, does not entail the Collapse Pr ...
... molecules in the Atlantic, but the hydrogen atoms in question are members of that plurality. Cotnoir [2013] develops an account of composition as generalized identity which actually allows for this. However, Composition as Generalized Identity, as Cotnoir develops it, does not entail the Collapse Pr ...
A Theory of Properties
... entails Theory Two, and is known to do so, then the question whether either of the theories should be accepted or rejected cannot be considered in isolation from the question whether the other should be accepted or rejected.) If, moreover, a theory might, for all anyone knows at present, entail plat ...
... entails Theory Two, and is known to do so, then the question whether either of the theories should be accepted or rejected cannot be considered in isolation from the question whether the other should be accepted or rejected.) If, moreover, a theory might, for all anyone knows at present, entail plat ...
Moral Supervenience - University of Hull
... conceptual knowledge by following out the implications of what we must know in order to be able to possess and apply a concept. But not all metaphysical necessities can be known in this way. We can separate out those metaphysical necessities which can be known by conceptual means from those which ca ...
... conceptual knowledge by following out the implications of what we must know in order to be able to possess and apply a concept. But not all metaphysical necessities can be known in this way. We can separate out those metaphysical necessities which can be known by conceptual means from those which ca ...
The Asymmetric Magnets Problem
... The problem I’ll be focussing on looks rather simple, but it brings out several points that seem to have metaphysical interest. In particular, it highlights the importance of three distinctions that are easy to blur when doing metaphysics. It will make the exposition of the puzzle easier to place th ...
... The problem I’ll be focussing on looks rather simple, but it brings out several points that seem to have metaphysical interest. In particular, it highlights the importance of three distinctions that are easy to blur when doing metaphysics. It will make the exposition of the puzzle easier to place th ...
Appearance properties
... A worry about the conjunction of views of appearance properties on which they are dispositions to produce experiences with certain phenomenal characters with the view that phenomenal character is to be explained in terms of perceptual representation of appearance properties. What we seem to get is t ...
... A worry about the conjunction of views of appearance properties on which they are dispositions to produce experiences with certain phenomenal characters with the view that phenomenal character is to be explained in terms of perceptual representation of appearance properties. What we seem to get is t ...
Theorising Social Constraint: The Concept of
... As the supervenience thesis in its structure–agency context is proposed by Healy, I shall begin with his explication. Healy (1998:516-17) states: ‘To say that A supervenes on B is to say there can be no difference in A without there being differences in B. This implies that when cases agree in subve ...
... As the supervenience thesis in its structure–agency context is proposed by Healy, I shall begin with his explication. Healy (1998:516-17) states: ‘To say that A supervenes on B is to say there can be no difference in A without there being differences in B. This implies that when cases agree in subve ...
Review of Frank Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics: A
... I don't know whether Jackson is attracted to this reasoning or not. But it looks to be in tension with a point he makes in his discussion of color. He says that the folk might well take it for granted that there is "a kind, indeed a natural kind, distinctive of the exemplars of water and gold. [But] ...
... I don't know whether Jackson is attracted to this reasoning or not. But it looks to be in tension with a point he makes in his discussion of color. He says that the folk might well take it for granted that there is "a kind, indeed a natural kind, distinctive of the exemplars of water and gold. [But] ...
Varieties of Supervenience
... 1) A change in the magnetic force need not come from a change in the underlying physical substance. It can be caused by electric currents, by the presence of another magnet, or the change in the magnetic poles of the earth. In other words, if we consider the base B as the magnetic material, the supe ...
... 1) A change in the magnetic force need not come from a change in the underlying physical substance. It can be caused by electric currents, by the presence of another magnet, or the change in the magnetic poles of the earth. In other words, if we consider the base B as the magnetic material, the supe ...
Supervenience
In philosophy, supervenience is an ontological relation that is used to describe cases where (roughly speaking) the upper-level properties of a system are determined by its lower level properties. Some philosophers hold that the world is structured into a kind of hierarchy of properties, where the higher level properties supervene on the lower level properties. According to this type of view, social properties supervene on psychological properties, psychological properties supervene on biological properties, biological properties supervene on chemical properties, etc. That is, the chemical properties of the world determine a distribution of biological properties, those biological properties determine a distribution of psychological properties, and so forth. So, for example, mind-body supervenience holds that ""every mental phenomenon must be grounded in, or anchored to, some underlying physical base (presumably a neural state). This means that mental states can occur only in systems that can have physical properties; namely physical systems.""It is useful to know both when supervenience does and does not apply. For example, the value of a piece of paper money does not supervene on the micro-features of the paper it's made out of, because the value of the money is not just determined by internal features of the paper, but also by a broader distribution of social facts and institutions. The paper alone does not determine the value of the money, so supervenience does not obtain between the value and the paper (though it does obtain between the value of the money and some larger part of the world which includes the relevant social institutions). Some philosophical problems can be stated in terms of questions about supervenience. For example: do mental properties supervene on neural properties? (externalists in the philosophy of mind say ""no"", internalists say ""yes."") Do the aesthetic properties of an art object supervene on physical properties of that object?Though it is intuitively clear what supervenience is, formally specifying what it means involves a complex technical apparatus and a family of related but subtly different definitions. Most definitions involve comparisons of objects for indiscernibility. According to one standard definition, a set of properties A (e.g. mental properties) supervenes on a set of properties B (e.g. neural properties), if and only if any two objects x and y which share all properties in B (are ""B-indiscernible"") must also share all properties in A (are ""A-indiscernible""). The intuitive idea is that if you could make a physical copy of a person, you'd also be making a psychological copy of that person. The reverse does not hold: two people could be in the same mental state, but that mental state could be supported by different brain states (the same mental state could be ""multiply realizable"" by different brain states). The properties in B are called the base properties (or sometimes subjacent or subvenient properties), and the properties in A are called the supervenient properties.Supervenience has traditionally been used to describe relationships between sets of properties in a manner which does not imply a strong reductive relationship. For example, many hold that economic properties supervene on physical properties, in that if two worlds were exactly the same physically, they would also be the same economically. However, this does not entail that economics can be reduced in any straightforward way to physics. Thus, supervenience allows one to hold that ""high-level phenomena"" (like those of economics, psychology, or aesthetics) depend, ultimately, on physical substance, without assuming that one can study those high-level phenomena using means appropriate to physics.