Executive Summary - National Institute for Public Policy
... of weapons because of their overwhelming, immediate destructive power. No other existing
single weapon can deliver such force. Today’s highly accurate, powerful conventional weapons
can indeed threaten some, but not all, strategic military targets. Some targets—such as deeply
buried targets where le ...
Pull Back - The Washington Center
... Libya, the U.S. military seems to find itself fighting enemies that prove tougher than expected. (Consider the fact that
Washington spent as much in real terms on the war in Iraq as it did on the war in Vietnam, even though the Iraqi
insurgents enjoyed little external support, whereas China and the ...
review - Cengage
... deterrence A policy of building up military
strength for the purpose of discouraging (deterring) military attacks by other nations; the policy
of “building weapons for peace” that supported
the arms race between the United States and the
Soviet Union during the Cold War. 352
foreign policy A systema ...
... strategic studies and/or security studies. In it, it will try to explore key conceptual
issues surrounding such intricate and controversial concept of international
relations. Hence, the course thoroughly examines the empirical distinctive features
of great power strategy in the nuclear age on the o ...
MR. LIPMAN’S AP GOVERNMENT POWERPOINT CHAPTER 19
... Truman (containment)
Nixon ($ not troops and deterrence theory)
Carter (“strategic and vital interests will be
• Reagan (military assistance to fight pro-Soviet
• Bush (preemptive strikes against potentially
Chapter 17, Section 3: Guide to the Essentials
... which said that if communism could be
European affairs as well as that
contained within its existing boundaries,
European nations should stay
it would collapse under the weight of its
out of the affairs of North and
United States origiinternal weaknesses. As the United States
South Amer ...
international cooperation for development
... The principle of sufficiency, by virtue of which each State may possess only the means necessary
for its legitimate defence, must be applied both by States that buy arms and by those that produce
and furnish them.
Any excessive stockpiling or indiscriminate trading in arms cannot be morally justifie ...
Deterrence theory gained increased prominence as a military strategy during the Cold War with regard to the use of nuclear weapons. It took on a unique connotation during this time as an inferior nuclear force, by virtue of its extreme destructive power, could deter a more powerful adversary, provided that this force could be protected against destruction by a surprise attack. Deterrence is a strategy intended to dissuade an adversary from taking an action not yet started, or to prevent them from doing something that another state desires. A credible nuclear deterrent, Bernard Brodie wrote in 1959, must be always at the ready, yet never used.In Thomas Schelling’s (1966) classic work on deterrence, the concept that military strategy can no longer be defined as the science of military victory is presented. Instead, it is argued that military strategy was now equally, if not more, the art of coercion, of intimidation and deterrence. Schelling says the capacity to harm another state is now used as a motivating factor for other states to avoid it and influence another state's behavior. To be coercive or deter another state, violence must be anticipated and avoidable by accommodation. It can therefore be summarized that the use of the power to hurt as bargaining power is the foundation of deterrence theory, and is most successful when it is held in reserve.In 2004 Frank C. Zagare made the case that deterrence theory is logically inconsistent, not empirically accurate and deficient as a theory. In place of classical deterrence, rational choice scholars have argued for perfect deterrence, which assumes that states may vary in their internal characteristics and especially in the credibility of their threats of retaliation.In a January 2007 article in the Wall Street Journal, veteran cold-war policy makers Henry Kissinger, Bill Perry, George Shultz, and Sam Nunn reversed their previous position and asserted that far from making the world safer, nuclear weapons had become a source of extreme risk. ""Senior European statesmen and women"" called for further action in 2010 in addressing problems of nuclear weapons proliferation. They said: ""Nuclear deterrence is a far less persuasive strategic response to a world of potential regional nuclear arms races and nuclear terrorism than it was to the cold war"".