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The Logic of Logical Revision
The Logic of Logical Revision

... because there is no intuitionistic treatment of modal logic canonical in the same way Montagovian type theory is for semanticists in the truth-conditional tradition. This being said, there is also nothing obviously wrong with the argument from an intuitionistic point of view, and the resources it us ...
drnous2
drnous2

... argument Salerno attributes to Dummett, this forces a stark choice, one must either (with Dummett) give up Bivalence, or (with the classicist) give up Verificationism. The bulk of Chapter 6 of Tennant’s The Taming of the True (“The Manifestation Argument is Dead”) concerns itself with attempting to ...
Walker Percy and the Magic of Naming
Walker Percy and the Magic of Naming

... of understanding the traditional Judeo-Christian teaching that the “something more” is a soul somehow locked in the organism like a ghost in a machine. What is he then? He has not the faintest idea…. When man doesn’t know whether he is an organism or a soul or both, and if both how he can be both, i ...
An Argument For A Neutral Free Logic
An Argument For A Neutral Free Logic

... this contrasts with the objectual interpretation in which existentially quantified sentences are true when some domain element satisfies the open sentence prefixed by the binding quantifier. So the objection goes, ‗something is identical to Powers‘ is true because the name ‗Powers‘ when inserted int ...
DOC - Princeton University
DOC - Princeton University

... How are epistemic and instrumental rationality related? Here is a particularly radical suggestion: epistemic rationality just is instrumental rationality. More precisely: epistemic rationality is a species of instrumental rationality, viz. instrumental rationality in the service of one's cognitive o ...
Not Every Truth Can Be Known (at least, not all
Not Every Truth Can Be Known (at least, not all

... logic in which these principles are couched, defeating the inference from (1) to omniscience [1, 5], these answers do not address the question I take to be asked by Fitch’s paradox. I say this because upon reflection, the principles motivating a knowability thesis in fact undercut its application in ...
The central argument is simple:
The central argument is simple:

... [A] thought can be split up in many ways, so that now one thing, now another, appears as subject or predicate. The thought itself does not determine what is to be regarded as the subject…We must never forget that different sentences may express the same thought. (Frege 1960)13 So the founding father ...
Foucault and Rorty on Truth and Ideology: A
Foucault and Rorty on Truth and Ideology: A

... relations between knowledge and power did not translate into speculations about an ideal society: a society in which the reign of mystifying ideologies will be overcome. His work as a critical intellectual was distant from such utopian endeavours, in this respect very different from that of Jürgen H ...
Collective Intentionality VI, Berkeley
Collective Intentionality VI, Berkeley

... handles violation by changing state and issuing new requests to fix the irregularity. We are now familiar with the idea that many practices are constitutive rather than merely regulative: they don’t just rule-out certain behavior, but enable new actions. For example, you can utter the sounds of the ...
Relativism, Vagueness and What is Said
Relativism, Vagueness and What is Said

... be assuming following Lewis, ‘‘one suited to play a certain role in a systematic restatement of our common knowledge about language . . . the detailed and parochial part—the part that would be different . . . if we were Japanese’’ (Lewis 1980: 23–4). Now, I understand the job of semantics to be (in ...
Knowledge and the curriculum - Brunel University Research Archive
Knowledge and the curriculum - Brunel University Research Archive

A Conception of Philosophical Progress
A Conception of Philosophical Progress

... our picture – there seems to be bits missing, or bits that don’t fit. We cannot keep together our conception of ourselves as free agents, motivated by thoughts and reasons, with an alternative but equally powerful conception of ourselves as creatures of nature, part of the everyday causal flux. We n ...
Many-Valued Logic
Many-Valued Logic

... logic. But it is opened by larger environment of possible worlds or situations and therewith by the global environment introduced via many-valued logic. Many-valued logic has the possibility to assign several additional values to the cases in question and so it is appropriate for leading the inquiry ...
Paul JE Dekker Heraclitean Oppositions
Paul JE Dekker Heraclitean Oppositions

... in between, so no beginning and no end, there is no circle. Opposites obviously oppose, and, hence, presuppose one another. They exist in their jointly making a distinction. Ludwig Wittgenstein’s pupil George Spencer-Brown once deemed the distinction the root of all cognition. In the next section we ...
James, Dewey, and Democracy
James, Dewey, and Democracy

... to here, but around that time, Dewey writes on psychology, education, schools, ethics, cultureepoch theory, metaphysics and much more.11 Later in a letter to Sarah Wyman Whitman of October 1903, James writes, Chicago University has during the past 6 months given birth to the fruit of its 10 years of ...
does gödel`s incompleteness theorem prove that truth transcends
does gödel`s incompleteness theorem prove that truth transcends

... right one. In this discussion about the significance of Gödel’s proof, the realist holds that the burden of the proof is on the anti-realist who must show that any truth-predicate independent of proof is involved in the incompleteness theorems. semantic anti-realism claims that “any thing worthy of ...
Truth and Perspectivism
Truth and Perspectivism

... Nietzsche’s perspectivism is an attractive doctrine in certain ways, but also a mindboggling doctrine (perhaps this is even one of its attractions). We might question it by asking how Nietzsche thinks he can know that the world consists of quanta of will to power struggling and interpreting, that t ...
Forthcoming in Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1996. HOW TO
Forthcoming in Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1996. HOW TO

... I. What is Non-cognitivism? Non-cognitivism about a particular family of terms presupposes a more general distinction: that between cognitive and non-cognitive discourse in general. In effect, the standard literature offers two possible answers to the question as to how this distinction is to be ch ...
Towart 1 - Personal.psu.edu
Towart 1 - Personal.psu.edu

... casualty of our time that defies comprehension is the death of truth. By denying absolutes and eradicating all points of reference by which we test veracity, our civilization has entered terra incognita on matters of the greatest importance even for survival.”3 How is it, then, that we understand wh ...
ABSOLUTE TRUTH AS CONTRASTED WITH
ABSOLUTE TRUTH AS CONTRASTED WITH

... casualty of our time that defies comprehension is the death of truth. By denying absolutes and eradicating all points of reference by which we test veracity, our civilization has entered terra incognita on matters of the greatest importance even for survival.”3 How is it, then, that we understand wh ...
quine - University of St Andrews
quine - University of St Andrews

... tool-kit of the logician. So it seems wise to bring them into the picture. Also, the definition of logical truth might become more perspicuous this way. ...
minimalism and truth
minimalism and truth

... Minimalism about truth has received considerable attention of late. We think that much of the discussion suffers from a pair of deficiencies. First, there has been a failure to discriminate different varieties and dimensions of minimalism about truth. Second, some serious and fundamental problems fo ...
PAUL SNOWDON VIRTUAL ISSUE NO. 1 Strawson`s Truth
PAUL SNOWDON VIRTUAL ISSUE NO. 1 Strawson`s Truth

... not typical of his style. Usually a paper by Strawson is a continuous and developing argument for a philosophical theory. But in this case he comments on Austin’s approach in a series of remarks, which to some extent are relatively separate. However, Strawson has two other more general goals besides ...
A History of the Connectives
A History of the Connectives

... positions. So, we do not know what arguments Philo and his followers used to support their position. Nor do we know what arguments Diodorus, Chrysippus, and their followers brought against it. Chrysippus analyzes conditionals as strict conditionals. The sense of necessity he has in mind is not clear ...
Truth, Values, and the Value of Truth in International Relations
Truth, Values, and the Value of Truth in International Relations

... understandings of truth which exclude any suggestion of ‘correspondence’ with an independent reality, focusing instead on the social practices involved in the expression of truth claims. In this context the concept of truth has taken on great practical importance, sustaining theories of political co ...
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Pragmaticism

Pragmaticism is a term used by Charles Sanders Peirce for his pragmatic philosophy starting in 1905, in order to distance himself and it from pragmatism, the original name, which had been used in a manner he did not approve of in the ""literary journals"". Peirce in 1905 announced his coinage ""pragmaticism"", saying that it was ""ugly enough to be safe from kidnappers"" (Collected Papers (CP) 5.414). Today, outside of philosophy, ""pragmatism"" is often taken to refer to a compromise of aims or principles, even a ruthless search for mercenary advantage. Peirce gave other or more specific reasons for the distinction in a surviving draft letter that year and in later writings. Peirce's pragmatism, that is, pragmaticism, differed in Peirce's view from other pragmatisms by its commitments to the spirit of strict logic, the immutability of truth, the reality of infinity, and the difference between (1) actively willing to control thought, to doubt, to weigh reasons, and (2) willing not to exert the will, willing to believe. In his view his pragmatism is, strictly speaking, not itself a whole philosophy, but instead a general method for the clarification of ideas. He first publicly formulated his pragmatism as an aspect of scientific logic along with principles of statistics and modes of inference in his ""Illustrations of the Logic of Science"" series of articles in 1877-8.
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