Most Ordinary Counterfactuals are (Probably) False
... is rather remote from ours, and in particular more remote than worlds in which he falls normally. Thus, the counterfactuals come out true after all. I believe that you have effectively denied that the ‘might’counterfactuals are true. For example, in claiming that all the ...
... is rather remote from ours, and in particular more remote than worlds in which he falls normally. Thus, the counterfactuals come out true after all. I believe that you have effectively denied that the ‘might’counterfactuals are true. For example, in claiming that all the ...
Willful Ignorance and Self-Deception
... The issue has importance for a number of reasons. First, the task of distinguishing selfdeception from a kindred phenomenon such as willful ignorance can only help improve our understanding of each. Even if we already feel that the two phenomena are distinct, the exercise is of value in clarifying t ...
... The issue has importance for a number of reasons. First, the task of distinguishing selfdeception from a kindred phenomenon such as willful ignorance can only help improve our understanding of each. Even if we already feel that the two phenomena are distinct, the exercise is of value in clarifying t ...
Notes on Epistemology
... vogue in recent years and which it is the purpose of this chapter to examine. It is to this effect: That the main problem which the epistemologist has to solve is whether the human mind has the power to acquire truth; that he must not commence his investigation by assuming the existence of this powe ...
... vogue in recent years and which it is the purpose of this chapter to examine. It is to this effect: That the main problem which the epistemologist has to solve is whether the human mind has the power to acquire truth; that he must not commence his investigation by assuming the existence of this powe ...
4 - Indiana University–Purdue University Indianapolis
... from experience up to this point, is perhaps more intimately connected to not being able to learn anything in the future than we are likely to realize. In any event, not to know anything (actually to be a skeptic) would possibly be endurable if it did not underwrite (or appear to underwrite) the fat ...
... from experience up to this point, is perhaps more intimately connected to not being able to learn anything in the future than we are likely to realize. In any event, not to know anything (actually to be a skeptic) would possibly be endurable if it did not underwrite (or appear to underwrite) the fat ...
Problems in Applying Peirce to Social Sciences
... of study, for which even English-speaking scholars often use its German name, Zeitdiagnose, diagnosis of one’s own time. When the German sociologist Ulrich Beck (1986/1992) some twenty years ago became internationally famous by claiming that modern society is essentially a risk society he was making ...
... of study, for which even English-speaking scholars often use its German name, Zeitdiagnose, diagnosis of one’s own time. When the German sociologist Ulrich Beck (1986/1992) some twenty years ago became internationally famous by claiming that modern society is essentially a risk society he was making ...
Applying Peirce to Social Studies – Some Do`s and Don`ts
... science proliferating today, and has searched for an alternative, both in sociology and economics. Most interestingly, as Bertilsson shows in her article ‘The Elementary Forms of Pragmatism’ (2004; about her work, see also 1996), critical realists have in their project even appropriated some ideas f ...
... science proliferating today, and has searched for an alternative, both in sociology and economics. Most interestingly, as Bertilsson shows in her article ‘The Elementary Forms of Pragmatism’ (2004; about her work, see also 1996), critical realists have in their project even appropriated some ideas f ...
The central argument is simple:
... Now, assume x(P x≠x). Then assume P. Given P, any conditional with P as antecedent must be true, so we get P a≠a. Existential intro gets us x(P x≠x), which contradicts our first assumption. Thus, P, or P, QED. ...
... Now, assume x(P x≠x). Then assume P. Given P, any conditional with P as antecedent must be true, so we get P a≠a. Existential intro gets us x(P x≠x), which contradicts our first assumption. Thus, P, or P, QED. ...
Foucault and Rorty on Truth and Ideology: A
... within discourses which in themselves are neither true nor false. (Foucault 2000, 119) Here Foucault was voicing opposition to a particular tradition of ideology-critique. For purposes of this discussion, I will call Foucault’s objection his ‘truth objection to ideology-critique’. Before elaborating ...
... within discourses which in themselves are neither true nor false. (Foucault 2000, 119) Here Foucault was voicing opposition to a particular tradition of ideology-critique. For purposes of this discussion, I will call Foucault’s objection his ‘truth objection to ideology-critique’. Before elaborating ...
PRAGMATISM, REALISM, AND RELIGION
... 2. James’s Metaphysical Realism and Pragmatic Account of Truth In this section, I propose to examine the coherence of James’s pragmatism: namely, whether James’s explicit commitment to realism (James 1975, 270–73, 283–85) and the notion of truth as agreement with reality (1975, 96–97) might cohere w ...
... 2. James’s Metaphysical Realism and Pragmatic Account of Truth In this section, I propose to examine the coherence of James’s pragmatism: namely, whether James’s explicit commitment to realism (James 1975, 270–73, 283–85) and the notion of truth as agreement with reality (1975, 96–97) might cohere w ...
Relativism, Vagueness and What is Said
... at which it will make explicit syntactic features that contribute to determine semantic features; at that level, sentences by means of which assertions are made will be analyzed into a force-marker and a sentence-radical. The same sentenceradical occurs with different force-makers (John will be home ...
... at which it will make explicit syntactic features that contribute to determine semantic features; at that level, sentences by means of which assertions are made will be analyzed into a force-marker and a sentence-radical. The same sentenceradical occurs with different force-makers (John will be home ...
Forthcoming in Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1996. HOW TO
... sharing the thesis that philosophy is prone to category mistakes of these kinds, but differing in how the categories should be characterised. The familiar semantic and psychological forms are two of the species of this common genus, but there might well be others. Thus we want to suggest that non-co ...
... sharing the thesis that philosophy is prone to category mistakes of these kinds, but differing in how the categories should be characterised. The familiar semantic and psychological forms are two of the species of this common genus, but there might well be others. Thus we want to suggest that non-co ...
does gödel`s incompleteness theorem prove that truth transcends
... of any realism (from Plato’s to Quine’s) and Gödel’s incompleteness theorems seem to give strong reasons to believe that this philosophical standpoint is the right one. In this discussion about the significance of Gödel’s proof, the realist holds that the burden of the proof is on the anti-realist w ...
... of any realism (from Plato’s to Quine’s) and Gödel’s incompleteness theorems seem to give strong reasons to believe that this philosophical standpoint is the right one. In this discussion about the significance of Gödel’s proof, the realist holds that the burden of the proof is on the anti-realist w ...
Veritistic Social Epistemology
... Without any specifications of the core notions of (DS), the requirement of the descriptive success approach that “what makes sentences true are wordly truth-makers” is not one that only correspondence theories of truth endorse. To my mind, many epistemic, pragmatic, and relativist theories that Gol ...
... Without any specifications of the core notions of (DS), the requirement of the descriptive success approach that “what makes sentences true are wordly truth-makers” is not one that only correspondence theories of truth endorse. To my mind, many epistemic, pragmatic, and relativist theories that Gol ...
Truth, Values, and the Value of Truth in International Relations
... Realist understandings of truth are considered. According to the first (from hereon CR1) truth has a dual aspect, consisting of both the epistemic dimension of claims, ideas, and discourses, and an ontological dimension of mind- or languageindependent states of affairs. Patomaki fears that approachi ...
... Realist understandings of truth are considered. According to the first (from hereon CR1) truth has a dual aspect, consisting of both the epistemic dimension of claims, ideas, and discourses, and an ontological dimension of mind- or languageindependent states of affairs. Patomaki fears that approachi ...
minimalism and truth
... different varieties and dimensions of minimalism about truth. Second, some serious and fundamental problems for the most popular varieties of minimalism about truth have not yet received sufficient attention. This paper aims to remedy those deficiencies. The paper is divided into three sections. In ...
... different varieties and dimensions of minimalism about truth. Second, some serious and fundamental problems for the most popular varieties of minimalism about truth have not yet received sufficient attention. This paper aims to remedy those deficiencies. The paper is divided into three sections. In ...
MODELS OF POSSIBILISM AND TRIVIALISM
... a general view of logical consequence might not be neat enough. Something similar happens with the case of the internal logic of degenerate toposes. Logical notions, from truth values to zero-, first- and higherorder connectives can be defined in toposes. However, in degenerate toposes (categories i ...
... a general view of logical consequence might not be neat enough. Something similar happens with the case of the internal logic of degenerate toposes. Logical notions, from truth values to zero-, first- and higherorder connectives can be defined in toposes. However, in degenerate toposes (categories i ...
Towart 1 - Personal.psu.edu
... On the other hand, truth can also be understood by what it is not. One theory regarding truth claims is that what is true is any truth claim that remains consistent, but there can be coherent empty statements that reveal nothing about reality. There can also be consistent statements made by a group ...
... On the other hand, truth can also be understood by what it is not. One theory regarding truth claims is that what is true is any truth claim that remains consistent, but there can be coherent empty statements that reveal nothing about reality. There can also be consistent statements made by a group ...
ABSOLUTE TRUTH AS CONTRASTED WITH
... On the other hand, truth can also be understood by what it is not. One theory regarding truth claims is that what is true is any truth claim that remains consistent, but there can be coherent empty statements that reveal nothing about reality. There can also be consistent statements made by a group ...
... On the other hand, truth can also be understood by what it is not. One theory regarding truth claims is that what is true is any truth claim that remains consistent, but there can be coherent empty statements that reveal nothing about reality. There can also be consistent statements made by a group ...
A problem for expressivism
... vivid, consider your reaction to being asked to enter an agreement to use the word ‘Fred’ for a certain shape by someone who won’t let you see which shape it is.7 If this line of thought is right, then any explanation of how we English speakers came to use the voluntary sign ‘good’ for the attitude ...
... vivid, consider your reaction to being asked to enter an agreement to use the word ‘Fred’ for a certain shape by someone who won’t let you see which shape it is.7 If this line of thought is right, then any explanation of how we English speakers came to use the voluntary sign ‘good’ for the attitude ...
Document
... disclosure of world itself. Likewise, we ourselves cannot be abstracted from the world, even in an experiment of thought, for we are who and ...
... disclosure of world itself. Likewise, we ourselves cannot be abstracted from the world, even in an experiment of thought, for we are who and ...
Minimal Epistemology: Beyond Terminal Philosophy to Truth
... known, but that nothing is justified even in the weak sense of being merely more likely true than not. If truth-indicative criteria (or whatever) should surface which can be shown to yield knowledge or at least justified belief, then include them, but meanwhile we'll do without. The minimalist agree ...
... known, but that nothing is justified even in the weak sense of being merely more likely true than not. If truth-indicative criteria (or whatever) should surface which can be shown to yield knowledge or at least justified belief, then include them, but meanwhile we'll do without. The minimalist agree ...
PAUL SNOWDON VIRTUAL ISSUE NO. 1 Strawson`s Truth
... even if facts are not properly to be thought of as within the spatiotemporal world, there, as it were, to be tripped over, maybe they are entities of another, abstract, sort, and if so, maybe they can also figure somewhere in a theory of truth. The question here is how far Strawson shuts out the Cor ...
... even if facts are not properly to be thought of as within the spatiotemporal world, there, as it were, to be tripped over, maybe they are entities of another, abstract, sort, and if so, maybe they can also figure somewhere in a theory of truth. The question here is how far Strawson shuts out the Cor ...
Bullshit - dharmafarer.org
... whose main aim – when speaking or publishing bullshit – is to impress us with words that communicate an impression favorable to the speaker, without any concern for the truth of what has been said. Likewise, the bullshitter is unconcerned with consistency between what he is saying now, and whatever ...
... whose main aim – when speaking or publishing bullshit – is to impress us with words that communicate an impression favorable to the speaker, without any concern for the truth of what has been said. Likewise, the bullshitter is unconcerned with consistency between what he is saying now, and whatever ...
What if all truth is context-dependent?
... If one takes the formal interpretation, then the statement “1+1=2” doesn’t have any meaning outside that given by the formal system it is part of – it derives all of its truth, meaning and relation to other statements from that system. It is, in other words, entirely dependent upon the context of t ...
... If one takes the formal interpretation, then the statement “1+1=2” doesn’t have any meaning outside that given by the formal system it is part of – it derives all of its truth, meaning and relation to other statements from that system. It is, in other words, entirely dependent upon the context of t ...