Download On December 16, 1944, the 1278th Engineer Combat Battalion

Action at Martelange
by Michael G. O’Connor
The United States Army engineer combat battalions (ECB’s) demonstrated unique
capabilities during the Allied force’s campaign to liberate Europe from 1944-1945. These
units were among the most skilled in the world at endeavors of engineering such as
bridge and road construction, and at a moments notice could shift to the role of combat
engineering, while still maintaining the skills of a combat infantryman. They were vital in
every campaign fought on the continent, from the D-Day invasion to well after victory
was declared against Hitler’s army. An especially illustrative example of their
multifaceted effectiveness involved the 1128th Engineer Group, whose battalions
undertook a number of combat and logistical missions to repel a massive counter
offensive by German Field Marshall Gerd von Rundstedt during the Ardennes offensive
of December, 1944.
In December of 1944, the 1278th Engineer Combat Battalion occupied the thick
wooded areas of the Ardennes, having been there since the 1st and 9th Armies switched
positions on October 19th. The battalion had just completed a record setting feat,
completing a 603 foot pile bent, steel stringer, two way class 70 highway bridge across
the Meuse River at Maastricht, Holland. The bridge was completed from scratch in 11
days, and was at the time the longest and strongest fixed bridge ever built by American
Army engineers. Now the battalion had taken up very comfortable quarters in the
Ardennes while employed in logging operations, running up to 23 sawmills and
producing about 50,000 board feet per day while preparing the Army for its winterization
program. These operations would be interrupted by Field Marshall von Rundstedt’s
massive counter offensive in the early morning hours of December 16th, 1944, and the
engineers, who had spent most of their time on the Continent building bridges, clearing
roads and landmines, were to receive their toughest test in their dual role as combat
infantrymen.
In the fall of 1944, the German occupying forces were losing on all fronts, and could do
little to stop the stream of supplies and fresh troops the Allies were pouring into the
continent. In September the Russians had stalled in Warsaw and operation MarketGarden had faltered to the west. The Allies were now within striking distance of
Germany. Adolph Hitler devised a plan for offensive reminiscent of operations his
invasion forces initiated in 1940. This time the target would be the coast near Antwerp,
Belgium, and the Allied supply lines running through to the front. The main thrust of his
assault would initially target the weakly defended area of the Ardennes, and then move to
Antwerp, which as of December 11th was giving the Allies a forward port from which to
supply its front lines. Much like 1940, Hitler’s plan required shock and speed. Any
prolonged engagement would prove too costly. Unlike 1940, Hitler was losing the
confidence of his general staff, and was forced to overrule them in order to launch the
offensive into the Ardennes. Even von Rundstedt himself opposed the idea.
On December 15th, just prior to the onset of hostile action, the 1278th was attached to
the 1128th Engineer Combat Group, which was located in the vicinity of Habay-la-Vielle,
Belgium, and consisted of the 1278th, 158th, and 299th Engineer Combat Battalions, the
467th Engineer Maintenance Company, and the 626th Engineer Light Equipment
Company. In preexisting defense plans, the commanding officer of the 1128th, Colonel
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George C. Reinhardt, was appointed area commander for the vicinity of the Province of
Luxembourg, Belgium, and would answer to the commanding officer of the 23rd Tank
Destroyer Group, who would act as Security Command for the entire First Army in the
event of a rear area engagement. Despite intelligence of the German Army building up its
forces and reconstituting units on the Western front, the Allies remained rather casual
about front line defenses in the Ardennes.
At 12:55am on December 16th, a call was received from Security Command to expect
paratroop landings in the rear areas, and to be on alert. Within three hours all sub unit
commanders were notified, and all units, including the 1278th, occupied predetermined
observation posts in accordance with the defense plan. Most of the day was spent
patrolling and attempting to locate possible German paratroop concentrations. On the
following day, the battalion was on the move, with half its troops going to Marloie and
Libramont, Belgium to guard petrol and ammunition trains. At 5:00pm word was
received that the Germans were moving in on the 28th Infantry Division at Wiltz. Late at
night on the 17th, all combat engineer battalions were assembled immediately for combat.
Company C of the 1278th worked around the clock guarding trains at Libramont, and was
joined by 250 men from Engineer Depot 513 on the 18th. At 10:00pm that evening, the
entire 1278th was ordered to form a barrier line from Libramont to Vaux les Rosieres. The
299th ECB was tasked to do the same from Vaux les Rosieres to Martelange, Belgium.
Along those lines the engineers were to make a stand against von Rundstedt’s counter
attack, blowing bridges, laying ad hoc minefields, and establishing manned road blocks
in the face of the advancing German paratroopers.
In the early hours of the 19th, enemy infantry and armor were threatening the lines
established by the engineers. Company B of the 299th established it’s command post (CP)
at Witry, Belgium, and began immediately to establish a barrier line, which they
completed by noon. This barrier line was extended later by Company A of the 299th, and
connected with that of the 1278th which extended to La Roche. Just prior to noon,
Company B of the 299th made contact with small bands of German paratroopers, some
impersonating American soldiers. After engaging oncoming German forces, Company B
blew two bridges in Martelange (One on the N-46 and one further north on the N-4) as
German forces were pushing into the town.
In the early morning hours December 20th, continued contact with the enemy was
made by units in all sectors, as the enemy had fanned out south and west of Houffalize
with infantry supported by armor and artillery. All engineer units in the vicinity were
engaged in defense of road blocks and key bridge locations. Three men from Company B,
1278th, attacked a German halftrack and three tanks with grenade and rifle fire while
maintaining a roadblock on a bridge by the Orthe River. Company B was busy blowing
bridges along the river near the village of Orthe. Sergeant Willie Kilgore and Privates
Bernard Chipego and Stanley Sitosky were positioned on the enemy side of the bridge
when the German halftrack and three tanks with infantry support approached from the
east. All three men attacked the lead halftrack with hand grenades and rifle fire from a
ledge above, causing the vehicle to swerve to the side. The German infantry leapt from
the backs of the tanks and deployed, returning fire towards Kilgore’s crew. Sergeant
Kilgore and his men raced back to the river, but found that the bridge had already been
blown. The men were forced to escape by swimming across the Ourthe River. All three
men received the Silver Star.
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At 3:40pm, elements of the 299th had reported enemy armor moving into Martelange.
Staff Sergeant John Funk of H&S Company (1278th), while on a reconnaissance patrol
through La Roche, received artillery fire of an unknown caliber. While approaching the
town of Martelange, Belgium, the weather worsened and the fog became thicker, making
visibility difficult. As night was falling, he came across a Sherman tank parked along the
N-4 road. He called out to it, and received a rifle shot in return. Thinking the shot must
have come from a nervous American soldier on guard duty, he called out again. The
soldier responded once more with a rifle shot, and a flare was set off, illuminating the
scene. To Sergeant Funk’s surprise, the soldiers standing around the Sherman were
German paratroops of the 5th Fallschirmjager (Paratrooper) Division under the new
command of Luftwaffe Generalmajor Ludwig Heilmann. A second tank, this one clearly
German, was parked 100 yards further north. Funk’s driver retreated south on the N-4
while his rear gunner returned fire. Upon reaching a U.S. roadblock at Route 9 manned
by the 511th Engineer Light Pontoon Company, it was blown.
The U.S. Army wanted Martelange, and made plans on December 20th to retake the
town. German forces there would have to be defeated if Patton’s Third Army was to drive
north and relieve Bastogne. At 5:45pm on December 20th, the 299th received orders to
assault the town from the west. Two forces were organized. Captain Manion of the 299th
met Captain Walter Sullivan of the 1278th, Company C in Habay-la-Vielle, and took
element of his company, and then went on to the CP at Witry and met up with the platoon
of 299th’s Company B, which had just blow the bridges in Martelange. Captain Manion
took command of this total force, to be known as Company B’s force. Other elements of
the 299th and 140 rifleman of the 341st Engineer General Service Regiment, code named
‘Buick’ force, established a perimeter south of Martelange on the N-4, and would attack
the town from that direction. At 10:00pm, the Executive Officer of the 299th, Major
Kohler, was sent to Company B’s CP at Witry to coordinate the assault on the town.
Captain Sullivan’s Company C of the 1278th was awoken by whistles early in the cold,
damp, hours of December 21st, and moved towards Martelange just after 2:00am. Earlier,
reports of at least six German tanks plus paratroopers in the vicinity of Martelange were
received by the 299th. The town was now entirely in German control, and Company C,
less two squads, as well as the depleted Company B of the 299th Engineer Combat
Battalion, was tasked to assault the German positions in the town, and slow the German
offensive. Martelange was in a key position along the N-4 road just 13 miles south of
Bastogne, and loosening the German grasp on the town would help clear the way for
Patton’s Third Army, now charging north to relieve elements of the 101st Airborne
Division holding on to that besieged city.
Under cover of darkness, Company C congregated west of the town. The air was damp,
and it had been drizzling on and off all night. The men climbed from the trucks and
moved east on foot along the N-46 road, and waited at the outskirts for dawn to arrive.
Company B of the 299th ECB positioned itself along the banks of the Sure River just to
the south, and was planning to follow the river as it bent north to support Company C’s
assault east along the N-46. Buick force began sending patrols into the town from the
south. After taking casualties, the patrols reported at least one Tiger tank as well as a
captured U.S. tank destroyer being used by the German paratroopers. At 4:00am a small
reconnaissance patrol from Captain Manion’s Company B came under fire as they
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reached a railway bridge on the western edge of the town. German flares were fired at
regular intervals as the patrol returned to the company and waited for the break of dawn.
At 5:45 am Captain Manion ordered one platoon of Company C, led by Staff Sergeant
Carl E. Pennington, to go back west on the N-46 road and cross over to the south side of
the river, and signal him by flashlight when this was completed. (Moments later
Lieutenants Zelazny and Christie were removed from the line, Christie for injuries
resulting in a jeep accident early in the morning.) Two civilians carrying suitcases were
questioned and turned back after explaining they were attempting to return to their homes
in town. South of town, Buick force was being relieved by 299th’s Company A, which
was to hold the position during the assault.
At 7:45am the order was given to move east into the town. Captain Sullivan led 1st and
2nd platoons of Company C along the N-46 to the center of town where a bridge over the
Sure River had been previously blown by engineers. Second squad of first platoon moved
forward on the left side of the road led by Staff Sergeant John Anspach, with Staff
Sergeant Carl Pennington leading third squad on the right side, with first squad in the
rear. At about 8:00am, the point halted, seeing a man partially hidden behind a building
on the east side of the river. Captain Sullivan moved forward to investigate why the point
had halted. The man shouted something unintelligible to the engineers, to which Captain
Sullivan responded, “Com bien”, attempting to draw the man into the open.
Moments later, as Captain Sullivan moved within thirty paces of the figure, a 20mm
cannon from a camouflaged tank positioned in front of a hotel east of the river, or an
unobserved mortar position in the same vicinity, opened fire. C Company scattered along
either side of the road to take up defensive positions, and returned fire. Captain Sullivan
immediately called for the .50 caliber machine gun when supporting fire from the 299th
Battalion was itself suppressed by German tank fire. The ammunition carrier for the .50
caliber was hit by mortar fire as the gun advanced, and the gunner was hit shortly after
setting up at the base of a stone wall overlooking the blown bridge. Private James Scott,
acting as Captain Sullivan’s runner, was hit while covering him with fire from his M-1.
Both Staff Sergeant Pennington and Anspach were wounded as fire from German burp
guns and mortars intensified. Sergeant David Hoyer, commanding 3rd squad of 1st
platoon, took a position along the road near two telephone poles with Sergeant Donald
Reichert of company headquarters. Both men emptied the clips of their M-1s on the
entrance to the hotel, bringing down 12-14 German paratroopers massed near the
doorway.
The German paratroopers increased their fire, adding 88mm fire from surrounding
armor, and increased mortar and machine gun fire. The mortar fire became extremely
intense. Walking wounded began to fall back west along the N-46 road. Company C was
not able to advance due to the blown bridge ahead of them, but they could not hold out at
there current position along the road, as German forces had them surrounded and
(unknown to Captain Sullivan at the time) were moving around the flank of the
engineers, and were ambushing and capturing the trucks the 1278th came in on, cutting
off any escape to the west. Captain Sullivan called for Company C to fall back about 100
yards to the west and reorganize.
Men streamed back through the small town to the west, cutting through a small church
yard while still receiving heavy fire from 88mm guns and mortars. Capt. Sullivan
proposed a second attack, concentrating on the German left flank. Sgt. Roy Yates led an
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ad hoc squad and set up a base of cover fire as Capt. Sullivan and his men advanced on
the flank. The Germans shifted their mortar and 88mm fire to Sgt. Yates position, forcing
him to withdraw, and leaving Capt. Sullivan’s men with no cover fire. Captain Sullivan
was forced to withdraw further south, and nearly as far west as their original start point
for the 7:45am assault.
Soldiers from Company C of the 1278th worked their way south, crossing a rail bridge
to the south side of the Sure River. Captain Sullivan met up with Captain Manion of the
299th Combat Engineer Battalion, and learned that the trucks had been captured and they
were cut off. The engineers now held the high ground to the south, but were not in
control of the town. The two had by now also come to the realization that they were
grossly outgunned by the German ambush. The captains immediately organized patrols to
reach out for reserves. One patrol was to go towards Laglise and the other towards Habele-Neuve, Captain Sullivan leading the later.
At 9:30am 1278th, Company C’s first Sergeant reported in to the CP that German
paratroopers in the vicinity of Fauvillers were cutting off the task force at Martelange.
Company C of the 299th, which was held in reserve, was sent in to keep the roads open.
Two tank destroyers aiding the roadblocks of the 552nd Heavy Pontoon Company were
also asked to move into Martelange, but the crews refused until receiving orders from
their own headquarters. At 10:05am Company C of the 299th arrived at Fauvillers. They
cleared the town, killing at least two paratroopers and taking four prisoners. Company C
of the 299th continued east towards Martelange, but was stopped when it came under
heavy machine gun and mortar fire about a half mile outside Fauvillers. The company
proceeded to the junction of N-45 and N-46 and reinforced the roadblocks in that
vicinity. Armored reconnaissance vehicles were called forward to aid the cut off task
force.
At 12:07pm the order was given from the CP for all units to disengage. The 1278th
and 299th had taken significant casualties and several had been captured by enemy forces.
Elements of Company B task force’s patrols under Captains Manion and Sullivan worked
south past pockets of German paratroopers on their way to reinforce Martelange. A small
force of men from 1278th’s Company C, first platoon worked there way south along the
N-4 road and eventually made contact with lead patrols from the 4th Armored Division of
Patton’s Third Army. They carried Staff Sergeant Pennington, who had been hit near the
groin. Pennington was turned over to the 4th Armored Division for medical attention, and
the rest of the platoon was fed a meal, ironically wieners and sauerkraut. At 1:20pm A
Company of the 299th blew a huge crater in the N-4 just south of Martelange, enlarging
an earlier crater blown on the 18th and keeping the remaining German forces bottled up to
the north (but also creating an obstacle to the 4th Armored Division to bridge on their
drive north). Over the next two days the 4th Armored Division defeated the remaining
elements of the 15th Regiment, 5th Paratroop Division in Martelange and the surrounding
area while punching north to Bastogne, while the remnants of the 1278th were
reconstituting in Belgium.
The counter-attack on Martelange was one of the key actions in the relief of Bastogne,
and driving back Field Marshall von Rundstedt’s massive counter offensive. While the
Allied forces would almost certainly have achieved the same outcome in the war, the
defensive perimeters of the outgunned and outnumbered engineer troops followed by the
assault on Martelange, disrupted Generalmajor Ludwig Heilmann’s plans to move further
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south and west the following day on the 22nd of December. This also prevented Heilmann
from reinforcing Martelange against the 4th Armored Division, attacking days later from
the south. Heilmann later said in a post war account of the Martelange action, “Quite a
few things had gone wrong [there]”. Heilmann was captured by Allied forces on March 5,
1945, and sent to Special Camp 11 in the UK, and was held as a POW until August of
1947. The 1128th Engineer Group continued to support the Allied drive across the Rhine
River, and into the heart of Germany. While their efforts were felt all over the continent,
their action at Martelange stands on its own as a prime example of the unique capabilities
of the United States engineer combat battalions during the liberation of Europe, and as a
shining testament to those who served with them.
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