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U.S. Policy toward CrossStrait Relations
Week 9-10
Week 9-10: Teaching Outline
• The Taiwan Dilemma in U.S. China Policy
• U.S. Position on Cross-Strait Political
Dialogue
• Can the U.S. Accept China’s Peaceful
Unification？
1. The Taiwan Dilemma in
U.S. China Policy
• Strategic interest vs. ideological
consideration
• Which one (side) is more important?
• The Nixon phenomenon
• Will vs. capability
1.The Taiwan Dilemma in
U.S. China Policy
• Since the establishment of Sino-U.S.
diplomatic relations in 1979, Washington
has maintained a virtually semiofficial
relationship with Taiwan in economic,
political, and even military spheres.
• The United States claims it would maintain
a “one China” policy
• It refuses to recognize the Taiwan issue as
a purely domestic matter of China.
1.The Taiwan Dilemma in
U.S. China Policy
• Principle: peaceful resolution
– Policy objective
• No war (no peace?), no unification
• no independence
– Subjecting the one-China policy to the
principle of peaceful resolution
– From peaceful integration to peaceful
resolution
1.The Taiwan Dilemma in
U.S. China Policy
• The bottom line of the U.S. policy is that the
Taiwan issue should be resolved peacefully by
the Chinese on the two sides of the Taiwan
Straits, and Washington takes an open attitude
to any specific resolution of the issue, willing to
accept either reunification or independence.
• In other words, while the United States is
pleased to see a peaceful resolution of the
Taiwan issue, it may not enthusiastically accept
China’s peaceful reunification in the end.
1.The Taiwan Dilemma in
U.S. China Policy
• In the late 1980s, the strategic foundation
of Sino-U.S. cooperation in dealing with
the Soviet Union was gradually loosening
– due to the detente of U.S.-Soviet relations
and the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations
1.The Taiwan Dilemma in
U.S. China Policy
• With the dramatic changes within former
Soviet Union and Eastern European
countries in the early 1990s, the world
entered into the post-Cold War era
• Consequently, there was a want of a solid
foundation of Sino-U.S. strategic
cooperation and a new one was yet to be
found
1.The Taiwan Dilemma in
U.S. China Policy
• In this transitional period, the United
States no longer took China’s core
interests, including cross-strait
reunification, so seriously as in the past.
– U.S. officials avoided talking about peaceful
reunification
1.The Taiwan Dilemma in
U.S. China Policy
– They deliberately interpreted peaceful
settlement as a broad concept referring either
to peaceful reunification or peaceful
separation
– They replaced the term “one China” principle
frequently used in the past with the “one
China” policy, which was subject to the
“peaceful solution” principle (the supreme
principle)
1.The Taiwan Dilemma in
U.S. China Policy
• Dual-track policy
– Maintaining a balance between the two sides
– Periodical shift of its preference
• Using China to check the Soviet Union/Jiang
Nan incident (70-80s)
• Tiananmen/end of the Cold War (early 90s)
• U.S. –China interest redefined (late 90s)
• Even-handed policy/co-managing the Taiwan
issue (2000s)
1.The Taiwan Dilemma in
U.S. China Policy
• Strategic ambiguity
– Double deterrence
– Aggressive diplomacy
• Toward strategic clarity?
– conditional commitment to T’s security
• Not support vs. oppose
– Opposing referenda on Taiwan’s bit for UN
– Intervening in Taiwanese domestic
policies
1.The Taiwan Dilemma in
U.S. China Policy
• The most important goal of the United
States in the Taiwan Strait is “to serve as
a reliable friend to a longtime partner that
shares many American values and is
acting responsibly in international politics”
and the second goal is to avoid war,
particularly large-scale war （Christopher
Twomey）
1.The Taiwan Dilemma in
U.S. China Policy
• Some people may mistake the second
goal as the first goal and others may think
a Taiwan that “remains militarily
separated” from the mainland as in the
U.S. national interest
• Isolationalism vs. hard realism
1.The Taiwan Dilemma in
U.S. China Policy
• Most American views would “cede the
initiative” to the two sides of the Taiwan
Strait, believing that American interests
are “fundamentally about the nature of
interaction between the two sides rather
than the outcome that comes out of that
interaction.”
• Realism or liberalism?
1.The Taiwan Dilemma in
U.S. China Policy
• Christopher Twomey, “Limits of Coercion:
Compellence, Deterrence, and CrossStrait Political-Military Affairs,” in Roger
Cliff, Phillip Saunders, Scott Harold, New
Opportunities and Challenges for Taiwan’s
Security (Washington, DC: Rand
Corporation, 2011), p.52.
1.The Taiwan Dilemma in
U.S. China Policy
• Beijing’s increasing military capability can
deter Taiwan from moving toward
independence
• It cannot obtain compelling success in
forcing Taiwan to accept unification
without the ability to conduct a viable
amphibious offence prior to 2020.
1.The Taiwan Dilemma in
U.S. China Policy
• In terms of military capabilities, Taiwan is
able to maintain a status quo of no
unification and no independence within 10
years.
• From a non-military perspective, the
United States is divided on the possibility
of Taiwan’s acceptance of unification
under certain pressures (Christopher
Twomey)
Chinese Embassy in the United States
Chinese Embassy in the United States
Chinese Embassy in the United States
Chinese Embassy in the United States
The Role of Taiwan in US strategic rebalance
or pivoting to Asia
At National Committee on American Foreign Policy, June 5-6, 2012
Beijing, Taipei, and Washington
U.S. Policy Objective
Peaceful separation
No unification and no independence
Radical TI
Taibei’s
Policy
Status
quo
Peaceful
unification
Peaceful
development
Unificaiton
by force
Beijing’s Policy
2. U.S. Position on Cross-Strait
Political Dialogue
– The severer tension between the
two sides of the Taiwan Strait, the
more likely that the United States
would encourage them to conduct
constructive dialogues and build a
peace and stable framework
– From the three no’s (no
encouragement, no intervention,
no mediation）to interim
agreement
2. U.S. Position on CrossStrait Political Dialogue
• Kenneth Lieberthal’s Interim Agreement
– Interim agreement presupposes
some sort of loose unification
(confederation) in the future
– Taipei should negotiate with Beijing for a stable
relationship (Ken Lieberthal, 2001)
• Harry Harding’s Modus Vivendi
• Maintaining the status quo
– Any resolution should be accepted by the Taiwanese
people
2. U.S. Position on Cross-Strait
Political Dialogue
• The closer of cross-strait relations,
the more likely that the United
States would take a cautious
position on political negotiations
between the two sides, worrying
that China’s possible unification
might affect American strategic
interest in the Taiwan Strait?
2. U.S. Position on Cross-Strait
Political Dialogue
• “conditional encourage”
• Unlikely to push for the interim agreement as
much as it did in the past
• Unlikely to oppose peace talks between the two
sides
• More worrying the loss of the momentum for
peace
• Positive development better than strait crisis
• Overburdened with other global issues
2. U.S. Position on Cross-Strait
Political Dialogue
• Maintaining the positive momentum in the
development of U.S.-China relations (James
Jones, US National Security Advisor）
• Engaging and cooperating with China positively,
handling the Taiwan issue cautiously （Jeffery
Bader, Senior Director for Asia-Pacific Affairs,
NSC）
• Welcoming the improvement of cross-Strait
relations（James Steinberg, Deputy Secretary,
DoS)
• Richard Bush, Ken Lieberthal, Bonnie Glasser
2. U.S. Position on Cross-Strait
Political Dialogue
• Improvement of Cross-Strait Relations Should
Not Affect Washington-Taiwan Ties in a
Negative Way
– U.S. is confident in maintaining a strong relationship
with Taiwan, never worrying too close ties between
the two sides of the Taiwan Strait; cross-Strait
dialogue is in the interest of Washington and Taipei,
as well as in the interest of the two sides of the
Taiwan Strait, which is a win-win game（Dennis
Wider，2008, Former Senior Director for Asia-Pacific
Affairs, NSC）
2. U.S. Position on Cross-Strait
Political Dialogue
– The Obama administration
will seek to change the
trilateral zero-sum game into
a positive-sum game,
encouraging the
improvement of cross-Strait
relations (Bonnie Glaser,
CSIS, 2009）
2. U.S. Position on Cross-Strait
Political Dialogue
– If the new development goes beyond
the scope allowed by the US, new
countermeasures are necessary
(Robert Sutter, 2009)
– The Ma administration has given
too much to the mainland in
economic, diplomatic and defensive
areas, resulting an unbalanced
game manipulated by Beijing
2. U.S. Position on Cross-Strait
Political Dialogue
– Taiwan may no longer serve as a
strategic partner of U.S. in hedging
against China
– The U.S. might consider to deal with
China directly, even at the cost of
Taiwan’s interest, to ensure U.S.
interest in the Taiwan Strait will not be
hurt (Robert Sutter, 2009)
2. U.S. Position on Cross-Strait
Political Dialogue
• Debate between Robert Sutter and Richard
Bush/Alan Romberg
– Washington’s long policy goal in the Taiwan region is
to maintain a power balance favoring the U.S. and
Taiwan, which has been weakened by the increasing
influence of the mainland on Taiwan (Sutter, 2009)
– Washington’s policy goal is to maintain peace and
stability in the region, which can be achieved not only
by balance of power, but also by diplomatic resolution
of dispute, encouragement of cooperation, a healthy
U.S.-China relations, and peaceful resolution of the
Taiwan issue (Bush & Romberg)
2. U.S. Position on Cross-Strait
Political Dialogue
• Mainland China has not changed the
balance of power cross the Taiwan
Strait, unable to force Taiwan to give
in
• Using military power is
counterproductive to
China’s final goal
2. U.S. Position on Cross-Strait
Political Dialogue
• Ma claims that reducing Beijing’s
suspicion and expanding cross-Strait
cooperation can better guarantee Taiwan’s
prosperity, international dignity, and
security
• If Taiwanese voters feel that Ma fails to
keep his promise during the election, they
can use votes to punish him（Bush &
Romberg, 2009）
3. Can the U.S. Accept China’s
Peaceful Unification？
• In the beginning of the normalization
of Sino-U.S. relations, especially from
1972 to 1982, the U.S. officials had
accepted the prospects of peaceful
reunification of China because of their
strategic needs of “allying China to
counterbalance against the Soviet
Union”
3. Can the U.S. Accept China’s
Peaceful Unification？
• The United States expressed its
respect and understanding of
Chinese interest in national unity
soon after the two countries decided
to launch the normalization process
3. Can the U.S. Accept China’s
Peaceful Unification？
• On July 9, 1971, Chinese
Premier Zhou Enlai told
visiting National Security
Advisor Henry Kissinger
that “Taiwan Province is
an inalienable of Chinese
territory which must be
resorted to the motherland.”
Kissinger answered:
3. Can the U.S. Accept China’s
Peaceful Unification？
• As for the political future of Taiwan, we are
not advocating a “two Chinas” solution or a
“one China, one Taiwan” solution
• As a student of history, one’s prediction
would have to be that the political
evolution is likely to be in the direction
which Prime Minister Chou En-Lai
indicated to me
• One China solution
3. Can the U.S. Accept China’s
Peaceful Unification？
• In May 1978, U.S. National
Security Advisor Zbigniew
Brzezinski told Deng Xiaoping
that the United States hoped
the Taiwan question would be
solved peacefully and eventually
one China will become a reality
3. Can the U.S. Accept China’s
Peaceful Unification？
• On September 30, 1981, Ye
Jianying, chairman of
National People’s Congress
Standing Committee of the
PRC, made the “nine-point
proposal” on China’s
peaceful reunification.
U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig openly
appreciated it and even suggested Taipei to
respond to it positively
3. Can the U.S. Accept
China’s Peaceful Unification？
• “The reunification would
occur by peaceful means,
and we have encouraged
the cross-strait dialogue
to achieve that”
-- Bill Clinton, 1998
• Susan Shirk’s formula of
one country, three
systems (1999）
With Susan Shirk
3. Can the U.S. Accept China’s
Peaceful Unification？
• If the two sides choose reunification, the
U.S. has no objection
-- Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, 2002
• If Taiwan wanted to accommodate the
mainland’s request for unification,
Washington could do little to prevent it
--Thomas Christensen, 2002
3. Can the U.S. Accept China’s
Peaceful Unification？
• Peaceful unification is in the U.S. interest,
because the United States has long-term
security and moral interests in the political
liberalization of the mainland
• Taiwan’s status as a Chinese democracy
—holding out the prospect of unification
with the mainland under the right set of
conditions—can be a powerful force for
liberalization on the mainland”
--Thomas Christensen, 2002
3. Can the U.S. Accept China’s
Peaceful Unification？
• Richard Bush proposed that the two
sides accept some type of
confederation that would satisfy the
minimum objectives of each side—
Beijing would get a form of unification
and Taiwan would preserve its claim
that its government retains
sovereignty within a national union
3. Can the U.S. Accept China’s
Peaceful Unification？
• James Lilley, former AIT Chairman
and U.S. ambassador to China also
believed that Taipei should not seek
independence unilaterally, but
negotiate with Beijing for peace coexistence.
• In addition to many examples of multi-countries
coexisting in Chinese history, the EU model has
provided a good experience in economic and
political integration
• The two sides could find a mutually acceptable
formula for their coexistence (2006)
With Raymond Burghardt, AIT
Chairman, June 5, 2012
With Douglas Paal, Vice President of
The Carnegie Endowment
3. Can the U.S. Accept China’s
Peaceful Unification？
– If a peaceful resolution of the crossstrait situation came about in the future,
it’s something that we would strongly
embrace but at the same time that
wouldn’t have any dramatic lasting
effect on the power and influence of the
United States in East Asia
--Evan Medeiros, Foreign Policy
Advisor for Obama’s 2008 campaign
3. Can the U.S. Accept China’s
Peaceful Unification？
• Because of Taiwanese democratic system,
any sort of unification
should be accepted by the
majority of people
• The format of unification
should be more creative to
accommodate people’s will
on the island（Bush & Romberg, 2009）
• Cross-Strait Political Dialogue Will Not Force
Taiwan to Accept Unification
3. Can the U.S. Accept China’s
Peaceful Unification？
• Washington’s acceptance of peaceful
unification in the 1970s and early 1980s was
due to the fact that Taiwan was not a
democracy then
• Washington’s openness to the final solution
is due to the fact that either unification or
independence should be accepted by the
majority of Taiwanese people
• It is difficult to convince Taiwanese people of
the immediate benefits of unification or
independence (Bush, 2009)
3. Can the U.S. Accept China’s
Peaceful Unification？
• The mainstream of
American scholars can
accept peaceful integration
of the two sides, even
though such likelihood
is very small for the
immediate future (Bush,
2009)
3. Can the U.S. Accept China’s
Peaceful Unification？
• If unification has been put on the
agenda between the two sides,
Washington needs to talk
seriously with Taipei to
understand its policy orientation
• Even then, the U.S. would not
attempt to stop Taiwan from
making its own decision, including
unification
3. Can the U.S. Accept China’s
Peaceful Unification？
• Only if the Chinese military is
stationed on the island , using Taiwan
to project power, or Taiwan’s
democratic regime has been
transformed by the external force,
does China have crossed the red line
of the United States （Romberg,
2009）
With Amb. Lord and Mr. Romberg
3. Can the U.S. Accept China’s
Peaceful Unification？
• The “longstanding notion of U.S.-supported
balance in the Taiwan Strait” has been shaken
by ever-increasing mainland influence over the
island, a product of institutionalization and
stabilization of cross-strait relations, and
“overshadowed by more pragmatic and
immediate concerns in Washington and Taiwan
regarding fostering positive relations with
China.”
3. Can the U.S. Accept China’s
Peaceful Unification？
• According to him, the mainland’s
“economic, military, and diplomatic
leverage over Taiwan,” the “eroded U.S.
support” of Taiwanese security, and
Taiwan’s weak self-strengthening will give
Taiwan little choice other than following “a
path leading to accommodation of and
eventual reunification with China.”
3. Can the U.S. Accept China’s
Peaceful Unification？
• Political elites in Taiwan and the United States
“privately may be aware of the implications of
Chinese leverage in determining Taiwan’s future
and perhaps may favor Taiwan’s eventual
reunification with China”
• Even though other stakeholders among
politicians, the administrations, interest groups,
media, and the general public may still “cling to
unrealistic expectations that Taiwan can
preserve freedom of action amid the increasingly
constraining circumstance.”
3. Can the U.S. Accept China’s
Peaceful Unification？
• “U.S. allies and friends in Asia, notably
Japan, will require extraordinary
reassurance that U.S. government
encouragement of conditions leading to
the resolution of Taiwan’s future and
reunification with China does not forecast
a power-shift in the region.”
• Robert Sutter, “Taiwan’s Future:
Narrowing Straits,” NBR Analysis
3. Can the U.S. Accept China’s
Peaceful Unification？
• According to Richard Bush, the development of
cross-strait relations will lead to two scenarios.
• One is the continued creation and consolidation
of a stabilized order, including increasing mutual
contact, mutual trust, and predictability, growing
economic, social and cultural interaction and
interdependence, and decreasing mutual fear
and competition in the international community.
• Such a relaxed coexistence is in great contrast
with the conflicted coexistence between 19952008.
3. Can the U.S. Accept China’s
Peaceful Unification？
• Another is a movement toward the
resolution of the fundamental dispute
between the two sides and realization of
political integration.
– Richard Bush, “China-Taiwan: Recent
Economic, Political, and Military
Developments Across the Strait, and
Implications for the United States.”
3. Can the U.S. Accept China’s
Peaceful Unification？
• U.S. military expert Michael McDevitt has
pointed out recently that if the two sides of
the Taiwan Strait could reach a grand
bargain of no independence and no war,
the United States could stop arms sales to
Taiwan as long as Taiwan no longer
needed it.
3. Can the U.S. Accept China’s
Peaceful Unification？
• If China was reunified, it would be the
“best outcome for better Sino-U.S.
relations” because it could “bring closure
to U.S. involvement in the Chinese civil
war.”
– Michael McDevitt, “Alternative Futures: LongTerm Challenges for the United States,” in
Roger Cliff, Phillip Saunders, Scott Harold,
New Opportunities and Challenges for
Taiwan’s Security (Washington, DC: Rand
Corporation, 2011), pp. 103-104.
3. Can the U.S. Accept China’s
Peaceful Unification？
• Theoretic hypothesis
– The more strategic cooperation between the
United States and China in the globe affairs,
the more likely that
Washington might
consider China’s core
interests in Taiwan and
accept, more or less,
peaceful reunification of
China