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THE SPARTAN NAVAL EMPIRE
412-394 B.C.
by
Ron Keeva Unz
A thesis submitted to
the Department of History
in partial fulfillment
of
the requirements for the
Degree of Bachelor of Arts
Harvard University
C ambridge
Massachusetts
23 March 1982
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TheNatureoftheEvidence.
/
Table
ofContents
Prologue..
*
.
.
.
*.
.
. . .
.11.1
*I.I...tSI.
Chapter I:
The Spartan Home Front...............3
Chapter II:
The Persian Perspective...
Chapter III
The lonian War and the Rise of the Spartan
N aval Einpix’e.
30
.
and her New
Chapter IV: Sparta
Chapter V:
16
.
*
Slipping
55
Hegemony
into a War with
Persia 72
ChapterVl:.Agesilaos’War 88
Epilogue....
.
.
.
.
.
.
99
.
Appendix A:
Appendix B:
The Selection
Appendix C:
C hrono logy
Notes to
. .
of
.
.
.
.
Ephors
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
A14
.
.
¶Pe,ct:
Notes to
.
.
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.
*
.
.
Al 8
nl-n27
Appendices.
Bibliography
.
.
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...*.......
Anl-An4
Bi -B6
THE FIRST SPARTAN NAVAL EMPIRE AND THE SECOND
Prologue:
In the summer of 478 B.C., Sparta
at naval empire.
attempt
land forces
against
and her place
Persia
prestige
of Sparta’s
at the head of the Greek alliance
had insured that
to lead the united Greek fleet
Spartan
were chosen
admirals
during the Persian
and Salamis;
blades had commanded at Arternision
tychidas
Eury
King Leo
War, Pausanias,
at Plataiai
and regent
Greek fleet
which won over Cyprus and Byzantion.2
Spartan
domination of lonia,
Pausanias’
Spartan
design.
the victor
for one of the Spartan kings,
the Hellespont,
of the Aegean seemed possible,
and this
But Pausanias
led the
Lasting
and the islands
may well have been
combined plans for increasing
power in the Aegean with plans for increasing
personal
power at Sparta,
and within
at the hands of the Spartan
his reputation
by stories
of his corruption,
Such propaganda,
makes it nearly
a few years
ephors as a traitor
to Greece,
blackened throughout
arrogance,
impossible
to untangle
his own
he was dead
to Sparta
the Greek world
to the absurd,
the details
of Paus
intentions.
Pausanias’
that Sparta’s
fall.
naval commitment did not
By 478,
and
and medizing behavior.3
ranging from the plausible
It is clear
survive
War.
at Mykale.1
After the close of the Persian
anias’
of
had had no history
Spartans
but the overwhelming
naval excellence,
abandoned her first
the year of Pausanias’
1
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2
first
become disenchanted
already
leadership
the Greek cities
for misconduct,
recall
as experienced
Dorkis arrived
with the severity
under Pausanias;
replacement,
as Pausanias’
at this
Sparta
had no great experience
Sparta
sea, and traditionally
conservative
Spartiates
naval operations
to the same political
venture.5
oversight
as land campaigns in the Peloponnese,
Spartan
admirals might dream of succeeding
It is essentially
at
along the Asian coast
control
had failed.
raised
must have
and risky
viewed a naval hegemony as a foolish
could not be subject
refused
the allies
indeed, many of her leaders
decision;
probably welcomed It.
More to the point,
of Spartan
when the Spartiate
to follow him and turned to Athens instead.4
no objections
of Asia had
and
and ambitious
where Pausanias
these reasons for rejection
of naval empire which Thucydides
ascribes
to the Spartans
of 478.6
Three-quarter
war against
Athens, Sparta
on naval hegemony.
been required
Sparta
varying effort
the Aegean.
of bitter
decision
fighting
had
the Athenian naval empire whose birth
This time Sparta
and for the next decade
and success to maintain
In analyzing the origin,
"second Spartan naval empire,"
why it came into being,
at the close of the
again came to a watershed
Twenty-seven years
to destroy
had allowed.
thalassocrat,
this
of a century later,
accepted the role of
she attempted with
her naval empire
growth,
in
and decline
of
we must seek to understand
and why the "first
never existed.
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Spartan
naval empire"
THE SPARTAN HOME FRONT
Chapter I:
Sparta
Greek state
is the commonly used modern name of the ancient
from five
the city of Sparta--formed
small villages--and
of Lakonia and the occupied
the home territory
controlling
centered on
of Lakedaimon in the Peloponnese,
lands of Messenia.
society
At the top of Spartan
scendants
of the Dorian
caste of the Spartan
conquerors
state.
the crop.
The Spartiates
prohibited
by law,
lived
and drill.
as such,
and living
training
held was
slaves
or serfs
called helots,
themselves
They constituted
a warrior
meant to instill
those
toughness,
lives
in barracks
caste,
athletic
necessary
ability,
themselves,
agoge--was
in a warrior:
and mental discipline.2
there
seems to have
been an important
distinction
and various
of hypomelones or "inferiors."3
types
between the homoioi or "equals"
term is widely used in describing
citizen
rights;
and
The rigorous
youths underwent--the
qualities
Among the Spartiates
referred
military
eating most of their meals in communal messes
much of their
tainly
from
were
did no workthey
but instead engaged in continual
process Spartan
physical
and the ruling
to produce a fixed annual contribution
who were required
training
of Lakonia,
The land Spartiates
worked for them by state-owned
de
were the Spartiates,
to Spartiates
it probably
Spartiates
and almost cer
in good standing,
reflected
their
3
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The former
possessing
political
full
"equality."
4
tary
command,
or political
the narrow social
emphasizes the Spartan
Consti ution
his
is quite
virtue
of
he felt
orders
the city
ment;
brought them,
violate
evidence
and
Amompharetos,
repeatedly
to be much better
than what he viewed
In 421 the Peace of Nikias with Athens
in control
his direct
he felt
"equality"
after
it was sworn when the Spar
of Amphipolis,
to turn
with the agree
the Spartan
ordersand
that
refused
in compliance
it was "impossible"
was very closely
he retreat,
supreme commander,
officials
saying that
for him to
by obeying.7
indentified
it represented
retreating;8
implied political
We know much less
To the
with "auto
insist
the pebble with
in his mind, political
independence.
about the hypomeiones.
term is used only once,
seems to be a generic
who
he cast a stone down at the feet of his
which he voted against
equality
des
Pausanias;
nomy." When Amompharetos became angered at Pausanias’
ence that
to
refused
facing the Persians
the wishes of the inhabitants
homoioi,
in
the empirical
of command.
position
over to the Athenians
despite
at length
from his commander-in-chief
was badly weakened shortly
Klearidas,
of obedience
at Plataiai,
unit
disobedience
as "cowardice."6
tiate
Although Xenophon
sense.
when in positions
withdraw his men from their
direct
in more than just
homoioi were remarkably willful
commanding a Spartan
pite
as "equals"
theLakedaimonians,5
strong that
independent-minded
mili
the franchise.4
and only they possessed
Homoioi viewed themselves
or normally
office
Only homoioi could hold political
In fact the
in Xenophon’s Hellenica
term for all
3.3.6:
those Spartiatewho
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it
for
5
one reason or another
homoioi.
rights
citizen
for an indefinite
the loss of all
A few Spartiates
period.9
course
probably
But most "inferiors"
under the Lykourgan system,
who failed
his contribution
mess was disfranchised,
became concentrated
and greater
ferior"
usage,12
of food to the common
into the hands of a few families,
Henceforth,
the term "Spartiate"
fell
some rough indications
century,
is of rourse
According
or lot.13
clined
by 479, at which time there
life-or-death
struggle
2000-3000 full
citizens
at Mantineia,
of military
by the time of the conspiracy
numbers
age.14
down to Leuktra
seem to have de
were about 8000,
By 418, at the
age available,15*
and
of Kinadon in 399, Spartiates
This trend of population
in 371,
re
there were only some
could be said to make up only one percent
population.16
some
and children
ceived a kieros
of whom over 5000 were of military
unknown, but
were redistributed
and each of the 9000 male Spartiatesadults
slightly
to the homoioi.
tradition,
land holdings
Spartiate
greater
with ancient
will be restricted
exist.
land
from homoios to "in
in accordance
The exact number of Spartia±s
time in the eighth
any Spartiate
and as more and more of Sparta’s
numbers of Spartiates
status.11
of training
became inferior
from economic causes:
to provide
group
or capture by the enemy,
may have been unable to pass the strenuous
of the agoge°
probably
from equality
atimia--"dishonor"--and
in formal
resulting
some fell
Of these,
on the battlefield
through cowardice
rights;
disfranchised
component of this
the most important
were fallen
citizen
lacked full
of the adult male
decline
continued
at which time there were fewer than
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6
1000 Spartiates
of military
century onward,
the fifth
within the Lakedaimonian
daimonian state
Lakedaimonians
part
who lived
spread across Lakonia;
Although they lacked the full
citizen
integrated
Argos,
rights
and Messene.1
of homoioi,
into the Lakedaimonian
and seem to have been very loyal
there
the descendants
in small communities away
of Sparta,
According to tradition,
around"
own small towns
they were probably
from the large Dorian centers
were fully
of land.18
were "dwellers
in their
of those Dorians who had settled
perioikoi
of the Lake
they were allocated
foundation;
the perioikoi
but others-
and helots.
Lykourgan redistribution
in the original
As the name implies,
Sparta,
were not Spartiates,
neodamodeis,
from its
of
98% of the people living
had been an integral
The perioikoi
a share
state
perioikoi,
"inferiors,"
perhaps
quarter
From the last
age.17
to the Spartan
army
state.2°
had been 30,000 male perioikoi
at the time of the Lykourgan redistribution,21
and we have
no reason to doubt this.
The neodamodeis
or "new citizens"
been freed for military
service.
The first
comes during the Peloponnesian
class
around 424 the Spartan
who had done Sparta
the Spartans
the best service
soon regretted
killed
after granting
them all
who had
mention of this
War, when some time
promised freedom to the 2000 helots
their
such a large body of potential
shortly
were helots
decision
rebels,
the helots
on the battlefield;
and came to fear
for it seems that
freedom,
the Spartans
in secret.22
Despite this
inauspicious
beginning,
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but
Spartan
use of
7
as hoplite
freed helots
troops
soon began in earnest.
on his Thracian
424, 700 neodamodeis were sent with Brasidas
expedition;
to Thucydides,
according
the Spartan
without risking
helots
Spartiate
with a viable
In any event,
served so well and so faithfully
in 421, Sparta
that
lives.23
leaders
at Sparta
at reducing the number of strong young helots
much as they hoped to provide Brasidas
that
as a resident
reluctance,
initial
and neodamodeis
for military
Sparta’s
of 600 helots
army
upon their
return
garrison.24
frontier
so that
began to utilize
Sparta
campaigns:
as
the freed
good behavior of these neodarnodeis set the pattern
followed,
force
purposes,
and over
in the years which
some neodamodeis
in overseas
especially
in 413 consisted
300 neodamodeis
were sent to
served at Byzantion;
took 1000 with him to Asia in 401/0,
2000 more a few years later.25
The
large numbers of helots
sent to Syracuse
and neodamodeis
Euboia in 413/2;
and Agesilaos
Thibron
brought
The reason for such widespread
use of freedmen--at
times neodamodeis must have far out
numbered Spartiates
and perioikoi
in the army--is
there were simply too few Spartiates,
Spartan
periods.
allies
were unwilling
and both were widely used.26
were thoroughly
and
from home for long
and mercenaries,
as we can tell,
neodamodeis
loyal.
also seem to have been freed or granted
freedom in return
state:
to serve far
As far
obvious:
while perioikoi
The choice was between freed helots
Helots
aimed
gave them land along the border with Elis so
they could serve
came Sparta’s
In
for performing other services
desposionautai
probably served as pety
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partial
to the Spartan
officers
over
B
oarsmen who rowed spartan
the mass of helot
performed obscure
adespotal
force;
police
may have been the Spartan
and the
as domestics
or
servants.27
state
social
At the bottom of the Spartan
helots
state-owned
proper,
crop to their
tilled.
master,
slave/serfs
the Spartiate
possessed no rights
Helots
killed
with impunity by any Spartiate
helots
were perhaps the descendants
habitants
of the Peloponnese;29
the Dorian Messenians,
Spartan
of each year’s
who owned the land they
whatsoever,
and could be
at will.28
Most Lakonian
the helots
of Messenia were
and seventh centuries.30
masters,31
the enslaved Messenians
on a number of occasions,
populationLakonian
up the great majority
Sparta’s
military
whelming ratio
of those living
of slaves
society,
to full
While
to
longed for
including
an
century.32
probably made
in Lakedaimonia.
system was strongly
of Spartan
characteristics
and Messenian
after
loyal
of some years in the middle of the fifth
The helot
in
of the pre-Dorian
seem to have been surprisingly
freedom and rebelled
uprising
bound to the land,
enslaved by the kindred Spartans
two long wars in the eighth
the Lakonian helots
pyramid were the
a fixed portion
and required to contribute
their
the aphetai
perhaps
roles,
erukteres
ships;
influenced
especially
citizens.
by the
the over
As mentioned above,
Spartiates
had the freedom from manual labor to be able to
devote all
their
truly
professional
Greece.33
time and effort
hoplite
The outstanding
to military
troops unequaled
performance
training,
anywhere else in
of Spartiate
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becoming
contin
9
shows the value of this
odds to win victory,
numerical
from this
same cause,
5 fr. P U.-
the me
number of Spartiates
enough for a few thousand Spartiate
enslaved,
designed around this
completely
-that the military
same reason,
the continual
Fear of a helot
factor
in Sparta’s
Kleomanes--a
Sparta
willingly
reluctance
relinquished
Spartans
them against
multi
Sparta under King
caution
or lack of
leading
decades did nothing
subject
allies,
to support
vague pro
It was the united
allies,
backed by the threat
if Sparta
Athens, which finally
to enter the Peloponnesi2n
in
the naval hegemony to
they might not long remain allies
to support
rising.
to enter into major
mises to the Thasians notwithstanding.37
that
began for this
or to aid the lonian revolt
of Athens’ rebellious
call for war by Sparta’s
it is likely
a long--term commitment to protect
Athens in 478,36 and for several
the revolts
seems
seems to have been a major
commitments.
of Plataiai
society
were greatly
difficulties
revolt
to undertake
the independence
and the
to keep several
task;
of Spartiates
man not noted for his great
daring--refused
49935
and Spartan
danger of a helot
remarkable
wars or lengthy military
warriors
one vital
preoccupation
In times of war, these
plied.
stemmed
During peacetime it was difficult
enormous number of helots.
hundred thousand helots
training.
caution and conservatism
extreme military
Sparta’s
overcoming extreme
Mantineia--oftefl
Tanagra,
Plataiai,
opylai,
century--Therm
of the fifth
at all the major battles
gents
persuaded the
War in 431;
this
juncture,
just
a few years of war, Spartan leaders
did nothing
and even at
King Archidamos opposed the decision.
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After
were already looking
10
to a negotiated
settlement,39
major set-back,
attempted
Spartan
to make peace.40
an extreme
campaigning reflects
Spartiate
sacrifice
and from the time of the first
unless
lives
absolutely
effort
to never
necessary.
Lake
to areas
daimonian troops were very seldom sent on expeditions
far
the 300 Spartiates
from the Peloponnese;
is about the only major exception.
captured
with Brasidas
Asia Minor expeditionary
this
force which
in 421 was made up of freed helots
Amphipolis
mercenaries,
Brasidas’
at Thermopylsi
and
himself the only Spartiate;1
forces
the
of Thibron and Agesilaos
had
same composition.42
Even during campaigns close to home, most Spartan
manders of the fifth
possible.
outside
century or later
King Agis refused
Argos in 418 despite
strength;
he retreated
the same year;
ceptional
casualties
was unwalled.
among Spartan
in 445,
a battle
after
403, King Pausanias
Athenian democrats
a few Spartiates
in
of Mantineis
caution
43
in
he returned
despite
ex
When King Pleistoanax
to the Peloponnese without
advancing no further
fighting
to
the next
Nor was Agis’ caution
commanders.
after
begun,
by storming Elis,
arranged a generous
than Elis.44
In
settlement
with the
a sharp skirmish
in which
were killed.4
It is important
military
with the Argives
overwhelming superiority
Elis which had barely
to risk
it
invaded Attica
risking
whenever
in 400 he used the excuse of an earthquake
year he refused
that
to join battle
before the battle
end a campaign against
the fact
avoided battle
com
to realize
adduced above,
that
in all
the examples of
it is the Spartan
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commander
11
rather
than the Spartan
better
part
that
these
troops who judges
to be the
in fact we are told
of valor and avoids battle;
were generally
to avoid battle
decisions
safety
punished
unpopular and we know of kings who were severely
by an enraged citizen
caution
for their
thought for fighting
to eschew rational
skill
best interests
might be served by minimizing
price
for their
were thinking
patriotic
The logical
of Spartiates.
basis
caution.
caution was the small number
for this
This grim truth
sheet of the battle
balance
men, and often paid a heavy
number of her full
century.
strongest
worth more to Sparta
the interests
total
citizenry
rounded,
than captured
of her major allies,
and had instead
aimed at saving
their
at Leuktra
1100 enemies
half were
perished.
cities,
killed
fleets
clearly
of ships,
or even the war effort
themselves
to the death after
given them face-saving
lives.50
yet even
The 120
chip in the peace negotiations,
to order them to fight
refused
in 418:
Pylos became Athens’
the men had only surrendered
itself;4
defeat
even shows up in the
of whornperhaps
captured by Athens after
bargaining
by the end of
was an overwhelming victory,
Mntineia
so over 5% of Sparta’s
Spartiates
cost Sparta
citizens
of Mantineis
died and only 300 Lakedaimonians,
Spartiates;48
that Sparta’s
casuaities;4
A few score dead in a skirmish
5-10% of the total
the fifth
and the glories
could not understand
death--simply
leaders
from infancy
raised
of battlefield
Sparta’s
The truth
body.46
ordinary Spartiates--men
seems to be that
very
Years later
only 400 Spartiates,
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after
Sparta
being sur
instructions
in 371, the Spartan
but this
was close
12
total
to half of Sparta’s
body by that
citizen
Sparta’s
power was broken forever.51
Sparta’s
time,
and
earlier
leaders
had had good reason to avoid heavy casualties.
As we have seen above,
zens was small,
oligarchy.
Spartan
so small that
But within
this
by any standards
ruling
elite
system was a peculiar
political
oligarchy,
the number of full Spartan
and democracy--the
ideal
citi
Sparta was an
of Spartistes,
the
blend of monarchy,
blend according to Plato,
Xenophon, and many other contemporary Greeks.
The Spartan
kingship
from the Agiad house, the
the kings possessed
and peculiar
was dual:
one Spartan
other from the Eurypontid.
great social
privileges--they
prestige
power was almost nil.
auctoritas
of his position,
and his right
tools
Although
and certain
archaic
were served double portions
food at the communal mess--by classical
political
king came
times,
their
of
intrinsic
A strong king might use the
the continuity
of his tenure,
to supreme command of an army in the field
to slowly build up his influence
and power.
as
Some kings
became de facto rulers
of Sparta.
who succeeded
there were many other kings who failed,
in this,
or never attempted
for real
or perceived
the five reigning
befell
to dominate Sparta politically.
number of kings were severely
prising
regent,
But for every Agesilaos
offenses:
Agiad kings,
punished
in the fifth
And a sur
by the ephors
century,
along with Pausanias,
were deposed or executed for misconduct;
two of the four Eurypontids
of this
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three of
an Agiad
the same fate
period.
Even
13
or death were made to pay severely
kings escaping exile
those
for their
mistakes:
threatened
house;
after
blunder,
a military
King Agis was
of his
with an enormous fine and the demolition
he was assigned
when he begged for a second chance,
as military
ten Spartiates
without whose permission
advisors
he could take no action:;53
Aristotle
hereditary
styles
kings as nothing more -than
Sparta’s
high priests
and this
and war leaders,
of the Spartan
concern ourselves
retical
constructs,
state;
with political
but as historians,
realities
and the continuity
rather
Even in immediate matters,
of his status
cisions;
and experience
as king,
a Spartan
had an important
ignorant
who happened to be ephors that
should not be over-estimated:
King Archidamos failed
from entering
over long-term
king by virtue
say on all
and unsophisticated
who made up the Assembly or the five ignorant
influence
in his effort
the Peloponnesian
power they did was the peculiar
state.
year.
In theory,
Spartiates
But a king’s
powerful and popular
to dissuade
the Spartans
War.4
the real
nature of the Spartan govern
the ephors were the rulers
Chosen each year from the entire
a king or any other magistrate
to fine or im
at will,6
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of the
body of Spartiates,55
the board of five ephors had the authority
prison
de
and unsophisticated
The main reason the Spartan kings possessed
mental system.
than theo
he might often succeed in winning over to
his side the thousand-odd
Spartiates
we must
of a Spartan king’s
power base gave him a good deal of influence
policy.
they
showing the political
would have appeared as on any paper chart
organization
is all
and it was
13
or death were made to pay severely
kings escaping exile
those
for their
mistakes:
threatened
house;
after
blunder,
a military
King Agis was
of his
with an enormous fine and the demolition
he was assigned
when he begged for a second chance,
as military
ten Spartiates
without whose permission
advisors
he could take no action:;53
Aristotle
hereditary
styles
kings as nothing more -than
Sparta’s
high priests
and this
and war leaders,
of the Spartan
concern ourselves
retical
constructs,
state;
with political
but as historians,
realities
and the continuity
rather
Even in immediate matters,
of his status
cisions;
and experience
as king,
a Spartan
had an important
ignorant
who happened to be ephors that
should not be over-estimated:
King Archidamos failed
from entering
over long-term
king by virtue
say on all
and unsophisticated
who made up the Assembly or the five ignorant
influence
in his effort
the Peloponnesian
power they did was the peculiar
state.
year.
In theory,
Spartiates
But a king’s
powerful and popular
to dissuade
the Spartans
War.4
the real
nature of the Spartan govern
the ephors were the rulers
Chosen each year from the entire
a king or any other magistrate
to fine or im
at will,6
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of the
body of Spartiates,55
the board of five ephors had the authority
prison
de
and unsophisticated
The main reason the Spartan kings possessed
mental system.
than theo
he might often succeed in winning over to
his side the thousand-odd
Spartiates
we must
of a Spartan king’s
power base gave him a good deal of influence
policy.
they
showing the political
would have appeared as on any paper chart
organization
is all
and it was
15
influence.
their
on the gerousia,
Both kings held seats
28 other members were elected
for life
Assembly consisted
from those Spartiates
of the citizen
over 60 years old by voice-vote
king might lobby members of the gerousia
policies,
of much recent
was multi-staged,
the gerousia
evidence,
his
discussion.66
and has been the sub
It is clear
that
the process
with the approval of both the Assembly and
required:
the gerousia
seems to have framed the
put it to the Assembly for approval
issue,
supporting
of the law-making process is unclear
because of the scant surviving
ment,
into
or sway the men of the Assembly by his speech.65
The exact nature
ject
body;64 the
A highly-regarded
adult Spartiates.
of all
whose
and possible
amend
then decided whether to approve the version which came
out of the Assembly.6
handled by this
same procedure;68
ratified
in this
gerousia
also functioned
cases,6
though in trials
of war seems to have been
Declaration
same way.
presumably treaties
Besides
its legislative
as a high court,
of a king,
were
role,
judging all
the
capital
the ephors were also in
cluded as judges.7°
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THE PERSIAN PERSPECTIVE
Chapter II:
In the second half of the sixth
people,
unified
the next several
led by their
centuries,
king,
the Persian
played a very significant
course of Greek history
titudes
young Indo-European
by a relatively
the Persians,
had created
of individual
Greeks.
and at times,
the tempting military
to Greek cities
Greek orators
is true,
is the consequence
political
that
Greeks.
Persian
in the rhetoric
of falling
into the mental frame
sources,
behavior
empire which he ruled
of the Persian
Much of this
culture
An idealized
of
Such a view of
who naturally
enough
But to
on the Greek
a par with Athens or Elis--hides
The political
of kingship.
prize
but misleading.
was not Greece and that
the context
at war with each other;
empire to a stock character
stage--on
Persia
the power
at times,
from the purely Greek perspective.
reduce the Persian
at
and statesmen.
work of our Greek historical
viewed Persia
in shaping the
Persia was at times the
ally
Persia
empire which Cyrus
and in molding the political
ful potential
All of this
For
Cyrus II.
role
overwhelming menace to Greek freedom;
panhellenic
the major
of the ancient Near East were conquered and
civilizations
politically
century,
the Persians
the fact
were not
of the Great King and the
can only be well understood
culture
in which it was rooted.
becomes apparent
Persian
in
ruler
16
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in the Persian
view
was not a "hero-king"
ror an Egyptian
as in the Greek homeric tradition
but had a royal nature
a "judge-king"as
closer
of a "lawgiver-king"
to that
sense,
in the Old Testacent
upon a people of a similar
cultur.
some of the characteristics
view
"God-king,"
or
based as it is
This is seen if we consider
as essential
to a king:1
Saith Darius the King: By The favor of Ahuramazda
I am of such a sort that I a:: a friend to right, I
am not a friend to wrong. It is not my desire that
the weak man should have wrcg done to him by the
mighty; nor is that my desire, that the mighty man
should have wrong done to h:rn by the weak.
What is right, that is my desire. I am not a friend
I am not hot-temp
to the man who is a Lie-follower.
ered. What things develop i my anger, I hold firmly
under control by my thinkirg power. I am firmly rul
ing over my own impulses.
The man who cooperates, ]im according to his co
operative action, him thu3 do I reward. Who does
harm, him according to th damage thus I punish. It
is not my desire that a ma should do harm; nor
indeed is that my desire, if he should do harm, he
should not be punished.
What a man says against a man, that does not con
vince me, until he satisfies the Ordinance of Good
Regulations.
The King does not embody the law or transcend
good and evil,
but is bound by the same stanards
and truth
the lowliest
peasant,
of justice
as
and is indeed charged with enforcing TWrs
VAL/Ec The role of the King is one of divinely-appointed
of men and champion of good and truth
against
judge
"the Lie:"2
Saith Darius the King: Much which was ill-done,
that I made good. Provinces were in commotion; one
man was smiting the other. The following I brought
about by the favor of Ahuramazda, that the one does
not smite the other at all, each one is in his place.
My law--of that they feel fear, so that the stronger
does not smite nor detroy the weak.
As we see above in these passages,
Great King merely at the sufferance
all-powerful
the Great King is the
of Ahuramazda,
the nearly
god who has made him King, bestowed wisdom upon
him, and maintains
and protects
him, and through him, the
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12
kingdom:
A great god is Ahuramazda, who created this earth,
who created yonder sky, who created man, who created
happiness for man, who made Darius king, one king of
many, one lord of many.
A great god is Ahuramazda, who created this excellent
rork which is seen, who created happiness for man, who
estowed wisdom and activity upon Darius the King.
HaurAtingly beautiful
As we see,
the Great King is King by grace of God, not
Man: we do not find Darius
claiming the kingship
or achievements,
his abilities
secular nature
essentially
is evident
other Persian
except insofar
This is directly
to the favor of Ahuramazda.
contrast
in Herodotus’
kings.
Herodotus
before the horses of the other
This is a typically
history
by virtue
stories
Greek tale,
contrary
to the
and the
of Darius and the
says that
Darius received
the
the aid of a stratagem
conspirators
and fits
as an empire-wide
of
as they are due
of the Greek weltanschauung,
throne because his horse neighedwith
political
of
ofPsalms in the Old Testament.
Book
the
of Ahuraxnazda, akin to that
praise
against
the Magus4
as well into Persian
election
based on universal
suffrage
The difficulty
seems to be that there was an unbridgable
gap between Greek and Persian
the Greeks unsuccessfully
in terms of their
a different,
sentially
decision.
attempting
"practical
of religion,
to describe
Greeks were devout,
more "secular"
metaphysics."
well that
own.
notions
attitude.
superstition"
which left
alien
ideas
but were filled
Greek religion
with
was es
rather than "transcendent
A Greek kept his oaths because he knew perfectly
the gods punished oath-breakers;5
The idea that
lies
or deceit"the
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it was a practical
Lie"
constituted
19
he treats
to the truth;
eating
this
and Herodotus
in their
being peculiar
comments on the Persians
customlike
was alien,6
in and of themselves
evil
absolute
as merely another
rigid
strange
adherence
foreign
and never even connects it to Persian
ants
religion
acts sprang from very mundane motives:
Most Greek ritual
an oracle
one visited
future;
better
one expiated
in a battle;
they could not be understood
men that
views on ethics
and morality
philosophy
religion
than with practical
no deep
more
seems very much1 concerned with"absolutes"
matters,
us.
In Greece,
and considering
Socrates
by asking such questions
good because it is good,
Gods do it?"10The
disturbed
as:
its modern distant
this
should not
the minds of many
"Do the Gods do what is
or is it considered good because the
in terms of Ahuramazda
would have been as meaningless
dark because it is dark,
because it is found in darkness?"
Jew or Moslem would probably
say with absolute
religions,
same questionrephrased
asked of Darius likely
darkness
a good man
and punished his enemies;
among the Judeo-Christian
Athenians
Even popular
involved.9
Persian
surprise
or dealt with.
were practical-minded:
was one who helped his friends
cousins
a curse in order to get a
Gods were not so far above
or to end a plague.8
harvest
or find out about the
an animal to learn whether or not victory
one sacrificed
was likely
a dispute
to settle
certainty
as:
or is the dark considered
An unthinkingly
have the same reaction.
that Darius’
dark
devout modern
We can
Ahuramazda was not a
god of the type which seduced Greek maidens or quarrelled
his wife while relaxing
"Is
in his home on Mount Olympus.
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with
we have quoted above probably give us
The inscriptions
of the essence of Persian
impression
an accurate
toward "Ithe Lie" and love of
abhorrence
mighty god Ahuramazda,
religion--the
and justice- -but they are all taken from only one period
truth
and the reign of only one man, Darius I;
over the two centuries
considerably
religious
but one fact
is clear:
the Persian
component peoples.
freedom among its
and diversity
rule.11
of -the Near East our general
the other religions
rather meager,
of Persian
between Persian
With regard to the relation
of the empire made this
they represent
which seems to have evolved
in time of a system of beliefs
a slice
as such,
religion
and
evidence
is
empire allowed
The great
local
priestswho
apparently
took this
the Babylonian
lesson to heart:
with the proper awe and reverence.14
Jews5
ruler,12
as we can tell,
complete religious
tolerance
winning over the important
avoided the endemic local
doom an over-extended
pre
the Babylonian gods
Cyrus adopted this
with regard to the gods of the Elamites,
As far
of
and he
although he himself
sumably worshipped Ahuramazda,13 he treated
policy
support
had been angered by the contrary
views of Nabu-Naid,
religious
Cyrus L
almost inevitable.
seems to have captured Babylon aided by the passive
discontented
size
same
Assyrians,
and
he seems to have established
for the various
priestly
unrest
political
classes
national
by this;
and hostility
empire.
gods,
hence he
which would
This policy was generally
continued by his successors.
From the political
feature
of the Persian
Ephesos on the Ionian
perspective,
the single
empire was its truly
coast,
it stretched
most significant
enormous size:
from
over 1700 miles by
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to Susa,
and from there
provinces
in the east,
a somewhat greater
making it one of the largest
which ever existed in the world prior
of comnrinications
construction
linking
land empires
to the development of
and one of their
and transport
The Persians
empire cannot be overemphasized.
cognized this,
to the Indian
and t::ansport.
modern communications
The importance
distance
greatest
to a large
re
clearly
achievements
was the
of "royal roads" and messenger networks
of a series
the heart of the empire with the outlying
provinces.
Our Greek sources speak with awe of the road from Sardis
close to 1700 miles long,
Susa:
route--a
three months’
top speed;
courier
royal messengers were stationed
equal to the distance
they could ride in a day at
by having a message relayed along the road from
to courier,
the Persians
land communication possible
vast distances
several
along the
journey for a traveier.16
Along each of these roads,
at intervals
with 111 way stations
to
achieved the fastest
in ancient
rate of
times.17 Even so, the
to be crossed meant that it would have taken
weeks for any word of what was happening at the frontiers
of the empire to reach the Great King at Susa or Persepolis,
and
an equal time for even the most hasty and urgent
of royal replies
to be returned;18
courts
have multiplied
Transporting
the leisurely
this
pace of oriental
time considerably
a major military
tightly-run
for ordinary messages.
force the length of the empire
would have taken most of a full
Under such physical
campaigning season.19
constraints,
a highly-centralized
empire was simply an impossibility.
Persia
was not a national
sense;
instead,
state
the Persian
would
or
Moreover,
in the Macedonian or Egyptian
Great King was quite
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literally
a
totally
its
subject
dissimilar
own customs,
as he did over a vast number of
ruling
"King of countries,"
and its
own traditions.
empire was not the single
the Persian
Even politically,
own language,
each with its
peoples,
as on
solid patch of bright
green or red which it appears
modern maps.
kings made no attempt to subjugate
Persian
and impoverished
fierce
hill
and the Uxians in the hills
Mesopotamian lands,
road,
looking the Susa-Persepolis
of the empire’s
territory
which did recognize
The
empire was composed of a varying number of kingdom-
sized political
units,
most centered on a particular
and each ruled by a vassal
Greek sources,
of the Great King.
some of these
PaphlagOnia--were
kings,
every time
of the Great King were ruled indirectly.
the authority
Persian
demanding tribute
over
between his capitals.2°
the Great King wished to travel
Those portions
we find
a few days’ march of Persia’s
the unconquered Carduchi within
richest
of the interior;
tribes
the
while the rest
kingdoms and their
were more closely
being ruled by a royal governor called
rapavan or "Protector
may be an artificial
According to our
as Gilicia
provinces--such
independent
nationality
rulers
bound to Persia,
a satrapPersian
of the Kingdom";21
but this
and
vassal
each
Khshath
distinction
and it was anyway more theoretical
construct,
than real.22
From our literary
trol
sources
the Great King exercised
erably from region to region
he employed to rnaintainthis
Xenophon tells
systemwhich
us that
it seems that
the degree of con
varied consid
but
and from era to era,
-the methods
over his satrapies
control
did not.
from the establishment
he anachronistically
ascribes
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In the Cyropsedia
of the satrapal
to Cyrus rather
than
23
in all
key garrisons
half of the 4th century--
first
had remained under the direct
the satrapies
as a check upon
of the Great King in order to serve
authority
satrapal
own day--the
down to his
to Darius
independence;23
this.24
the evidence we have supports
all
Herodotus and Xenophon also speak of the "King’s Ears" and "Eye"
of some sort,
royal spies
or inspectors
charged with the task of monitoring
the activities
or
"Eyes",
apparently
It is virtually
independence
for us to learn the degree of
impossible
exercised
evidence
based entirely
upon our Greek sources,
satraps,
concerning
principally
those
and Hellespontine
Aside from glimpses,
we know absolutely
of Persian
be generalized
Communication distance
this
of the empire
rule.
the Asia Minor satrapies
to the Persian
should not
empire as a whole.
alone would ensure that
the King’s hold in
region would be weaker than his grip on the heartland
empire;
and there are other factors
Minor satrapies
were easily
their
of Asia Minor
of LydiaSardis
Our evidence concerning
necessarily
is
yet with few exceptions
of what went on in the Eastern provinces
for the two centuries
and
of satraps
the position
touch only upon the activities
PhrygiaDaskyleion.
nothing
Our only detailed
by most satraps.
circumstantial
these sources
of satraps.25
somewhat anomalous.
available
which tended to make the Asia
Excellent
in the Aegean area;
Greek mercenaries
we have evidence
use going back to the middle of the 5th century.26
were also the powerful states
could and often did support
of Greece itself,
a rebellious
Asia Minor may be a special
relations
case,
of
There
some of which
satrap.2?
but in analyzing
with Greece it happens to be the special
most interested
of his
Persia’s
case we are
in, and the evidence based upon our Greek sources
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is very useful.
The
impression
our evidence generates
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of satrapal
24
is quite
independence
the satrap
century,
against
As early as the middle of the 5t
remarkable.
the Athenian empire,
supporting
the Samian revolt
hostage;28
he appears
to be acting
holding Athenians
though it may be that
vblition,
a blind eye to his activities.
operated
with invading
apparently
tirned
By the end of the century,
satraps
armies against
When reins
The reins
are loose,
importance
Hellespontine
Persians-.-was
northern
third
at Daskyleion,
was a satrap,
did so long as they
of the driver,
abutted
satrapy
just
south
he struck
as a very honorable
of the
"People by the Sea" by the
covering
in
a man whose great-grandfather
we know Pharnabazos’
that
and at this
the Greek world.
of the Hellespont.
Pharnakes
indeed.
of the horses becomes of
theory
most of the
Artabazosof
royal
in succession
the European Greeks.31
personality
the Greeksor
capital
By 412 Pharnabazos
had ruled the satrapy
before him from the time of the against
can state
and did not threaten
of western Asia Minor, with its satrapal
and father
say that
the Great King did
to say something of those portions
Phrygia--called
a large
All of this
and Xenophonwho must
that
tribute
the nature
empire which directly
and
of the Great King seem loose
than the nature
it is worthwhile
blood
satraps
sent him the appropriate
his own position.3°
openly,
to know believed
not much care what his outlying
Persian
satraps,
neighboring
at times even went to war with each other.29
have been in a position
point
on his own
the Great King deliberately
seems to have been done more or less
regularly
and
of the Great King in Asia Minor commonly co
and other officials
greater
seems to wage a "cold war
of Sardis
Pissouthnes
is foolish,
at least
but we
our Greek sources
and courageous man; he was a rather
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To
hellenized
25
which should not surprise
Persian,
ruled a province
containing
us since
Greek cities
his family had
and in close prox
imity to Greece for four generations.32
Sardis,
mre
the other major satrapy
of the west,
comprised
Its
or less the area of the vanished kingdom of Lydia.
satrap
seems often to have ruled the smaller
of Carla as well,33
satrapy
coastal
controlled
the fifth
of whose cities
by Athens for most of the fifth
century,
the satrap
most of the southern
of Sardis
two-thirds
had once been a rich kingdom,
the satrapy of Sardis
independence.
leion,
In contrast
satrap,
century;4
and it seems that
pattern
succesion
at Sardis:
led a rebellion
of the two western satraps
Pisidians,
Thracians--were
extent,
Many tribal
Lykaonians,
independent
and quieting
at Dasky
independence-minded
around 418; the next
command in 396.
examples.
was in firm control
peoples
Paphlagonians,
Bithynian
or lesser
them often occupied much of a satrap’-s
During most of the fifth
the Greek cities
of the Aegean coast--those
spontine
Phrygia and those
attached
to Sardis--were
rule;
century,
part
making up the "satrapy"
many of
of Helle
of lonia,
members of the Athenian empire and
however the Great King never theoret
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of
of the interior-
or autonomous to a greater
time and effort.
free from Persian
of
by Darius I in the late
was murdered at royal
all his nominal holdings.
Mysians,
Lydia
the strength
The long gaps in our knowledge may hide further
Neither
during
thus held claim to
with the orderly
Pissouthnes
Tissaphernes,
were de facto
of western Asia Minor.
was murdered through stealth
sixth century;
the
often tempted its holder with dreams of
we find a checkered
Oroites
satrapy
to have held in title
and generally
of ioniainany
southern
26
ically
tribute
their
loss
acknowledged their
and merely ceased to request
money from his western satraps;
this
presumably
being the arrangement worked out in the Peace of Kallias
sworn
with Athens.37
The likely
of the Persian monarchs toward Greece
attitude
and the Greeks is rather
In contrast
to the ancient
defenders
of civilization,
barbarian
protecting
barbarians
image
East.38
To a fifth-century
have seemed a distant
culture
significanceexcept
of Greece as the
themselves
civilizations
for miserable
peoples
and no political
unity,
stage of organization
of their
more in
for the amount of trouble
lives
border regions.
to fighting
in contrast
of Mesopotamia;
Greek
Greeks
one another
to the peaceful
Greece had no wealth
being merely a step above the tribal
in the mind of a King of Kings.39
long as it is not taken to extremes;
of the early first
of the Near
of little
land,
comparison with Rome and the German tribes
as
perspective
and hence unattractive;
patches of poor soil,
and "civilized"
the
Great King at Susa, Greece must
perhaps
alien
part
against
of an empire which
than any of the other outlying
devoted the greater
common popular
the Persian
and peculiar
was completely
philhellenes.
it is the Greeks who are the
the ancient
and protects
it caused
its
hammering at the gates
embces
trinsic
city-states
hordes of Asia,
produces an inverse
warlike
to unthinking
Greek viewand
which sees the free
ization
"savage"
sobering
century A.D.admittedly
A
is very illuminating
a German Herodotus
an impossibility
would have given the impression that the main ambition of the
subjugation
despotic rulers of Rome was theAof the free Germanic peoples.
Just as in the
the main impact of Greece upon
RomanTOparadigm,
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Persia and the
attention
of a Persian
Great King was in the
a?
nonetheless
military
sphere;
regard.
The Persian
Greece was very important
empire had been founded from the saddles
of the superb Persian
and Median cavalry,
the world during this
period.
esteem in Persia,
Infantry
the Royal Guard--the
was the only well-trained
soldiers;
the remainder
likely
seems to have held low
system.4
nature
It is likely
Ten Thousand Immortals described
dotus--41
levy,
probably the best in
as might be expected from the "feudal’
of the economy and the land tenure
peasant
in this
and -equipped
that
by Hero
body of foot
of the infantry
undoubtedly
was probably Asiatic
without training or armor, 42 and
to melt away in the heat of battle
if it were used at
all.
Like the Persian
navy,
the grand army of the Persian
was merely the sum of the various
making up the empire,
contingents
nomadic peopleswho
relied
entirely
satrap.
of Asia seem to have had military
similar
to that
organization
of neighboring
system or for the domination
it was hard put to hold its
and poor soil
large personal
Except for the
systems
the various
essentially
had been admirably
of nomadic tribes
upon long spears
opylai
proved that
unsuited
or for heavy reliance
tactics,
armored and well-trained
relied
of horsemen,
own against Greek armies.
of Greece was
estates
and contact
disciplined
adapted
kingdoms based upon the same
armies were bu&lt around hoplite
of heavily
and serving
of the persians.4
Persian military
terrain
or king,
upon cavalry,
nations
to the conquest
of the nationalities
each led by its chieftain
under the command of the appropriate
empire
but
The rugged
for the growth of
upon cavalry;
Greek
the use of dense formations
yeoman citizen-soldiers,
fighting
hoplite
troops
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for victory.
who
Therm
in close raanks
on favorable
or Asiatic
attacking
cavalry
victories
of Plataisi
Persian
much larger Persian
The subsequent
infantry.4
and Mykale signaled
supremacy,
military
any number of frontally-
could defeat
terrain
armies on open terrain.4
fighting
that
policy was to hire Greeks to do much of their
for them,
either
as "bought"
collectively
wealth,
they had little
soon came to the conclusion
and Great Kings and satraps
wisest
of
armies destroyed
as Greek hoplite
But though the Greeks fought well,
their
the passing
individually
or allied
we again note the resemblance
or
as mercenaries
and subsidized
city-states;
to Rome’s German policy
during
the Empire.
evidence
There is substantial
contingents
by western satraps
5th century,46
and this
dreams of rebellion.
the support
likely
as early as the middle of the
played a crucial
endence-minded
for despite
role
divided
Oroites
to them alone rather
between satrap
and Great King;
position,
a personal
the Great King convinced the men of his Persian
Tissaphernes,
When a later
his agent first
Great King tried
militarily
and cavalry less
so, the Iranian
trump,
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away from
stratagem.48
became more important
cavalry
and the success
came to depend upon which side
message from
to do away with
by a clever
as Greek hoplites
the Great King’s irresistible
of a revolt
indep
bodyguard to
had to lure the satrap
his bodyguard of 300 Greek mercenaries
Even more significantly,
than
could have used such men in the 6th century,
his strong military
execute him.4
in satrapal
A Greek mercenary bodyguard gave satraps
of men who were loyal
men with loyalties
for the use of Greek mercenary
ceased to be
or failure
could obt in the larger
number of Greek mercenaries.
that
The Great King seems to have realized
gold was his
‘
strongest
credit
Greeh arms as early asA46O if we
weapon against
our sources:
we are told -that he sent Megabazos to
Greece around this time to "buy" a Spartan
Athens, hoping that
this
would force the Athenians
their massive intervention
10,000 golden "archers"
Spartan politicians
their
part
the Spartans
in Egypt.4
were distributed
of several
in stirring
attack
to end
In the early 4th century,
to the leading
large Greek cities;
up an anti-Spartan
against
coalition
out of Asia.5°
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these
anti
did
and driving
Chapter III:
THE IONIAN WAR AND THE RISE OF THE SPARTAN NAVAL EMPIRE
When Sparta and her allies
went to war with Athens in
L1.31,1 the expected stalemate of land power against sea power
quickly developed.
500 shipsU
Despite foolish Spartan dreams of obtaining.
from friendly Greek cities
in the West or of
hiring away Athens’ experienced mercenary seamen by offering
better pay, the truth was that Sparta had few ships and almost
no money.2
While Spartan hoplite troops were the best in the world-the nucleus of the unmatched land army of the Peloponriesianssuccess in naval warfare was largely
resources:
a function of financial
a trireme cost about one talent to build, and pay
for the 200 sailors
on a ship ranged from three to six obols
per man per day, or one-half to one talent per ship per month.3
Only a state with a huge financial
a fleet
base could hope to maintain
of 100 or more triremes for any length of time, and
while Athens could draw on the yearly tribute of over 100 sub-’
jects and had a large reserve fund,I Sparta had no significant
financial resources whatsoever.5
Sparta’s Peloponnesian allies
ition.
were in much the same pos
Only Korinth had a fine naval tradition
resources,
and adequate
but she was no match for the Athenian empire in
either category
furthermore,
she suffered a precipitous
decline
in strength during the early years of the war as the Athenian
naval blockade apparently took its toll
on her commercial re
lations.6
30
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p
31
recognized their
The Peloponnesians
only a handful of rather
cautious
naval weakness,
and limited
and
naval efforts
were made during the early years of the war against Athens.7
When in 425 the entire
Peloponnesian
fleet
of 60 hipswithout
their crews was seized by the Athenians following a truce,8
it seems not to have been rebuilt:
between 425 and 414 we find
not a single reference to Peloponnesian naval forces.9
The
sea had been wholly abandoned to Athens.
It was the Athenians themselves who caused the end of
Athens’ absolute naval supremacy.
In 415, Athens took ad
vantage of the Peace of Nikias made with Sparta a few years
earlier to dispatch an enormous military expedition to Syracuse
in an astonishingly boldand foolish
Sicily.
attempt to subjugate all
The result was utter disaster,
and as the entire total
of the Athenian expeditionary force together with major re
inforcements--over 200 ships and crews plus 3400 Athenian
hoplites--1°
was annihilated in Sicily,
the Spartans re-entered
the war against Athens1
The sheer magnitude of the Athenian losses--perhaps
two-
thirds of Athens’ naval strength and a third of her land
army--12 created a widespread feeling throughout the Aegean
that Athens was doomed,13 and this encouraged additional parties
to enter the field against her.
Many major Athenian subject
allies such as Chios, Mitylene, Erythrai,
revolted or moved toward revolt.14
and Euboia either
Even more significantly,
Pharnabazos, satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, and Tissaphernes,
satrap of Lydia, independently sent representatives
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to the
32
Spartans to promise cooperation against Athens, along with
generous subsidies
The intervention of Persia must be placed in context.
Throughout the first
phase of the Peloponnesian War, the
Spartans had made some effort to gain Persian support, since
only Persia sould supply the cash which Sparta desperately
required in order to wage effective naval warfare.
We find
a joint Peloponnesian embassy dispatched to Persia in 430, and
many other diplomatic missions had been sent by 425.16
results of these efforts were nil.
The
The Persians had far too
much respect for the strength of Athens to risk a war, and in
any event the political
scruples of the Spartans--men raised
on the mythos of Thermopylai and Plataiai--toward the notion
of Greek liberty seem to have kept the Spartan offers to the
Great King so ambiguous and ungeneráous that the Persians saw
little
to gain from
Spartan victory.17
There is substantial
evidence that Darius II renewed Persia’s standing peace treaty
with Athens, perhaps in 2+24/3, shortly after he had come to
the throne.18
The aftermath of Sicily changed all this,
and we are told
that it was the Great King himself who took the initiative
in pressuring
Athens9
letter;
his satraps to actively
By this
time,
support Sparta against
the peace treaty had become a dead
Athens had broken it some time around 414 by supporting
the revolt of Amorges, who hadcontinuedor
rekindled? the
earlier revolt of his natural father Pissouthnes,
late satrap
of Sardis.2°
With the entrance of Persia into the war, a very complex
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314.
and multipartite
struggle began along the waters and coastal
areas of the eastern
Aegean--the
"lonian"
nesian War--lasting from 2+12 until
Aigospotami in 405.
Athens’
Several distinct
pase of the Pelopon
final defeat at
parties were involved:
the Athenians, attempting to maintain their surviving imperial
control over th4reek cities of Asia Minor and the Aegean islands,
and to safeguard Athens’ lifeline
of grain from the Black Sea
area; the Spartans and their allies,
doing their best to destroy
the remaining Athenian navy and force Athens into surrender; the
Persians, supporting the Spartans against the Athenians in hopes
of recovering the Asian Greek cities,
once part of the Persian
empire, but since 2+78 under Athenian sway; and the Greek cities
of the region themselves,
some such as Miletos or Chios under
governments strongly anti-Athenian,
others such as Samos under
governments staunchly loyal to Athens, but most--as far as we
can tell from the evidence--mere onlookers, seeking to avoid
being trampled by the giants struggling all about them.21
Even this muddled picture of three major participants
a host of more or less
and
neutrals is far more straightforward
than the true state of affairs;
neither Athens nor Sparta nor
Persia had a unified policy or leadership.
At Athens., the
disaster in Sicily and the beginnings of Persian intervention
had led to a general loss of faith in the efficacy of democracy,
and oligarchic elements used this opportunity to seize power
in the winter of 412/11; for much of the following year, the
pro-oligarchic forces based at Athens were more or less in a
state of war with the main fleet,
remained loyal to democracy.22
based at Samoa, which had
Even after popular govern
at Athens
in 411, there seems to remain a
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35
severe lack of coordination and trust between the home city
and her commanders in the field; we commonly find generals
replaced for political
reasons, or even executed.23
Sparta’s difficulties
were of a slightly
different nature.
From 413 to the end of the war, King Agis remained summer and
winter at Dekeleia, a fortified base he had established
Attica,
in
from which he continuously ravaged Athenian holdings
and encouraged slaves to desert.
Dekeleia wasa great success--
decisive in the decline of Athenian strength__24 but to a
certain extent it cut both ways, for it allowed Agis to set up
what amounted to a second Spartan government, one entirely
under his personal control.25
of the Spartan war effort,
The result was fragmentation
especially
during the first few
years of the lonian War, as Agis and his political
rivals back
home at Sparta independently prepared military thrusts against
Athens, each hoping to gain sole credit for the expected victory
in the war.26
Persian rivalries
mirrored those within Sparta: Pharna
bazos and Tissaphernes each hoped that he would be the won
to win the lion’s share of the Great King’s gratitude for
regaining the Greek cities of Asia; hence ntther supported
the other, and each tried to convince the Spartans to make
his satrapy the primary area of operations against the Athe
nians 27
Given this image of fragmentation on all sides, it is
often stated that it was only the disorganization of Athens’
enemies which allowed her to survive the year 412.
To a
certain extent this is true, but if we focus our attention on
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36
the simple question of raw naval power, we find that Athens’
strength was not at all incommensurate with that of her foes.
In Sicily she had suffered a loss unmatched by that of any
other Greek city-state
in history,
but even the remnant of
Athenian might was very powerful indeed; in 2+12 she had perhaps
more than 100 ships available in need,28 and rather more than
1000 talents in cash.29
Against this, Sparta and her allies
seem to have had only sixteen ships available before winter
2+13/12--those had fought in the Syracusan campaign and were
still
in Sicily--30
ordering her allies
and while during the winter we find Sparta
to construct 100 ships,31 this is remini
scent of that earlier directive
demanding 500 ships, and from
the external evidence it seems that at most only 40 or 50
triremes were completed and crewed by the end of suninier 412.32
Chios added 30-40 ships to this total,33 and 20-35 Sicilian
triremes arrived in late summer 2+12.
The veteran crews
Athens possessed remained far superior to the inexperienced
Peloponriesian sailors
for several years.35
The pattern of Athenian weakness masked by even greater
Peloponnesian weakness was doubtless repeated in finances; the
military calamities of Athens would not have put cash into
bankrupt Peloponnesian treasuries,
and for the first few years
of the lonian War, the subsidies of Persian satraps were prob
ably measured not in hundreds but in scores of talents.6
The precise details of the lonian War need not concern
us, except insofar as they touch upon the two matters most
crucial to an understanding of the Spartan naval empire: Sparta’s
relations with Persia and Sparta’s policy with regard to the
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37
Asian Greeks.
The course of the lonian war had much influence
on the evolution of both these political
issues,
and they in
turn determined the nature of the Spartan naval hegemony which
emerged
I.j
4o4.
The first hard decision the Spartan government was forced
to make came in 2+13/12, when it was faced with the choice of
either sending its newly-built ships to assist the revolt of
Chios and the other cities
of the lonian region as Tissaphernes
requested, or to the Hellespont to support Pharnabazos.37
The
strength and importance of Chios seems to have decided the
issue, and in spring 2+12, the first tentative naval forces
were sent out: 21 ships under the Spartiate Alkamenes were
detected by the Athenians and bottled up in Korinthian ter
ritory,38 but five Lakedaimonian ships under Chalkideus suc
ceeded in making their way to lonia, where they supported the
revolt of the Chians; revolts of the nearby Erythraians and
Klazomenaians soon followed.39
In all of these cities,
the revolts which occurred were
most strongly supported by the oligarchic elements of the
population, the wealthier and more powerful of the citizens;
the exact attitude of the popular elements is unclear, though
at Chios, Thucydides implies that they were somewhat hostile
to the notion of revolt.
Support for whichever outside power
seemed stronger at the moment was also a major factor.40
Soon after bringing about the revolt of Miletos, Chalkideus
negotiated the first
of what proved to be several treaties
between the Spartans and the Great King, as represented by
Tissaphernes.41
alliance,
This first treaty formalized a Persian-Spartan
and conceded the Greeks of Asia to the Great King.
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38
These terms may seem significant
tentions,
as evidence for Spartan in
but this impression is rather misleading; a close
inspection makes it seem likely that the treaty is nothing
more than the on-the-spot creation of Chalkideus, and hence
gives us little
insight into the policy of the Spartan gov
eminent concerning Persia and the freedom Of the Asian Greeks.
The very haphazard nature of the pact is shown by its
other features:
the treaty grants the Great King most of
European Greece along with the Asian cities2+2 itmakes
no reference to Persian financial support for sparta;4
it binds only the current Great King, Darius II
any successor to violate the agreement freely.44
,
and
allowing
These miserable
terms for Sparta make it clear that no Spartan diplomat had
been present at the negotiations,
and quite likely that Chal
kideus had been the sole Spartan author.
Chalkideus obviously
knew nothing of diplomacy, and as a Spartiate commander he would
have been too proud to devolve any of his negotiating respon
sibility
upon any of the other Greeks under his command; it
may also be that he was trying to hide the fact that he was
promising to return all the Greek cities
of Asia to Persian
rule--how would the Chians have reacted to this?
This seems
the only way to explain the treaty’s terms.
Not long after these events, the Spartan nauarch Astyochos
crossed the Aegean with four ships and arrived at Chios!
This episode serves to illustrate
the lack of Peloponnesian
confidence in the sea and in naval matters at this point in
time, for Astyochos left
16 of his ships behind in Korinthian
territory;46 Chalkideus’
earlier crossing of the Aegean
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:-
39
with five ships had been made only at the continual urgings
of his friend Alkibiades, the daring Athenian exile, who knew
perfectly well that Spartan caution was one of the chief ob
stacles to victory.4
initial
Only near the end of summer, after these
probes have proven strikingly
successful,
Spartans consider sending their main fleet--55
and Sicilian
ships--to
Ionia.48
do the
Peloponnesian
At this same time, the
Spartans sent out their first harmost of the lonian War, Ped
aritos,
who was given charge of the Peloponnesian forces at
This last institution
deserves some mention.
number of Spartiates--probably
The small
fewer than 2000 at this time--5°
made it impracticaland far too risky
to be sent overseas for any reason.
for any sizable number
Despite this,
Sparta’s
position at the head of the anti-Athenian alliance along
with the high military prestige of Spartiate warriors allowed
Sparta to make the presence of her citizens felt:
only a handful
of Spartiates might be sent out, but each was sent as a com
mander or a potential commander.
A single Spartiate,
Brasidas,
leading a force of mercenaries and neodamodeis had nearly
ended Athenian control of the Thraceward region a decade
earlier;
the single Spartiate Gylippos with a similar force
had turned the tide at Syracuse, leading to the destruction of
fully half of Athens’ total military strength.51
Now in the
lonian War, the Spartans hoped to repeat the success of this
system, and Pedaritos is the first
in a long series of hammosts
sent to Asia by the Spartans, Lakedaimoniansusually Spartiates
as far as we can tell
appointed as military governors in coin-
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40
mand of cities
controlled by the Peloponnesians.
The Spartan use of nauarchs--of whom Asyochos seems to
have been the first
same system.
appointed for a decade--was based on the
Although Lakedaimonian triremes composed only
a tiny fraction of the total Peloponnesian fleet facing Athens-10 ships out of 120 at Arginousai--52 once again Sparta’s
position and her prestige insured that the commanding admiral
was always a Spartiate;
monians
the Lakedai
would have balked at serving under say
or a Syracusan.
ition,
the various alliesand
a Chian
Since the Spartans had no strong naval trad
and no man could hold the nauarchy twice,53 the, system
usually meant that the Peloponnesian fleet was commanded by
a man with little
or no naval experience; this naturally proved
to be a severe handicap during the course of the lonian War.
During winter 2+12/11, the nauarch Astyochos and the
Spartiate Therimenes arranged a new treaty with Tissaphemnes
and the Great King aimed at removing some of the inequities
the earlier treaty.2+
This time Persia is explicitly
of
required
to provide pay, and the treaty is made binding upon King Darius
and all his sons--potential
phemnes.
heirs each one--as well as Tissa
However, by implication this new treaty still
grants most of European Greece to Persia.
This may simply be
once again an oversight- -two ignorant Spartiates not realizing
the full legal meaning of the words--but since the other obvious
blunders of the first treaty have been caught, we should perhaps
look for an alternate explanation.
One is easily available.
The world-view of the Great King--his religion and culture-LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
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2+1
would have made it difficult,
perhaps nearly impossible, for
him to formally acknowledge the loss of any territory which
he or his ancestors before him had once claimed.
Being a party
to a treaty which implied the independence of those parts of
mainland Greece which had once sent earth and water to Darius I
or which had fallen to Xerxes’ army was simply unacceptable at
this point; Tissaphernes would have known this and it is possible
that he succeeded in convincing Astyochos55 and Therimenes to
humor the theoretical
claims of the Persian monarch.
It is possible that when the terms of the treaty sworn
by Astyochos became known at Sparta, they caused a furor, for
soon after the swearing we find twelve Spartiates being sent
out as "advisors" to Astyochos--with the authority to replace
him if they choose--56 and one of these, Lichas,was an exper
ienced diplomat.57
Lichas reacted with horror at the terms of
the two treaties with Tissaphernes and the Great King.58
The
agreements were declared null and void; they had never been
ratified by the Spartan gerousia and Ass3lyand
knew that they could never be ratified,
was more or less legitimateat
view.
Lichas well
so their nullification
least from the Spartan point-of
Tissaphemnes reacted very angrily to this: to his mind,
the Spartans had proven themselves to be completely untrust
worthy, making and then nullifying two separate treaties within
a short space of time.
After having forwarded to the Great
King two consecutive treaties which respected his formal claim
to Greece, Tissaphernes did not dare to ask the King to be a
party to a treaty which did not; he left the Spartans in disgust.
At this point, Tissaphemnes is alleged to have come under
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2+2
the influence of Alkibiades, that brilliant
Athenian exile.
but unscrupulous
After the death of his patron Chalkideus in
battle outside Miletos, Alkibiades had become distrusted by
the Spartans,
and some time toward the beginning of winter, he
had fled for protection to the satrap, offering excellent
political
advice about the Greeks in return for safety.59
According to him, the Great King’sand Tissaphernes’
wisest
course of action was to pay the Peloponnesians as little
as possible and hence keep them
money
weak as the Athenians; the
result of such a policy would be that the two Greek alliances
would wear each other out, and leave the Persian satrap to
pick up the pieces, without having to contend with a strong
and victorious Sparta.
Alkibiades is clearly Thucydides’ chief informant for
much of book eight,60 and he very likely exaggerated his own
influence with the Persians; but as Thucydides himself points
out, Tissaphernes certainly seemed to act as if he were fol
lowing Alkibiades’ suggestions,
though à:.key motive perhaps
was his resentment as what he viewed as Spartan treachery with
regard to the treaties.
The facts are that pay for the Pelopon
nesian sailors was reduced from six to three obols per day, and
the money was given infrequently at that.61
This may also be
partly due to the limited nature of Tissaphernes’ resources;
a
satrap did not have the wealth of the Great King, and Tissa
phemnes was spending his own money at this point.62
After a lengthy period of dispute with the Peloponnesians
brought on by the disagreements over Persian sovereignty and
subsidies discussed above, Tissaphernes decided to end the
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4.3
hostility
and negotiate
a new treaty with Sparta.
We are
told that Tissaphernes was beginning to fear that the Pelopon
nesian fleet--which
had relocated to Rhodes in anger--would
completely disintegrate
due to lack of funds or might even
begin pillaging the mainland for suppiies6
been on starvation
rations for almost three months.64
The treaty which followed did
difficulties
the sailors had
not contain any of the
of the earlier agreements, and its form shows that
it had been negotiated by an experienced diplomat.6
The Great
King’s sovereigntywas explicitly limited to Asia and pay was
guaranteed for the Peloponnesian fleet while it served in
support of Persia.
As part of the agreement, Tissaphernes
promised to bring a powerful Persian fleet up from Phoenicia
to support the Peloponnesians and help sweep Athens from the
sea.
In return for all this, the Great King was granted all
the Greek cities
of Asia.
The Persian concession over so
vereignty. in Greece made it impossible for the Great King
himself to be a party to the treaty, but the oaths of Tissa
phernes, Pharnabazosalong with his brothers,
the Great King’s brother-in-law
the participation
and Hieramenes
66
were sufficent for the Spartans;
of the last of these men makes it clear that
the treaty had Darius’ de facto approval.
The promise concerning the status of the Asian Greeks is
very significant.
Although both the earlier treaties had
contined similar provisions,
we have seen that they also
contained provisions which were clearly not acceptable to
Sparta, and had been negotiated by Spartiate military commanders
who possibly did not even realize the enormity of the concession
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44
they were making with regard to the Greeks of Asia.
By contrast,
the third treaty was sworn by a full team of Spartiate envoys,
headed by Lichas, an experienced diplomat, .who may well have
been sent out from Sparta for this very purpose.
Sparta had
entered the Peloponnesian War vowing to liberate the Asian
Greeks from Athenian rule, but now she had apparently sold
their freedom to Persia in exchange for Persian financial and
military support.
This much is clear.
What is not clear is how long this
arrangement remained in effect.
That the third treaty was a
model of diplomatic correctness--proper
opening formula and
date--has blinded many scholars into failing to consider the
question of whether the treaty long remained in effect,
indeed whether it was ever even ratified
or
at Sparta; it is
widely assumed that this third treaty governed Sparta’s re
lations with Persia and her policy toward the Asian Greeks
down to 405, and even beyond.6
In considering this extremely crucial issue, we must
bear in mind that some time during summer 2+11 the Spartan
gerousia and Assembly must have been considering whether to
ratify or reject the proposed treaty; presumably, under ordin
ary circumstances, the requirements of diplomatic honor and
the trust in the judgments of the men on the scene would make
the ratification
certainty;
of a properly
.
negotiated treaty almost a
but rejection was always a possibility.
The death
of Lichas in early summer 2+1168 would have removed the most
powerful voice for ratification.
In fact,
the empirical
evidence we shall examine below proves that the treaty as
ratified,
given in ThucydidesLICENSED
was never
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or at least did not
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remain in force for more than a few months; in practice,
was a dead letter
it
by late summer 2+11, and’ Spartan commanders
no longer officially
recognized the right of the Great King
or his representatives
tO do as they wished with the cities of
the Asian Greeks.
Several factors combined to doom the treaty, notably the
perceived betrayals of Tissaphernes and the violent reaction
of many Asian Greeks to their new status as Persian subjects.
Some time after the end of winter 412/11, Tissaphernes had
established a fortified
garrison at Miletos--now his to do with
as he wished under the agreement--and in early summer 411, the
Milesians
stormed the fort
and drove out the Persian garrison.6
This incident brought home to Sparta the difficulties
position,
for while most of Sparta’s alliesand
other lonians
of her
obviously the
were wholeheartedly in support of the Milesians’
action, seeing it as a blow for Greek liberation
bar*barian, if Sparta herself approved it,
from the
she would be in
violation of her recent treaty with Persia.
The decision was difficult,
Spartiate present,
but Lichas was the senior
and he had a personal stake in the success
of his treaty; also, as a diplomat, he was very likely more
sophisticated than most Spartiates,
ent Sparta was upon Persian support.
and realized how depend
He came down firmly on
the side of the treaty, telling the Milesiansand any other
lonians who wished to hear that they and all the citizens
the Greek cities
of Asia would have to subjugate themselves
to some extent to Tissaphernes,
at least until the war with
Athens was over and Persian support was no longer needed.7°
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of
2+6
This greatly angered the Milesians--they
refused Lichas
burial when he died soon afterwards of an illness--71
but
his words would hardly have assured Tissaphernes when his
agents at Miletos reported them; they implied a future betrayal
by the Spartans after the war with Athens was concluded.
Further
more, Thucydides does not say that the Milesians were forced
to reaccept Tissaphernes’
been difficult
garrison,
which likely would have
for the Spartans to manage; if the garrison
was not reinstalled,
into certainties.
Tissaphernes’
suspicions would have grown
It is reported that Tissaphemnes became
very dilatory in his financial
and the Persian fleet--whose
support as the summer moved on;
entrance into the war the treaty
had assumed--never arrived.72
Sparta’s allies
words as final,
and the Milesians had not taken Lichas’
but instead had sent representatives
to Sparta,
hoping that the home government would annul the agreement or
at least demand its modification with respect to the status of
the Asian Greek cities.73
Then as the summer wore on and the
failure of Tissaphernes’
promises became more and more manifest,
the Peloponnesians decided to sail north and support the efforts
of the satrap Pharnabazos instead,
as the latter
had apparently
been trying to persuade them to do for some time.4.
afterward,
Soon
we find the Peloponnesians giving support to the
Antandrians after they drOve one of Tissaphemnes’ garrisons
out of their city;75 Tissaphernes’
out of Knidosa Spartan coiony6
garrison was also driven
around this same time.77
It is apparent by now that the treaty is no’ longer oper
ational,
at least in the minds of Spartan field
their hostility
toward Tissaphernes
seems plain.
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commanders; and
2+7
The military
events of the next few years of the lonian
War are important for our purposes only in outline.
Pharnabazos
proved to be a much better ally than Tissaphernes had been,
and the Spartans were not in serious financail want again
for several years
Despite this improvement in condition,
.
Peloponnesian naval incompetenceor more precisely the in
competence of Spartan nauarchs
victorious
in battle
allowed the Athenians to be
after battle.
In summer 411, Mindaros
was defeated at Kynossema, the first major battle of the lonian
War;79 later that same summer, he was badly beaten at Abydos;8°
and in spring
annihilated
shore.81
4io,
he was killed and the ships of his fleet
at Kyzikos, though most of his men escaped to
Although Pharnabazos supplied enough money to allow
the Peloporinesians to rebuild most of their fleet,
it was still
several years until they had regained the strength and deter
mination to risk a major sea battle,
and during this period
the Athenians went on the offensive,
recapturing
a number of
their subject cities.
This same period is very badly attested politically,
arthe
only evidence we have concerning the sort of arrangement
Sparta had with Pharnabazos is empirical;
cities
we know what Sparta didor
in a limited number of
did not do with the satrap’s
blessing or at least his acquiescence.
These examples permit
some cautious generalization.
In 2+08, we find a Spartan harmost, Hippokrates,
in
charge at Chalkedon, rather than the agents of Phamnabazos;
yet when Hippokrates was defeated and killed by the Athenians,
it was Pharnabazos LICENSED
who took
responsibility
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for the city,
nego
2+8
tiating
for the safety
of its
citizens.82
The same pattern is repeated at Byzantion.
the Spartan harmost, ruled the city,
composed of Peloponnesians,
Klearchos,
and the garrison was
but Phamnabazos seemed to be
content with this arrangement and willingly
supplied money
to the Greek forces.83
About this same time there was a revolUtion at Iasos,84
and the Spartan harinost Eteonikos along with his garrison
were driven out; a party supported by Tissaphernes
power.85
seized
Whether or not the satrap had actively aided the
overthrow is unclear;
but it is apparent that Sparta did
not feel herself to be under any sort of treaty obligation
to surrender the city to direct Persian control.
In fact we find not a single iinstance in the years 410-408
of a Persian garrison of either satrap present in any Asian
Greek city.
This may possibly be due to the pro-Spartan
bias of our chief source, Xenophon, who might find Spartan
willingness
garrisons
simply too embarrassing to mention; but surely we
would still
sources,
to hand over ‘!Liberated" Greek cities to Persian
find some mention in passing in one of our other
say Diodorus-Ephorus,
probably based for these years
on the excellent Hellenica Oxyrhynchia.86
The total of the
evidence makes a rather good prima facie case that Sparta had
completely reversed her apparent earlier policy of allowing
Persian satraps to assume direct control over Greek cities
freed from Athens--the policy begun after the treaty with
Tissaphemnes.
What was Sparta’s new policy? From the limited and
scattered evidence LICENSED
discussed
above, a pattern emerges.
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Greek
49
cities
were not to be occupied by Persian garrisons or dir
ectly reincorporated
into the empire; Miletos, Antandros, and
Knidos had shown this to be unworkable.
the cities
were to be under titular
onnesian garrisons
control.
Instead,
though all
Persian authority,
Pelop
and Spartan harmosts were to be in direct
Phamnabazos was clearly willing to accept this new
arrangement; it is likely that Tissaphernes was not.
It seems extremely doubtful whether any provisions of
this new agreement were rigidly set down in the form of a
permanent treaty;
established
more probably, it was a working arrangement
after t} failure of the earlier
apparent to all parties.
treaty had become
Given the difficulties
experiencing with Tissaphernes,
Sparta was
and the Spartan belief that
he had broken hiscOrnmitments under the third treaty,
been the chief cause of its failurea
and had
belief he reciprocated,
we would expect that the Spartans were attempting to negotiate
a treaty with the Great King himself during these years.
In fact,
in early spring 2+07, we hear of the return of
a Spartan diplomatic mission froth the Great King’s court.87
We are not told when the mission had been sent out, but the
vast distances to be travelled and the ponderous workings
court make summer 4.09 a reasonable possibility;
of an oriental
this would hve been perhaps
had tried--and
the disaster
failed--to
five or six months after Sparta
make peace with Athens following
at Kyzikos.88
Apparently the long negotiations led by Boiotios had
been successful,
and a treaty of some sort with the Great King
had been worked out, presumably more or less along the lines
of the third treaty;
it may even be possible that the treaty
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50
was formally resurrected.
Under other circumstances the new arrangement worked
out with Darius might have received more attention
sourcesthough
terms,
in our
not in Xenophon, who would have deplored its
but in this case its importance was overshadowed
by the appearance of Cyrus, the younger son of the reigning
Great King; he had been sent down to the coast with the returning
ambassadors by his father to act as overlord of the local satraps.89
The intent was to provide centralized
to Persia’s
efforts
ambassadors must
very much.
coordination
against Athens, which--as the Spartan
have pointed out--had so far failed to achieve
It is likely that the Great King had become con
vinced that unless a personal representative
of his, such as
his own son, were in charge, the local satrapsespecially
Tissaphernes
might continue to pursue their own policies
and
the war might continue to drag on for some time.
It is also
very likely that he feared to entrust
royal funds
to a potentially
rebellious
significant
satrap.
The arrival of Cyrus marks a watershed in the pattern
of Persian support for Sparta.
On the purely finanôial
level,
the subsidies granted Sparta until the appearance of Cyrus
seem to have been very meager, probably no more than a few
hundred talents
rapal stinginess
from 2+12 to 408.90
This may be due to sat
or satrapal poverty.
arrived with 500 talents
In any event, Cyrus
of royal silver,
and he made it
clear that he intended to spend it all and as much more as
was necessary to bring the war to a successful
For the first
conclusion.91
time, money ceased to be a limiting
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factor.
51
Another actor of exceptional importance to the history
of the Spartan naval empire also entered
time.
the stage
at this
In spring 2+07, the term of the Spartan nauarch Krates
ippidas expired,
and a new and unusually capable nauarch,
Lysandros, arrived in.Ionia.92
Within a matter of weeks,
shrewdly charming Lysandros had met with Cyrus at Sardis,
and laid the foundation of a close personal friendship with
the Persian prince,
an impressionable youth of about 17; Cyrus
went so far as to directly modify his father’s
by raising the pay for Peloponnesian sailors
instructions
as a personal
favor to Lysandros.93
With full Persian cooperation assured, Lysandros was
able to turn his attention to military matters,
4.07 at Notion, he succeeded in inflicting
and in late
a stinging
defeat
upon the main Athenian fleet under the temporary command of
Antiochos, Alkibiades’ first
officer.2+
from decisive militarily--only
lost--but
The battle was far
some 20 Athenian ships were
it was decisive politically:
Notion represented the
first major Spartan victory at sea in the six years of the
lonian War, and in the political
the battle,
Alkibiades’ political
repercussions
enemies at Athens used the
defeat to drive him once more into exile,
of her most brilliant
which followed
thus depriving Athens
general and diplomat.95
Soon after Notion, probably during winter 407/6, Lysandros
began to capitalize
on his victory by attempting to create a
personal power base in the Asian Greek cities.
many of the leading men of these cities
He invited
to his headquarters
at Ephesos, and distributed
honors and favors to those who
pledged him their loyalty;
he encouraged these men to form
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52
"political
clubs" loyal to him and to Spartain
in their respective
cities.6
Lysandros may have hoped that
a network of supporters in the Greek cities,
the personal friendship
influence
that order
together with
of Cyrus, would allow him to retain
in lonia after his nauarchy expired; he certainly
attempted to make matters difficult
for his successor,
in the
hope that he would fail.97
Lysandros’ hopes were realized.
successor Kallikratidas
arrived,
In spring 406, his
a young man seemingly cast
in the mold of an ideal Spartiate--brave,
scrupulously honest,
and too proud to charm a Persian barbarian for financial
outs.98
Xenophon admired these characteristics,
portrayed Kallikratidas’
deeds in as favorable
but he could not cover up the basic facts,
show us that Kallikratidas’
experienceand
ability
In quick succession,
hand
and accordingly
a light as possible,
and these easily
Lakonian virtues
and lack of military
left him rather a tactless
he succeeded in alienating
blunderer.
his paymaster
Cyruswho expected the proper deference due a son of the Great
King and Lysandros’ clients in the Greek citieswho
a continuation
summer
of Lysandros’ political
favoritism;
expected
and in
2+o6, after a few bold naval strokes, Kallikratidas
while losing 77 Peloponnesian ships at Arginousai,
died
a disastrous
defeat brought on by his own stupidity.99
Cyrus seems to have become very annoyed with the Spartan
government for replacing his friend the victorious Lysandros
with the blunderer Kallikratidas;
the peculiar Spartan political
system which forbade a single man from holding the nauarchy
twice would have been alien .and incomprehensible
prince.
to a Persian
TO UNZ.ORG very plain after Arginousai,
Cyrus madeLICENSED
his displeasure
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53
for he seems to have cut off all Persian subsidies.
We
find the surviving Peloponnesian sailors hiring themselves
out as agricultural
laborers at Chios in order to eat,
and facing starvationduring
winter 2+06/5; these terrible
conditions led to a widespread conspiracy among the men
which was discovered by the commanding Spartiate
just in time,
and the Peloponnesian fleet narrowly escaped mutiny and dis
integration *b00
This final
incident badly frightened
the Spartan gov
ernment, causing it to finally bow to the demands of Cyrus’
envoys and those from the lonian cities,
and Lysandros was
returned to command; since he was prohibited from serving as
nauarch a second time, he was appointed assistant
a nonentity,
actually
nauarch under
with the understanding that it would be he who
commanded the fleet.101
Returning to Asia in spring
tored good relations
4o5, Lysandros quickly res
with Cyrus and with the men he had established
in power in the Greek cities.
More Persian money was obtained
and the Peloponnesian fleet was restored to strength within a
few months.
Then, some time, during summer
a great stroke of fortune:
to be at his father’s
4o5, Lysandros had
Cyrus was sommoned home to Persia
deathbed,
and the young man decided to
leave his remaining war funds, together with his official
thority over the Greek cities
and their tribute,
of his Spartan friend Lysandros02
au
in the hands
Tissaphernes traveled to
the Persian court in company with Cyrus.103
Hence, for the
crucial year or two which followed, Lysandros had almost un
checked authority over the coast of Asia Minor,
.
Lysandros was not one to waste such an opportunity,
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he immedite1v
oroceeded to use his militrv
.
and
strength nd Cyrus’
54
writ to install
cities
his own supporters
as rulers
controlled by the Peloponnesians.
in those Greek
In Miletos, he
seems to have arranged a massacre of the popular elements and
those among the wealthy whom he suspected of opposition;
power was placed in the hands of Lysandros’
all
cronies.104
This same process was probably repeated in less bloody fashion
in many of the other Greek cities
at this time.105
In late 405, Lysandros finally felt his strength was
sufficient
for a decisive engagement, and he brought the
Athenian grand fleet to battle in the Hellespont at Aigos
potami; through clever strategy,
Although the details
the outcome is
he was completely victorious.
of the battle are confused and unclear,
not: the Athenians lost all but a handful of
their 180’ ships, and the Peloponnesians led by Lysandros gained
absolute control of the sea.°6
Following up his decisive victory,
the Greek cities
fleet,
Lysandros swept through
of the Aegean and coastal Asia Minor with his
allowing the demoralized Athenian garrisons in each to
return home under truce and installing
harmosts and native dekarchiesboards
composed of influential
citizens
in their places Spartan
of ten,
the latter
chosen for their loyalty to
Lysandros and placed in charge of day-to-day administration.107
Aside from democratic Samos, which remained loyal to the cause
of Athens and continued to resist,
Sparta now controlled most
of the eastern portion of the old Athenian empire.
naval empire had come into being.
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A Spartan
Chapter IV:
SPARTA AND HER NEW HEGEMONY
During the winter
of 405/4, Sparta’s
was one of near absolute
been won militarily
power.
The war against
Long Walls,
inued to resist
200 ships
Minor,
and elsewhere
Athens had
into surrender
only democratic
the Peloponnesians.
controlled
the islands,
Samos cont
Lysandros’
and the Hellespont
at Susa awaiting
the
behind
fleet
the Aegean, and the Greek cities
domination or her direct
still
in Greece
and would soon be won politically:
Athenians were slowly being starved
their
position
were all
of
of Asia
under Sparta’s
Cyrus and Tissaphernes
control.
were
the Great King’s death in March 404,1
and Cyrus’ writ given to Lysandros
still
held;
for now, Sparta
could do as she wished with the Asian Greeks without Persian
interference.
Sparta
and Sparta’s
policies
ahd come to a crossroads.
The mission which she had undertaken
Athenian imperialism
twenty-seven
eration
fraction
was dead.
long years
of Spartan
of Sparta’s
But that
in the past,
leaders
had raised
mission
citizenry
had been begun
and an entirely
now ruled the state;
naval character
only a small
The unprecedented nature
and the alliance
with Persia-
up new leaders whose power and position
upon characteristics
nant to a Spartiate
new gen
was now made up of men who had
voted for war in the assembly of 432.
of the war--its
in 4.32 had been fulfilled;
were based
which would have seemed alien and repug
Lysandros had never fought a land
of 432.
55
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56
battle,
but his naval experience
charm Persian
aristocratscontrast
him an importance
approaching
of other Spartiates
harmosts,
and his ability
that
had similarly
or subordinate
gave
of a Spartan
Dozens
officers;
men raised
under total
in sole and absolute
command of wealthy Ionian
fraction
poverty had been placed
thought,
and instilled
ability;
by 402+ a sizable
the outside
in discipline
Peloponnesian
degree.
to close herself
up once more.
ritories,
was intimately
funds and hostile
time in their
base to support
it.
had
a state
of
had
possessing
of coined money.
her domination of overseas
and a navy required
to Lakedaimonian society;
ter
a financial
Sparta had no revenue or state
alien
to
of whether
connected with the issue
to the very notion
The
society
income,
of a tax levied upon wealthy Spartiates
have been utterly
imposition
lives
As a land power, Sparta
wished to retain
she needed a navy,
and the notion
had "discovered
Sparta now faced the choice
the naval hegemony.
But if Sparta
than in original
than with reasoning
been able to remain closed and conservative,
no public
citizens
War had opened up the closed Spartan
The question
century,
to give orders as well as to obey them.
an unprecedented
retaining
rather
of Spartiates
world" and for the first
had an opportunity
with all
with courage rather
fraction
or corrupt.
of the eighth
had been run as a closed society,
save for the kings trained
cities--small
became power-hungry
From the time of the Lykourgan reforms
Sparta
king.
served abroad as nauarchs,
and scrupulous
a sizable
and
dead Kallikratidas
Lykourgan discipline
wonder that
to flatter
would
only a re
of the hated peacetime phoros in one form or another
could provide
sufficient
revenue for a fleet.
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In essence,
Sparta
57
was faced with only two options:
empire Lysandros
Athenians
had created
she could retain
the naval
in the process of defeating
the
or she could give it up, and accept the power vacuum
which would result.
There were many Spartiates
two policies.
Lysandros
who advocated
each of these
and others who had benefited
from the naval hegemony obviously wished to maintain
other Spartiates
may have remembered the terrible
the regent Pausanias
the more recent
cases of corruption
a "cosmopolitan"
"political
Sparta
But to talk
era.3
a closed society
of perhaps
members of a warrior
political
parties,
and to Spartiates.
caste
official
factions"
most accurate
less
supported the notion
less
opposed it,
thought
of "political
1500 ignorant,
is misleading;
platforms,
tribution
ephors--underlies
sentiment--and
Spartan
policy
in the
in
unsophisticated
it evokes
ticket.4
some Spartiates
of a "naval empire,"
The thread of this
of Spartiate
The first
to say that
"imperialist"
factions"
and candidates
and many were undecided
at all.
three
which existed
campaigning on the pro- or anti-imperialist
safestand
of
naval empire would
often speaks of the twoor
or "anti-imperialist"
of this
lesson
Many
and misdeeds by Spartiates
bring moral decay to Sparta
Modern scholarship
it.
in the 470s and would have pointed to
in Asia2 as proof that
necessarily
greatly
images of
for office
It is
more or
some more or
or gave it no consistent
shifting
and evolving
the chance selection
dis
of
of the next decade.
direct decision Sparta faced came in early 2+04
when Athens surrendered.5
and facing mass starvation,
The Athenians,
blockaded
for months
had sent an embassy to Sparta
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in
58
order to sue for peace on any terms.
Thebes,
and many of Sparta’s
any Athenian surrender
the city
Melos,
ful leaders
so notable
must have realized
allies,
that
Athens lost
a docile
Less happily,
ally
Athens is somewhat unclear;
ingly brief
and imprecise
who actually
imposed the Thirty;
many events
into a few sentences,
the formal surrender
he was an eye
But if we credit
then it was Lysandros
Plutarch’s
account compresses
but the other
say that
is so annoy-.
two accounts,
Lysandros
and acting
did this
sOme
on his own initiative,
is supported by the sequence of events which our sources
describe.9
This would have been in character,
noted above, Lysandros succeeded
to him as rulers
similar
came to power at
it seems unlikely
arxl Pseudo-Aristotle,
which are much more detailed,
She was also
Xenophon, an Athenian,
that
and
time.7
or bothered to learn the details.8
Plutarch,
her existence
Thirty Tyrants.
at this
symbols
she gained an imposed
The exact manner in which the Thirty
and this
who were already
with Spartan highhandedness.6
the so-called
as a Spartan
time after
to some of Sparta’s
notably the Thebans,
fortifications.
Diodorus,
her more thought
and dependent
of her power, but she retained
extreme oligarchy,
witness
Sparta
her navy and her Long Walls to the Peiraieus,
and substance
enrolled
further,
counterweight
showing signs of discontentment
destroy
deal of hatred.
a great
a city;
Athens would make an exbellent
more independent
opposed accepting
and Skione had been destroyed;
years of war had left
balked at destroying
her city
allies
and instead wished to totally
the way Histiaia,
twenty-seven
other
We are told that Korinth,
influence
in installing
in most of the Spartan-occupied
over Athens, the largest
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city
for as we have
men favorable
cities;
having
in Greece,
would
59
have been very tempting.
In the early summer of 4.04, the entity
as the Spartan
we have described
naval empire might have seemed more a Lysandrine
naval empire to the Greeks of the cities
which composed it.
Lysandros was the man who commanded the fleet
the Aegean, his clients
personally
captured
ruled in the subject
held nearly
loot
which controlled
all
of Sparta’s
and the remaining
and he
cities,
made up of
warchest,
money of Cyrus;1°
when his
friend Cyrus returned
from Susa, Lysandros was likely
still
All of these
more powerful.
power than any Spartan
factors
this,
honor.11
this
erected
in his name, and created
sacrifices
Plutarch
power at this
had ever had, and
flattering
posing songs in his honor; whole cities
offered
gave Lysandros more
commoner in history
the Greeks of his day recognized
believed
that
to become
him by com
altars
to him,
festivals
in his
Lysandros wielded more personal
time than any single
Greek before him had, and
may well be true.12
But if Lysandros’
firm political
power was enormous,
foundation.
Lysandros
it was without
was not a Spartan
he was too young to become a member of the gerousia
were selected
randomly,
His achievements
and the office
gave him great
only official
position--the
him under extraordinary
Athens was over,
it was likely
of Greece a private
Spartan
citizen
party"
loyal
and since
but it is
to him;
been granted
,f
single
to make the erstwhile
once more, with no authority
ships or troops.
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and his
the naval war with
not to be renewed.
of the ephors would be sufficient
ephors
at Sparta,
de facto nauarchy--had
conditions,
king;
could only be held once.
influence
nonsense to speak of a "political
any
vote
ruler
over
60
Essentially,
Lysandros
had two choices:
within the Spartan constitutional
to subvert
great
it.
His prestige
at this point
him to secure
further
in Lakedaimon.
serve Lysandros’
his reputation
But while this
What Lysandros
a permanent politicalAbase,
sources,
constitution.
oracles
kingship
reputation
to direct
election;
was
of our
this
when Lysandros
spoils
of Aigospotami6
involving
his
choice at the next vacancy,
time,
to be illegitiinate.-5
traveled
with his
Lysandros
of Apollo at Delphoi,
to Deiphol to dedicate
His next attempt,
of Zeus at Dodona possibly
A third
to occur in the future,
to open
but
had presumably taken place during winter
405/U,
it too failed.’
he hoped
‘sure that
an old man by this
sought to bribe the oracle
Lysandros
the Spartans
he felt
would make him an obvious
was unsuccessful;
simple;
Using bribery,
which would persuade
only "son" widely believed
plots
required
to several
was fundamentally
and King Agis was already
first
desperately
one by changing the Spartan
schemed to become a Spartan &ing.
their
it was obviously no
14.
The goal they allege
to obtain
and hence his
course of action might
and according
he sought to obtain
for
commands; and new victories
needs for a few years,
long-term solution.
at Sparta--very
might make it possible
military
would allow him to maintain
power
framework or he could attempt
and influence
in time--
he could work
came during this
attempt
the
made at the oracle
same winter,
and
at Zeus Aminon in Libya was
as were various
forged sacred tablets
other more complicated
and a spurious
Apollo.
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son of
61
How much we can credit
to judge.
oracles
all
The fact that
these
stories
is difficult
Lysandros visited
the three prinicipal
in the Greek world within a short
span of time cannot
be disputed,
and does seem to imply some extraordinary
on his part;
but whether his plans
our sources
describe
be called
they
if
of Lysandros’
is so ill-established
guesswork;
few and fragmented
of events
dreams of kingship
The chronology
reputation.
movements in this period
sources,
these
did not blind Lysandros to his need to main
tain his military
frankly
to the ones
is unclear.
What is clear is that
can be credited
corresponded
motive
but if we stick
as they are,
that
it must
closely
to the
a consistent
sequence
does emerge.18
It seems that
soon after
Athens, Lysandros succeeded
send him to Thrace-9
length against
side Sparta’s
the leaders
those
establishing
in persuading
cities
He captured
elements,
probably
operations
a city near Poteidaia.2°
Lysandros moved
to the Hellespont
dispatched
complaints
to Sparta,
the ephors
officially
recalled
they may have also overturned
region,
who resented
within his sphere
made in the Hellespont.22
slaughtering
and spent some
in late 404,
there he’ clashed with Pharnabazos,
made on territory
Thasos,
siege of Aphytis,
time in an unsuccessful
the focus of his
the ephors to
of the north which remained out
of the pro-Athenian
this,
at
We find him waging a campaign of some
hegemony.
Some time after
the Thirty
the attacks
of influence.
and after
Lysandros;21
a few of his
The latter
some consultation,
at this
same time,
local decisions
Lysandros suffered
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and
some disgrace
62
and obtained
the ephors’
permission
Zeus Ammon in Libya in fulfillment
the temple of
to visit
of a vow made during the
Thracian campaign;23 he obviously hoped to return
after
storm had died down and perhaps with a
the political
helpful
oracle.
There does seem to have been a political
this
time,
as the full
implications
began to make themselves
warrior
caste.
had dispatched
felt
to the blunt minds of Sparta’s
Samoa for Athens,
Before leaving
one of his subordinates,
and when the man embezzled part
was detected,
a major debate
naval empire broke out.24
the incident
as further
of Sicily,
had fallen
of the money and the theft
Spartiates
policy:
before a sack of silver.
"purifying"
silver
in Thrace by this
views ‘carried
while private
was made a capital
its
offense,
a fleet
Ephorus and
considered
Lysandros was
newly-created
but still
retain
public
the public
and the naval hegemony.
the day and a com
possession
of gold or
the Lakedaimonian state
Sparta hoped to remove the opportunity
dizement,
the hero
time and could not add his voice to the
men of Lysandros’
would retain
o’f
whether publicly
But in the end, although
promise was worked out:
silver
and gold,
used
effects
Gylippos,
the ephors seriously
held.25
of the
on the whole question
Theopompus both agree that
or privately
to Sparta
which had accumulated,
proof of the corrosive
Lakonia of all
Lysandros
Gylippos,
Traditionalist
new naval and fiscal
Sparta’s
storm around
of a naval hegemony
with the bulk of the cash and valuables
debate,
to Sparta
treasury.26
By this
for personal
aggran
funds she needed for
It is doubtful
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that any firm
63
or final
decision
Sparta’s
to retain
control
of Lysandros,
of private
harmost of Samos--in
doubtless
survived
many other cases
upon all
those Spartiates
incorruptibility
a worse fate
since
overseas
representatives
complex cities
to Trachinian
immediately
of the Spartiates
often resulted
Herakleia
putting
harmost at Athens,
unmatched
noting
did so by
an enormous number
As Lysandros is
a brutality
of the
did not know how to govern
men.31
Far worse from Sparta’s
Lakonian toughness"
cases
unrest
to death 500 citizens,
many Spartiates
placed in charge
A Spartan harmost sent
to put down civil
to have observed after
The brutality
in atrocities
for a Greek city of about 10,000 men.3°
free
were showing
to be far worse than merely corrupt.
the time of the Persian Wars:
alleged
for scrupulous
reputation
and poverty which saved him from
and lack of sophistication
of large,
who had served abroad;
than mere disgrace.29
Many of Sparta’s
themselves
which have not
of peculation
and it was probably only Lysandros’
personal
and
would have put a permanent stain
in the sources,
of suspicion
of Kallibios,28
the bribery
crime,
possession
illegal
Such an incident
money and had executed him.27
coupled with Gylippos’
the
of Lysandros and the
had caught Thorax- -a friend
man he had appointed
of whether
of her naval empire.
over the cities
About the same time as the recall
Spartans
question
was made on the overall
of personal
by far the worst.
own perspective
than some "good
on the part of a harniost or two were the
abuse of power.
Of these,
Klearchos’
Some time in 4.04 or 403 this
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Spartiate
was
64
had been sent out as a harmost to the Byzantines,
troubled
by civil
strife
and warfare with the Thracians.
No sooner had Klearchos
arrived
and secured his power than
he hired a large body of mercenaries,
magistrates,
murdered the civic
and set himself up as a tyrant
terrorizing
the Byzantine population
neighboring
Salyinbria;
needless
of the Spartan ambassadors
ment.
and local
to say he ignored the orders
sent to recall
having to send out a sizable
him home for punish
Lakedaimonian
throw the man she herself
had placed
f ought battle,
army was defeated,
Klearchos’
in power; after
but whatever the date,
the degree to which Klearchos’
position
of
army to over
a hard
and he himself
We cannot date the career
with any precision,
potentate,
and even conquering
Sparta was forced into the humiliating
fled to Cyrus.32
who were
of Klearchos
we can well imagine
deeds soured the Spartans
on
their naval empire.
Some time in late
still
away f,rom Sparta
coast from Susa.33
of execution
4.04--very likely while Lysandros was
in Libya--Tissaphernes
Cyrus was still
for plotting
against
at court,
Parysatis
plot and only the intervention
who favored
to the
under threat
his elder brother Artaxerxes
who now reigned as Great King; Tissaphernes
alleged
returned
her younger son
had uncovered the
of the Queen Mother
had been sufficient
to save Cyrus’ life.34
The arrival
of Tissaphernes
work under which the Spartan
In her treaties
War, Sparta
changed the’ political
frame
empire in Asia had been created.
sworn with Persia during the Peloponnesian
had promised the Asian Greeks to the Great King
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II,
65
and his successors,
and upon his return
would have demanded that
Tissaphernes
legitimate,
of those
was no friend to Sparta,
such Spartans
who feared the inordinate
included
drawing the Spartans
cities
brutal
with the wishes
influence
ruling in the lonian
cities;
stationed
in lonia
coming as it did after
at Sparta,
Spartan
several
harmosts
With
would have certainly
and the Greek
might not have been too displeased
and corrupt
of
King Agis and King Pausanias.35
to the "anti-imperialists"
themselves
change,
but his demand was
and his wishes would have coincided
Spartans
obviously
Sparta honor her commitment.
Lysandros and his dekarchies
appealed
Tissaphernes
by the
years of rule by
and Lysandros’
tyrannical
dekarchies.
Obviously,
the ephorate
the ordinary
Spartiates
would never have approved
Greeks of Asia to the barbarian;
of the Assembly or
"abandoning"
but Sarta’s
leaders
would never have presented
terms.
Instead,
"free
the lonians
more sophisticated
the decision
in these
the ephors would have been persuaded
from Lysandros’
the harmosts and garrisons
tyrannies"
which kept the dekarchies
but merely left
them free
to
by withdrawing
Sparta would not have turned any of the lonian
to Tissaphernes,
the
in power.
cities
over
and independent
just as she had promised to do in 4.32; if Tissaphernes
happened to take them over,
This was precisely
it was none of Sparta’s
concern.
what Sparta had done in a similar
situation
at Amphipolis,following
the Peace of Nikias with Athens
during the Peloponnesian
War.36
The preceding
three paragraphs
are admittedly
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conjectural
66
and poorly documented;
of our sources
that
is there a statement
Sparta returned
phernes
the sad truth
control
upon his return
of Tissaphernes’
our other sources
during these
all
Tissaphernes
stain
Zenophon obviously would
on Sparta’s
of our sources,
upon Cyrus’ return
while
the external
is very strong.
the Asian Greek cities
had revolted
from
and gone over to him; nowhere is there
to depose all
or harmostsrpresent.38
of the dekarchies
the Asian Greek cities,
a mention
When we are
convinced
the ephors
Lysandros had installed
and "return
of the people,"39
evidence
to Asia Minor around
King Agis and King Pausanias
garrisons
record,37
of control took place
of any Spartan garrisons
control
of the Asian Greeks to Tissa
itself.
the silence
Xenophon says that
told that
implication
are very sketchy at best concerning Asia
such a transfer
early 403,
or a direct
years.
Despite
that
nowhere in any
to Asia Minor--we are not even told
arrival
not have mentioned this
is that
the governments
the Spartan harmosts
must have been withdrawn at this
in
to the
and Peloponnesian
same time.
In early 4.03, a major new development took place as the
civil
war at Athens reached a critical
appointed by Lysandros,
politically
At first
they had been content
popular
leaders;
which probably blamed these
not to have opposed this
The Thirty,
had grown more and more violent
extreme in the months following
and her radical
to kill
point.40
their
to execute Athens’
and
appointment.
demagogues
arid the Athenian citizenry--
groups for defeat
very much.
in the war--seems
But soon the Thirty
large numbers of Athenians without
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cause,
began
including
67
those members of the upper classes
and a regular
reign of terror
broad support
they had once held,
whose wealth they coveted,
began.
the Thirty requested
Spartan
harmost and a Peloponnesian
protect
them "from the rebellious
was granted
along with various
With 700 foreign
troops
the Thirty further
menes, depicted
the Thirty,
garrison
their
by some sources
to their
During this
many of these
greater
their hold over the city,
killings,
exiles
and greater
an exiled
fortress
of 404/3 this
sufficient
strength
with their
foreign
garrison
Peiraieus,
killing
their
remaining
extreme
of the Thirty,
popular
and
liberation
leader,
had formed
force had accumulated
troops
in a battle
near the
Critias
in the process;
dispirited
and discredited,
the
while their place was taken by a new
group of ten oligarchs,
slightly
among citizens
As the popular forces
to the city,
numbers of Athenians
of Phyle which he had seized.
exile
leader
oligarchs,
support
for his
to defeat the army of the Thirty along
withdrew to Eleusis,
more moderate and apparently
of the cavalry
based at the Piraieus
the Ten and possibly
of the Thirty as well
the democrats.
oligarchs
began to join the "national
and based at the Attic
with strong
and soon Thera
as the leading moderate among
the city and the terror
army" which Thrasyboulos,
By the winter
them.41
extreme policies.
time,
had been fleeing
and this request
other measures to support
to strengthen
increased
a
from Sparta to
democrats"
was executed by the other
opposition
siege
Losing what little
prepared to lay
the surviving
sent for Lakedaimonian
By now it was spring
class.42
support
members
against
403, and Lysandros
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saw
68
an excellent
influence;
opportunity
to regain
he persuaded
some of his old power and
the Spartan government to send him
out as harinost of Athens,
and with his brother
been appointed nauarch for 403/2--in
blockading
Lysandros
the democratic
forces
gegan to raise
regain contol
Libys--who had
command of a fleet
inside the Peiraieus,
a mercenary army with which to
of Athenian territory.
Lysandros’
ambitions
Spartan kings acting
were once more frustrated
in unison.43
by the
We are told that
they
feared Lysandros would again become too powerful if he were
allowed to take Athens,
the greatest
city in Greece,
time,
and install
his
three
of the five
ephors to send King Pausanias
Peloponnesian
own men as rulers.
a second
The kings persuaded
with a large
army to Athens in order to arrange a settle
ment there.
After a sharp skirmish
the Athenian democrats,
was worked out;
generous political
it met with the approval
who had accompanied
man negotiating
a fairly
near the Peiraleus
Pausanias’
team later
with
settlement
of the two ephors
army and a special
fifteen-
sent out by the Assembly and
ephors at Sparta.44
The terms of the agreement were designed
Lysandros’
ambition
democrats--the
yet stillserve
overwhelming majority
Athens and presumably
arrangement
same time,
Sparta’s
most of Attic
a politically-independent
territory;
the Ten, and those
around Eleusis
rump-state
of their
oligarchic
interests.
of Athenians--were
would have meant a resumed civil
the territory
to frustrate
war.
The
granted
any other
At the
was detached to form
granted
to the Thirty’,
supporters
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who feared
69
punishment
by the victorious
Athens would not be able to pose a threat
it lasted,
hostile
Athens’
power and ambition.
Eleusis
were
Both Athens and Eleusis
as Spartan allies.45
As we have noted,
of the ephors present
this
seemed a brilliant
permanently
home government;
solution
not wasting Spartiate
lives
virtually
Pausanias’
triumphant
condemned.46
pro-imperialist
in continually
putting
Only Lysandros,
personal
all modern scholars
return,
who had lost
in Greece’s
had let
the democrats
Yet it
believe
he was tried
that
upon
by the Spartans
escape--and
nearly
The grim hand of vengeful Lysandros and his
"political
faction"
is seen in this.
As we have discussed
above, Lysandros had no "politicalparty"
at Sparta
sense of the word, and such personal
and "fellow travellers"
him politically
down
as rulers
clients
This idea is obvious nonsense.
meaningful
problem of
would have been dissatisfied,
seems that
for malfeasance--he
indeed it must have
power while at the same time
Athenian popular rebellions.
his chance at installing
support
negotiators
special
to the difficult
checking Athens’
most populous city,
had the full
settlement
and of the fifteen
sent out by the Spartan
Athens;
to
would serve as a strong check on
Sparta;
enrolled
war, and so long as
Athenian civil
would end the troubling
This arrangement
democrats.
after
his plans
as he did possess
his
supporters
would have abandoned
complete humiliation
in front
had been thwarted by the united
both kings,’ and the settlement,
made by Pausanias
work of the ephors and Assembly as well.
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in any
effort
of
of
had been the
Lysandros would have
70
appeared to be anything
But Pausanias
but a rising political
was tried
for his settlement
we even know the distribution
condemnation.4
that
this
show that
in 403.
the trial
In fact
the Athenians
their
state
At this
time,
which must have seemed so brilliant
to be nothing more than a recipe
were clearly
policy;
tells
even elderly
time,
4.03 had been correct
For several
political
convincing
of authority
and annexed it,
Pausanias’:
unifyirg
solution
in 403 had shown itself
for allowing
the restoration
since
all
with the
it was felt
that
in
his policy
in
along.48
Pausanias’
about his activities,
evidence that
to raise
settlement
and this
at Athens,
Out
silence
is
Lysandros was given no position
command.
He plays
no, role in Cyrus’
a Greek mercenary army and secure
Spartan military
assistance;
it probable
Lysandros never even had personal
that
Plutarch
weakness is very much apparent.
nor military
growing efforts
the man identified
regained much of his influence
years after
sources are silent
rather
shortly
King Agis voted for conviction.
us that Lysandros
Lysandros’
conclusively
and powerful Athens, and the Spartiates
enraged against
Sparta at this
our sources
had seized Eleusis
once more.
his
we have no reason to believe
took place around 401 or 400,
after
of a democratic
at Athens;
of votes ‘for and against
The point is that
occurred
star.
with the ‘Persian prince after
the silence
405.
of our sources
makes
contact
When Sparta sent a fleet
to support
Cyrus in spring 401, Lysandros would have been
an obvious
choice
as admiral,
but Samios was appointed
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instead.4
71
Thibron was appointed
Tissaphernes
Lysandros
in 400, and Derkyllidas
would have given anything
Lysandros
personal
obviouly
supporters
much became clear
policy.
to conduct the war in Asia against
retained
in 397--but
as a private
frustration
significant
lonians
We must remember that
warrior
for those
in the lonian cities
nothing more than anordinary
itarian
replaced
state,
citizen
him in 399;
commands.
numbers of
and elsewhere--that
had no say over Spartan
officially
Spartiate,
Lysandros was
a cog in a total
and he could not even leave for Asia
without
Lysandros felt
the ephors’ permission.5’
The
must have been enormous; he who
might have carved out a personal
empire in Asia Minor was
trapped at Sparta
by the archaic
Lykourgan code,
drink black broth
in the communal messes as a Spartiate
moner.
Lysandros,
who a little
erful man in Greece,
forced to
com
before ‘had been the most pow
was reduced to this.
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Chapter V: SLIPPING INTO A WAR WITH PERSIA
By the winter of 402/1,
believe
close
that
relations
between Sparta
for the indefinite
bear a grudge against
most Greeks must have come to
future.
and Persia
Many Spartans
Tissaphernesand
would remain
might still
vice-versa
for what
had happened during the lonian War, while others might dream
of being able to return
to lonia
as harmosts over rich lonian
cities,
but in Asia Minor "Persia"
brother
of the Great King and chief among the western satraps;
meant Cyrus,
he had seemingly healed his differences
had returned
II and
power restored
soon
had returned.1
Sparta’s relations
Spartans
with Artaxerxes
to the coast with his original
after Tissaphernes
the younger
with Cyrus were excellent.
must have continued to feel gratitude
Many
for the generous
support which he had provided them during the lonian War, and
soon Sparta
providing
as a whole was to show her collective
him with substantial
been significantly
hellenized
had ‘spent in Ionia,2
mercenary troops.3
transfer
by
Cyrus had
years which he
and he employed large numbers of Greek
in lonia he had taken
which Tissaphernes
the departure
had gained control
of the Spartans,
had not been free of violence;4
bore Tissaphernes
support.
by the formative
Upon his arrival
over the Greek cities
following
military
feelings
a grudgeto
Artaxerxes
in the succession
Darius II,
and apparently
and apparently
this
no doubt Cyrus still
put it mildly
stuggle
of
for upporting
following
the death of
doing his best to have Cyrus executed.5
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72
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Xenophon’s
account of Cyrus’ great popularity
is obviously
Asia6
nonetheless;
biased,
as mentioned
at least.7
It seemed that
some thirty
4o1,
Cyrus began his attempt
from his brother.
stable
His earlier
mercenaries,
which he intended
tingents
his preparations
were all
In all,
3000 cavalry.9
probably be able to’ field
Spartan support
perhaps
70,000 Asiatic
The Great King, would
but Cyrus believed
with many
that the
and heavy armor of his Greek hoplites--who
in a broad,
and the throne.
shallow front--1°
For her part,
of about 700 hoplites,
Lakedaimonians,
Sparta contributed
including
were to
would win him victory
a substantial
and commanded by Cheirisophos,
she also sent 35 ships
support
By
and the Greek con
an army twice as large,
times the number of cavalry,
fight
the Great King.
same time.8
of them hoplites--and
including
training
to use as the cutting
Cyrus’ army comprised about 13,000 Greek merce
naries--11,000
troops
empire
large numbers of Greek
were complete,
at this
as
had been pretence:
ordered to assemble at Sardis;
requested
was formally
of the Persian
reconciliation
edge of the army he would lead against
early 401,
come to the Aegean
framework came apart
years he had been gathering
for several
and Cyrus
open warfare.
control
to seize
would
of Greek mercenaries
peace had finally
this
true
and dekarchies
seem good by comparison,
years of more or less
Then in spring
hoplite
harmosts
knew how to win the friendship
certainly
after
but probably more or less
earlier,
have made most other rulers
among the Greeks of
a contingent
number of
a Spartiate;U
under the nauarch Pythagoras
Cyrus’ march along the coast
to
of Asia Minor.12
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The reasons
behind Sparta’s
easily
apparent.
Sparta
on the throne of Persia
that
The advantages
Cyrus was entitled
the support
support
of having a friend
are obvious;
of
and the argument
to Spartan assistance
in return for
he had given Sparta during the war against
Athens would have swayed a Spartiate
precisely
for Cyrus are
the reasons
our sources
assembly.
cite,
and apparently
were good enough for the vast majority
of Spartiates,
we do not hear a whisper of any disagreement
or any recriminations
These are
they
for
over the policy
when Cyrus’ scheme failed.13
For Cyrus did fail,
dying in battle
against
Artaxerxes
II
in summer 401 at Kunaxa, and in the months which followed,
Sparta began to learn the risks
pretender
to the Persian
the Spartans
Persian
by supporting
a
In the mind of Artaxerxes,
they had been given a few years
a Persian
Greek King.
of all
throne.
in supporting
and the other Greeks had repaid the generous
assistance
Artaxerxes
involved
rebel and waging war against
We are told that
considered
men.14
the Spartans
provocation;
the
to the end of his life,
to be the most shameless
The Greeks had attacked
of Persia without
earlier
the legitimate
ruler
the Gree.ks would have to be
punished.
The suitable
phernes,
agent.for
a personal
punishment was at hand.
enemy of Cyrus,
had remained loyal to
Artaxerxes,
and had given valuable
for loyalty
went hand in hand with punishment
and accordingly,
service
by summer 400 Tissaphernes
Asia Minor as satrap
of Karia,
Tissa
Lydia,
lonia,
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at Kunaxa.
Reward
for betrayal,
had returned
and other
to
75
holdings;
he was also given authority
who had apparently
over Pharnazcs,
remained at his own establishment
the struggle
between Cyrus and Artaxerxes.16
Tissaphernes
intended
but their
loyalty
hostility
to treat
the cities
Spartans
How severely
the lonian Greeks is unclear,
toward him combined with their
to Cyrus certainly
dispatched
led them to suspect
embassies
to Sparta,
war with Persia
in the context
were faced with a dilemma.
had been the last
But now friendly
doubtful
that Tissaphernes
old arraement,
and grant
lonian
would consider
the lonians
assembly that Tissaphernes
poor past relations
Spartiates
returning
a sizable
meant to install
destroy
these
their
against
other than Tissaphernes’
to Asia or allowing
very harshly
treated
An earlier
and taxes.
tyrants
in their
would have led most
A Spartan embassy
warning him not to commit
the Greeks of Asia;
was faced with the choice
degree of
freedom, and Sparta’s
charges.
was sent to the ‘Persian satrap,
aggression
to the
would have told the Spartan
with Tissaphernes
to believe
was
Cyrus was dead, and it seemed very
ambassadors
and completely
Cyrus, who
perspective,
autonomy in exchange for submission
Frightened
A
thing Sparta had intended
of Asia Minor and Sparta’s
Persia.
no reply
the worst;
begging the
when she had sent her men and ships to support
cities
past
for protection.17
Sparta and the Spartans
internal
during
it apparently
attack
of either
on Kyme.18
sending a military
received
Sparta
force
the Asian Greeks to be conquered and
bythe
hated Tissaphernes.
Sparta might have sent a second embassy,
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‘
76
then washed its
of late
hands of the whole business;
400 contained
a substantial
number of Spartiates
who longed to leave the narrow confines
to Asia Minor:
aiding
of Greece and return
these men would not have let
the lonian
struggle.
cities
The specific
incidents
memory being as transient
probably lost
much of their
had annexed Eleusis,
sting.
earlier
years
in the past,
By this
date,
of the lonians,
to Asia.
We must not neglect
is--had
the Athenians
to regain a measure
he would have vigorously
arguments
partial
as it usually
causing Lysandros
of his old influence;
endorsed the
hoping to be sent out as a commander
emotional considerations:
Spartan assembly might have been swayed by the pleas
lonian representatives
to protect
the hubris
Tissaphernes.
arrival
of detested
of the Ten Thousand--the
have come to hold an exaggerated
barbarian
We know nothing
a
of
fellow Greeks against
If rumors of the
remnant of Cyrus’ mercenaries--
at the Euxine had reached Sparta by this
Greek arms against
of
of power abuse and corruption
from naval empire were several
and--public
the issue
fade away without a political
which had helped to bring about Sparta’s
retreat
but the Sparta
time,
impression
Spartans
might
of the power of
numbers.
of the arguments made at Sparta,
or
how narrow the vote turned out to be, but some time probably
in lat+00,
against
Thibron was sent out to defend the Asian Greeks
Tissaphernes
and Persia.
The chronology
ensuing war in Asia over the next half-decade
presented
in the surviving
sources
that
of Sparta’s
is so poorly
it is generally
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77
difficult
to firmly
establish
hence our treatment
although
a precise
impossible,
pattern
Sparta’s
history
and generate
Tisaphernes
importance
into a consistent
of the nature of
empire.
of Sparta’s
commitment to the war against
question
for us to decide.
it might seem that
upon the war, for the army Thibron took with him
1000 neodamodeis
4000 Peloponnesians
cities.2°
from the allied
is somewhat deceiving,
were obviously worth nearly
actually
Also,
have negative
Diodorus’
allies"
mercenaries;21
since
be paying for them,
Sparta was uninterested
shows that
the
would presumably
None of this
in the war;
there was no great
interest.
seeking an empire in Asia, she
seeking an "empire on the cheap."
her imperial
of Thibron in Asia, Sparta began to
presence
we have argued earlier,
an infrastructure
tell,
themselves
presence.
to were actually
they cost Sparta nothing.
With the arrival
recreate
and might
us that
informs
which Xenophon refers
If Sparta was consciously
was definitely
of neodamodeis
value if Sparta feared their
the lonians
proves that
but it certainly
for the lives
account
and
But this
nothing to Spartiates
more detailed
"Peloponnesian
directly
At
Sparta placed great
was very large by Greek standards:
appearance
But
is virtually
do fall
a good impression
is a crucial
inspection
of these years
themselves
overseas
The strength
first
must take the form of an outline.19
the events
revived
any date to within a year;
along the lonian
Sparta’s
As
naval empire had never had
or administrative
it merely consisted
coast.
base;
of individual
as far as we can
harmosts ruling by
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78
fiat,
scattered
military
with its nauarch.
require
little
garrisons,
garrisons,
and the Spartan fleet
Re-establishing
such an "empire"
more than sending out new harmosts and
and persuading
or
coercing
the Greek cities
into accepting
them; widespread
fear of Tissaphernes
have made this
last task rather
easy.
Matters were different
There, Pharnabazos
certainly
ruled,
we have,
and the Hellespontine
Anaxibios,
at his hands.
it seems that
ended her presence
would
in the north of Asia Minor.
would not have turned their
in fear of destruction
evidence
would
in that
cities
Greeks
over to Sparta
But from the limited
Sparta had never completely
area.
In early 400, we find
the Spartan nauarch for 401/0,
making his presence
known in the Euxine,22 and some time later
we come across a
Spartan harmost in charge of Byzantion.23
A Spartan
garrison
is also in control
includes
vague statements
of Chalkedon,24
to the effect
of the region had Spartan harmosts.25
the Spartan presence
Pharnabazos
blessing
appears
had recently
Hellespontine
Chalkedon continuously
importance
and since
arrangement
his
terms with the Spartan
that
Sparta had controlled
such as Byzantion
and
from 4.05,26 probably because of the
of Euxine grain to Greece.27
If the nature
from this
cities
cities
There is no hint that
to have given the entire
it seems very likely
some important
various
been restored,
and to have been on amicable
authorities,
that
and Xenophon
of Spartan
area and time--and
control may be generalized
we have no reason to doubt this--
then the ‘Spartan naval empire was an extraordinarily
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loose
79
and undirected
entity.
Since the recall
404., there had been no single
harmosts
pretty
the Spartiates
whether contrary
or
chain of command.
account makes this
strikingly
After the Ten Thousand led by Xenophon had made
and nearly
a dispute
with the local
Anaxibios
made a proclamation
caught within
Spartan
directive
he
Pharnabazos
expired,
that
any of the mercenaries
disagreed
while the man was nauarch,
to completely
commander.31
Spartiates
recognized
The evidence
were sold as
had done his best to secure Anaxibios’
but after
this personal
reverse
he did his best to frustrate
individual
the
the sick and dis
400 Greek soldiers
harmost of Byzantion instead;
new Spartan
Kleandros,
and simply ignored
ignored him, and made arrangements
Anaxibios
the nauarch
but when his successor Aristarchos
some time later,
cooperation
officials,
seems even to have invited
abled to come in,
slaves.30
sacked the city following
the city would be sold as slaves.29
the harmost of Byzan-tion,
clearly
like,
of any official
way to Byzantion
arrived
it
and the wishes of the local Greeks
We see no signs
clear.28
as a result,
sent out to Asia as commanders
Xenophon’s eyewitness
their
of policy;
much did whatever they felt
to "Spartan policy"
not.
leader to dominate the various
and set the broadlines
seems that
of Lysandros in
his earlier
his term
with the new
insult
led
behavior,
the aims of Pharnabazos
Sparta had no policy,
sometimes
did;
and
and the
though
and Pharnabazos
this.
of Xenophon also supports
Spartan commanders in these years
essentially
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the notion that
ruled by fiat.
‘
80
He says this
outright
in the Anabasis:
are not far away, and the Spartans
They have the power, yes,
Greek
cities
He repeats
this
each individual
same description
of Greece.
Spartan in the
there. ‘"32
of Spartan authority
in
Since we come across no mention of any
system of taxation
Spar-tans during this
financial
are masters
has the power, to do what the3.like
the Hellenica.33
organized
‘The Greek cities
"
period,
contributions
or tribute-gathering
by the
it is quite
that
possible
local
to Spartan commanders were raised
in the same manner, by fiat.
During winter 400/399,
among his lonian
allies
Thibron quartered
and raised
Ephesos and other neighboring
a further
Greek cities;
his troops
2000 men from
by late spring,
he had also gained the service
of most of the 5000 remaining
troops
of the Ten Thousand.34
Although the 12,000 or so
troops
he now had may seem a small force when measured
against
army.
the manpower of Asia,
We must remember that
Greek mercenaries
it was actually
a very formidable
Cyrus had expected his
to win him victory
against
the grand army
of the Great King in the heart of the Persian
force
14,000
empire.
is more than twice the size of the original
Thibron’s
land army
which Athens had sent to Syracuse.35
The presence
of this
is without precedent.
enormous Greek army in Asia Minor
In her day, Athens had been a naval
power, and her empire had confined
or coastal
strips.
By contrast,
accustomed
to land warfare,
its expansion to islands
the Spartans
we’re most
and with increasing
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numbers of’
81
Greek mercenaries
rather
than of citizen
hoplites
allowed
Sparta’s
commanders in Asia to take military
Perikles
or even a K,on had never dared to consider.
risks
that
a
The
Athenian naval empire had done no more than send out small
tribute-collecting
forces
a few miles
inland;36
under Sparta,
large armies were to march all through the interior
of
western Asia Minor.
The first
tentative
Spartan probes into the interior
and cautious.
army on Ephesos,
In early spring
Thibron
captured
towns, but withdrew to the coast
cavalry.3.7
nearly
After the arrival
doubled the strength
confident
Greek
in the face of Tissaphernes’
of Cyrus’ mercenaries
of lonia,
including
remained
inland
had
of his army, Thibron felt
marched into the hinterland
had apparently
399, basing his
several
enough to face Tissaphernes
number of inland towns
were very
in open country,
and
winning over a large
some Greek ones
under Persian
control
which
since the
6th century.39
Following
this
short
from the ephors ordering
concentrate
in Caria.3
his attack
him to leave lonia
upon Tissaphernes’
his successor
him; Thibron returned
condemned for misconduct--he
allies--and
a message
and instead
home territory
As he was at Ephesos in summei/399 preparing
for his march into aria,
to replace
campaign, Thibron received
Derkyllidas
to Sparta,
had let
arrived
where he was
his troops’ plunder
exiled.0
Derkyllidas
into the details
was now in command, and we need not go
of his campaigns at all.
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Over the next
his
82
two years,
it is unlikely
months actually
fighting
that
he spends more thana
Tissaphernes
of the remaining time is spent
to help build a wall against
few Chian exiles
lidas’
great willingness
with the Persian
"Sisyphos"__42
or besieging
the truces
he does
is as obvious as his nickname-
which happens to be the name of an ancient
for his shrewdness
seems almost certain
Derkyllidas
that
and greed.
was turning
commission in Asia to very profitable
lining his pockets with Persian
causing the Persian
satraps
It
his
advantage,
gold and in return not
any trouble;
empire in Asia was very likely
Naturally
a
The reasons behind Derkyl
king of Korinth legendary
military
most
the Chersonese
the Thracians
to make all
satraps
or Pharnabazos;
visiting
in Atarneus.41
few
under him Sparta’s
a glorified
Xenophon--who very clearly
liked
protection
racket.
Derkyllidas--43
makes no mention of this.
how Derkyllidas
It is also obvious
with his activities:
almost nil.
Thibron,
phernes
Spartan
Just before
the latter
interest
Derkyllidas
had received
managed to get away
in Asia was clearly
had arrived
to replace
an order to attack
in Caria and had been preparing
to do so; Derkyllidas
simply ignored the order and marched north instead
The ephors apparently
forgot
all
Tissa
about him.
of south.44
Two years
later,
after Derkyllidas marched to most parts of coastal Asia Minor
except Caria probably
Tissaphernes
paid him well,
once again send him an order to invade Caria;
ignorance of geography,
had invaded Carla,
until
it is possible
that
given Spartiate
they thought
some Ionian Greeks pointed
error. 45
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the ephors
he
out their
83
While Derkyllidas
Chian exiles,
had been sasting
the Persian
the situation.
satraps
The Spartans
his time against
had been taking stock
had shown themselves
more dangerous than the Athenians
levies,
and they had succeeded
the Spartans
time marching aimlessly
might not be permanent.
Tissaphernes
have begun to fear that
step of attempting
ability,
this
indecision
and Pharnabazos may
to extend her power into the non-Greek
overthrow a Great King,
defeating
supported
to wast their
Sparta would soon take the logical
areas of Lydia or Phrygia;
trouble
by Athens.
were content
along the coast,
to face with
in capturing
inland towns which had never been controlled
Although at present
to be much
had ever been, for their
powerful land army made them simply too strong
mere satrapal
of
at least
would have no
if they were properly
cavalry.
led and
It was well within Sparta’s’
from the purely military
point
to detach the western satrapies
from Persia,
in the hands of friendly
rulers.
been able to call
could nearly
8000 or 9000 hoplites
a satrap
by adequate
if 12,000 hoplites
native
upon thousands
of view,
and place them
If Pissouthnes
of allied
had
Greek hoplites,
his revolt would have been successful.
It is obvious
from Sparta’s
government never even remotely
but the Persiaris
considered
army remained on their
the Spartan
any of these
could not have known this,
would have grown increasingly
paring to depart.
behavior that
options,
and the satraps
nervous as the large "barbarian"
territory
arid showed no sign of pre
In early summer 398, Phanabazos set off
for Susa to confer with the Great King about the situation.46
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84
By the time Pharnabazos
reached
King, messengers from Evagoras,
had already
been there
and placing
and were attempting
land power with
Evagoras proposed building
a large fleet
it under the command of Konon, the experienced
in exile
added his support
500 talents
of the Great
king of Cyprus,
to counter Spartan
Athenian admiral living
apparently
a subject
for some time,
to persuade Artaxerxes
Persian naval power;
the court
to initiate
at his court.
to this
plan,
the construction
Pharnabazos
and was granted
of a fleet
at Cyprus;
Konon was put in charge of the Great King’s ships.
Returning
to the coast
bazos met with Tissaphernes;
army from the territories
20,000 infantry
truces
dangerously
levies,
account,
lites
Persia
low in numbers,
during the long
had allowed his army
and now, even with
attack
he claims Pharnabazos
Tissaphernes.--who
From Xenophon’s
might very well have
urged suc’h an attack,
remembered what a few Greek hop
had done at Kunaxa--decided
A truce was arranged,
terms:
Derkyllidas
a Persian
to avoid battle
would be left
independent
and in exchange the Spartan harinosts
be withdrawn from Asia,
to seek approval
instead.
and the commanders negotiated
the Greek cities
Ephesos.
with the army he had
he had only 7000 troops.4
been successful;
but that
marched against
to defend his base;
it seems that
a large
satrapies--allegedly
Derkyllidas
with the Persians,
lonian
they raised
and 10,000 cavalry--and
put together
to fall
together
of their
There, they encountered
hastily
some time in early 397, Pharna
Both parties
for the treaty
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from
and army would
dispatched
from their
treaty
messengers
respective
home
85
governments.
It is very likely
this
as a device to stall
"treaty"
were waiting until
sail;
Derkyllidas
significant
of these
events
a strong
had finally
terms were harsh:
would be ready to
the Spar-tans
had been unfolding
Peloponnesian
side,
which had long
state
and after
communities,
and power.
several
Korinthians
both refused.
of growing Boiotian
allies,
in that
resentment
in Korinth.
willing
overt
Athens.5-
mirrored
Later that
to overthrow
to contribute
is a pattern
of the Spartan hegemony over
to a lesser
with the
year and the next
and covert assistance
puppets;5°
and
of the loot from Dekeleia and
of Athens.49
fighting
as pro-Spartan
there
In 404 Thebes had quarreled
over the division
democrats
The
the Athenians
while the Boiotians
Greece, and we find Thebes’ attitude
she had provided
397.
and hence lose much of her
From the end of the war against Athens,
over the fate
years of
in spring
The war is notable
as Spartan
Spartans
in main
Elis was forced to grant independence to
participated
extent
in Asia,
Sparta had gone to
,
forced a surrender
many of her outlying
territory
the Persians
had also been taking place
been a thorn in Sparta’s
fighting
were using
support.
40048 probably
In late
war with Elis,
for time:
may have been hoping that
developments
land Greece.
both sides
the Great King’s fleet
would send him additional
While all
that
the Thirty,
neither
troops
to the Athenian
whom she viewed
Thebes nor Korinth had been
to Pausariias’
Some time in these years--very
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expedition
likely
against
before the
86
overthrow
slice
of the Thirty--the
Thebans had annexed a small
of Attic
territory
around Oropos,
led to further
political
conflict
Internal
Boiotlan
much of Bolotia’s
discusses
politics
pro- and anti-Spartan
that
may have
with Sparta.52
played a role
foreign policy;
it seems most likely
and this
in shaping
the Oxyrhychian historian
factions
at length.53
the mere fact
of Spartan
But
hegemony
over Greece was the main factor which pushed Korinth and
Thebes into opposition;
Greece against
Athens three
While relatively
and Boiotia
overwhelming Athenian power had united
strong
could afford
known, Athens could not.
and a year of terror
in the physical
her annexation
dutifully
such as Elis,
to make their
Thirty
anti-Spartan
years
under the Thirty
of Eleusis
sending contingents
as requested..5
they learn that
Greece
had drained her, both
sense.
Aside from
seems to have
than a true military
403,
to Thibron and to the war
as 397, we find
Even as late
all Athenians--upper-class
demagogues alike--desperately
sentiments
of war against
in 401/0--which
putsch rather
Korinth,
she remained a model Spartan ally after
against Elis
nearly
states
and in the psychological
been a near-bloodless
action--S4
decades earlier.
politicians
frightened
a few citizens
and popular
and submissive when
had arranged
a provocation
against sparta.56
As to Sparta’s
two or three
own internal
years after
Cyrus’ expedition,
a near impenetrable darkness.
Lysandros’
star
had risen
politics
in the crucial
we are faced with
When Athens annexed Eleusis,
while King Pausanias
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had narrowly
87
escaped condemnation--this
know in this
period,
is impossible
supported
and even it is poorly established.
the Elean War or Dkyllidas’
following
or the Athenian annexation
have attempted
into the interaction
factions,
slate,
but this
leaders
inactivity
of Eleusis.
of several
Certain
well-defined
any
in Asia
of Oropos
modern
political
is the more accurate
of Sparta are a mystery,
which is not solved by the construction
digms which have no historical
It
Spartan policy-making
amounts to drawing a cartoon
workings
if
the Theban annexation
to dissect
and the blank slate
The internal
the only fact we
to guess which of Sparta’s
or non-intervention
scholars
is virtually
on a blank
picture.
a mystery
of artificial
reality.
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para
Al
A:
Appendix
THE NATURE OF THE EVIDENCE
In the period of Greek history
on, virtually
all
important
evidence is very marginal
inscriptions
which -this thesis
evidence is literary.
Athens and not to Sparta.
few of major importance
Epigraphical
and will not be discussed
are few and those which survive
Of our literary
to this
thesis
focuses
below:
are relevant
sources,
to
only the
will be singled out for
analysis.
Thucydides:1
The history
for malfeasance
detailed
of Thucydides,
an Athenian general
in 4234.104_107,5.26,2
account ot the Peloponnesian
and Sparta;
the narrative
and covers
the war to 411.
the finest
of our ancient
the most rigorous
discusses
is a continuos
standards
and
War fought between Athens
the rise
Thucydides
sources,
exiled
of Athenian power
is rightly
approaching
of factual
recognized
as
in his writing
accuracy and depth of
analysis.
We need not concern ourselves
of the man or his method;
Thucydides
carefully
logically,
a general
cross-examines
of his informants1.22,
vention2.54.,
refuses
statement
he was able to.gather
to credit
information
to suit
fickle
be enough.
supernatural
inter
to use evidence,
hypotheses1.2-6.
from the men of both sides5.26.
story
will
discussion
and compares the statements
and shows a keen ability
and form plausible
as a romantic
with a detailed
reason
As an exile,
on the course of the war
He intends
his history
public tastes,
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but as a
not
A :;.
sober record of the events of his time,
of the future
beings
a solid knowledge of the ways in which human
and city-states
As such, his writing
or apologetic;
with regard
rather
aimed at giving men
react
under varying conditions1.22.
is meant to be true rather
such little
bias as manages to creep ine.g.
to Kleon:4.27-39
than the rule
than moralistic
seems very much the exception
in comparison with most other ancient
historians.
Unfortunately
for our purposes,
to complete his history
eighth
rough and unfinished
to this
state.
none of the polished
show the apparent
furthermore,
War; even his
of the Peloponnesian
covers the beginning of the lonian War and
book--which
hence is most pertinent
tains
Thucydides never lived
motives
thesis--is
unmistakably
Unlike the others,
this
in a
book con
speeches which Thucydides used to
and views of the major belligerents;
the narrative
breaks off abruptly
at the end,
in the middle of a narrative.
Besides these
requires
extensive
porting
the revolt
obvious
signs,
editing
and revision.
of Amorges against
Minor8.5,19,28,54.,
the revolt
appears
at Athens:
dides
in Persia’s
the Great King in Asia
decision
version.3
several
that
the
The same need for
minor inaccuracies
probably would have caught in a later
also likely
to back Sparta
in the a,ccount of the oligarchic
it contains
revolution
which Thucy
check.4
It is
Thucydides might have reworked the form of
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of
Athenian collusion
so Thucydides would have discussed
at length in his final
revision
clearly
We find Athens sup
or why Athens decided to intervene;
Andocides 3.29,
revolt
itself
but we are never told of the beginning
with Amorges was crucial
cf.
the account
the three treaties
period,
between Sparta and Persia
though this
is not certain;
the treaties
in form and seem to have been directly
documents,
rather
actual
in the eight
authors.
vantage--Thucydides’
to those
treaties,
is concerning
relating
to the war in lonia;
the political
informants
we get goodthough
at Sparta
of the
which is a great
is Thucydides’
and that
chief
inclusion
surviving
ad
far
sources.
account sadly lacking,
decisions
Alkibiades
made at Sparta
is obviously
for book eight,
undoubtedly
one of
and while he is
biased
but when he leaves for Asia with Chalkideus
more about Sparta’s
as
apparent
account of the lonian War is still
Only in one regard
Thucydides’
own style,
Even with these
of our subsequent
greatly
based on the original
book--and the apparent
forms of the Persian
superior
differ
than reworked into Thucydides
was usual with ancient
defects
made during this
information,
we learn nothing
view of the events which develope.
Xenophon:
No other source
of Sparta’s
personal
as important
to our understanding
naval empire as Xenophon, both because of his great
knowledge of Sparta
is the only extant
history;
is nearly
continuous
hence it is vital
and Persia
narrative
and because his Hellenica
of this
period of Greek
to gain a good understanding
of the
man and his works.
Xenophon himself was apparently
cavalry class--note
Art
born into the Athenian
his essays on
ofHorsemanship
and the attention
cavalry classHell.2.4.26-27.
cavalryThe
Cavalry Commander,
paid to theThe Athenian
This made him a member of the
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richest
one or two
although
percent
it is clear that
service
he performed anything
skirmishes
seem based on personal
described
concerning
proves that
their
reign
and heartily
e.g.
Hell.2.3.15,17,50-56;
the rise
despised their
have made him somewhat suspect
cruelty
and violence
rather
But he
than join
and his social
class would
under the restored
a year he had left
the city,
to join Cyrus’ army in AsiaAnab.3.1.4-1O.
the death of his friend
of the
and fall
he was no extremist.
army of liberation,
403, so within
The
he was in Athens during most of
had remained in Athens under the Thirty
Thrasyboulos’
in the Hellenica
experienceHell.1.2.2-5,15-18.
which he includes
Thirty Tyrants
but loyal
during the years of the Peloponnesian War:
a few of the cavalry
details
but
population,6
his sympathes were mildly oligarchic,
there is no evidence that
military
of the citizen
democracy of
invited
by a friend
After Kunaxa,
and
along with the other Greek generals,
Xenophon helped lead the remnant of the Ten Thousand back to
Asia Minor; these events he recorded in his Anabasis,
memoirs with apologia.7
years,
serving
King Agesilaos.
Agesilaos
Derkyllidas,
He seems to have become a close friend
important
Pharnabazos:
He remained in Asia for several
under the Spar-tans Thibron,
during this
at several
period,
for he is obviously
conferencesmost
Hell.4.1.30-40,
noticably
and after
or eight years Xenophon spent
a strong leavening
and
of
an eyewitness
Agesilaos’
death in
The seven
in Asia under Cyrus and under
gave him a considerable
and some years later
more
the one with
360/59, he wrote a lengthy encomium, the Agesilaos.
the Spartans
combining
he distilled
of historical
knowledge of Persian
this
knowledge--together
romance and moralism--into
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affairs,
with
f1c
his Cyropaedia,
the education
When Agesilaos
in
394.,
part
marched back to Greece with his army
back with him, clearly
Xenophon travelled
in the battle
fought
of Koroneia
on the other side,
to his native
to return
controlled
together
acquire
city,
settling
territory
with Agesilaos
with his close
Ages.2.lO-l5;
and henceforth
Peloponnesian
His friendship
of Cyrus the Great.
Athens had
Xenophon was unable
at Skillos
instead
and other
proximity
taking
in Spartan-
Anab.5.3.7-13.
leading
Spartans
to Sparta allowed him to
a knowledge of Lakedaimon which was unprecedented
for a non-Lakedaimonian.
customs
of the Spartans
Lacedaimonians,
Besides
describing
the social
at length in his
in his Hellenica
specialized
Spartan terms--the
Assembly,"
the "Spartan-trained"
Consti ution of
he routinely
"inferiors,"
usesthe
the "Little
Hell.3.3.6;3.3.8;5.3.9--
whose meaning we can only guess at, proving the depth of
his knowledge and the depth of our ignorance.
likely
that
thousand
Xenophon had personally
Spartiates
of this
Xenophon’s Hellenica
or institutional
rather
poor.
and purports
as a source
but as straight
Thucydides’
history
work is not unitary.
between the first
to the surrender
narrative
of Mantineia
it is
breaks off,
years,
in 362; however,
the
There is a very obvious stylistic
portion--which
break
deals with the Ionian War
of Athens and the establishment
Hell.2.3.ll--and
of social
begins with the loniari
to cover the events of the next fifty
closing with the battle
Thirty
period.
His "Greek History"
War in 411 soon after
is very
met most of the few
is invaluable
knowledge;
It
the remainder
of the
of the work, which
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may or may not have been composed as a single
late
unit
in the
350s.8
The portion
War contrasts
of the Hellenica
sharply
with the account
The events
little
for its
clumsiness
and lack of detail
of Thucydides which it attempts
of seven years--411
to 404--are
more space than Thucydides
and wheat not chaff is lost.
effort
dealing with the lonian
devotes
compressed
Xenophon apparently
significant
defeat
war in Korkyra Diodorus
seizure
13.52-53;
in 410 Diodorus
of the Athenian-held
52-53;9
fortifications
13.65.1-2.
He mentions
departure
of Boiotios’
embassy to Susa Hell.
devotes
one ambiguous sentence
Hell.
1.2.18;
of his chronology
first
magnified
cf.
the very
the return but not the
to the Spartan
1.4.1-3;
capture
and
of
The accuracy
to much doubt-°
of historiography
which Xenophon displays
segment of the Hellenica
in his account
the
or the Iviegarian
Diodorus 13.64.5-7.
is subject
All the errors
in this
he
of Nisaia
Diodorus
ceases
made little
Spartan peace mission to Athens following
at Kyzikos
into
to the year 412;
to gain firm knowledge of the war as a whole:
omits the civil
Pylos
to continue.
are repeated and
of events after
to even mention the passage
404., for now he
of most winters,
leaving
us often unable to date an event within a year or two.11
His factual
coverage
clearly
ominissions are equally
striking.
of the Asian campaigns of Agesilaos
participated
His
in which he
is often vague and spotty.
The decisive
naval war along the Asia Minor coast between 397?
Knidos is almost totally
ignored,
and afterwards
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and
naval matters
‘p
are treated
is attempted,
with the land war
no integration
very briefly;
while the chronology
Hell.4.8.1-5.1.29.
is turbid
of the
Xenophon makes no mention anywhere of the foundation
Second Athenian Confederacy
in 378 or the refoundation
Messene in 370, both events
of the greatest
of devoting
Instead
importance.
his space to significant
trivial
spends four full
giving a vivid description
Agesilaos’
training
Hell.3.4..16-19,
in Phrygia
12,
following
A little
later,
is closer
Apologia
especially
the Hellenica,
carries
silences.
for Sparta and King Agesilaos,
between the lines
to.guess
times no doubt making it
one word about Sparta’s
of Asia Minor to Persian
Agesilaos’
daughterHell.4..1.4-15.
its title,
no weight at all.13
often in the form of
often forcing us to read
impossible.
rule
of matters,
and some
The Hellènica
says not
of most of the Greek cities
at the conclusion
of the Pelop
onnesian War;-’ not one word of the many atrocities
by Spartan
of Greece,"
Xenophon bore a deep admiration
the truth
return
instead
role as matchmaker
despite
also plays a large role,
suspicious
Oxyrhynchia
as much as
memoirs than "A History
on any matter
of
Oxyrhynchia 21,
of Otys to Spithridates’
to being personal
and its silence
Hellenica
Xenophon ignores
at great length about Agesilaos’
As Cawkwell aptly notes,
He
campaign of 396
may be due to apologia
campaign in Mysia Hellenica
in the marriage
details.
word on Agesilaos’campaign
of Sardis
the battle
weighting
incompetence.12
writing
to the Sardis
but not a single
though this
difficult
camp prior
but colorful
matters,
Xenophon often emphasizes
sections
of
committed
commanders in Asia;15 not one word about Agesilaos’
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story
Lysandros
that
had secretly
it is as often in defense of
When Xenophon does speak,
as in defense
he defends Agesilaos
impropriety
youth,
at great
length against
the Hellenica
Agesilaos
father,
political
the boy."l?
Agesilaos
Similarly,
seizure
Oxyrhynchia 21 briefly
raid against
Diodorus 15.20.2;
it is very difficult
that
in Phoibidas’
to suit
co-believer,
Agesilaos
in 378 Hell.
the truth
sentiments
long, noble speeches
valorHell.1.6.1-34,
his
23
or
5.4.20-34;
of these affairs.
also cause him to
own conceptions.
He
into the mouth of Kallikratidas,
and emphasizes
his ability
and
though a close reading shows the man to
have been rather a blunderer.18
Agesilaos’
as much more ambitious
campaigns in Asia
and successful
than they
were.19
Besides these
moralizing
ponsible
Plutarch
to disengage
cut and trim the facts
Assembly,
states
in the son than in the
the Peiraieus
Xenophon’s panhellenic
actually
about
of the Theban Kadmeia in 382 Hell.
Sphodrias’
are portrayed
interest
knowledge and keeps silent
from any complicity
cf.
as his
Agesilaos’
Xenophon does his best to exonerate
5.2.25-36;
depicted
a handsome
"he was said to have a mighty passion for
and Sparta
treacherous
inserts
he emphasizes
was much more interested
saying that
charges of
son Megabates,
while in the Hellenica
Negabates;
In the Agesilaos5.4.-7
of the truth.
with Spithridates’
in Spithridates’
to make himself
means.16
king by extra-legal
his friends
plotted
biases,
Xenophon at times shows a rather
and superstitious
"seemingly
impelled
for the disaster
streak.
The hubris
of the Spartan
by some divine power," is res
at Leuktra;
the battle
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is lost
at
/39
the place
where some Boiotian
themselves
had long ago killed
after having been raped by some SpartansHell.6.4.2-8.
After lason
treasures
virgins
of Pherai
of Delphoi,
appears to be planning
the God says that
own, and lason is slaughtered
20
6.4.30-31
Despite
allthese
remain our principal
him of inaccuracy
statements
his
with Xenophon, he does
for this
everywhere,
against
he will protect
in the very next sentenceHell.
difficulties
source
to seize the
period.
We can suspect
but we Can directly
a more credible
source
check his
only rarelysee
next
item
Hel enica
Oxyrhynchia,
Xenophon’s devaluation
in this
accellorated
papyri.
lished
--are
Ephorus,
as a historical
in 190,8 by Grenfell
parently
fragments
beginning
Papyri--the
and Hunt,
of several new
first
others
fragments pub
in 1949 by Bartoletti
of an anonymous Greek history,
where the history
papyrus
in 386.22
The authorgenerally
is unknown and speculation
surviving
fragments
is little
more than a name ot us,
historian.23
and great
seem totally
ap
of Thucydides leaves off
and ending perhaps at Knidos in 394, or more likely
of Antalkidas
The
source has been
century by the discovery
In these Oxyrhynchus
contained
andDiodorus:21
at the Peace
denoted "P." for
includes Theopomposwhose
dissimilar,
Cratipposwho
or some totally
unknown
But whoever the man was, the serious
analysis
detail
of the portions
of his writing
which survive
show him to have been far superior to Xenophon in historiography.
One surviving
chapter
of the political
of P.’s history
structure
of Bolotia
gives
us more knowledge
than all Xenophon’s works
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give us about the Spartan
constitution.
Unlike Xenophon,
P. devotes the proper space to the naval war up to Knidos,
and gives
winters,
us complete information
the appointment
concerning
the passage of
and the domestic politics
of nauarchs,
of the Greek states.
The detailed
it virtually
nature
certain
that
of the information
the author relied
and first-hand
accounts whenever possible;
lowed directly
the historical
of, Thucydides.
The history
method,
nor passages
and there
against
is little
overt political
the anti-Spartan
factions
and here it may be due to P.’s
baldly
charges
that
bribes
to anti-Spartan
view, discounting
to political
merit--but
bias,
politicians,
but at least
accurate;
except perhaps
in Thebes and in Athens,
Where Xenophon
War was caused by Persian
P. takes
the impact of the Persian
fighting
instead;
a. more moderate
gold and pointing
his view may not be
it is much more balanced.
Although Xenophon served in Asia with Agesilaos,
his accounts
of the campaigns do not begin to compare with-those
Oxyrhynchus historian,
dull--
far as we can
as
informant.24
the Korinthian
faction
wholly correct,
he probably fol
though not the style,
speeches
of much literary
makes
upon eyewitness
he wrote was relatively
there were none of Thucydides’
tell,
P. presents
whether in clarity,
accuracy,
of the
or
completeness. 25
Despite the substantial
of the Hellenica
limited
intrinsic
value of those fragments
Oxyrhynchia which have been found, they are
in size and number and come from only a few years of
the history.
Their greatest
value comes from the strong
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/11/
evidence they provide
Athenian,
a bit
of battles
fragments,
Diodorus,
is our conduit
for Ephorus
unfortunately
a poor one.
world history,
including
upon P.
and
poor.26
were rather
in the age of Caesar,
other historians
Setting
Greek,
and
out to write
Sicilian,
a complete
and Roman affairs
and set within a chronological
on an equal footing
work of Archonships,
a serious
and a man whose descriptions
Greek writing
a Sicilian
Consulships,
difficulty:
Ephorus,
and Olympiads,
frame
he encountered
his chief source for much of
the 5th and 4th centuries ,wrote not chronologically
topically.
This--together
makes his history
with Diodorus’
virtually
useless
repeatedly
the fall
led Peloponnesian
of the Thirty
invasions
before
before a continuous
e.g.
of’ Attica
Diod.
12.35.4;27
the activities
Diod.
of the Ten’
14.30.4-14.33.6;
complete "years" -are devoted to Sicilian
sometimes several
Greek narrative
Diod. 14.40-78.
is quite poor--he
sources--and
three years
the
at Athens is dated to 4.01/0 rather
Thousand during winter 400/399
vice-versa
dating:
of the war which took his name and in which he
than 4.03/2, and is placed after
affairs
but
own incompetence--
for precise
death of King Archidamos II is recorded
the outbreak
we
but he is known as a pro-
of a moralizer,
when not relying
for
way into
Of Ephorus himself,
work, which survives.
have rew surviving
were the basis
and hence found their
much of Ephorus’history,
Diodorus’
P.’s writings
that
there
Diodorus’ general accuracy
sometimes blunders
is substantial
chose which historian
is resumed and
in summarizing his
evidence that
he occasionally
to follow based upon his own predisposition
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for moralizing,
seeking to show the success
and the failure
of the wicked.28
Despite all
us with a great
Diodorus provides
of these numerous faults,
deal of valuable
of the good
information
about Greek
between 411 and 386, years when it seems that
history
summaries of Ephorus retain
Oxyrhynchia.
Hellenica
In all
activities
at Rhodes,
it is clear
that
perhaps
the outbreak
Justin
Because of this,
assume that
reasonable
contains
of Polyaenus,
Pausanias,
and
based upon P.
it is probably safe to
period which
of Diodorus in this
and detailed
War--
is the ultimate
be ultimately
with some caution
any passage
Konon’s
of the Korinthian
the Oxyrhynchus historian
may likewise
history
fragments
to surviving
of Notion and .Sardis,
A few portions
source.29
of Diodorus’
portions
during these years which correspond
of P.’s work-- the battles
of the
a bit of the facts
quite
his
information
is ultimately
trustworthy.
derived from P., and hence essentially
Plutarch: 30
A well-educated
lived
Greek from Chaironeia
in the era of the Roman Empire, writing
the late
first
with facts
for their
but biography,
is intended
to illustrate
chronological
and Plutarch
often
speaking,
and the factual
the personal
than simply recount the life’s
A strictly
Although ‘Plut
Lives were not overly concerned
own sake; strictly
not history
Plutarch
his works during
and early second centuries ‘A.D.
arch disdainedrhetoric,31his
rather
in Boiotia,
they were
material
character
history
each contains
of the subject
of the manAlex.1.
development of events is not the goal,
digresses
sharply
from the main flow of his
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13
narrative
in order to illustrate
2.4.-5;24.1-26.4
world was obviously no better
Ephorusy.17.2,
wrote a continuation
Knidos.
Plutarch
Plutarch’s
provides
some modern scholars
versions
difficult
major historians
clear
sources
for the more obscure
himself,
Plutarch
consulted
upon condensed
The question
authors,
routinely
disagreement
he also attempts
is
but for such
reasonably
an intermediate
compares his
between theme.g.
to use sources with direct
knowledge of historical
it does seem at least
upon himas
has led
read them in the original.32
knowledge of the, events they describe
Plutarch’s
The very
as Ephorus or Theopompus the evidence seems
and often cites
17.1-2,20.6;
sources.
of
for
by Plutarch
merely relied
in intermediate
that Plutarch
As an writer
the personal
and passim.
to boubt whether he actually
to resolve
down to
much of the material
sources cited
works themselves,or
contained
the last
who wrote a long history
ofArtaxerxesArta.1
large number of historical
the original
II,
but
he uses XenophonAges.
the works of Ctesias,
of Artaxerxes
Life
of his sources,
of Thucydides history
also cites
which apparently
Persia
century B.C. Greek
and Theopompus.17.2;
of these
court physician
than that
Among others,
are many and good.
18.1,
traite.g.
cf.20.6.
knowledge of the fourth
Plutarch’s
these
a particular
whenever this
is possible.33
method may be informal,
good.
We can generally
source.
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but
rely
Alt L1
Appendix :
THE SELECTION OF EPHORS
In recent
its
years,
the nature
impact upon Spartan policy
scrutiny;1
yet several
of the Spartan
puzzling
problems remain.
the chief power in the Spartan
4th century,
of money during their
lives
of ease.2
The author
any criteria
state.
they had
In addition,
emoluments to the office:
by the late
and
have come under increasing
ity of the ephors was enormous--by
were other
ephorate
Aristotle
ephors routinely
terms of office,
there
says that
made vast sums
and in general
lived
The ephorate would seem a very attractive
position.
Yet there is no known case in these
Spartiate
seeking the ephorate,
for any positivepersonal
contrasts
the excessive
with the relatively
according
of of any ephor being elected
or political
to him it is the gerousia
ate is that
Aristotle
power of the ephorate
of the gerousia
which attracts
but
power-
while the main problem of the ephor
it is routinely
Aristotle’s
reason.
and dictatorial
modest authority
hungry men of ambition,
of any
centuries
filled
by "any chance men"O
statements are borne out by such’ external
evidence as exists.
We have the names of some 64. Spartan
ephors down to 330/29, yet of these all but eight are apparent
nonentities,
who receive no mention in our sources except
during their term of office;and
of the eight which do appear,
only three--Brasidas,
Endios,
and Antalkidas--appear
of major importance.
Five ephors were appointed
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as men
each year,
and by law or by custom reappointment was forbidden;
the small number of Spartiates
would have allowed many un
men to serve as ephor.4
distinguished
this and
But the evidence of
our sources is that
this was the overwhelming rule
than the exception;
the number of distinguished
rather
men serving
as ephor is about what we would expect random chance to produce.5
Perhaps
this
whose results
is because ephors were selected
approached those of random chance.
Greece,
most democratic
highest
civilian
identified
officials
election
by lot,
as the "democratic"
by lot--Aristotle
In classical
elected
and the ephorate
their
is always
component of the mixed Spartan
It is clear that
constitution.6
as Athens
statessuch
by a process
the process was not simply
4.7.5
Politics
rules
this
out--7
but the evidence
totle
is that whatever the actual system--Aris
it very childish- _8 the result was that ephors
calls
were chosen essentially
that
no Spartiate
at random.
Aristotle
there was no danger of ambitious
contrast
to the gerousia;9
instead
system for allowing
to become ephors,
he repeatedly
criticizes
riixoes
"any chance men"o
condemns Sparta for choosing her ephors
in a random manner, Plato praises
same reason:
your government still
the Spartan
"Then your third
fretting
and fuming,
one might say; by the power of the ephors,
nearly
Plato
itin
and hence hold so much power and make so
While Aristotle
this
men gaining
decisions0
many important
exactly
implies
could announce his candidacy for the office
and that
the Spartan
strongly
to
and Aristotle
power
ephorate
savior,
seeing
curbed it,
leading
as
thegov
ernment
bylot."11
disagree
for
about the efficacy
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of the
system,
the same facts,
but both men recognize
ephors were chosen in an essentially
The word "essentially"
were blindfolded
interpreting
point
procedure
Spartiates
fluence
point
the result
of politics
From this
be elected
or policy,
fact
on the basis
purposes;12
rather
board,
it follows
than to any shift
the chance selection
change in Sparta’s
Thucydides
that
of any "policy"
this
from the stand
randomly.
could not
they espoused.
If
from those of
possibly
in Spartiate
could in
due to chance
"public opinion;"
and
of ephors might very often cause a dramatic
foreign
5.36
or domestic policy.
contains
an excellent
the impact of chance upon ‘Spartan foreign
how Xenares and Kleoboulos,
two Spartan
the Peace of Nikias negotiated
year and did their
the important
ephors
on an issue
was quite
some
honestly
ephors were selected
the ephors of one board differed
the preceding
or priests
or group of Spartiates
for political
crucial
that
But whether the
of sacred chickens,
is that no Spartiate
process was,
makes it clear
took place.
the entrails
of the issue.
what the actual
and as mentioned above, Aristotle
electors
random manner.
goes to the heart
We have no way of ever guessing
sort of elective
that Sparta’s
.
example demonstrating
policy;
he describes
ephors for 4.20, opposed
by the ephors of the preceding
best to thwart it:13
The following winterfor
there chanced to be dif
ferent ephors from those under whom the treaty had
been made, and some of them actually opposed the
treaty..,
Thucydides’
words do not in the least
change in the views of most Spartiates,
by electing
ephors who favored
describe
a general
which they demonstrated
an end to the treaty
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with Athens;
A17
instead,
he is describing
Athenian ephors,
the chance selection
a purely fortuitous
impact on Spartan-Athenian
of two anti
event which had a decisive
relations.
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AI
C:
Suggested pChronologies
endix
Notes
on
Xenophon describes
Chronol gical
the
two invasions
The first
Hell.3.2.21-31.
Elean War:
of Elis
began the war and was quickly
terminated
following
diplomatic
maneuvering followed,
then "as the year was coming
the ephors called out ‘the ban
again and Agis led all the alliesexcept
the Boiotians
invasion
the rest
the Korinthians
lengthyHell.3.2.26,
and after
behind the harmost Lysippos to ravage Elis
of the summer and the following
time contraints
Thucy.1.20.3
took place
and the phrase
make it virtually
during different
exchanges
that
toieniautoiCf.
Agis’ two invasions
The description
described
ultimately
In Diodorus’
by Xenophon, so Diodorus’
account
with the name of the king changed.
account,
but found it too difficult
walls.
derives
bears no resemblence
In Xenophon’s account we are told that Elis
had strong
with the dip
The account is filled with numerous
so it very likely
details
cannot be a duplication
Elis
"during
describes only one invasion of Elis,
from P. and is accurate.
invasions
de
campaigning seasons,
and that by King Pausanias.
and very precise
it ended,
winter"Hell.2.3.29-3O;
peri onti
certain
The
occupying the winter.
Diodorus14.17.4.-12
3.2.27.
and
in a second invasion of ElisHell.3.2.25.
seems rather
Agis left
to’the
Some
an earthquakeHell.3.2.23-24.
round"
lomatic
by King Agis
Pausanias
laid siege to Elis
to capture14.17.1O-11;
Therefore,
if we believe
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is unwalledHell.
clearly
both these
A19
details,
invasion must come after Agis’ second
Pausanias’
invasion,
in the next campaigning season.
probably
tells
XenophonHell.3.2.30-31
in the summer following
us that
Elis
sought peace
but that Sparta
Agis’ second invasion,
found the Elean terms unacceptable
and "compelled"
make peace on Sparta’s
"compulsion"
to Pausanias’
campaigning
invasion.
seasons,
this
Therefore
Elis
second invasion
probably
dedicating
two
surrendered
during
The Spartans
Games at Elis
been refused
main Spartan pretexts
an interruption
summer 400.
that
this
invasion.
and this
to attend the Olympic
provided
for the warHell.3.2.21.
on of the
Therefore
our sources would have failed
401
lasted
from summer 4.00 to winter
,
to winter 397NB:
winter had already
either
it
to mention
of the war by the Olympic games which fell
Thus, the war probably
403 to winter
Hell.3.3.1;
permission
for over a decade,
seems unlikely
the booty from his
to the God at DelphoiXen.
is the reason he does not lead the third
399
in the first
three
winter.
King Agis died soon after
summer
probably refers
the Elean War lasted
with Agis’ invasions
in the third.
and Pausanias’
the third
terms;
Elis to
in
from summer
398, or from
the war ended after
the third
The death of King Agis occurred in
begun.
the middle year of the war.
The possibility
Xenophon that
4.03-401 is ruled out by the statement
the Elean War occurred while Derkyllidas
campaigning in .AsiaHell.3.2.1;
in 399See
following
item.
took place
in 400-398or
Derkyllidas
Therefore
later,
was
in Asia
the Eleari War probably
with Agis’
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399or later.
arrived
of
death occurring
in
4.c
who succeeded Agis, died in winter 361/0
But Agesilaos,
or more likely
Plutarch
360/59Cf.
Agesilsos
for 41 yearsor
40 years.
40,2 tells
at the least
Spartan political
Ages.4.0; Xen. Ages.2.31,
Plut.
years,
i.e.
he had been king of Sparta
us that
his reign
that
that
extended into 41
it had lasted
than that.
If the Olympic games did not interrupt
the war must be dated to 4.00-398; otherwise
sibility,
the Elean War,
401-399 is a pos
though the overlap with Derkyllidas’
Asia would be so slight
3.2.21.
for about
Hence, Agis’ death might come in 399, but it could
not come later
So:
while
This,
as to nearly
conflict
campaigns in
with Xen. Hell.
combined with the implausibility
Olympic festival
of an unnoticed
in the middle of the war, suggests
should be excluded
that 401-399
and leaves 4.00-398 as the only plausible
date.
Notes
on
As our starting
occurred
first
the
point,
Campaigns
we know that
in summer 4.01Anab.1.8.lff;
winter
after
of
the Battle
the Ten ThousandAnab.7.5.6;
in Asia,
short
3.1.5;
399,
weather for ships
of 399, Thibron contacted
but by Hell.3.2.1,
so he must have arrived
In early spring
The
The winter of 4.00/399 was explicitly
In the spring
mentionedAnab.7.3.13.
wintered
Diod.14.28.
when there was good sailing
Diod.14.30.4-5.
The
marked by the Ten
Thousand’s march through heavy snowAnab.4.5;
Anab.5.3;
of Kunaxa
Diod.14.22.lff.
the battle--4O1/O--was
summer of 400 came
andDerkyllidas:
ChronoThil gicabl ron
Thibron had
in very late
400.
Thibron campaignednearEphesos
time before the Ten Thousand joined himDiod.14.36;
once Cyrus’ mercenaries
arrived,
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for a
Hell.
he campaigned in north-
-
em
Lydia for a timeHell.3.1.6-7.
After this,
the ephors
ordered Thibron to invade Caria, and while he was at Ephesos
preparing
his expedition,
Hell.3.1.7-8;
Diod.14.38.2.
with Tissaphernes
captured
Derkyllidas
Derkyllidas
made an eight
Derkyllidas
him
then made a truce
and led his army to Aiolia,
a number of townsHell.3.1.9-28;
After this,
to replace
arrived
where he quickly
Diod.14.38.2-3.
month truce with Pharna
bazos and marched into Bithynian Thrace for the winterHell.3.2.
1-5; Diod.14.38.3.
At the beginning
of spring
398, Derkyllidas
Europe and had his term of office
missioners1-lell.3.2.6-9.
a wall against
had gone to Cyprus,
before the time of the harvest
had left
for Susa,
probably returning
and form there
to Asia Minor some time
397Diod.14.39.1-4..
After completing
for eight
where he built
as soon as the second truce with Derkyllidas
had been sworn, Pharnabazos
returned
com
Diod.14..38.6-7.
Meanwhile,
in early
until
to
renewed his truce with
to the Chersonese
the Thracians
Hell.3.2.9-10;
renewed by some Spartan
Derkyllidas
then traveled
Pharnabazos,
returned
the work in the Chersonese,
to Asia and then besieged Atarneusheld
monthsHell.3.2.11;
to Asia not long before
Since Derkyllidas
the time of the harvest,
Derkyllidas
by Chian exiles
had returned
Atarneus’
fall must be dated to summer 397.
After this,
the ephors ordered Derkyllidas
as he was preparing
to do this,
Tissaphernes
marched toward Ephesos,
encountered
a tmuceHell.3.2.12-20;
Diod.14.39.4-6,
came at this
and Pharnabazos
Derkyllidas’
time1-Iell.3.2.21.
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to invade Caria;
army ,and swore
The nauarchy of Pharax
Notes
on
the
Asian
The chronology of Agesilaos’
straightforward.
ology differs
campaigns in Asia is relatively
The sequence of events
is clear
from the orthodox chronology
I argue for the existerce
Xen. Hell.3.k.28-29
Chron logical
ofAgesilaos:
Campaigns
in only one respect:
of a "missing winter"396/5
A
In Hell.
Hel enica
are:
Q.9,
the nauarch Pollis
the nauarch Archelaidas;
kmates arrives
passed,
around
and in the badly fragmented book 14 of the
Oxyrhynchia,
My arguments
and my chron
in Hell.
to replace
Q.19,
Pollis.
but the only place
comes out to replace
the nauarch Cheiri
Prima facie
a winter has
where a winter might have been
mentioned is in book 14.
B
Xenophon claimed that money sent out by Tithraustes
the Korinthian
remained
at Ephesos until
from Sparta,
sells
War to beginHell.3.5.1.
all
the thirty
hardly before late
captured prisoners
he won the battle
of Sardis,
news of the defeat
new Spartiates
spring,
raustes
least,
scarcely
of events
C
to travel
is the cause-and-effect
presents.
‘
By the time tith
it would have been well into the summer at
giving him time enough for starting
Tithraustes
is able to tell
then after
to reach Susa and for Tithraustes
in Greece which led to the Korinthian
arguing that
since he
it would have taken some time for
which Hell.3.4..21-25
arrived,
especially
had
had arrived
nakedHell.3.k.16-20;
to Lydia and execute Tissaphernesthis
relationship
But Agesilaos
caused
us that
did start
the chain
War.
I am not
the war; only that
Xenophon
he did.
If there is a missing winter
in Hell.
Qç.14,
then Hell.
the events of 396 and the "eighth year"
Qy.9 would deal with
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referred
to is the eighth year after
War in 404which
use
rather
is a very plausible
than the eighth
as important
the end of the Peloponnesian
reference-point
year after
403which
a year and hence a much less
point.
LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
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for P. to
is not nearly
plausible
reference-
ni 9
to
chapter IV:
1. Xen. Anab.1.1.1-3;
Olmstead,
History of
Notes
Plut.
the
Arta.2-3. For the date, cf. A.T.
Persian EmpireChicago,1948371.
2. For example, Astyochos, the Spartan nauarch, was thought
to have been bribed by Tissaphernes in 411Thucy.8.5O.3,8.83-84.
3. C.D.Hamilton is the leading current advocate of this view.
Cf. C.D.Hamilton, "Spartan Politics and Policy, 405-401 B.C.,"
Journal ofPhilology 911970294-314
American
and
Sparta’sBitter
VictoriesIthaca,1979.
4. This grotesque caricature is almost identical to Hamilton’s
impression of Spartan government and society; cf. Hamilton1970
295,303 and Hamilton197975,81-87
for a few examples. Hence
forth I will not bother to refute Hamilton in detail.
5. For what follows, cf. Xen. Hell.2.2.9-23;
Plut. Alc.38; Plut. y.l5;
Ath. Const.34.2-3;
13 . 5ff , 13. 33ff
Diod.13.1O7,14.3;
Lysias.12.4.8ff,
6. The Thebans had demanded a share of the loot
Xen. Hell.3.5.5.
at Dekeleia
7. Xen. Hell.2.20.
8. It is also exactly at this point that the break between
the first and second parts of the Hellenica comes; this may
have added to Xenophon’s compression of events.
See Appendix
A.
9. At the time of Athens’ surrender, we are told that she
was forced to allow all political exiles to return, and that
it was these exiles who helped to call in Lysandros and establish
the Thirty. Obviously, it would have taken a week or two at least
before these exiles would have returned to Athens; hence the
Thirty probably were set up some time after Athens’ surrender.
10. Allegedly 1500 talents of silver at the time of the esta
blishment of the Thirty at AthensDiod.13.106.8.
11. Plut.
12. Plut.
j.18.2.
13. Diod.14.6.1.
14. Plut. y.20.6,24.-26,30.2-4;
Ephorus seems to be the ultimate
15. Xen Hell.3.3.1-4..
Diod.14..13.2-8; Nepos
source of these stories.
Agis was an "old man" when he died in
399.
16. Plut.
17. There is no real way to precisely date the attempt at Dodona.
LICENSED
TO UNZ.ORG
us that
it came after the one at Delphoi and
All our sources tell
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED
n20
before the one at the oracle of Zeus Arnmon; the first likely
came during winter 405/4 while the second directly followed
Lysandros’ recall from the north in summer 404.
This means
that Lysandros either visited Dodona during winter 4.05/4 or
between the establishment of the Thirty and the beginning
of his Thracian campaign which seems to contradict Plutarch.
For a different reconstruction of Lysandros’ movements,
18.
cf. R.E. Smith, "Lysander and the Spartan Empire," Classical
Philology 431948,
145-156.
19.
Plut.
20.
Nepos y.2.1-3
21.
Plut.
and Polyaenus
1.4.5.4;
Plut.
!.
20.5.
19-20.
22.
Plut.
14.2; it may be at this point in time that
the ephors overturned his expulsion of the Sestians from their
city.
23.
Plut.
20.4-21.1.
24.
Plut.
16-17;
25.
Plut.
17.1-2.
26.
Plut.
17.4..
27.
Diod.
28.
Plut.
29.
For Lysandros’
Plut.
Diod.
106.8-10.
14.4.4..
19.4.
reputation for incorruptibility
cf.
2.30.
30.
Da.od. 12.59.5, 13.38.4.
The severity of Spartan harmosts
been
at Herakiela had
noted by Thucydides 3.93,
but although
Herakleia was not a typical city in the Spartan naval empire-the Spar-tans themselves had founded It in the late 5th century-it is likely the brutality of Sparta’s harmosts there was not
atypical.
The 500 citizens summarily executed by Herippidas
may have represented a much larger fraction of the population
than the 1500 Athenians killed during the year-long "reign
of terror" of the Thirty Ath. Pol. 35.4.
31.
Plut.
15.5.
32. Diod. 14.12. The parallel with Pausanias’ career as
tyrant of Byzantion in the 470’s would not have been ignored
Thucy.
1.128-131.
33. As we noted above, Darius II died in March 404, and
Tissaphernes would have presumably left for home soon after
ward.
34. Xen. Anab.1.1; Plut.
Arta.2-4..
LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED
n21
35. Plut.
36. Thucy.5.35.
37.
See Appendix A.
38. Xen. Anab.1.1.6-8.
39.
Plut.
Lysandros’
dekarchies
were clearly
so
unpopular that simply withdrawing Spartan support from them
would have been sufficient
to cause their overthrow
the governments to the control of the people."
4.0. For most of what follows, cf. Xen. Hell.2.3-4;
Ath. Const.35-40.
32-33; Plut. y.21;
and "return
Diod.14.
41. The Spartans ordered all the other Greek states to return
any Athenian exiles to the Thirty; only Thebesand Argos re
fused to allow thisDiod.11+.6.
42. This is asserted
in Xenophon’s versionHell.2.4.24-27.
43. Xenophon and Diodorus only mention King Pausanias’ in
volvement, but since it was he who was actually sent out, it
is understandable that they ignored King Agis.
4.4.. Xen. Hell.2.4..38.
45. Xen. Hell.2.4.35-36. There is a surviving decree from
the state of Eleusis concerning the right of an Athenian army
to travel through Eleusinian territory when summoned by the
Spartans. See J. Wickersham and G.Verbrugghe,
Gre k Historical
of
the
Documents
Fourth CenturyToronto,1973#2.
46. So Lewis1977;
Hamilton1979;
Jones196796.
47. Paus.3.5.1-2. Fourteen gerontes and King Agis voted for
conviction; fourteen gerontes and the five ephors voted for
acquittal.
Although King Agis had supported the original plan
to stop Lysandros, he clearly did not support the settlement
Pausanias had arranged.
4.8. Plutarch y.21.3-4
makes it very clear that King Paus
anias was brought to trial"some time after" his settlement at
Athens when "the Athenians had revolted again;" this, is clearly
a reference to Athens’ annexation of Eleusis contrary to the
terms of Pausanias’ agreement. According to Ath. Pol.40.4, this
annexation took place two years after the settlement at Athens,
in the Archonship of Xenainetos, hence in 401/0.
49. Diod.14.19.4.-5; he was probably the nauarch for 402/1
since Xenophon’s account of a later stage of the campaign
describes the Spartan nauarch as being Pythagoras, who was
apparently the nauarch for 401/0Xen. Anab.1.4.1-2.
50. Xen. Hell.3.1.4.,8.
51. Cf. Plut.
20.4-21.1.
LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED
n22
to
chapter V:
1. Plut. Arta.3.5.
See chapter4,
ni.,
Cyrus it is unlikely
month or two.
Notes
Artaxerxes came to the throne in March 4.04
and after he was persuaded not to kill
that he kept him at Susa for more than a
2. For his hellenization,
of. the eulogy in Xen.Anab.1.9
which emphasizes his personal traits;
these allegedly
were
very Greek and very commendable. He also had several Greek
mistressesXen.
Anab.1.10.1-3
3. Xen. Anab.1.2.1-3.
4. Xen. Anab.i.i.
5. Xen. Anab.1.i; Plut. Arta.3. Tissaphernes either
Cyrus’ plot to assassinate the Great King or invented
either way, Cyrus would be a great enemy of his.
6.
revealed
the story;
Xen. Anab.i.i.6-8,1.2.2.
7. Only such loyalty, plus a great deal of gold, could have
enabled Cyrus to persuade his mercenaries to march 1500 miles
into the heart of Asia.
8. Xen. Hell.3.1.i.
9. Xen. Hell,i.2.9;
Diod.14.19.7-8.
10. Xen. Hell.1.2.15.
The Greeks were to fight in ranks four
deep rather than the usual eight to allow them to extend over
much of the front of the Great King’s army. Cf. G.L.Cawkwell,
notes and introduction to Xenophon’s HellenicaNew York,1972
37-4.1.
11. Xen. Anab.1.4..2-3; Diod.i4.21.1-2.
For proof that Cheiri
sophos was a Spartiate and not merely a perioikos cf. Xen. Anab.
4.6.13-15. There. was definately a large sprinkling of Lakedaim
onians in Cyrus’ army; of. J.Roy,
Historia 161967303-306.
12. Xen. Anab.1i4.2;
.two references
seems difficult
13.Xen.
list
Diod.i4..19.3-4;
of Cyrus,"
Xen. Hell.3.1.1.
Samios as the Spartan nauarch,
The last
and the matter
to resolve.
Hell.3.1.1-2;
14.. Demon p.
"The Mercenaries
Diod.14.19.2-5;
Plut.
Arta.6.2-3.
Plut.. Arta.22.1.
16. Xen. Hell.3.1 .3,3.2.13;
17. Xen. Hell.3.1.3;
Diod.14.27.k,14.35.2-3,
Diod.14..35.6-7.
18. Diod.14.35.6-7.
19. A suggested chronology of these years of the war in Asia
TO UNZ.ORG
will be presented LICENSED
in Appendix
C.
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED
n23
20. Xen. Hell.3.1.4
21. Diod.14..36.1.
22. Xen. Anab.5.1.4..
-
23. Xen. Anab.6.2.13.
24. Xen. Anab.7.1.20.
25. Xen. Anab.6.6.13.
26. With the exception of the period of Klearchos’
of course;
revolt
of. chapter 4, pp.63-64.
27. The importation of Euxine grain into Greece--especially
Athens--was probably considerable in this period. Cf. G.E.M.
de Ste. Croix,
The
Origins of
the
Pelop n esian WarLondon,
1972; E.F.Bloedow, "Corn Supply and Athenian Imperialism,"
Classigue 4.4197520-29.
L’Antiguite
28. Much of what follows is discussed in Cawkwell19794.4-4.5;
but Cawkwell seems unable to believe the evidence which he
himself has gathered.
29. Xen. Anab.7.i.36.
30. Xen. Anab.7.2.5-6.
31. Xen. Anab.7.2.7-13.
32. Xen. Anab.6.6.12.
33. Xen. Hell.3.1.5.
34. Xen. Hell.3.1.5-6
Diod.14.36.2-37.4.
35. Thucy.6.43.
36.
Thucy.2.69,3.19.
37. Diod.36.2-3; Xen. Hell.3.1.5.
38. Xen. Hell.3.1.6-7.
39. Xen. Hell.3.i.7.
4.0, Xen. Hell.3.1.8,3.2.1;
Diod.1k.38.2.
41. Xen. Hell.3.i.8-3.2.11;
Diod.14.38.2-7.
and a suggested chronology, see Appendix C.
4.2. Xen. Hell.3.1.8.
.
43. Xen. Hell.3.i.21.
44.. Xen. Hell.3.i.8-9.
LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
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For the details
.
n 24
45. Xen. Hell.3.2.12-13.
46. For what follows, cf. Diod.14.39.1-4 and Plut. Arta. 21.1-3
with a good discussion and analysis in C.D.Hamilton, Sparta’s
VictoriesIthaca,197911k-117though
onlyBit er insofar as he
concerns himself with Persianmatters.
47.
Xen. Hell.3.2.12-20;
Diod.14.39.4-6.
4.8. For a detailed discussion of the Elean War and its sug
gested chronology, see Appendix C.
49. Xen. Hell.2.2.19-2O;
5G. Xen. Hell.2.4.1-2;
3.5.5.
Diod.14.6.3,14..32.1.
51. Xen. Hell..2.4.30.
52. Diod.14.17.1-3.
53. Hell.
Bruce1960.
p
.17-18;
54. Xen. Hell.2.4.4.3;
55.
for a full
Ath.
discussion
and analysis,
of.
Const.4O.
Xen. Hell.3.1.4,3.2.25.
56. Hell. 6-7.
A few citizens with the collusion of members
of the Athenian Boule had dispatched an Athenian trireme to Konon;
this was probably intended as an anti-Spartan provocation, but
the very negative public reaction--which cut across party lines
--forced the act to be disavowed. It had perhaps also been in
tended as a show of support for Konon and to give him some idea
of Athens’ potential assistance.
LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED
24. Cf. R.J. Seager, "Agesilaus in Asiafl Propaganda and
Clas ical Monthly 21977,
Objectives,"
Liverpo l
184;
H.J. Kelly, "Agesilaus’ Strategy in Asia Minor," Liverpool
Monthly 31978 97-98. Clas ical
25. It is the issue of whether Agesilaos did or did not
successfully exploit his opportunity on which Xenoon’s
Cf. Cawkwell 1979
account appears highly questionable.
16-17.
26. Hell.
Q.
27. Xen. Hell.
21.
4.1.3-4.;
Hell.
20-25;
28. Xen., Hell.
4.1.1-2,
29. Xen., Hell.
4.1.20-28.
22;
Q.
Plut.,
Plut.,
Ages. 11.
Ages. 11-12.
Agesilaos’ reluctance or inability
30. Xen., Hell. 4.1.26-28.
to force Herippidas into agreeing to an equitable division of
and the Paphlagonians is remarkable.
spoils with Spithridates
31. Xen. Hell
3.5.3-16; Hell.
32. Xen. Hell.
3.5.17-25;
33. Xen. Hell. 4.2.1-4;
34.
Hell.
Plut.,
Plut.,
19-20; Diod.
35. Xen. Hell.
16-18; Diod.
Q.
28-30;
14.81.1.
Diod.
Ages. 15; Diod.
81.1-3,
89.
14.83.
81.4-6.
4.3.10.
36. Peisandros had been appointed by Agesilaos
to the naval
of
his
command through the persuasion
sister,
Agesilaos’ wife;
Xenophon himself criticizes
Peisandros’ complete lack of naval
3.4.27;
experience Xen.Hell.
37. Xen. Hell.
4.3.10-12;
Plut.,
Ages.
LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED
16; Diod.
83.4-7.
r11
to
Appendix A:
Notes
1. Cf. M.I.Finley, notes and introduction to ThucydidesPenguin,
1972, including a brief analysis of the eighth book.
2. For this and subsequent notes in this appendix, the source
unless otherwise noted will be the author under discussion.
3.
See chapter
3, p.32.
4.. The number of syngrapheis appointed to revise the con
stitution was probably 3OAth. Const.29-33
rather than the
10 as Thucydides reports8T67;
see Finley1972618-619
for
a discussion of this and various other minor inaccuracies.
5. For an excellent discussion of Xenophon’s life and his
Hellenica from which many of the following arguments are
borrowed, see G.L.Cawkwell notes and introduction to Xenophon’s
HellenicaPenguin,1979
6. Thucy.2.13. In 4.13 there were 1200 Athenian citizens in
the cavalry class, 29,000 in the hoplite class, and uncounted
additional masses who served as rowers or light troops.
apologetic
7. For an excellent discussion of the essentially
nature of the Anabasis, see G.L.Cawkwell, notes and introduction
to Xenophon’s AnabasisPenguin,1972l7ff.
8. See Cawkwell1979l7ff.
9. See chapter 3, p.49.
10. Besides being very muddled, XenophonHell.1.1.35-36
dir
ectly contradicts both Thucydides8 .80 and Diodorus13.51
in
dating when Klearchos was sent to Byzantion; numerous other
errors may simply be undetectable due to the absence of parallel
accounts.
.
11. See chapters
4 and 5 passim.
12. The campaign didn’t
accomplish
anything;
13. So Cawkwell197928.
14.. See chapter 4, pp.64-66.
15. See chapter
4,
pp.63-64.
16. See chapter
4, pp.60-61.
17. See chapter 6.
18. See chapter
3, p.52.
19. See chapter
6.
20. So Cawkwell197934-35.
LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED
see chapter
6.
21. For an excellent discussion of the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia,
see I.A.F.Bruce,
An
Historical
Com entary on
theHellenica Q
rhynchiaCarnbridge,19671-27
and passim for a brief account
of Ephorus, see R.Meiggs,
The
Athenian EmpireOxford,197210
Diodorus is discussed in R.Drews, "Diodorus and his Sources,"
Journal ofPhilology831962, American 383-392.
22. Cf. Bruce19673-5
for the evidence
and reasoning.
23. Cf. Bruce196722-27.
24. Cf. I.A.F.Bruce, "Internal Politics and the Outbreak
of the Corinthian War," Emerita 28196075-86 and "The Pol
itical Terminology of the Oxyrhynchus Historian,"
Emerita 30
1962,63-69.
25. Discussed
-
in Cawkwell1979
passim.
26. Cf. Meiggs19721O.
It should be noted that Polybius 12.
2Sf highly praises Ephorus’ accounts of the naval battles of
Cyprus and Knidoswhich would have been based on P., while
he finds a great deal of fault with his accounts of Leuktra
and Mantineiawhich could not have been based on P..
27. So Meiggs197211.
28. So Drews1962.
At 1.2.2 of his history, Diodorus says
that he aims at:
.preserving the nobility of distinguished men, pro
claiming the wickedness of the base, and serving the
good of mankind in general. For if the myths about
those in Hades, despite the fact that their content is
fictitious,
do much to turn men toward piety and jus
tice, certainly History, the voice of truth ‘and the
"mother country" of all philosophy, must be regarded
as a most effective means of endowing men’s character
with noble integrity.
29. Cf. Bruce196720-22.
30. An excel1t
J.R.Hamilton,
discussion of Plutarch is contained in
introduction.
Plutarch:AlexanderLondon,1969,
31. Evidence collected
32. The matter
in Hamilton1969xxxvi-xxxvii.
is discussed
in Hamilton1969xliii-xlix.
33. Cf. HamiI%on1969xlvii.
LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
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‘
to
Appendix C:
Notes
1. See A.Andrewes, "The Government of Classical Sparta," in
SoAncietniets
andInstitutionsOxford,1976,
E.Badian, ed.,
pp.1-20; A.H.1VI.Jones, "The Lycurgan Rhetra," in
AncientSocieties
InstitutionsOxford,1976,
E.Badian, ed., pp.165-175;
and H.D.
Westlake, "Reelection to the Ephorate?,"
Greek,
Roman,and
Studies197634.3-352
P.J.Rhodes, "The Selection
Byzantine
of
Ephors at Sparta," Historia1981498-5O2.
2. Arist.
P01.2.6.14-16.
In the latter reference, Aristotle
3. Arist. Pol.2.6.16,2.7.5.
says that the kosmoi of Krete are similar to the ephors of Sparta
in that they are hol tychontes, but differ in that they are
selected only from certain families rather than from the citizens
as a whole; this proves that hoi yhontes
is not being used in
the sense of "anybody" but in the sense of "any chance persons."
4. So Rhodes1981499.
1913,
Pros pogràphie
derLakedaimonierBreslau,
5. P.Poralla,
lists references to some 800 Spartiates who are mentioned by our
sources down to the era of Alexander the Great; he also lists
the 64 ephors known to us.
If we restrict
our examination to
the hundred-odd years from 433/2 to 330/29--which contains the
bulk of these references--these
numbers are reduced to perhaps
and 57 ephors. There were probably fewer than
600 Spartiates
3000 adult Spartiates
alive in 433/2, the number had declined to
about 1000 by 371, and that year 400 of these died at Leuktra
See p.
; it is likely that there were fewer than 6ooo adult
Spartiates
alive between 433/2 and 330/29. About 10% of these
attracted the notice of our sources, and roughly the same fraction
of Sparta’s ephors were deemed worthy of mention outside the
term of their ephorate; all but a small handful are simply names
on an ephorate list to us. Rhodes1981498 makes the valid point
-that importance in the eyes of our sources and importance in
the minds of most Spartiates are not necessarily
equivalent; but
it seems rather presumptuous to argue that all of our sources-including Xenophon, who knew Sparta intimately--simply
ignored
the overwhelming majority of Sparta’s leading political
figures.
6. Arist.
7.
Pol.2.6.15-16.
Cf. Rhodes1981
for a good discussion.
-
8. Arist. Pol.2.6.16.
Aristotle Politics 2.6.18 also describes
the manner oelecting
the gerousia as "childish;"
but there is
no reason to believe that the two processes were necessarily
similar in any significant way.
9. Arist.
Pol.2.6.16-19.
‘
10. See n.3 above.
11. Plato Laws 692a, emphasis mine. Rhodes1981499 points out
that after Leuktra, the Spartiate population was so severely
LICENSED
three or four Spartiates
eventually
reduced that perhaps
one TO
in UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED
served as ephor; this
he cites
of words. Rhodes’ figures
as the reason
are questionable--he
for Plato’s
choice
is assuming an
equilibrium model, which was not the case--but even if they
are correct, Plato’s passage is clearly referring to Sparta of
the 8th or 7th century, when there were perhaps 6000 or 7000
Spartiates,
making it highly unlikely that any particular
in
dividual would serve as ephor.
12. Admittedly Agis IV arranged for his supporter Lysandros
to be elected ephor in 243Plut. Agis.7,
but this is over a
century later than the time of most of our other evidence, and
it is apparent that the Spartan constitutional
system had
broken down by this date: a year later, Agis summarily removed
five hostile ephors and appointed a new board of his own choice,
and he himself was murdered some time laterPlut.
Agis.12-19.
It is notable that while we hear rumors of all forms of political
maneuvering and intrigue by Spartan kings and other prominent
figures of the 5th and 4th centuries,
there is never a whisper
that a Spartan leader attempted to get a friend or supporter
elected to the ephorate.
X&’c
13.
I
,.
cj
ôflC’L.
‘tvcy
.1
cyc-
LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED
?ç’
1.’
7
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