Download The Nature of God I am pleased to be invited to participate with my

THE NATURE OF GOD
I am pleased to be invited to participate with my two colleagues, Dr. Ingrid Shafer and Dr. Tom
Boyd, as we discuss the Nature of God. I guess my task is to present the scientific approach to the
nature of God, and I will do my best to represent that viewpoint. As a believer in God, I do believe
that there is a valid viewpoint for the existence of God, or as Ted Peters calls it, a Consonance. I
recognize that there are several very vocal scientists who would deny the existence of God, or that
God could ever have a place in the scientific viewpoint. I disagree with that perspective, as do a
significant percentage of American scientists.
Perhaps by way of background, I should describe the premises that modern science rests
upon. Often this is referred to as methodological naturalism, or methodological nontheism. This position can be described by four statements that most scientists hold as the
foundation upon which science stands. These four statements are:
1) Nature, whose reality we can substantiate, can be understood. (comprehensibility)
2)
Given the proper set of circumstances, nature can be perceived in the same way by any
number of observers. (repeatability)
3)
Human reason is reliable and adequate to understand nature. (rationality)
4)
Every effect has a cause. (causality) (Harrington 10)
In fact, Albert Einstein is quoted as saying, “The most incomprehensible thing about the universe is
that it is comprehensible.”
How does methodological naturalism fit with these foundations? If one assumes that something
outside of nature could influence or change the workings of the natural laws that govern the
universe, then we could have effects that have no cause, or experiments that are not repeatable.
The comprehensibility and rationality of the universe would be destroyed, and man would be
enslaved by the whim and caprice of “beings” or “demons” beyond his reach. That is precisely the
superstitious model of the universe that precedes the age of reason, and one to which science is
loathe to return. Thus, it is axiomatic that what experiments we do, what effects we as scientists
observe, must fit within the realm of natural law governing the universe. Einstein phrased it thus:
“The more a man is imbued with the ordered regularity of all events the firmer becomes his
conviction that there is no room left by the side of this ordered regularity for causes of a different
nature.” (26) To view it in any other way is generally considered unscientific.
Does this view of natural law affect the scientist’s view of the nature of God? I think it must. Such
a perspective would typically prohibit the action of God in response to prayer, for example.
Miracles, such as those recorded in scripture, would therefore violate the natural order of things,
and thus must not be true. In this view, God can be a First Cause but not an intervening cause.
God becomes impersonal, exemplified by words such as Truth and Beauty. God can be Creator but
not sustainer of the universe. In general, this is a deistic view of God, in which God winds up the
universe, sets it in motion, and then goes on vacation (or perhaps sets back and watches it with
amusement).
And yet, in the Judeo-Christian tradition, God is not distant or uncaring. He is clearly portrayed as
a personal God, a Father who views us as his children. Can such a view be reconciled with the
perspective of science? While Einstein would unequivocally say “No,” other writers have looked
at things somewhat differently.
For example, Robert John Russell suggests that science is far less deterministic than naturalism
would presume. He writes: “For the past two to three centuries, we were given a choice between
two understandings of special providence: (1) as the objective acts of God in nature and history to
which we respond – but these acts can only be understood as divine interventions into the natural
and historical world, or (2) as our subjective response to God’s acts – but these acts must be
understood as uniformly the same in all events. My thesis is that this assumption no longer holds
and we now have a third option. The old choice was based on classical physics and modern,
reductionist philosophy. Today, because of changes in the natural sciences, including quantum
physics, genetics, evolution, and the mind/brain problem, and because of changes in philosophy,
including the move from reductionism to holism and the legitimacy of including whole/part and
top/down analysis, we can now understand special providence as the objective acts of God in
nature and history and we can understand these acts in a non-interventionist manner consistent
with science. Whether God did, or does, act in specific instances remains an open question, of
course, but it can no longer be ruled out automatically by the charge of interventionism.”
[Emphasis in the original.] (79)
The key to this change in many ways relates to the changes in our understanding of physics at the
beginning of the 20th century. With the development of quantum theory, physics moved from a
totally deterministic set of laws to laws that rested ultimately upon probability. For example, given
a mole of U-238, we can accurately foretell the number of alpha-particle emissions that will occur
in a fixed time period, but we cannot predict which of the nuclei will emit those alpha particles.
Those nuclear decays are governed by the probability of quantum mechanics, and nothing in our
understanding will make them totally deterministic.
Russell suggests that this quantum indeterminacy provides a way for God to act without violating
the order of natural law. His argument is that, at an atomic or molecular level, God can act within
the probabilities that exist to bring about his will. In Russell’s words, “most of the broad, general
characteristics of the macroscopic world are a function and result of the character of quantum
events and God’s action as creator there.” (93) Personally, I am not especially thrilled by Russell’s
suggestion. I think it smacks of a “God-of-the-gaps” approach rather than imbuing God with the
power to do whatever He wishes with his creation. Yet, what Russell seeks to do is to reconcile the
methodology of science with the reality of a personal God, one who does answer prayers and
intervene in the lives of his believers.
Perhaps it is significant that Einstein never was comfortable with the Copenhagen interpretation of
quantum physics, which required that probability would govern action at the atomic or molecular
level. Perhaps he saw this as the opportunity for divine intervention in the world. At any rate,
Niels Bohr’s response to the famous Einstein saying, that “God does not play dice with the
universe,” may have some relevance in our discussion tonight. Bohr is reported to have said,
“Albert, you must quit telling God what to do.” And so, perhaps, should we.
At any rate, whether one believes that a personal God who acts is consonant with the methodology
of science or not, I do believe that science is not the correct vehicle to determine the redemptive
nature of God. Yet, even in saying that, I believe that our natural world reveals to us much of
significance about God, as even the apostle Paul said in the first chapter of the epistle to the
Romans, “…since the creation of the world His invisible attributes, His eternal power and divine
nature, have been clearly seen, being understood through what has been made…” What we
observe in nature does not hide God from us, but should help us to know at least some of his
attributes.
What do we see? Foremost, we see order in the universe. That order is a consequence of the
natural laws, the physical laws that govern the entire universe. Physicist Stephen Barr, in his book
Modern Physics and Ancient Faith, points out that there is a deep and subtle symmetry underlying
these laws. He makes the point that the four forces known in nature – gravitational force,
electromagnetic force, and the strong and weak nuclear forces – are all based on fundamental
symmetries. He writes, “When we say that all these forces are ‘based on’ symmetries, we mean
several things. Most profoundly, the very fact that there are such forces in nature is a consequence
of these symmetries. If nature did not have these symmetries, it would also not have these
forces…The structures of the mathematical laws governing these forces are to a large extent
determined by their underlying symmetries. So much is this the case that modern fundamental
physics is not so much driven by the search for new kinds of matter or new forces, but for the new
and more powerful principles of symmetry that are suspected to lie beneath the surface of what is
presently understood.” (102) Such would be the case with current explorations of string theory, as
described by Brian Green’s best-selling book, The Elegant Universe, and the subject of a recent 3part NOVA miniseries.
But what does this mean in our search for the nature of God? Barr concludes, “If symmetry is
found in works of art of every sort and is an important element in what it is to be beautiful, and if as
well the laws of nature are based on symmetries that are so sophisticated and so deep that while we
may study them with the tools of modern mathematics they lie far above our mental powers to
appreciate on an intuitive level, does that not suggest the mind of an artist at work that is far above
the level of our own minds?” (104) Barr’s view is that the symmetries we observe that underlie
the natural laws in physics suggest the existence of purposeful design rather than haphazard
accident or random chance. And the elegance and subtlety of this design indicates a Designer who
powers far exceed those of mere man.
Barr again states, “If the ultimate laws of nature are, as scientists can now begin to discern, of great
subtlety and beauty, one must ask where this design comes from. Can science explain it? That is
not possible, for if science always explains design by showing it to be part of or a consequence of a
deeper and greater design [i.e, a deeper and greater symmetry], then it has no way to explain the
ultimate design of nature. The ultimate laws of physics are the end of the road of scientific
explanation. One cannot go any farther in that direction.” (106)
And hence comes the dilemma posed by presupposing naturalism: One cannot invoke any form of
supernatural explanation for what one observes, yet the scientific explanation is inherently limited
in its ability to explain where those laws arise. In many ways, science points towards what it
cannot invoke.
One cannot determine from a study of science whether the personal God displayed in the Bible
exists. As we have seen, despite the premise of methodological naturalism that lies at the heart of
modern science, Robert Russell has suggested a way that the action of a divine God could be
consistent with our understanding of science, that is, that such action would not be viewed as a
violation of the natural laws that govern science. At the same time, Russell states that whether such
action has actually occurred is “an open question.” Similarly, Einstein in denying that God could
or would act in the world, states that “the doctrine of a personal God interfering with natural events
could never be refuted, in the real sense, by science…” (26) So I believe that the question of
whether God is a personal God who acts in this world is not an appropriate question to ask of
science.
But what science may be able to discern is the infinity of God, the depth of the mind of God, the
aspect of order and symmetry that the laws of nature reveal to us. More than just Truth and Beauty,
but certainly encompassing them as well, science may reveal to us “His invisible attributes, His
eternal power and divine nature.”
References:
Barr, Stephen M., Modern Physics and Ancient Faith, Notre Dame, IN: U. of Notre Dame Press,
2003
Einstein, Albert, Out of my Later Years, New York: Wings Books, 1996.
Harrington, John, Discovering Science, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1981.
Russell, Robert J., “Does the ‘God Who Acts’ Really Act in Nature?” Science and Theology, The
New Consonance, Ted Peters, ed., Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998. 77-102.