Download Chapter 9: The Ethical Treatment of Animals

Chapter 9: The Ethical Treatment of Animals
Gaverick Matheny, “Utilitarianism and Animals”
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Matheny's main 2-part argument (part 1):
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1. Being sentient is sufficient (enough) for having
interests, including being free from pain and
suffering.
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2. Many nonhuman animals are sentient.
Thus (from 1 & 2),
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3. Many nonhuman animals have interests,
including being free from pain and suffering.
© Oxford University Press
Chapter 9: The Ethical Treatment of Animals
Gaverick Matheny, “Utilitarianism and Animals”

Matheny's main 2-part argument (part 2):

3. Many nonhuman animals have interests,
including being from pain and suffering.

4. An action is morally right (permissible) only if the
like interests of all who will be affected by one’s
action are given equal weight by one’s action.
Thus (from 3 & 4 ),

5. An action is morally right only if the like interests
of all who will be affected by one’s action, including
nonhuman animals, are given equal weight by one’s
action.
© Oxford University Press
Chapter 9: The Ethical Treatment of Animals
Gaverick Matheny, “Utilitarianism and Animals”

Matheny's tests for particular animal
experiments
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Balance of pain test: “In every case, we should ask
if the pain prevented by an experiment is greater
than the pain caused by that experiment.” If not,
experimentation is wrong.

Infant substitution test: “Would researchers
contemplating an animal experiment be willing...to
place an orphaned infant in the animal's place?”
© Oxford University Press
Chapter 9: The Ethical Treatment of Animals
Tom Regan, “Are Zoos Morally Defensible?”
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A utilitarian approach to the question
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Interests of animals (e.g., their “needs, desires, and
preferences”) will figure in the moral assessment of
zoos.

A problem with applying this approach: We need to
know about the interests of all affected, not just the
interests of animals.

A serious implication of this problem: “the theory
requires knowledge that far exceeds what we
humans are capable of acquiring”
© Oxford University Press
Chapter 9: The Ethical Treatment of Animals
Tom Regan, “Are Zoos Morally Defensible?”

The rights view
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If wild animals confined in zoos are treated with
appropriate respect, then (contrary to the utilitarian
approach), we don't have to ask about:
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The interests of those employed by zoos
Economic benefits of zoos
How much people learn from zoos
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Animals have rights for the same reasons that
humans do.

Zoos are not defensible because they violate
animals' right to freedom.
© Oxford University Press
Chapter 9: The Ethical Treatment of Animals
Carl Cohen, “Do Animals Have Rights?”
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What is a right?
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“A right (unlike an interest) is a valid claim, or
potential claim, under principles that govern both
the claimant and the target of the claim.”
Why animals do not have rights:
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Cohen's lioness & baby zebra thought experiment
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Animals are “totally amoral...they do no wrong,
ever. [...] In their world there are no rights”
© Oxford University Press
Chapter 9: The Ethical Treatment of Animals
Carl Cohen, “Do Animals Have Rights?” (cont'd)

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“Animals cannot be the bearers of rights because
the concept of rights is essentially human; it is
rooted in, and has force within, a human moral
world.”
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Note: Cohen still thinks we have obligations
towards animals, because he thinks factors other
than rights can produce obligations.
Why Regan's argument for animals rights fails

Regan's argument equivocates on “inherent value”
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Sense 1: moral dignity
Sense 2: being more than “just a thing”
© Oxford University Press
Chapter 9: The Ethical Treatment of Animals
Mary Anne Warren, “Human and Animal Rights
Compared”
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The content of a right = the sphere of activity the right
protects (e.g., the content of the right to free speech is
free speech).
The strength of a right = the strength of reasons
required for it to be legitimately overridden (e.g., the
right to live might be stronger than the right to vote—it
may be all right to prevent someone if doing so will
save a live).
Warren argues that both animals and humans have
rights, but these rights differ in terms of content and
strength.
© Oxford University Press
Chapter 9: The Ethical Treatment of Animals
Mary Anne Warren, “Human and Animal Rights
Compared”

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The rights of animals are weaker than the
corresponding rights (i.e., rights with the same
content) as humans because:
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1. Humans desire liberty and life more strongly, and
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2. Humans possess moral autonomy
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Note: Moral autonomy is not necessary for having
rights, according to Warren, but it can strengthen
the rights one already has.
The nonparadigm human objection and Warren's
response
© Oxford University Press
Chapter 9: The Ethical Treatment of Animals
Jordan Curnutt, “A New Argument for
Vegetarianism”
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Part 1 of his 3-part argument:
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1. Causing harm is prima facie morally wrong.
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2. Killing animals causes them harm.
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3. Therefore, killing animals is prima facie morally
wrong.
Part 2 of his 3-part argument:
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3. Killing animals is prima facie morally wrong.
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4. Animal-eating requires the killing of animals.
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5. Therefore, animal-eating is prima facie morally
wrong.
© Oxford University Press
Chapter 9: The Ethical Treatment of Animals
Jordan Curnutt, “A New Argument for
Vegetarianism”

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Part 3 of his 3-part argument:
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5. Animal-eating is prima facie morally wrong.
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6. The wrongness of animal-eating is not overridden.
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7. Therefore, animal-eating is ultima facie morally wrong.
Objection to Part 3: the wrongness of animal-eating is
overridden
Appeals to tradition, aesthetics, convenience, human
welfare
Curnutt's reply
© Oxford University Press