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Transcript
Entanglement verification with detection efficiency mismatch
Yanbao Zhang1, 2 and Norbert Lütkenhaus1, 2
1
Institute for Quantum Computing, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, N2L 3G1 Canada
Department of Physics and Astronomy, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, N2L 3G1 Canada
0.5
η1=1, η2=1
0.45
η1=1, η2=0.9
0.4
η1=1, η2=0.8
0.35
η1=1, η2=0.7
0.3
p
For quantum key distribution (QKD), we usually use
optical signals, which are naturally described in an infinite dimensional Hilbert space, to encode information.
To measure optical signals, we tend to use threshold
detectors, which do not provide any refined knowledge
about the photon number of an incoming signal. Often,
there is a detection efficiency mismatch between the various detectors in a setup, either intrinsically, or induced
by an adversary. Such a mismatch affects the security
of the QKD system. For example, if the adversary can
control the efficiency of each detector used and the efficiency mismatch introduced is large enough, successful
intercept-resend attacks exist, as demonstrated in the recent work [1].
As entanglement, either physical or hypothetical, is
a necessary condition for secure quantum key distribution [2] and also implies the absence of any interceptresend attack, it is important for the sender and receiver
in QKD to learn whether or not they can effectively share
entanglement. If there is no detection efficiency mismatch, entanglement can be verified via applying squashing maps [3] which reduces the problem to a finite dimensional problem. However, in the efficiency mismatch
case, no method is known so far to verify entanglement
efficiently. Note that one can use Bell inequalities for this
purpose, but they are too restrictive in practice.
Here, given that the detection efficiency mismatch is
characterized and known, we present a method to verify
entanglement in the implementation of the BB84 protocol with polarization encoding. (The method can be
extended to other QKD protocols.) The main idea is
to construct an expectation-value matrix (EVM) [4, 5]
using a finite number of real measurements which contain the efficiency mismatch information. In this way, we
map an infinite dimensional density matrix into a finite
dimensional EVM.
To illustrate our method, we study a toy channel connecting the sender and the receiver, where with probability ω it depolarizes the input Bell state and then with
probability p it intercepts the single photon and resends
multiple photons to the receiver. The receiver can measure the polarization state of incoming photons using either the active or passive detection scheme. We would
like to know, for which values of ω and p the sender and
receiver can verify entanglement. For this particular situation, the results using the active detection scheme are
shown in Fig. 1. The results suggest that, the larger the
mismatch is, the smaller the set of quantum channels
that can be verified to transmit quantum information
0.25
0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05
0
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
ω
FIG. 1: Results in the active detection scheme. Different
curves are for different mismatches as labeled. For each mismatch, when the noise parameters ω and p in the transmission
are below the curve, one can verify entanglement. See the text
for more details.
becomes. Similar results are obtained for the passive detection scheme. We also compare our method with the
method based on squashing maps [3] when there is no
mismatch, and the results as in Fig. 2 show that our
method gives a stronger criterion.
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
p
2
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
0
Passive detection, Our method
Passive detection, Squashing
Active detection, Our method or Squashing
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
ω
FIG. 2: Comparison of our method with the method based
on squashing maps, when all detectors are perfect. Different
curves are for different detection schemes and methods as labeled. For each case, when the noise parameters ω and p in
the transmission are below the curve, one can verify entanglement. See the text for more details.
2
[1] S. Sajeed, P. Chaiwongkhot, J.-P. Bourgoin, T. Jennewein,
N. Lütkenhaus, and V. Makarov, Phys. Rev. A 91, 062301
(2015).
[2] M. Curty, M. Lewenstein, and N. Lütkenhaus, Phys. Rev.
Lett. 92, 217903 (2004).
[3] N. J. Beaudry, T. Moroder, and N. Lütkenhaus, Phys.
Rev. Lett. 101, 093601 (2008).
[4] J. Rigas, O. Gühne, and N. Lütkenhaus, Phys. Rev. A 73,
012341 (2006).
[5] M. Navascués, S. Pironio, and A. Acı́n, Phys. Rev. Lett.
98, 010401 (2007).