Download Russian lobbying in the United States: stages of evolution

yes no Was this document useful for you?
   Thank you for your participation!

* Your assessment is very important for improving the work of artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project

Journal of Public Affairs
Volume 12 Number 4 pp 279–292 (2012)
Published online 23 April 2012 in Wiley Online Library
( DOI: 10.1002/pa.1423
■ Academic Paper
Russian lobbying in the United States:
stages of evolution
Sergey Sergeevich Kostyaev*†
Institute of Scientific Information on Social Sciences of Russian Academy of Sciences, Economics,
Nahimovsky prospect 51, Moscow 117997, Russian Federation
The article examines Russian lobbying in the US. The endogenous and exogenous factors of Russian lobbying are
analyzed as well as its qualitative and quantitative characteristics. The article depicts stages of Russian lobbying
development: (i) from government to private entities; (ii) nongovernmental lobbying; and (iii) a return to government.
Additionally, occasional attempts by Russian entities to secure funding from the US budget are mentioned. Two case
studies are studied to show the nature of current Russian lobbying in the US: lobbying campaigns by Techsnabexport,
state-owned corporation, and GML, a private business concern. The article concludes that Russian lobbying in the
US is weak. At the beginning, it was mostly about investment consulting, and with the rise in oil prices and the
decrease in political freedom, the need for and availability of lobbying diminished. Some private corporations
were nationalized under President Putin and, as a result, lost control over their international expansion strategies,
with the remaining private corporations being afraid of independent lobbying campaigns abroad. Copyright © 2012
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
When anyone reads a phrase ‘Russian lobbying in
the US’, a question arises: does such a thing exist?
Surprisingly, yes, it does. The reason for that
doubt is the literature regarding ethnic lobbies in
the US and how they try to influence American
foreign policy towards their home countries
(Ahrari, 1987; Ambrosio, 2002). Russian emigrants
in the US try to assimilate as soon as possible and
do not form any civic society organizations to
represent themselves politically. This circumstance, by the way, is one of the reasons why
Russian lobbying in the US is weak. It limits the
range of lobbying techniques because tools such
as campaign financing and grassroots campaigns
are unavailable.
However, since 1942 (see Appendices A and B),
many Russian entities (government, corporations,
banks, mass media, political parties, and even
individuals) have been hiring Washington, DC
consultants to deal with the US government. In this
article, I show how Russian lobbying in the US
have evolved in a historical perspective, how
lobbying issues have changed, and what were the
factors affecting the successes and failures of
Russian entities in the US. The intensity of lobbying somewhat decreased during three stages: in
every year from 1991 to 1993, 7.6 Russian entities
registered to lobby the US government, whereas
from 1994 to 2004, the number decreased to 4
entities a year, and from 2005 to 2011, the number
decreased to 1.6. Two case studies of lobbying
campaigns by Techsnabexport, a Russian uranium
exporting monopoly, and GML, former owner of
expropriated Yukos oil company, are presented to
demonstrate the present condition of Russian
lobbying in the US.1
*Correspondence to: Sergey Kostyaev, Institute of Scientific
Information on Social Sciences of Russian Academy of
Sciences - Economics, Nahimovsky prospect 51, Moscow
117997, Russian Federation.
A version of this article was presented at the September
2010 Annual Meeting of American Political Science Association,
Washington, DC, USA.
Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Currently in the literature on foreign lobbying in
the US, most scholars are engaged in the study
of Middle Eastern lobbying. Political scientists,
At the conclusion, the prospects of Russian lobbying in the US
are analyzed.
S. S. Kostyaev
concerned with the practices of Israeli lobbyists,
remark that they have become dangerously
powerful (Terry, 2005; Petras, 2006; Mearsheimer
and Walt, 2007; Kostyaev, 2010a). Another critical
study reiterates the same observation concerning
the Arab lobby (Marrar, 2008; Bard, 2010). A more
unbiased approach can be found in the article by
Al-Yasin (2008). Notably, Asian lobbying has not
received much attention with regard to China
(see Koehn and Yin, 2002; Xie, 2009) or South
Korea (see Kostyaev, 2010b). Insightful analysis
of lobbying and foreign policy making is provided by Newhouse (2009). Lastly, some scholarly
attention is paid to lobbying regulation in the US
(Lawson, 1996; Kostyaev, 2005; Atieh, 2010).
Although there is a gap in the literature, thorough
investigations of Russian lobbying in the US are absent. A number of scholars study Russian immigration to the US (Kishinevsky, 2004; Trumbauer and
Asher, 2004; Isurin, 2011), but none of them detects
any visible political activity. There are only two
studies of Russian lobbying in the US (Kostyaev,
2005, 2009). The first one, conducted in 2005, is outdated; the second one (2009) covers only business
lobbying. It is a significant drawback because since
2005, government entities, which lobby the US
government, outnumber private ones (Table 1). This
article is an attempt to present an up-to-date analysis of all streams of Russian lobbying in the US.
In the model presented in the article, the level of
democracy in Russia is related to the level of activity
of Russian lobbying in the US. The more democracy,
the more active is Russian lobbying and vice versa.
The democracy level itself is, in some part, dependant
on oil prices. The relationship is not simply casual.
There is significant literature regarding the applicable
theory known as the ‘resource curse’. Most scholars
following Mahdavy (1970), who was the pioneer of
this theory, argue that reliance on natural resources,
particularly oil and gas, cements authoritarian
regimes (Ross, 2001, 2009; Friedman, 2006; Ramsay,
2006, 2011; Aslaksen, 2010). Others argue that this
hypothesis is simply incorrect or incomplete, and a
regime category is influenced by other circumstances
(Dunning, 2008).
Testing ‘oil curse’ theory specifically on Russia,
Treisman thoughtfully indicates that the relationships
Table 1
between oil and democracy are not causal but are of a
more subtle nature. ‘At moments of overwhelming
popularity, a president has the opportunity to make
significant changes to the system, pushing it towards
either more or less democracy. President Putin,
with an approval rating close to 80 percent, chose
the latter. This was not inevitable, had the Kremlin
candidate in 2000 been a more committed democrat.
One can imagine that the subsequent boom might
have helped sustain support for further democratic
reforms’ (Treisman, 2010).
There are exogenous and endogenous factors
of Russian lobbying in the US. The endogenous
parameters are, first, the level of democracy in
Russia measured through the Freedom House index,
although its methodology is limited (Coppedge
et al., 2011).
The second factor of Russian lobbying is the government’s share of gross domestic product (GDP) as
a result of privatization/nationalization of the
economy measured by Federal Statistics Service of
Russia, whereas the third remains as a Russian state
and business conflict. These factors determine the
number of entities hiring lobbyists to represent
Russian interests. In other words, they specify
quantitative characteristic of potential motives for
Russian lobbying.
The fourth and last factor is resources: government allies, number of former government officials
employed by organization as lobbyists, overall
financial resources, lobbying expenditures, and
membership size. Baumgartner calculated the percentage of issues where the side with the greater
control of the resource gained its preferred outcome:
government allies helped to secure success in 78% of
issues, whereas former officials employed as lobbyists helped to achieve the goal in 63% of issues. The
other types of resources gained preferred outcome
in half of the issues, which means, in other words,
they were not decisive (Baumgartner et al., 2009).
The exogenous factors of Russian lobbying in the
US are: first, presidential politics; second, concerns
The number of Russian entities registered under the provisions of Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 and Foreign
Agents Registration Act of 1938
Number of registered
foreign principals
Data in the table is collected from Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 and Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 reports. Data is up to
the first quarter of 2012. By mistake, several Russian entities are registered under LDA and FARA provisions simultaneously. This
circumstance is taken into account to eschew double counting.
Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
J. Public Affairs 12, 279–292 (2012)
DOI: 10.1002/pa
Russian lobbying in the US 281
about cost/budget impact; third, logistics of the
legislative process; fourth, partisanship/ideology;
fifth, electoral politics; and sixth, the US legal
environment—for example, Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 (FARA) prohibits foreign entities
from making campaign contributions.
The seventh determinant of Russian lobbying is the
low degree of diaspora organization; ethnic diasporas
are important in political as well as in economical
spheres (Leblang, 2010). If the Russian diaspora had
been politically organized, it would have made
campaign contributions and launched grassroots
campaigns to influence the US foreign policy toward
its motherland, as seen in many other diasporas
(Ahrari, 1987; Ambrosio, 2002). The third, sixth, and
seventh factors remained time invariant for Russian
lobbying throughout the period of 1991–2011; hence,
they will not be analyzed in detail further. All these
factors determine the success/failure of Russian
lobbying; to put it another way, they influence qualitative characteristic of Russian lobbying.
In summation, in the presented model, the abovementioned endogenous and exogenous factors are independent variables, whereas the quantitative (number
of registered entities) and qualitative (success/failure of
a particular lobbying campaign) are dependant
variables. The mathematical modeling of these variables is not possible because the available data is hard
to assess. For instance, out of 106 lobbying firms hired
by Russian entities, 66 did not disclose their lobbying
expenditures, whereas 30 lobbying firms did not identify the issues that initiated their engagement by the
Russian entities.
As per the findings from Table 2, Russian lobbying in the US is diversified; all kinds of entities are
involved in representing their interests: corporations, banks, governmental bodies, civic society
organizations, research and cultural institutions,
and even mass media, political parties, and individuals. As noted, business entities comprise 46% of
all Russian entities registered under the provisions
of Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 and Foreign
Agents Registration Act of 1938.
Table 2
Structure of Russian lobbying in the US,
Type of entity
Share in %
Government and its entities
(departments, agencies, funds)
Civic society organizations
Research and cultural organizations
Mass media
Political parties
The table is based on the data from Appendices A and B.
Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
From 1991 to 1993, the endogenous factors of
Russian lobbying in the US have changed. The level
of democracy increased: in 1990, the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics was rated ‘not free’and in 1993,
Russia became ‘partially free’. In this period, the
Russian government under President Yeltsin began
to privatize the Soviet economy to foster a transition
to a free market and, thus, to create the premises for
burgeoning nongovernmental lobbying. From 1990
to 1993, the share of GDP produced by the public
sector decreased from 89% to 49%. There was
no major state versus business conflicts because
government was decreasing its role. These factors
resulted in 23 Russian entities hiring consultants to
promote their interests in the US. The mean is 7.6
registrations by each new Russian entity per year.
The parameters of resources are hard to identify
because of the data limitations.
The exogenous factors also have changed. In
1992, George H.W. Bush lost the presidential
election to William J. Clinton. Although Clinton
was an ardent supporter of Russian democratic
transition, thanks to Strobe Talbott, ‘Marshal plan
for Russia’ has never been fully considered because
of concerns about budget costs; in 1992, the deficit
in the US federal budget was $290bn, and at
that time, it was perceived as the largest dollar
deficit in American history. Russian issues were
not partisan and ideological at that time. All these
factors caused mixed results for Russian entities;
some of them failed, and some succeeded in achieving desired goals.
The main goal of Russian lobbying at the first
stage was to attract the investments of both government and private sources due to lack of financial
recourses in Russia, because inflation adjusted oil
price was in the range of $20–$30 per barrel. The
government of Chechen Republic, Tyumen Region
Administration, and the Russian Academy of Arts
hired Waterman Associates, Inc., New Horizons
Ventures, and the Law Office of Stewart & Stewart,
respectively, to attract US investments. American
law giant Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis was
doing the same thing for the Prefect of the West
Administrative District of the City of Moscow and
the Russian company CentroBAMstroy. The city of
Ufa was using services of consultant Donald K
Hansen to secure the US government funding for
environmental programs.
From 1994 to 2004, the endogenous factors of
Russian lobbying in the US have changed. In 1994,
Russia was rated partially free, but in 2004, the status was changed to not free. In the above-mentioned
J. Public Affairs 12, 279–292 (2012)
DOI: 10.1002/pa
S. S. Kostyaev
period, the public sector in GDP declined from 38%
to 30%. The level of state versus business conflict
increased; in 2000, President Vladimir Putin orchestrated the takeover of the first private TV network
‘NTV’ by Gazprom. This led to NTV lobbying
campaign in the US. All these factors resulted in
44 Russian entities hiring lobbying, Public Relations (PR), and law firms to promote their interests
in the US. At the apex of the period in 2003, 13
Russian entities had contracts with lobbyists, lawyers, or PR specialists (Table 1). The mean is four
registrations for each new Russian entity per year.
The data on resources is available only in several
cases, for instance, on the NTV lobbying campaign.
The exogenous factors have also changed. Relationships between President Clinton and Yeltsin
had deteriorated by 1999 because of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operation
in Kosovo, the NATO expansion to the East, and
Russia’s default in 1998, etc. In the 2000s, the
Bush–Putin relationship was strong at the beginning because since 11 September 2001, Russia
has been helping the war on terrorism. Later
US–Russian relations soured over the Iran nuclear
program and other issues. Concerns over budget
costs were not major obstacles for Russian entities
in the US in this period because lobbying issues
were mostly unrelated to the budget. Although
oil prices were between $20 and $40 per barrel,
as a result, the need for foreign investments
remained. Russian issues became more partisan
and ideological in American politics in this
period than before. For instance, the Bush administration’s position was more critical of Russia’s
human rights violation record than Clinton’s. All
these factors determined quite a moderate success
level for lobbying campaigns by Russian entities.
Systematic data on this qualitative characteristic
of lobbying is not available.
Firstly, the most visible lobbying campaign in
this period was caused by state versus business
conflict. NTV and its owner ‘Media’ most tried to
prevent a takeover by Gazprom, with the help of
the US consultants—Rubinstein Associates and
the law firm Patton Boggs. The media holding
had used the following resources: congressmen
Thomas Lantos (D-CA) and Christopher Smith
(R-NJ) were government allies, who cosponsored
the Joint House Senate resolution condemning
Kremlin actions; the associated lobbying expenditures were $2.8m. All this was in vain, as the
lobbying campaign in the US did not prevent the
government takeover of TV network NTV.
Currently liquidated ‘RAO UES of Russia’ also
was one of the biggest, but unsuccessful, Russian
business spenders in Washington, DC, with more
than $1m. Cassidy & Associates has rendered
lobbying services to the Russian electric power
monopoly (see APPENDIX A). Oleg Barvin, former
lobbyist at Cassidy & Associates, told the author of
Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
the article that the purpose of lobbying activity was
to convince eastern European countries to allow the
Russian state-owned corporation to buy assets in
their electric power market. Anatoly Chubais, the
CEO of the RAO UES of Russia at that time, had
hoped to use amity in the US–eastern European
relations. He seemed to think that the US Department
of State could be persuaded to act on the behalf of
Russia in relations with the governments of eastern
European countries. Alexander Kwasniewski, former
President of Poland, revealed to the author of the
article that he had never heard of any American
involvement in Russia’s attempts to buy assets in
his country. Failure to achieve this goal has led to
termination of the lobbying contract with Cassidy
& Associates in 2005.
The Russian financial sector also was active in
promoting its interests in the US. Six banks hired
government relations consultants. Among them
were the biggest players on the Russian market—
‘Vnesheconom bank’, ‘Inkom bank’, and ‘MDM
bank’ (the lobbying contract with the latter one
was wrongfully not registered under provisions of
Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995). The main goals
for all of them were investment projects and
attempts to open offices in the US (see APPENDIX
A). Elaborating on the failure of the Russian financial sector in the US, James Collins, former US ambassador to Russia, told the author in a personal
interview that Russian banks did not meet the standards of US banking regulation laws. Their business, assets, and investments portfolios were not
transparent enough. This was the reason why their
attempts to start business in the US failed. The only
success stories worth mentioning are MDM bank,
with a $3.2m loan guarantee from the US Export–
Import Bank (Kalicki and Lawson, 2003) and an
‘MMVB’ (Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange)
involvement in the US technical assistance program
with the help of the law firm of Arnold & Porter (see
Between 2005 and 2011, the endogenous factors of
Russian lobbying in the US have not changed.
Russia remained not free, according to Freedom
House. The public sector in GDP remained stable
around 35%, although there was a sharp increase
of 5% (30%–35%) from 2004 to 2005 because of the
partial nationalization of the oil and gas industry
(expropriation of Yukos, nationalization of Sibneft),
military–industrial complex, etc. The level of state
versus business conflict remained relatively high
as the most notorious examples continued to be
the takeovers of Russneft (Mihkail Gutseriev) and
Euroset (Eugeny Chichvarkin) by Kremlin-affiliated
corporations. However, this factor did not cause an
increase in lobbying activity in the US because the
J. Public Affairs 12, 279–292 (2012)
DOI: 10.1002/pa
Russian lobbying in the US 283
futility of such actions became clear for Mihkail
Gutseriev and Eugeny Chichvarkin. These factors
resulted in 11 Russian entities engaging consulting
firms to represent their interests in the US. The
mean is 1.6 registrations for each new Russian entity
a year. This changed not only the number of
registered entities but also the nature of lobbying.
As illustrated in the findings in Table 1, since 2005,
at the beginning of the second term of President
Vladimir Putin, private entities gradually have
decreased lobbying activities in the US. The data
on lobbying resources is limited and available only
in some cases.
By contrast, the exogenous factors of Russian
lobbying have changed. By 2008, the Bush–Putin
relationship deteriorated, and elections of the Barak
Obama and Dmitry Medvedev have led to so called
‘reset’. This had a mixed impact on different lobbying campaigns (see case studies of GML and Techsnabexport lobbying campaigns further). Concerns
about budget cost were not an issue because
Russian entities no longer have sought financial
assistance from the US government. Because of
soaring oil prices (inflation adjusted oil prices
soared from $40 in 2004 to $90 in 2007), Russia
had plenty of financial resources. Partisanship
played a significant role in the US policy with
Russia. The Bush administration was very critical
of Russia’s human rights record. By contrast, the
Obama administration decided to lower the level
of negative criticism of Russian democracy, its rule
of law, and its human rights issues. However, the
2008 Russian–Georgian war increased the importance of Russia in the US presidential elections.
These factors influenced the success of entities, such
as Techsnabexport, and caused the failures of
others, such as GML.
Russian nongovernmental lobbying in the US
reflects the political history of the Russian Federation.
Although the most visible political lobbying campaign
in Washington, DC was undertaken by GML (formerly
‘Menatep’ group), it hired four American consulting
firms, which have spent more than $3.4m to
influence the US government position toward the
Khodorkovsky–Lebedev trials (see APPENDIX B).
On the opposite side of the political spectrum are
government-owned entities, which are working on
mitigating the damage to Russia’s image incurred
by the Khodorkovsky trials and other domestic
and international politics events, such as the
Ukrainian gas crisis and the 2008 war with Georgia.
First of all, in 2006, ‘Rosneft’, a government-owned
oil company, which received assets from expropriated Yukos, used services of Brunswick Group,
LLC to make sure that its Initial Public Offering
(IPO) in the London stock exchange would receive a
favorable or at least a neutral reception in Washington,
Furthermore, Gazprom and its daughter company ‘Gazpromexport’ were rendered lobbying
Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
services by four Washington, DC consulting firms.
Three of four contracts were triggered by the
Ukrainian gas crisis when Gazprom stopped supplying Europe with gas because of payment conflicts with Ukraine (see APPENDIX A). Regarding
the PR events aimed at improving Gaspromexport’s
image in Washington, DC, it is important to note the
roundtable with Alexander Medvedev, the CEO of
the gas monopoly exporting branch, at Georgetown
University in December 2007. The author of this article was able to attend the event and observe how
Mr. Medvedev tried to assuage the hostile attitude
of eastern European journalists by stressing that all
corporate decisions are the result of cost-benefit
analysis not political deliberations.
The lobbying campaigns by Russian nuclear
materials exporting monopoly, Techsnabexport and
GML, are noteworthy because they epitomize the
nature of current Russian lobbying in the US.
Case study Techsnabexport as a lobbyist of Russian
government interests
Techsnabexport, an exporting branch of ‘Rosatom’,
which is a corporate successor of Ministry of nuclear
energy of Russia, got involved in promoting the
US–Russian Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation by hiring PR firm APCO Worldwide. It
is profitable for the Russian corporation because it
allows direct selling of nuclear materials to its
American business partners. Moreover, it significantly will raise the export quota on nuclear materials in 2014 and completely terminate it in 2020.
Adherence of US to principles of free trade was
tested on the case.
Techsnabexport used the following resources to
promote the agreement. The most important one is
an important government ally President Barack
Obama. The corporation was able to use him
because of the reset in US–Russia’s relationships.
The other resource is former government officials:
on APCO Worldwide’s International Advisory
Board sits the key figure—Carlos Gutierrez, former
US secretary of commerce, who signed the agreement. Others that are also worth mentioning
include Richard V. Allen, former assistant to President Reagan for National Security Affairs and chief
foreign policy advisor; Don Bonker, former US congressman and senior member of the House Foreign
Affairs Committee; Stuart Eizenstat, former deputy
secretary of the Department of the Treasury and
Undersecretary of State for Economic, Business
and Agricultural Affairs, etc. The next parameter is
overall financial resources; in 2010, the commodities
turnover of Techsnabexport was almost $4bn. The
lobbying expenditures were $450 000.
The export of Russian nuclear materials to the US
and the lobbying campaigns, which accompany this
process, have a long history. Since 1992, veteran of
uranium trade, Techsnabexport, has used the services of six law, lobbying, and PR firms in attempts
J. Public Affairs 12, 279–292 (2012)
DOI: 10.1002/pa
S. S. Kostyaev
to build positive relationships with the US government (see APPENDIX A). The Russian nuclear
materials exporting monopoly faced a US Department of Commerce antidumping investigation at
the very beginning of its attempts to sell uranium
in the US. The investigation was incited by USEC
Inc., an American competitor of Techsnabexport.
According to my calculations based on Lobbying
Disclosure Act database, since 1999 (the earliest
available year), the American corporation has
expended more than $33m on Washington, DC
lobbying, used 11 capitol-based consulting firms,
and its own Washington, DC office to promote its
interests in the US federal government.
In a response to the antidumping investigation,
Techsnabexport hired lobbying firm Hogan &
Hartson. As a result of this counter-lobbying campaign by the Russian nuclear materials exporting
monopoly, the US Department of Commerce antidumping investigation was suspended. In exchange
for the suspension, Russian export of nuclear materials to the US was subjected to quotas.
A breakthrough came on 26 September 2007. The
US Court of International Trade ruled that the antidumping investigation was illegal. The ruling was
based on the precedent stemming from the 2005
‘Urenco’ and ‘Eurodif’ cases that rendered the
court’s decision, which determined that uranium
export is a service not a good and therefore should
not be subject to the antidumping investigation.
The court’s ruling has become an incentive for the
US Department of Commerce to begin working out
the US–Russian Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear
Cooperation. The other reason was willingness
of American energy companies to lobby the US
government. American utilities needed to diversify
their sources of uranium supply. On 27 November
2007, the US Department of Commerce posted the
Agreement draft on Federal Register. Thirteen corporations commented on the text: Utilities Group,
AREVA S.A., Fuelco LLC, General Electric, etc.
Also, USEC Inc. expressed its opinion, along with
the Nuclear Energy Institute, the nuclear materials
producers’ powerhouse, and the Allied-Industrial
and Service Workers International Union. According to my calculations based on the Lobbying
Disclosure Act database from 1999 to 2010, a conglomerate of these entities expended on lobbying
with the federal government more than $ 440m.
Then, in 1 February 2007, the US Secretary of
Commerce at that time, Carlos Gutierrez, and the
head of Rosatom, Sergey Kiriyenko, signed the
US–Russian agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation. Firstly, it allows Russia to sell nuclear materials to American utilities without any American
intermediate sellers. Secondly, export quotas are
set to increase in the period from 2010 to 2013 from
16 to 41 tons per year and in 2014–2020, from 485 to
514 tons and will be terminated after 2020. Thirdly,
in the agreement, it is stated separately that the US
Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Department of Commerce is going to adhere to
the 26 September 2007 US Court of International
Trade ruling.
The agreement was not perceived favorably by
American nuclear materials producers. In 2009 and
2010, Russia was the fifth top producer of nuclear
materials (3500 tons per year), whereas the US was
the eighth largest (1400 tons per year). Therefore,
to please American manufacturers immediately
after the 2008 Russian–Georgian war, the administration of G.W. Bush removed the US–Russian
Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation from
the US Congress.
To deal with the problem, Techsnabexport hired
Cassidy & Associates. The firm was paid $160 000
to promote reintroduction of the agreement to the
Senate and to obtain a Pentagon contract. By 2009,
the lobbying firm had obtained no results and was
replaced by the PR firm APCO Worldwide. Because
of good personal relationships between the President of the US, Barack Obama, and the President
of Russia, Dmitry Medvedev, and perhaps the PR
firm activities, on 10 May 2010, the administration
of the US reintroduced the agreement to the
Congress. The other reason for that was an active
lobbying campaign by American energy companies
to increase the number of uranium suppliers.
Reintroduction of the agreement was the breakthrough in the ratification process. There are three
types of international accords: treaties, such as
START, which are approved by two-thirds of
senators; executive–congressional agreements, such
as NAFTA, approved by a simple majority; and
executive agreements, such as the US–Russian
agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation, which
are ratified automatically. In regards to this third
type of agreement: ‘For the Agreement to become
operative after agreement and signature by the
states parties, it must be notified to Congress and
be at both Houses of Congress for 90 consecutive
working days’.2 The only way for Congress to block
the automatic ratification is for the House and
Senate to pass a resolution of disfavor. It is subject
to presidential veto, which can be overturned by
two-thirds of the congressmen and senators.
On May 25, Congressmen Edward Markey
(D-Mass.) and Jeff Fortenberry (R-Neb.) introduced
H.J. Res. 85, a resolution ‘expressing the disfavor of
the Congress regarding the proposed agreement for
cooperation between the United States and the
Russian Federation’. The resolution has been referred
to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. In
announcing the resolution, Congressman Markey
stated: ‘Russia continues to train Iranian nuclear
physicists, supply sensitive nuclear technology to
Iran, and give secret instruction on Russian soil to
the Iranian Revolutionary Guard on the use of the
Personal interview
J. Public Affairs 12, 279–292 (2012)
DOI: 10.1002/pa
Russian lobbying in the US 285
advanced S-300 interceptor-missile systems.’ It
should be noted that Congressmen Markey and
Fortenberry were not telling the truth. Because of
the introduction of the resolution of disfavor, Russia
was instrumental in passing the UN Security
Council’s fourth sanctions’ resolution against Iran
on 9 June 2010. Despite the above-mentioned efforts
by Congressmen Markey and Fortenberry, on 9
December 2010, the Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear
Cooperation finally became operative.
It is important to note that according to data
collected by the Center for Responsive Politics, a
Washington, DC campaign finance and lobbying
watchdog, in the 2009–2010 election cycle, the
energy and natural recourses sector contributed
$211 000 to Congressman Markey’s and $5500 to
Congressman Fortenberry’s reelection campaigns.
Russian entities do not have that option. The list
of lobbying tactics used by Russian corporations is
somewhat limited because of legal restrictions. The
Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 prohibits
foreign entities from making campaign contributions at any level. Because of absent ethnic lobby,
grassroots methods of influence are not employed.
As noted, such a tool as the establishment of the
Washington, DC government relations office is
allowed. Techsnabexport, along with Energy, a
state-owned space corporation, has its own office
in the nation’s capital, (Tenam Corporation) that
monitors US nuclear materials policy. The lobbying
tactics used were working in coalitions with
American utilities, hiring lobbying firms, media
relations, providing testimonies at different executive
branch hearings, direct contacts with decision makers,
etc. The key factor in approving the agreement
was such powerful resource as President Obama.
Case study Lobbying campaign by GML
On 19 February 2003 at the meeting of President
Vladimir Putin with the CEOs of several of the largest Russian corporations, Mikhail Khodorkovsky,
CEO of Yukos, accused Rosneft management, a
state-owned oil corporation, of corruption. After
the meeting, the Ministry of Taxes of Russia
accused Yukos of tax evasion. On 2 July 2003 Platon
Lebedev, CEO of Menatep and a major shareholder
of Yukos, was arrested. The next month, Menatep
hired Covington & Burling, Washington, DC
powerhouse to influence the US government
position on the Yukos case. On 25 October 2003,
Mr. Khodorkovsky was arrested.
Soon, a fully muscled lobbying campaign was
launched. GML used the following resources:
government allies were Senators Richard Lugar
(R-IN) and John McCain (R-AZ) and Congressmen
Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ) and Thomas Lantos
(D-CA), etc. Former government officials employed
as lobbyists were Edward Ayoob, the former legislative counsel, tax counsel, appropriations manager,
and foreign affairs advisor to US Senate Majority
Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Leader Harry Reid (D – NV); Don Bonker, a former
US congressman; Alan Slomowitz, a Chief-of-Staff
to Rep. Robert A. Borski (D-PA), etc. The lobbying
expenditures of GML were $3.6m.
Four Washington, DC lobbying, law, and public
relations firms worked to inform policy makers
and general public about the Yukos case (see
APPENDIX B). Many phone calls to government
officials were made, abundant appointments with
senior bureaucrats were scheduled, numerous
op-eds in the US National Press were published.
As a result, on 21 November 2003, the US Congress
passed a joint resolution regarding the case (see
section on Back to government).
Furthermore, on 17 February 2005, lobbyists
initiated Senate hearings, ‘Democracy in Retreat in
Russia’. In the hearings, the following participated:
Dr. Anders Aslund, Director of Russian and Eurasian
Program, Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, Bruce P. Jackson, President of Project on
Transitional Democracies, Nelson Ledsky, Regional
Program Director for Eurasia, National Democratic
Institute, Richard Lugar, G., US Senator from
Indiana, Timothy Osborne, Member of Board of
Directors, Group Menatep, United Kingdom, and
Steven Theede, CEO of Yukos Oil Company,
Moscow, Russia.
In his opening remarks, Senator Lugar stated: ‘The
campaign against Yukos and Mikhail Khodorkovsky
reached a new low, on 28 December 2005, when one
of President Putin’s senior economic advisors criticized the forced sale of Yukos’ main oil-producing
unit and its purchase by a state-owned company as,
quote, “the scam of the year”, end of quote. This
honesty resulted in the official being stripped of most
of his responsibilities by the Kremlin’ (S. Hrg. 109-83,
this adviser, Andrey Illarionov, is currently a senior
fellow at Cato Institute; author’s note). In his
testimony, Mr. Theede noted: ‘. . .The US has a direct
interest in the resolution of the Yukos situation.. . .
There are the rights of more than 60,000 individual
and institutional investors, many of them Americans’.
In Mr. Theede’s opinion, the reason why the Kremlin
launched the campaign against Yukos was the support
for oppositional political parties provided by Mr.
Khodorkovsky (S. Hrg. 109-83, 2005). Mr. Osborn
testified that: ‘the Russian Government’s aim
was the expropriation of Yukos’. The rationale
for that in Mr. Osborn assessment is to prevent
selling a major share of Yukos to an American oil
corporation. The deal was considered by Mr.
Khodorkovsky before the arrest S. Hrg. 109-83
(2005). Among many proposals by Mr. Osborn to position the case as a high-profile issue in the international arena, one finally succeeded in that the US
State Department mentions Mr. Khodorkovsky and
Mr. Lebedev in its annual human rights violations
reports every year.
Not surprisingly, the lobbying and public relations
campaign had little effect on the Russian authorities’
J. Public Affairs 12, 279–292 (2012)
DOI: 10.1002/pa
S. S. Kostyaev
position: on 16 May 2005, Mr. Khodorkovsky and
Mr. Lebedev were sentenced to nine years in a general
regime colony.
Lobbyists hired by GML did not give up their
efforts. On 13 July 2005, the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe held a briefing:
‘Yukos Affair and Its Implications for Politics and
Business in Russia’. Participants were Christopher
H. Smith, cochairman of the commission, Tom
Lantos, Member of Congress (D-CA), deceased,
Leonid Nevzlin, former executive of Yukos. Congressman Smith in his opening remarks noted: ‘I
was surprised to hear that much of the verdict
in the trial of Mikhail Khodorkovsky was merely
the judge’s restatement of the indictment filed by
the prosecution. This is reminiscent of the dissident
trials of the Soviet era’ (Briefing).
Surprisingly, after the appeal by lawyers of
Mr. Khodorkovsky and Lebedev, on 22 September
2005, the sentence was shortened to eight years.
However, four years later, when the sentence time
was coming to an end, on 3 March 2009, the second
trial began. This time, former businessmen were
accused of embezzlement of all crude oil produced
by Yukos.
The US State Department annually issues
memorandums raising concerns about the fate of
Mr. Khodorkovksy. The most recent event was
remarks by Philip H. Gordon, Assistant Secretary
of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian
Affairs, on 16 June 2010 at the German Marshall
Fund, when he said
We also continue to be plainspoken with Russia
about our commitment to human rights and
democracy. The entire Obama Administration
has engaged intensively on this issue; the President held a parallel civil society event during
his visit, and gave an interview to Novaya Gazeta.
Secretary Clinton has also met extensively with
civil society leaders, gave a speech at Moscow
State University describing how political freedom was necessary for progress, and gave an
interview on Ekho Moskvi. NSC Senior Director
Mike McFaul on his recent trip to Moscow held
a civil society event on prison reform and met
with Sergei Magnitsky’s mother and Mikhail
Khodorkovsky’s lawyer (Gordon, 2010).
Russian authorities do not take into account US
government concerns. On 7 September 2010, Prime
Minister of Russia Vladimir Putin addressed the situation of Khodorkovsky at the meeting of the Valdai
club of leading international experts on Russia: ‘His
hands are stained with blood, He killed people to protect the economic interests of his company’ (Putin).
The remark proves that the Khodorkovsky prosecution was a result of a personal bias not a legal matter.
Even in the Russian legal system, Mr. Khodorkovsky
was never charged of murder. On 30 December 2010,
Mr. Khodorkovsky and Mr. Lebedev were found
Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
guilty of embezzlement and sentenced to remain in
prison until 2017. On 24 May 2011, Moscow city court
shortened the sentence by one year.
The lobbying campaign by GML has made the
US government aware of Mr. Khodorkovsky and
Mr. Lebedev prosecution. It resulted in several
governmental actions: Congressional resolution,
hearing, and briefing, Department of State memorandums, etc. However, US foreign policy makers
are more interested in Russian foreign policy than
domestic. The usefulness of Russia in handling nuclear proliferation issues with Iran or North Korea
outweighs the lobbying campaign by GML. Yukos
was expropriated, and Mr. Khodorkovsky and Mr.
Lebedev are in prison. The US has no leverage in
solving the domestic problems of Russia.
The study shows that there is no direct causal
relationship between such independent variables
as the share of public sector in GDP, and the
state versus business conflict, and such dependent
variable as the number of Russian entities lobbying
the US government. The latter variable has some
correlation with such a parameter as the level of
democracy in Russia; the higher the level of democracy, the more Russian entities register to lobby the
US government.
The other independent variables—lobbying
resources, presidential politics, concerns about
budget costs, logistics of the legislative process, partisanship/ideology, electoral politics, the US legal
environment, low level of diaspora organization—
determine the success rate of lobbying campaigns
by Russian entities. The data limitations do not
allow the quantification of the success rate. Nevertheless, the analysis of case studies—lobbying
campaigns by Techsnabexport and GML—confirms
previous findings that lobbying expenditures are
not the most important factor in gaining the preferred outcome; the support of high-profile government allies is much more important (Baumgartner
et al., 2009).
In conclusion, from the point of view of Government Relations (GR) expenditures, Russian lobbying
is not of any significance, although it is very diversified. All kind of entities navigate in the US politics
(see Table 2). Political lobbying is the most visible
but not very effective. Neither Chechen Republic
nor TV network NTV under Vladimir Gusinsky nor
GML were able to solve their problems with the help
of the US government. American foreign policy
makers are very pragmatic. They take into account
only the disposition of forces on the chessboard of
politics. Moscow’s help in dealing with Iran and
Afghanistan is more important to the US than issues
of human rights, freedom of speech, and the rule of
law in Russian domestic politics.
J. Public Affairs 12, 279–292 (2012)
DOI: 10.1002/pa
Russian lobbying in the US 287
Business lobbying in the US is mostly sporadic,
with the exception of Techsnabexport, which was
able to make the US–Russia Agreement on Peaceful
Nuclear Cooperation operative on 9 December
2010. This is the greatest success story of Russian
lobbying in the US up to date. Hardly anyone is
occupied with organizing a system of interest
representation. Consulting firms are hired on a
short-term basis from time to time to solve some
particular problem.
Perspectives of Russian lobbying strengthening
are small. The Russian diaspora in the US is not
organized. Russians are allergic to cooperation and
common action since the establishment of the
Soviet Union, when collectivism was forced upon
the people. US–Russia’s trade is so insignificant that
it cannot be a springboard for lobbying. But the
trade itself is difficult to increase without lobbying
to lift different trade barriers imposed by domestic
industry’s closed circle, although some hopes are
inspired by plans of partial privatization of the
economy, which were announced by the government
of Vladimir Putin on 22 October 2010.
Through the diversification of the lobbying
perspective, Russian entities use all forms of interest
representation: hiring consulting firms, using trade
associations, and establishing Washington, DC offices.
However, the latter of the two techniques remains the
exception not the operative rule of conduct.
The support for the research was provided by
the Russian Humanities Foundation grants #07-0302039a and #11-33-00324a2. The author is grateful to
John Mearsheimer, Frederick Boehmke, Gail Brenner,
and Ginger Silvera for thoughtful comments on the
earlier versions of the article.
Sergey Kostyaev is a senior fellow at the Institute of
Scientific Information on Social Sciences, the
Russian Academy of Sciences (sergey.kostyaev@ The research was conducted
during Fulbright fellowship at Georgetown University in 2007–2008 academic year and Legislative
Fellows Program at NCSL in 2010.
Ahrari ME (ed.). 1987. Ethnic Groups and U.S. Foreign
Policy. Greenwood Publishing Group: Westport.
Al-Yasin Y, Dashti AA. 2008. Foreign countries and U.S.
public relations firms. Journal of Promotion Management
14: 355–374. DOI: 10180/10496490802637713
Ambrosio Th (ed.). 2002. Ethnic Identity Groups and U.S.
Foreign Policy. Praeger: Westport.
Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Aslaksen S. 2010. Oil and democracy: more than a
cross country correlation? Journal of Peace Research 47:
Atieh J. 2010. Foreign agents: updating FARA to protect
American democracy. University of Pennsylvania Journal
of International Law 31: 1051–1088.
Bard M. 2010. The Arab Lobby: The Invisible Alliance that
Undermines America’s Interests in the Middle East. Harper:
New York.
Baumgartner FR, Berry JM, Hojnacki M, Kimball DC,
Leech BL. 2009. Lobbying and Policy Change. University
of Chicago Press: Chicago.
Coppedge M, Gerring J, Altman D, Bernhard M, Fish S,
Hicken A, Kroenig M, Lindberg SI, McMann K, Paxton P,
Semetko HA, Skaaning S-E, Staton J, Teorell J. 2011. Conceptualizing and measuring democracy: a new approach.
Perspectives on Politics 9(2): 247–267. DOI: 10.1017/
Dunning T. 2008. Crude Democracy: Natural Resource
Wealth and Political Regimes. Cambridge University
Press: New York.
Friedman T. 2006. The first law of petropolitics. Foreign
Policy 154: 28–36.
Gordon P. 2010. U.S.-Russia Relations under the Obama
Administration, Washington, D.C. http://www.state.
gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2010/143275.htm [1 August 2010].
Isurin L. 2011. Russian Diaspora. Walter de Gruyter: Berlin.
Kalicki JH, Lawson EK (eds). 2003. Russian-Eurasian
Renaissance? U.S. Trade and Investment in Russia and
Eurasia. The Woodrow Wilson Center Press: Washington,
Kishinevsky V. 2004. Russian Immigrants in the United
States. LFB Scholarly Pub: New York.
Koehn PH, Yin X-H. 2002. The Expanding Roles of
Chinese Americans in U.S.-China Relations: Transnational
Networks and Trans-Pacific Interactions. M.E. Sharpe:
New York.
Кocтяeв C. C Poccийcкoe лoбби в CШA: cтpуктуpa,
цeли, пocpeдники//CШA – Кaнaдa: ЭПК. 2005.
№10. C.109-27. Kostyaev S. 2005. Russian lobbying in
the US: structure, goals, consulting firms. USA-Canada:
Economics, Politics, Culture 10: 109–127.
Кocтяeв C. C Лoббизм poccийcкoгo бизнeca в CШA//
MЭиMO. 2009. №4. C. 43-54. Kostyaev S. 2009. Russian
business lobbying in the US. World Economy and International Relations 4: 43–54.
Кocтяeв C. C Изpaильcкoe лoбби в бюджeтнoм
пpoцecce CШA//CШA-Кaнaдa: ЭПК. 2010.#11. C.106-15.
Kostyaev S. 2010a. Israeli lobby in the US budget process.
USA-Canada: Economics, Politics, Culture 11: 106–115.
Кocтяeв C. C Кopeйcкoe лoбби в CШA: coглaшeниe o
cвoбoднoй тopгoвлe, вoeннoe coтpудничecтвo//
MЭиMO. 2010 #8. C.95-101. Kostyaev S. 2010b. Korean
lobby in the US: free trade agreement, military cooperation. World Economy and International Relations
8: 95–101.
Lawson C. 1996. Shining the “spotlight of pitiless publicity” on foreign lobbyists? Evaluating the impact of
the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 on the Foreign
Agents Registration Act. Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 29: 1151–1184.
Leblang D. 2010. Familiarity breeds investment: diaspora
networks and international investment. American
Political Science Review 104(3): 584–600. DOI: 10.1017/
Mahdavy H. 1970. The patterns and problems of economic development in rentier states: the case of Iran.
In Studies of the Economic History of the Middle East,
MA Cook (ed.). Oxford University Press: London.
Marrar K. 2008. Arab Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. Taylor
& Francis: Hoboken.
J. Public Affairs 12, 279–292 (2012)
DOI: 10.1002/pa
S. S. Kostyaev
Mearsheimer J, Walt S. 2007. The Israel Lobby and U.S.
Foreign Policy. Farrar, Straus and Giroux: New York.
Newhouse J. 2009. Diplomacy, Inc. The influence of
lobbies on U.S. foreign policy. Foreign Affairs. http://
diplomacy-inc [26 March 2012].
Petras JF. 2006. The Power of Israel in the United States.
Clarity Press: Atlanta.
Ramsay K. 2006. The Price of Oil and Democracy. Working
Paper, Princeton University: Princeton; 27.
Ramsay K. 2011. Revisiting the resource curse: natural
disasters, the price of oil, and democracy. International
Organization 65: 507–529.
Ross M. 2001. Does oil hinder democracy? World Politics
53: 325-361.
Ross M. 2009. Oil and Democracy Revisited. University of
California- Los-Angeles: Mimeo.
S. Hrg. 109-83. February 17 2005. Democracy in retreat in
senate11sh109.html [1 August 2010].
Terry JJ. 2005. U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East: The
Role of Lobbies and Special Interest Groups. Pluto Press:
Treisman D. 2010. Oil and democracy in Russia.
NBER Working Paper No. 15667
papers/w15667 [13 September 2011].
Trumbauer L, Asher R. 2004. Russian Immigrants. Info base
Publishing: New York.
Xie T. 2009. U.S.-China Relations: China Policy on Capitol Hill.
Taylor & Francis: Hoboken.
USSR - Office of Information
Intourist & Aeroflot
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics Ministry of General
Machinery Building
Supreme Soviet of the Russian
Soviet Federative Socialist
Russian Republic
Prefect of the West
Administrative District of the
City of Moscow
City of Ufa
Tyumen Region
Administration of the Russian
Republic, USSR
Globe Nuclear Services and
Central Medical
Administration of Moscow
Moscow Pharmacy Chamber
City Council of People’s
Deputies of Nizhnekamsk
Republic of Tatarstan
International Foundation for
Mother & Child Care
Ministry of Health Care of the
Republic of Tatarstan
Ministry of Ecology & Natural
Resources of the Russian
Clients’ interests
Attempt to obtain a contract
to launch American satellites
on Soviet rockets
Assistance in establishing
joint ventures with Western
Lobbying, PR, law
Partners & Shevak
Association Films, Inc.
Europican Marketing,
AMRU International
Trading Corporation
Schnader, Harrison,
Segal & Lewis
Attracting investments
Seeking funding for
environmental programs
International trade and
Counseling in anti-dumping
US Department of
Commerce investigation
Attracting investors
Banking and corporate law
in the US
Contacts with Mass-media
and US government officials
about Russia’s economic and
political development
Hansen, Donald K
New Horizons
Feingerts & Kelly, PLC
Hogan & Hartson
Schnader, Harrison,
Segal & Lewis
Mayer, Brown & Platt
Powell Tate
Nutter & Harris, Inc
Providing information to US
government about the need
for humanitarian assistance
in Tatarstan
International cooperation for
improvement of child care
Funding for health care
reform in Tatarstan
Obtaining financial aid from
US government
Stroock & Stroock &
Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
J. Public Affairs 12, 279–292 (2012)
DOI: 10.1002/pa
Russian lobbying in the US 289
NPO Energy
Russian Academy of Arts
Russian Space Agency
Joint-stock cargo company
Volga– Dnepr
Joint-stock company Aviastar
Staninterservice MashineTools International Services
Russian-American Investment
Association of Manufacturers
and Businessmen of Tatarstan
Central Aerohydrodynamics
Institute (TsAGI)
Vitaly Medvedkov
Ministry of the Russian
Federation for Atomic Energy
Trade representative office of
Russia in the US
Administration of Volgograd
Republic of Bashkortostan
Russian State Library
Kurchatovsky Institute
Clients’ interests
Contacts with NASA,
dissemination information
about Russian space
Arranging exhibitions and
sales of works by members of
the Academy
Space cooperation
Investment projects
Contacts with US
Attracting investors
Assistance from the US
Processing enriched uranium
into commercial fuel
Contacts with US politicians,
programs of financial aid
Contacts with government
officials and congressmen
Establishing a Washington,
D.C. office
Contacts with potential
Program of governmental
loans, contacts with federal
branch officials
Program of general
preference system
Seeking funding for
environmental programs
Gazprom officials visits to
the US, monitoring of issues
related to clients interests
Attempts to increase
investors trust
Adoption of program of
general preference system
towards export of titan from
Russia to US
Getting approval of two loan
guarantees from Export–
import Bank of US
See above. Media-consulting
Project funded by the US
Department of Labor
Lobbying, PR, law
Law Office of Stewart
& Stewart
Haight, Gardner, Poor
& Havens
Hogan & Hartson
Hogan & Hartson
International Inc.
Murray, Scheer &
Redman, Eric
Shaw, Pittman, Potts &
Dutko & Associates
Powell, Goldstein,
Frazer & Murphy
Tiongson, Noel Viri
Hogan & Hartson
Law office of Steward
& Steward
Hatter & Harris
Smith, Dowson &
Hogan & Hartson
Samuels International
Hana, Albert Rowell
Hansen, Donald K
Trade mission of
Republic of
Hill & Knowlton
Gavin Anderson &
Pace Global Energy
Ketchum Inc. NY.
Wides Barton
Akin Gamp Strauss
Fleishman Hillard
Gallaher, John
Gallaher, John
Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
J. Public Affairs 12, 279–292 (2012)
DOI: 10.1002/pa
S. S. Kostyaev
Primorskore marine
steamship line company
United Energo-Systems of
Ilim Pulp
Alfa Group
Norilsky nikel
Saratov aviation factory
Oleg Deripaska
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Russian Federal Property
Russian-American Business
Clients’ interests
Initiation of US
governmental technical
assistance to Russia’s
regulatory agencies
Assistance in anti-dumping
US department of commerce
Import of uranium to the US
US policy towards import of
radio-active materials
Promoting Congressional
approval of US – Russia’s
agreement of peaceful use of
nuclear materials dated May
6, 2008. Creating business
opportunities in the US
Assisting trade and cultural
exchange between the US
and Russia
International law regarding
conflict with two ships in
open sea, contacts wit US
Department of State
Electric power policy toward
NIS and Russia
PR, selling of oil and gas to
the US
Informing congressmen
about client’s attempts to
invest money to American
Contacts with US Congress
Anti-dumping sanctions
Monitoring of federal
government approval of
purchasing assets in the US
Selling of aviation goods
Visa matters
Status of foreign principal
visa application, engaging
with the Department of
Treasury’s Auto Task Force
regarding the prospective
acquisition of GM European
Visa status of Oleg Deripaska
Attracting foreign
investments, organization of
informational events in the US
Organizing meetings with
American politicians
Telecom issues
Getting money from US
federal budget for Russian
non-profit television network
in the US
Lobbying, PR, law
Arnold & Porter
Hogan & Hartson
Shaw, Pittman, Potts &
White & Case
DC Navigators
Cassidy Assoc.
APCO Worldwide
Carmen Group
Lebof, Lemb, Green,
Sagamor Assoc.
Cassidy Assoc.
Fleishman Hillard
Solutions North
APCO Worldwide
Hill & Knowlton
Sidley & Ostin
Barbor Griffith
Solutions Worldwide
Alston & Bird
Endeavor Law Firm,
Law Offices of Stewart
and Stewart
Public Strategies, Inc.
Akin Gamp
Fabiani and Co.
Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
J. Public Affairs 12, 279–292 (2012)
DOI: 10.1002/pa
Russian lobbying in the US 291
City Government of St
Krasnodar Region
Novolipetsk Steel
Lobbying, PR, law
Clients’ interests
Contacts with politicians,
businessmen, pundits about
IPO in London
Promotion of St Petersburg’s
technologies on the US
market, attracting
investments, facilitating
exchange programs
Promoting foreign
investments in Krasnodar.
arranging meetings with
editors of the Wall Street
Journal, Forbes, The New
York Times and Business
Acquisition of John Manleey,
Alerting US government to
implications of interruption
of wireless communication
for people of Turkmenistan.
Brunswick Group,
Council for Trade and
Cooperation USA-CIS
APCO Worldwide
Hogan Lovells US
Prime Policy Group
Pharmaceutical company of V. Bryntsalov.
World’s largest manufacturer of titan.
Co-owner of TNK.
Daughter company of Norilsk nikel.
*expenditures are given in thousands of dollars.
Data in the table is collected from Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 and Foreign Agents Registration Act of
1938 reports. Data is up to the first quarter of 2012.
Russkij Blok (Russian
Club of CarpathoRussian Deputies
Telegraph Agency of
Soviet Life Magazine
Department, Embassy of
Government of Chechen
Democracy Next
Century Association
Democratic Party of
Partnership Center
Most Group
Clients’ interests
Lobbying, PR, law firms
Gierowski, Alexis
Covering US politics
Editing articles for
Soviet Life Magazine
Arranging governmental
meetings for Russians
visiting US and Americans
visiting Russia
Four Continent Book
EBSCO Industries, Inc.
New York Bureau of the
Telegraph Agency of
Russia (TASS)
Arau Associates, Inc.
Hammack, Sarah N.
Waterman Associates,
Gowran International,
Daniel J. Edelman, Inc.
Public relations
GCI Group, Inc.
Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
J. Public Affairs 12, 279–292 (2012)
DOI: 10.1002/pa
S. S. Kostyaev
Republic of Ichkeria*****
Chechen Caucasus
NTV TV Network
Euro-Asian Jewish
Russian Information
Agency of the Russian
GML (formerly
Menatep Group)
Yukos oil corporation
Center of the
Development of
Information Society
Leadership of the
Rodina Political Party
NCB Finetechproject
Consulate of Russia
Clients’ interests
Lobbying, PR, law firms
Visits to the US
Contacts with the US
government, food aid
Informing US
congressmen about
violations of human rights
in Chechnya
Resolution H.R. 128**, bill
H.R. 2121 ‘About
democracy in Russia’
Representation of
interests before US
Disseminating political
information about Russia
in the US, promoting
academic exchanges
between Russian and
American scholars, visits
to US elected officials
Forming US government
position toward ‘Yukos’
case, and imprisonment of
GML officials
Resolution H.R.336/85***
Rubenstein Assoc.
Advantage Associates
research describing new
concepts to combat
terrorism and corruption
with the intent to improve
between the Russian
and the US governments.
Legal matters (Viktor
but case??)
Hooper, Owen &
Patton, Boggs.
MWW Group
Covington & Burling
Greenberg Traurig
APCO Worldwide
Barnes & Thornburg
APCO Worldwide
BKSH & Associates
Global Strategic
Spencer, Thomas R.
Brown Legal
Consulting, LLC
Notes: * expenditures are given in thousands of dollars.
**and *** Both resolutions are condemning Russian authorities over ‘Yukos’ trial.
****Liberal Democratic Party of Russia.
*****Chechnya under separatist’s government.
Data in the table is collected from Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 and Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 reports.
Data is up to the first quarter of 2012.
Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
J. Public Affairs 12, 279–292 (2012)
DOI: 10.1002/pa