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Y’s strategy
Strategy 1
Strategy 2
Strategy 1
a, a
b, c
Strategy 2
c, b
d, d
X’s strategy
Figure 10.1 Two player binary choice games.
Y’s strategy
X’s strategy
Pollute
Abate
Pollute
0, 0
5, -2
Abate
-2, 5
3, 3
Figure 10.2 A two-player pollution abatement game.
Y’s strategy
X’s strategy
Defect
(Pollute)
Cooperate
(Abate)
Defect
(Pollute)
2, 2
4, 1
Cooperate
(Abate)
1, 4
3, 3
Figure 10.3 The two-player pollution abatement Prisoners’ Dilemma game: ordinal form.
Y’s strategy
Pollute
Abate
Pollute
-4, -4
5, -2
Abate
-2, 5
3, 3
X’s strategy
Figure 10.4 A two-player Chicken game.
Figure 10.5 Extensive form of Chicken game.
Y’s
choice
Pollute
Pollute
(-4, -4)
Abate
(5, -2)
X’s
choice
Abate
Pollute
Abate
(-2, 5)
(3,3)
B’s strategy
Do not
Contribute
Contribute
Do not contribute
0, 0
0, -8
Contribute
-8, 0
4, 4
A’s strategy
Figure 10.6 A two-player Assurance game.
Figure 10.7 The payoffs to one country from abating and from not abating as the number of other countries abating varies.
Figure 10.8 The payoffs to one country from abating and from not abating as
the number of other countries abating varies: alternative set of parameter values.
70
60
50
40
30
20
NBP
10
NBA
0
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Figure 10.9 The payoffs to one country from abating and from not abating as
the number of other countries abating varies: third set of parameter values (a =
0, b =5, c = 3 and d = 3).
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
NBP
15
NBA
10
5
0
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Figure 10.10 A comparison of the non-cooperative and full cooperative solutions to an
environmental public good problem.
MB
MCi
MBi
ZN
ZC
Z
Figure 10.11 A one shot Prisoners’ Dilemma game.
B’s strategy
Defect
Cooperate
Defect
P, P
T, S
Cooperate
S, T
R,R
A’s strategy
Figure 10.12 The two-shot Prisoners’ Dilemma game.
B’s strategy
Defect
Cooperate
Defect
2P, 2P
T+P, S+P
Cooperate
S+P, T+P
R+P,R+P
A’s strategy
Figure 10.13 (the old Figure 13.1) Incremental SO2 concentrations from an oil
combined cycle power station located in Lauffen, Germany.
Source: ExternE (1995), page 61.
Fig.10.14 (old Figure 13.8) United Kingdom year 2000 total abatement cost
curve.
Source: Halkos and Hutton, 1993, page 5
Figure 10.15 (old Figure 13.9) Cooperative and non-cooperative pollution
outcomes in the presence of international pollution spillovers.
Figure 10.16. Qualitative directions of SRES scenarios for different indicators.
(Source: IPCC(3), Figure TS.1, page 24)
Figure 10.17. IPCC: Comparison of reference and stabilisation scenarios.
(Source: IPCC(3), Figure TS.2, page 25)
Figure 10.18 (the old Figure 13.2 with one correction) Trade and the
environment.