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Gov 1206: Contemporary Political Islam Final Study Guide
ID’s
Post-Islamism
(definition from Shahin’s lecture + article by Asef Bayat)
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Originally referred only to the realities of the Islamic Republic of Iran; when the end
of the Iran-Iraq War (1988), the death of Khomeini (1989) and President Rafsanjani’s
post-war reconstruction program marked a turn in the vision for an Islamic society.
Now, refers to a metamorphosis of Islamism (in ideas, approaches, and practices)
from within & without; primarily, a shift in the attitudes/ strategies of Islamist
militants in the Muslim world
Not a distinct reality; simply one variant of Islamic politics – a condition and a
project.
It is neither anti-Islamic, un-Islamic or secular.
Islamism = fusion of religion and responsibility; post-Islamism = emphasizes rights
instead of duties, attempts to fuse religiosity and rights, faith and freedom, Islam and
democracy; historical models instead of fixed scriptures, future instead of past.
Post-Islamists view the state as a civic and not necessarily religious enterprise. They
view the state and society through a pluralistic orientation.
They view themselves as representing not Islam per se but as one of the many Islamic
actors.
Also willing to tone-down/ water-down their demand for the implementation of the
Shari’a.
Acutely conscious of Islam’s importance as a socio-economic dimension.
Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya (Egypt)
History
 Founded in the mid-1970s
 At first, active primarily on university campuses, umbrella organization for militant
student groups formed after the Muslim Brotherhood renounced violence in the
1970s. Its membership has since become poorer, younger, and less well educated; its
main base of recruiting and support has moved away from universities to poor
neighborhoods of cities, and to rural areas.
 Confrontation with the State began early on. In 1978, arrestation of members after
protests against Camp David. The Jama’a was responsible of the assassination of
president Anwar Sadat (October 6, 1981).
 Involvement in the jihad in Afghanistan.
Ideas
 “Our goal has always been the establishment of an Islamic state” (Talat Fuad Qasim,
one of the founding members and leader of its military wing).
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Very influenced by Sayyid Qutb’s thought. Disagreement with the Muslim
Brotherhood: believe that the peaceful efforts of the MB have failed. “Our
disagreements with the Brothers prevent cooperation” (Talat Fuad Qasim).
Supports violence, seen as necessary for the birth of an Islamic state. Cover story of
the first magazine of the Jama’a: “Terror is a Means to Confront God’s Enemies.”
Military wing was established in 1987. “We [the majlis al-shura, governing council
of the Jama’a] supported the idea because the only way to express yourself in this
world is through force, the only language that is understood” (Talat Fuad Qasim). In
the 1990s, the Jama’a engaged in an extended campaign of violence: murders and
attempted murders of prominent writers and intellectuals, repeated targeting of
tourists and foreigners.
Rigid positions, refuses dialogue with the regime. « There will be no dialogue until
one side is victorious over the other, or the Islamic regime is established. (…) After
coming to power perhaps we will enter into a dialogue with the leaders about ho they
can leave the country ” (Talat Fuad Qasim).
However, in 1996 the Jama’a declared it would unconditionally cease all violent
activities in Egypt and abroad. It is not clear if this reversal is a tactical maneuver or a
genuine change.
Global perspective, not only local goals: “We consider the United States the main
ennemy” (Talat Fuad Qasim).
HIZBULLAH
HISTORY (from Lara Deeb’s “Hizballah: A Primer”)
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“Hizballah, the Lebanese Shi‘i movement whose militia is fighting the Israeli
army in south Lebanon, has been cast misleadingly in much media coverage of
the ongoing war” with Israel in the summer of 2006
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“Much more than a militia, the movement is also a political party that is a
powerful actor in Lebanese politics and a provider of important social services.
Not a creature of Iranian and Syrian sponsorship, Hizballah arose to battle Israel’s
occupation of south Lebanon from 1982-2000 and, more broadly, to advocate for
Lebanon’s historically disenfranchised Shi‘i Muslim community.”
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In the 1970s, Sayyid Musa al-Sadr, a charismatic cleric who had studied in the
Iraqi shrine city of Najaf, began to challenge the leftist parties for the loyalty of
Shi‘i youth. Al-Sadr offered instead the “Movement of the Deprived,” dedicated
to attaining political rights for the dispossessed within the Lebanese polity. A
militia branch of this movement, Amal, was founded at the start of the Lebanese
civil war in 1975. Alongside al-Sadr, there were also other activist Lebanese Shi‘i
religious leaders, most of whom had also studied in Najaf, who worked to
establish grassroots social and religious networks in the Shi‘i neighborhoods of
Beirut. Among them were Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, today one of the
most respected “sources of emulation” among Shi‘i Muslims in Lebanon and
beyond, and Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah. A “source of emulation” (marja‘ al-taqlid)
is a religious scholar of such widely recognized erudition that individual Shi‘i
Muslims seek and follow his advice on religious matters. Among the Shi‘a, the
title of sayyid denotes a claim of descent from Muhammad, the prophet of Islam.
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Following the events of 1982 [the Israel invasion of Lebanon and the resulting
violent ethnic clashes], many prominent members of Amal left the party, which
had become increasingly involved in patronage politics and detached from the
larger struggles against poverty and Israeli occupation. In these years, a number of
small, armed groups of young men organized under the banner of Islam emerged
in the south, the Bekaa Valley and the suburbs of Beirut. These groups were
dedicated to fighting the Israeli occupation troops, and also participated in the
Lebanese civil war, which by this time had engaged over 15 militias and armies.
Initial military training and equipment for the Shi‘i militias was provided by Iran.
Over time, these groups coalesced into Hizballah, though the formal existence of
the “Party of God” and its armed wing, the Islamic Resistance, were not
announced until February 16, 1985, in an “Open Letter to the Downtrodden in
Lebanon and the World.”
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Hizballah and its majlis al-shura officially follow Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the
successor to Khomeini as Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, but
individual supporters or party members are free to choose which marja‘ to follow,
and many emulate Fadlallah instead. The point is that political allegiance and
religious emulation are two separate issues that may or may not overlap for any
single person.
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Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah is the current political leader of Hizballah. While he is
also a religious scholar, and also studied at Najaf, he does not rank highly enough
to be a marja‘ al-taqlid and instead is a religious follower of Khamenei. Nasrallah
became Hizballah’s Secretary-General in 1992, after Israel assassinated his
predecessor, Sayyid ‘Abbas al-Musawi, along with his wife and 5 year-old son.
Nasrallah is widely viewed in Lebanon as a leader who “tells it like it is” -- even
by those who disagree with the party’s ideology and actions. It was under his
leadership that Hizballah committed itself to working within the state and began
participating in elections, a decision that alienated some of the more revolutionoriented clerics in the leadership.
TAKE-AWAY POINTS
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A Shi’a poltical party and paramilitary organization based in Lebanon, which
follows the ideology of Ayatollah Khomeini, the spiritual leader of Iran’s
Revolution
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Has wide support among many Lebanese. H has vast social programs. Helps feed
people, rebuild after conflict, etc.
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Current leader is Hassan Nasrallah
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Fought summer ’06 war with Israel of which, because of Israel’s withdrawal,
Hizbullah considers itself the victor
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Wishes to eradicate Western colonialism [DESTROY ISRAEL] and establish an
Islamic government in Lebanon
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US, Britain, Israel (obviously) and much of the EU considers it a terrorist group;
most of the Arab and Muslim worlds consider it a legitimate resistance group.
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Has its own TV station (wow!)
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Operates with financial support of Iran as well as Syria’s official blessing (though
also with money from Syria in all probability)
WIKIPEDIA
On February 16, 1985, Sheik Ibrahim al-Amin issued
Hezbollah's manifesto. According to this manifesto
(titled "An Open Letter: The Hizballah Program"), the
three objectives of the organization are:
* To expel Americans, the French and their
allies (sic) definitely from Lebanon, putting an end to
any colonialist entity on our land.
* To submit the phalanges to a just power and
bring them all to justice for the crimes they have
perpetrated against Muslims and Christians.
* To permit all the sons of our people to
determine their future and to choose in all the liberty
the form of government they desire. We call upon all of
them to pick the option of Islamic government which
alone is capable of guaranteeing justice and liberty
for all. Only an Islamic regime can stop any future
tentative attempts of imperialistic infiltration onto
our country.
The 1985 manifesto makes it clear that Hezbollah
intends to use armed force to achieve these goals and
phrases its argument for this measure through the
language of defensive jihad
Jihad Group (Egypt)
The Jihad Group, which has origins in the Muslim Brotherhood, solidified in Egypt
during the late 1970s. In 1981 it joined forces with Al Jama’a al-Islamiyya. The merger
was followed by the assassination of President Anwar Al-Sadat and by an armed
insurrection aimed at overthrowing the government (which failed). The two organizations
split back in 1984 in the wake of a dispute about who should lead the joint organization.
Al Jama’a al-Islamiyya rejected the leadership of Abboud Al-Zumar because he was in
prison; the Jihad Group rejected the leadership of Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman because
he was blind. Together they are responsible for all acts of political violence carried out in
Egypt in the name of Islam during the last two decades. Since 1991, the Jihad Group has
been led by Ayman al-Zawahiri. The Jihad Group was contained when Egyptian security
forces seized a computer where the names of all the members were stored. Al-Zawahiri
has abandoned his original goals of fighting the ‘close enemy’ in order to fight the
‘distant enemy,’ mainly because it was increasingly difficult for him to operate in Egypt.
As a result, although the Jihad Group has toned down its rhetoric, it is hesitant to
completely renounce violence because of their lack of unity and opposition of their
leaders abroad (Al Zawahiri, etc.).
The Gray Zones of Islamic Movements:
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Islamic Law: All Islamist Movements call for the application of the Islamic
sharia. However, Islamic movements have much maneuvering room since Islamic
law is not a single, well-defined legal code contained between the covers of a
book, but a complex body of rules and interpretations that spans many centuries
and follows different schools. According to the Carnegie Endowment, the
“application of Islamic sharia” is potentially the most significant gray zone in the
thinking of Islamic movements. Furthemore, the issue of who has the right to
legislate, and under whose authority is a fundamental point of divergence between
Islamists and non-Islamists. One thing is for sure – secularism is not a stance
likely to attract much political support in the Middle East.
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The Use of Violence:
o While moderate Islamist movements claim that they are committed to
nonviolent change, most governments in the Arab world accuse them of
having violent and revolutionary tendencies. These governments
particularly fear that if the democratic road to power doesn’t produce
results for Islamist movements, they will and are ready to turn to violence
to achieve their ends.
o However, some of these charges are unfair, as most of the region’s
electorally oriented major Islamist movements are statistically far more
likely to be victims rather than perpetrators of violence. (ie: Egypt and
Tunisia)
o The reactions of Islamist organizations to the more repressive political
environment suggest that the commitment to nonviolence by the
mainstream organizations is real – they have tried to navigate a careful
course in the new environment.
o Virtually all Islamist organizations, however, believe that violence against
Israel constitutes legitimate resistance, rather than terrorism.
o Efforts to balance commitment to nonviolence with the recognition that
Palestinians have the right to resist have led some organizations to
considerable ambiguity. (Hamas and Hizbollah)
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Political Pluralism:
o Islamists are accused of being opposed to political pluralism – the
governments reinforce the fear that once the Islamists take power at the
ballot box, they will do away with democracy.
o In the 1970s and 80s mainstream Islamists distrusted the notion of a liberal
democracy and rejected he legitimacy of secular forces or tolerated their
presence resentfully. They were thus considered illegitimate by incumbent
governments and liberal organizations.
o During the 1990s, Islamists began to reevaluate their position in order to
avoid further government repression and take advantage of growing
demand for reform.
o “Participation, not domination” seems to be the motto of Islamists taking
part in electoral politics.
o It is unlikely however, that Islamist organizations will succeed in
removing doubts about the limits of their tolerance as long as they have
both a political and religious agenda.
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Civil and Political Rights:
o Many worry that under an Islamist regime, restrictions would become
extensive rather than minimalist, not only preventing unrestrained attacks
on the religion rejected by the overwhelmingly majority of the people in
the region, but also barring any interpretation of Islam other than the one
favored by a particular group.
o A manor problem is the tendency among Islamists to subordinate the
rights of individuals to the good of the community.
o There are sometimes strong incentives for Islamist movements to launch
strong attacks on certain forms of expression.
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The Rights of Women:
o Islamists are accused to intending to deprive women of civil and political
rights; remove women from public life; treat them as minors, forever
under the tutelage of a male family member; and impose restrictive dress.
o Islamists proclaim that they respect women and are committed to women’s
rights within the Islamic marji’iya.
o Debates on women’s rights rarely focus on issues of political participation.
Islamist parties don’t tend to fight women exercising their political rights,
but social customs and male prejudice still keep most women away from
public life.
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Religious Minorities:
o So long as Islamist movements retain their dual political-religious identity,
acceptance of full equality of all groups is impossible. Religious
movements cannot be open to adherents of all faiths, but democratic
movements must be open to all citizens. [The Muslim Brotherhood, for
example, excludes non-Muslims from its ranks.]
o As Shahin asked, can a Copt or Maronite be the leader of an Islamic state?
Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders
Statement by the World Islamic Front in February of 1998
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“…fight and slay the pagans wherever ye find them, seize them, beleaguer them.”
“I [Muhammad]…have been sent to ensure that no one but Allah is worshipped.”
“The Arabian peninsula has never been stormed by any forces like the crusader
armies spreading in it like locusts, eating its riches and wiping out its plantations.”
“Three facts are known to everyone”:
o For more than 7 years, the US has been occupying the lands of Islam in
the holiest places, the Arabian peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to
its rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbors, and turning its
basses in the Peninsula into a spearhead through which to fight the
neighboring Muslim peoples.”
 Refers to US continued aggression against Iraqis
o Despite 1 million people being killed by the “Crusader-Zionist” alliance,
they want more massacres
o Aside from America’s religious and economic aims, it also aims to serve
the “Jews’ petty state and divert attention from its occupation of Jerusalem
and murder of Muslims there.”
 For example, US’ eagerness to destroy Iraq, the strongest
neighboring Arab state
This is a “clear declaration of war on Allah”
It is therefore the individual duty of every Muslim in any country to kill the
Americans and their allies – civilian and military – to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque
and the holy mosque in Mecca.
Little is the comfort of this life, as compared with the afterlife.
“Unless ye go forth, He will punish you with a grievous penalty.”
1. Reformists/Conservatives (Iran) – Political movements by groups of political parties
in Iran
Reformists support plans to institute political reforms that include more democratic
aspects. Reformists expect the government to promote Islamic issues such as the
implementation of the Sharia, yet prefer rule of law to divine theocratic rule; they do not
believe in the need to perpetuate the rule of the jurist. They stress that reforms focus on
the rebuilding of Iran’s war-torn economy and increasing the nation’s economic
prosperity. The movement emphasizes government participation at the local level versus
clergy run politics. They want to distance themselves from the current political and
religious offensive attitude (jihad movements) and demand that political assassins be held
accountable for their crimes. Reformists call for cultural liberalization in the form of
tangible freedom of press and increased cultural freedom (ex. arts and cinema), and aim
to improve relations with neighboring countries.
Conservatives have won the majority in elections since 2000. They sustain concept of
the rule of the jurist, arguing that it represents the dividing line between those loyal to
system and those not. Conservatives in government are mostly clerics who supported the
revolution because of the power it gave them over society, they use clerical rule to reinforce what
they see as the Islamic values of order, property, and hierarchy. They strive to defend all
symbols of the revolution and the Iranian state, and advocate cultural protectionism,
which also means preventing the US from having any role in the nation’s development.
They push for strict enforcement of Islamic laws, particularly those pertaining to women
and morality. Their economic policy is more conservative, they call for less state
intervention in the economy, and side with bazaarists (local businessmen) who in turn
provide them support.
Reformists and conservatives struggle for governmental control, both attempt to block
each other’s measures, and act as power checks for eachother.
Necmettin Erdogan:
He is one of Turkey’s oldest Islamist leaders, and has founded a number of parties that
have been successively banned since the 1970s. Throughout his career he was an
opposition figure to the leading secular rulers, espousing a program built on religiosity
and Islamist goals. He came to power as prime minister in 1996 and his party, Refah, was
able to run the government. However, he did not come to power on a solely Islamist basis
– his slogan was “Just Order,” which appealed to a broader base. The party judged its
religious voters were secure, and focused on economic and social issues which appealed
to working people and used aggressive grassroots tactics to rally them. Refah’s
government fell apart under the contradictory pressures of trying to run a modern state
integrating into Europe and pursuing Islamist goals simultaneously, and under the
military’s pressure to remain secular. Erdogan antagonized his base through actions like
remaining a military ally to Israel and antagonized his opponents with projects like
building a huge public mosque. The military’s pressure eventually forced him to resign,
and the Refah party was outlawed in Turkey for violating the principles of secularism.
AK Party (Turkey)
 Also known as the Justice and Development Party
 Was created by members of the old Welfare/Reformist Party on August 14, 2001
 The AK won 46.6% of the popular vote and was allocated 341 seats[3] in the
rescheduled 22 July, 2007 elections in Turkey
 Portrays itself as moderate, conservative, pro-Western party that advocates a
liberal market economy and Turkish membership in the European Union.
 Harbors a hidden Islamist agenda and is the main opposition to Turkey’s secular
stated driven developmental parties
 If the EU rejects Turkey there is a big chance that the AK Party could again split
between its reformist and conservative factions
 The party made significant structural reforms and its policy achievements have
seen rapid growth and an end to Turkey's three decade long period of
hyperinflation. The Economist and the Financial Times consider the AK Party's
government to be the most successful in Turkey in decades.
 Current leader: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
Refah Party (Turkey)
 Also known as The Welfare Party (Refah Partisi)
 Was founded by Ahmed Tekdal in Ankara in 1983 as heir to two earlier parties
that had previously been banned from politics in secular Turkey
 The popular vote for the Refah Party increased over the years until they became
the largest party under Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan in 1996.
 Refah's popularity comes from the failure and corruption of the secular parties
previously seen in Turkey. Additionally Refah's record in local government points
to a successful marriage of the ideas and values of East and West:
 The coalition government of Erbakan was forced out of power by the Turkish
military in 1997
 A large part of the fall in power was Erbakan’s immediate pursuit of alliances
with radical Islamist governments internationally, such as Iran and Libya, that
convinced the public that the Refah could be nothing but a problem for Turkey
 In 1998 the Welfare/Refah Party was banned as an Islamist political party
 The Refah Party is not unique from other Islamist movements in its ideological
goals, but it is a unique product of Turkish politics
The Neglected Duty
 The Neglected Duty (Al-Faridah al-Gha’ibah) was written by Muhammad Abd
al-Salam Faraj
 Members of the Muslim Brotherhood who assassinated the Egyptian President left
a pamphlet about the Neglected Duty on his body. Their lawyers argued that it
presented "a valid, Islamic defense" of the assassination.
 The neglected or forgotten duty, of course, is the duty of jihad, "war against
unbelievers.
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A set of ideas revolving around the establishment of an Islamic state (Caliphate).
At the center of these ideas lay the modern concept of Takfir al-Hakim
(Unbeliever ruler), whereby the ruler is accused of un-belief and thus of apostasy
from Islam, a condition which justifies violence against him.
These arguments are based mainly on the Koran, the Traditions relating to
prophet Muhammad, and influential Muslim scholars. According to the
document’s logic, not only is the rule of God over the earth obligatory for
Muslims, but Jihad is also a duty
Bin Laden’s referral to the Koranic verses for his fatwa against the Jews and
Crusaders had been emphasized by The Neglected Duty.
The opening Koranic verse in the fatwa had been designated “The Verse of the
Sword” by The Neglected Duty.
HAMAS:
Originally an acronym, HMS, from the original Arabic name Harakat Al Kmokawama Al
Islamyia. Then became “Hamas” an Arabic word meaning ‘zeal’ which embodied many
of the founding principles (borrowed from the Muslim Brotherhood’s slogans: Rights!
Force! Zeal!)
Organization:
Different wings of Hamas: political, communications, security, youth, Intifada, and
prisoner’s wings. Formalized after Hamas’ inaugural meeting in 1987 (December 8).
Ez Ed Din Al Qassam Brigades (military wing of Hamas):
Main goal was to attack settlements in order to stop Jewish immigration into Palestine.
When they began in 1991 they only had twenty machine guns, stayed that way until
2000! In addition to killing Israeli personalities they also killed many Palestinians known
to be working as agents for Israeli Intelligence.
The PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization), PLF (“” Front) was the military wing.
This organization preceded the Islamic Organization, militarily and at the grassroots
level. Interaction with Hamas: Cairo was neutral ground where leaders from Fatah and
Hamas could meet. Arafat (PLO) and Yassin (Hamas) had a good relationship and in
1998 agreed to halt Hamas’ military strikes to facilitate Israel’s withdrawal from the
West Bank.
Hamas eventually established its own security force called the Intervention Force, distinct
from the Brigades (the military wing of Hamas) but the Brigades could “assist” if
necessary. Structured loophole to get around formally supporting and utilizing the
militant side of Hamas.
Personalities:
Yehia Ayyash, “The Engineer” : Skilled bomb-maker and extremely adept at altering his
appearance. Came up with suicide bombings. Assassinated by a mobile phone bomb.
Raed Zakarneh: First Hamas suicide bomber, April 6, 1994, killed 8 Israelis by driving a
bomb into a bus stop.
Miriam Farhat (Umm Nidal): 56, four daughters and six sons, 3 of whom had died as
suicide bombers, one in prison, and two still participating in armed resistance in the Gaza
Strip. Now a member of the Palestinian Legislative Council and has great popularity
amongst the people.
Rantisi, followed in the professional path of Yassin, assuming control of Hamas, but was
known for his fiery rhetoric and outbursts. He was a trained Doctor.
On the psychology and extremism of suicide bombers: One “martyr” (in 1997) switched
allegiance from Islamic Jihad to the military wing of Hamas because he didn’t want to
wait on the waiting list of would-be suicide bombers and wanted to achieve martyrdom
quickly. Never “suicide bombings” but “acts of martyrdom”
Additionally there is a branch of Hamas set up to do damage control and PR. After every
suicide bomber completes his/her mission, a small delegation of Hamas soldiers go to
comfort the family and reiterate their “success” and the pride that they should feel to be
parents of martyrs.
Yassin Quotes:
On the Taliban: “How dare they ban women from contributing in our lives by preventing
them from working and teaching? Their ways can only harm the Islamic religion” (pg
108)
Recep Tayyip Erdogan
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Prime Minister of Turkey, member of the Islamic-tilted AK (Justice and
Development) Party
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Controversial figure who was barred from taking Prime Ministership after
AKP won elections in 2002 due to a previous criminal conviction for reading an
Islamic poem at a rally
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AKP and similar parties have long been opposition, but have been in
power since 2002
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With Islamic tinge, AKP and Erdogan have "gradually built social
consensus for change"
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Example of a religiously-oriented leader in a secular country building
coalition amongst liberals and Islamic voters (framed himself and his beliefs
nicely for political purposes)
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One of the main champions in Turkey for EU membership, receptive
towards the West, but also deeply rooted in his faith
READINGS
The Far Enemy
by Fawaz Gerges
Motive: book challenges the vague, uninformed ideas the general public holds abt Islamic
jihad.
Content: explains the events and people (especially Zawahiri, see below) that caused
radical Islamists to abandon their traditional fight against al-Adou al-Qareeb (the near
enemy) such as autocratic or secular regimes, and instead take on al-Adou al-Baeed (the
far enemy), the United States and the West.
Addresses Major Misconceptions:
(1) While all jihadis share this conception of jihad, jihadis represent a tiny minority
even among Islamists. Theirs is NOT the dominant view.
(2) The jihadist movement has NOT always seen the United States and the West as its
primary enemy. In fact, Al Qaeda’s 9/11 attack was the result of a “civil war**
within the jihadist movement” and “represented a monstrous mutation, an
implosion from within, not just another historical phase in the movement’s
evolution.”
History:
2 major shifts occurred in the concept/understanding of jihad by the Islamic radicals:
(1) from collective to personal duty
(2) from domestic to transnational war
Since the Prophet’s era, jihad has been seen as fard kifaya, or a collective duty, the
agenda of which can only be determined by the whole community. Contemporary jihadis,
on the other hand, consider it to be fard ‘ayn, or a permanent and personal obligation. As
such, jihadis believe they are justified in taking up arms and carrying out terrorist attacks
on their own authority. When did this shift happen?
The Near Enemy
Early 1970s, the jihadist movement was born in reaction to Egypt’s authoritarian, secular
regime. Main riff = apostate Muslim rulers hindered establishment of Islamic govt based
upon Shari’a.
Inspired by Sayyid Qutb, a radical Islamist (executed in 1966 for opposing the Nasser
govt), the jihadi followers elevated the importance of outward jihad, or armed struggle, to
be equal with the five pillars of Islam. Later, al-Jama’a al-Islamiya (Islamic Group), one
of the largest jihadist organizations in the world, + Tanzim al-Jihad (Islamic Jihad)
collaborated on the 1981 assassination of Egypt’s president Anwar Sadat.
Until as late as 1995, Ayman al-Zawahiri (leader of Tanzim al-Jihad since 1991,
currently Al-Qaeda’s #2 man) preached battling the near enemy only. Despite his
subsequent alliance with bin Laden and his conversion to transnational terrorism, “the
overwhelming majority of jihadis have been religious nationalists whose fundamental
goal was to effect change in their own society.”
**RUPTURE**  The Far Enemy
What dispute created Al-Qaeda and the transnational terrorists??
(1) Military Defeat: years of clashes with govt troops in Egypt and Algeria (home to
majority of active jihadis in the Muslim world)
a. executed or imprisoned most jihadi leaders by mid-1990s
b. disrupted traditional jihadist groups
c. individual jihadis went on the run
 most stragglers found refuge and regrouped in Afghanistan, home to highly
trained and battle-seasoned mujahedeen who had served American foreign
policy for a decade against the Soviets.
i. Americans did indeed partly create Afghanistan’s jihadis
ii. Muslim states also aggressively encouraged local jihadis to travel to
Afghanistan in order to deflate the jihadist threat at home.
(2) Intellectual Poverty: Desperation
a. Al-Qaeda’s 9/11 attack was NOT the peak of the jihadist movement
b. Rather, it was an act of desperation that aimed to save the sinking ship by
catalyzing a “clash of civilizations” with the West that would rally the ummah
(global Muslim community) into the battle on the jihadists’ side.
c. Ironically, 9/11 backfired - part of the ummah do resent the US, but Islamic
opinion after the attacks was almost universally critical of Al Qaeda and Bin
Laden, for
i. sullying the name of jihad
ii. endangering the ummah
(3) US invasion of Iraq
a. Al-Qaeda was on the verge of collapse under all the criticism post 9/11
b. Ironically, Bush’s decision to invade Iraq breathed new life into the
organization; united a substantial portion of the ummah against what seemed
to be US’ imperialist aims.
CONCLUSION/FUTURE PROSPECTS:
(1) To withdraw from Iraq now would create even more misery and bloodshed
(2) Transforming Muslim societies is not the US/West’s job;
(3) Western powers can only pressure their Muslim allies to change
(4) Lasting and positive changes in these societies must be built from the ground up.
Vocabulary
 mazhabiya – confessionalism or sectarianism (for which Wahabbism has no
tolerance)
 asabiya - group/tribal loyalty
 jahiliya - state of ignorance of God’s divine authority.
 hakimiya – God’s sovereignty
 mujahid, mujahedeen pl. – Islamic fighter(s)
 kufr – impiety
 tafkeeri –the practice of ex-communication of Muslims
 uzla – withdrawal from society
 wilayat al-darir – rule of the blind
 fard ‘ayn – personal duty
 mufassirin – jurists
 muhaddithin – interpreters
[Detailed Chapter Summaries:
Ch. 2 – The Afghan War
Impact of 1980s Afghan War: rallied and radicalized jihadists
 Early 1980s, secure training ground for jihad against “near enemy” (Muslim Rulers)
 1979 Russian military intervention + 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution: radicalized
jihadists
 1981 Anwar Sadat Assassination
 1990s Taliban took over
 destroyed the myth of a “superpower” in the minds of young Muslim mujahedeen,
and expanded jihad to the “Far Enemy”
A Defensive War : Unintentionally Transformed into Transnational Jihad
 Struggle between global ummah and godless communism of the Russian invaders
 The war was a “collective duty”, intended to be defensive, legitimate and limited
 Aimed to defend the land of dar al-Islam from non-Muslim rule or occupation; not to
espouse s undiscriminating violence
 Some former Afghan volunteers are shocked at how bin Laden etc have hijacked
Afghan jihad and their original mission statements for their own political purposes




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Unprecedented coalition of Muslims from all over the Middle East & Asia to protect
dar al-Islam
BUT Ideological & Cultural gulf between Afghan die-hards & Foreign assistants:
aside from Russia, disagreed on every area including politics and religion.
Collective training and fighting developed esprit de corps and strong asabiya
between many Arabs, Turks, Pakistanis etc.
Unintentionally transformed jihad into being transnational, vs the “Far Enemy”,
offensive.
Ex: 1986, Zawahiri returned to Afghan to reorganize Afghan jihadist cells to form the
lethal Islamic Jihad to overthrow “apostate” Cairo authorities and take power; NOT
intended to antagonize US and Israel
The Rivalry Among Jihadis
 Misleading to view jihadis through the narrow lens of September 11
 Internal strife and rivalry: competition among jihadist factions and between jihadis
and mainstream Islamists has defied any attempt at a jihadist superstructure or
leadership to truly threaten regional and international security.
 Split b/c of charismatic personalities & regional affiliations, not b/c of institutional
hierarchies and ideologies  danger of entire jihadist enterprise becoming divorced
from Muslim reality
 Irony: unable to collaborate against their common “near enemy”, how would jihadists
administer and interpret divine authority on earth?
 Right now, religious and ruling elites are both responsible for the crisis and vacuum
of legitimate governance in Muslim countries today.
 Enlightened religious authority is needed to prevent hijacking Islam by false prophets
like bin Laden and Zawahiri and protect from authoritarian abuse.
Ch. 3 – The Rise of Transnationalist Jihadis and the Far Enemy
Al-Qaeda & Islamic Jihad
 Founders: Osama bin Laden, Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri, Abu Hafs
 Zawahiri: pivotal in developing network; developed close but very complex
relationship with BL
 Saudi relations: BL has scathing criticism for regime, but calls upon young Saudis to
expel the occupying American enemy via guerrilla warfare
 Jihadis Archetype: (BL & Z)
 The cult of personality & charisma is the decisive driver among jihadis. Not
institutions, true consultation or power sharing.
 Ironically, jihadis have fallen into the same trap as their secular tormentors of
asabiya and personality-worship.
 Also prone to political positioning, internalizing nationalism, and acting as
separate tribes even though they portray themselves to be the vanguard of the
ummah






Nonetheless, Al-Qaeda’s global jihad ideology is NOT representative of all
jihadis.
Recent Inciting Events:
 1998 - Declaration of War on America & Americans
 2001 - formal merging of Islamic Jihad with Al Qaeda
Why did Z change enemies and join BL’s World Islamic Front against the Crusaders
(Americans) and Jews?
1. Financial dependence
- Zawahiri’s Islamic Jihad was entirely financially dependent on bin
Laden
- only partial reason; this did not force Z to merge; the choice was
conscious
2. “Near Enemy” not worth it:
- BL believed political returns from attacking Egypt were very low, and
costs risked in sinking Muslim public opinion too high.
- 1980s, Z & BL’s views on jihad had converged
- 1990s, Z knew that the war against the Egyptian government was lost
- 1999, Z lost most of human assets and his network in Egypt
3. Compromise
- Z saw himself as senior to BL; ego and ambition made him believe he
could maneuver BL to serve Islamic Jihad’s original goals
- Knew that a spat between him and BL would just ruin any potential
success; Z was more concerned on achieving ends than BL (more
driven by personal political agenda) partly because of his history and
embittering imprisonment.
Ultimate Goal: to internationalize jihad with local governments and turn it into a
clash of civilizations in order to resonate in Muslim’s imaginations and reverse the
jihadis’ military-political misfortunes since the mid-1990s
Current Deadlock: Modern jihadis are trapped in the costly and ambiguous war
against both the near and the far enemies. No end in sight, an “eternal” armed
struggle against the unbelievers
Unviable Ends: BL’s tall order to destroy the whole existing system requires them to
completely topple the US, who is the enforcer and keeper of the status quo.
Ch. 4 – Splitting up of Jihadis
Surrender & Jihadis’ Civil War
 2nd half of 1990s: Bin Laden rose as an international star among jihadists while
religious nationalists suffered military defeat at home
 1997: Egyptian al-Jama’a al-Islamiya, or Islamic group declared ceasefire. Peace
initiative by one of the biggest Arab jihadist organizations came as an unexpected
shock.
 Reactions:
1. Relief: majority of members and their families





2. Panic: Al-Jama’a’s surrender threatened ambitions of BL & Z by exposing the
divisions and internal rivalries between nationalists and transnationalists
 concerned with the psychological and political effects on jihadis,
Zawahiri wrote a letter to the Islamic Group accusing them of
treachery and abandoning the struggle
3. Weakness: West realize that Al-Qaeda didn’t speak for everyone in the
Muslim world
 Overwhelming majority of jihadis did not join Al-Qaeda; Zawahiri
was exception
 BL’s “World Islamic Front” was missing signatures from leading
jihadist and Islamist organizations
 Zawahiri’s men were suspicious of BL and did not admire him.
High costs to Z and his men immediately after signing the World Islamic Front
because US no longer pretended to be neutral and retaliated.
End of 1990s, all-out confrontation between the US and BL. Even though September
11 caught the US by surprise, they had already been waging a hidden war with covert
captures etc.
At that time, the reality of stakes for American government and their citizens: while
jihadis’ violence were highly costly in human and material terms, their internal
fighting and rivalry render them neither the vanguard of either social revolution or a
skillfully executed coup within the political class and state administration and
bureaucracy.
“Going transnational” and challenging ‘The Far Enemy” transformed Al Qaeda from
being a lone voice that possessed no mass following to a global movement
unprecedented in jihadist historical doctrine and practice.
Why did the US underestimate Al-Qaeda?
1. Deceptive Numbers: although Al-Qaeda represented a tiny minority within the
jihadist movement, it had a huge human armada
2. Underestimated BL’s recruiting and mobilizational skills, his charisma, and
his determination to exact revenge on “the enemies of God.”
Chapter 5 – The Aftermath: The War Within
 Success for al-Qaeda remains a distant dream, if not an illusion
 What has been the impact of al-Qaeda’s actions on the jihadist movement as a whole?
o Outside Afghanistan, jihadi reaction was disbelief and deep skepticism about
identities of attackers
o Non-Al Qaeda jihadis in general did not heed bin Laden and Zawahiri’s call to
join and fight against the US
o Religious nationalists dreaded the coming war and decided not to take sides
o Eventually, chiefs of main jihadist groups attacked bin Laden and Zawahiri
for endangering their movement
 Say that killing Americans emboldened US hardliners to unleash
American armada and gave power to pro-Western Muslim rulers to
crack down hard against Islamists
o Al-Jama’a al-Islamiya also has presented comprehensive critiques of jihadism
in general and transnational jihadis in particular



Believe that Al Qaeda misinterpreted and distorted Islamic texts to
advance its own transnationalist agenda
o Regardless of internal turmoil within jihadist current, a plurality of jihadis
critique the despotic decision making of bin Laden, Zawahiri, and Zarqawi
o There is a general realignment in the current against Al-Qaeda and global
jihad (229)
To what extent has Al Qaeda’s call for war against the US resonated with ordinary
Muslims?
o “Not really” (233)
o More Muslims now view al Qaeda as a losing force and are reluctant to
gamble on it
o This does not mean some will not be seduced and carry out violent acts in its
name
o Mainstream Islamists have condemned its actions
o Conservative Islamists and Ulama are vs. Al Qaeda
o Al Qaeda also failed to draw in enlightened, modernist, and radical Islamists –
dislike policy of waging offensive jihad against civilians
In short term, Al Qaeda might reap some publicity and a few recruits, but it is
unlikely to exert much influence, let alone control over the decisions and actions of
these groups
Chapter Six – The Iraq War: Planting the Seeds of Al Qaeda’s Second Generation?
 Iraq has provided Al Qaeda with a new lease on life, a second generation of recruits
and fighters, and a powerful outlet to expand its ideological outreach activities to
Muslims worldwide
 2005 London attacks show the Al Qaeda’s decision making is still functioning,
though it is greatly degraded
 Invasion has blurred lines among mainstream, liberal, and radical politics in the Arab
world and squandered much of the empathy felt for American victims and America
after 9/11
 The most effective means to put Al Qaeda out of business is to complete its
encirclement and siege internally
 There are limits to what America and Europe can do; Arabs and Muslims must take it
upon themselves to change their own political destiny ]
Zubaida, Sami, "Is Iran an Islamic State?" in Beinin and Stork, Political Islam, pp.
103-119. CP
INTRO

Both adherents of Islamic movements and Westerners writing in the Orientalist
tradition postulate a cultural essence which underlines and unifies Islamic history
and distinguishes it from an equally reductionist notion of the West.

“They [above] see the territorial nation-state as an alien graft, imposed by the
West but remaining “external” to Muslim society…” (103)

The territorial nation-state is incompatible with the umma

Western writers in the Orientalist tradition see many ME states as modern
extensions of traditional Islamic absolute rulers, who rule by coercion and
extensive patronage networks

“Broadly speaking, the region has experienced a breakdown of local selfcontained socioeconomic units as they have been integrated into wider systems
which are in turn linked up to an international economy” (104)

Even with calls for pan-Arabism or pan-Islamism, most modern Islamic
ideologies assume the nation-state as a given.
EXISTING ISLAMIC STATES

Iran is the only example of an Islamic state installed through a popular revolution.

There is a dualism of nation-state and Islam in Iran that is quite novel. It is a
republic, which represents a link with the French Revolution and all revolutions
that have toppled monarchy. It has a written constitution, written after heated
debate by the Assembly of Experts, and amended in 1989 amide political
upheaval. There is an elected president and parliament.

The project of the Islamic Republic is to Islamicize state, society, and culture.
Nonetheless, authorities are often forced to adapt their policies and discourses to
practical consideration.
THE PRINCIPLE OF NATIONALITY

Islamic Republic [of Iran] is internationalist, and recognizes the umma

Iranian nationality is a condition for full citizenship, however

President must be Iranian and Shi’i

At the same time, Iranian Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians are accorded full
citizenship rights (although they cannot assume positions of leadership in the
government)

(’80-8) sharpened the national identity of the revolution as Iranian and Shi’i
LOCATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY

THE CONSTITUTION OF IRAN IS NOT THE ISLAMIC SHARI’A

It privileges the Shari’a as a source of legislation.

There is, however, a dualism in the Iranian constitution between the
sovereignty of the people and the sovereignty of Allah

An elected parliament, the Majlis, debates an enacts legislation;
parliament may scrutinize the executive, who is accountable

The religious element of the constitution emanates from the principle of
vilayet-I faqih

The Spiritual Leader (Guardian Jurisconsult, or faqih) combines
legislative and executive power. As the mujtahid (jurisconsult) he has the
ultimate powers of interpretation of the canonical sources and, therefore,
the approval of legislation. As head o the executive, he may appoint and
dismiss the chief of general staff, the other chiefs of defense, and the head
of the Revolutionary Guards (106).

The president, after being elected, has to be appointed by the Leader, who
can dismiss him.

Since Khomeini’s death in ’89, constitutional amendments and political
developments have diminished the power of the Leader.

The leader appoints six of the twelve members of the Council of
Guardians, the other six being appointed by the Majlis from a list
approved by the Supreme Judicial Council. IN SHORT, THE COUNCIL
OF GUARDIANS IS COMPOSED OF MUSLIM JURISTS WITH THE
POWER TO SCRUTINIZE AND CENSOR LEGISLATION. They have
unlimited powers to intervene in the name of Islam.

They did intervene with issues regarding private property and foreign
trade in the 1980s.

In1988, Khoeini “declared the Islamic government, acting in the
general interest of the Muslim nation, can, if necessary, abrogate
Shari’a principles!” (107)

This was an empowering of the government against the Council of
Guardians

In the case of a deadlock between the COG and the parliament, the
Council for the Identification of [the Republic’s] Interest would
decide the majority vote.

This change and others were enacted with the sweeping constitutional
amendments of 1989. Their main effect was to create the presidential
system (abolishing the PM). Ministers would be subject to parliament’s
approval, but the president would not.

The position of Leader was also downgraded. He was not simply chosen
by the Assembly of Experts
THE LAW OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC

The Civil Code from the previous regime [The Shah—Monarchy] has
been largely retained

Regarding criminal law, the Quranic penal code, which provides
severe penalties such as amputations for theft and executions for
murder, is only SELECTIVELY used

Special revolutionary courts have dealt with political offenses, called
offenses against the revolution. These draw upon Shari’a. They
imprisoned, tortured, and executed people throughout the 1980s.

The most Shari’a-heavy area is personal and family law. The previous
regime took divorce and other non-Islamic acts in a more liberal
direction, which the current regime has maintained. There are other
provisions for women’s rights an so on.
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Revolutionary Committees watch over the revolutionary purity of relevant
organizations. They also look over Islamic morals of employees, rituals, correct
forms of dress (particularly for women)

The committees have pretty much been absorbed by the state despite their job
entailing the revolution

All who stand for public office have to demonstrate their “commitment to Islam
and the Islamic government.”

The Council of Guardians is in charge of vetting each candidate for Islamic
qualifications. In 1992, 1/3 of candidates were deemed unfit.
FACTIONS

Radicals: try to carry on the revolutionary momentum of populism, social
justice, and anti-imperialism. They favor state control of the economy, with
redistributive functions in favor of the poor—such as land reform and labor
rights. In foreign policy they advocate Islamic revolution everywhere. They
are typically anti-Western and anti-American.

Conservatives: mostly clerics who supported the revolution because of the
power it gave them over society. They try to impose Islamic values of order,
property and hierarchy and enforce religious morality, observance and
censorship (of art, culture and the media). They favor private property and
oppose state controls.

Pragmatists: try to rebuild the economy, favor market reforms,
privatization, and opening up to foreign investment. They are more
conciliatory towards the West. They are socially more liberal.
WOMEN, FAMILY, AND SOCIAL POLICY

Compulsory veiling of women

Not completely subjugated. Revolution actually gave women political powers.
Women, to the dismay of conservatives, are not merely confined to the family and
home.

In 1982, new marriage contracts were introduced which contained provisions
allowing women to initiate divorce for maltreatment, delinquency, addiction, and
contracting a second marriage without the first wife’s consent.

Men still have more divorce privileges and the right to custody of children
CONCLUSION

An important distinction between Islamic Iran and its neighbors in the ME has been
the continuing struggle waged by the Majlis been rival centers of power. These have
been negative as well as positive, given that such rivalry often gets in the way of
legislating. ON THE POSITIVE SIDE, THIS PARTISANSHIP HAS PREVENTED
THE MONOPOLIZATION OF POWER BY ONE CENTER. THE REGIME IS
MUCH MORE PLURALISTIC THAN IT COULD HAVE BEEN.
Hoogland, Eric, "Khatami's Iran," Current History, Feb. 1999
Eric Hooglund’s 1999 article “Khatami’s Iran” was published during the second
year of Mohammed Khatami’s 1997 – 2005 presidency. At the time of the article,
Khatami was engaged in an increasingly difficult struggle against his hardline opponents.
Khatami advocated for the rule of law, democracy and the inclusion of all Iranians in the
political decision-making process, which, for obvious reasons, led to intense clashes
against powerful conservative Islamists (Guardian Council). Although Hooglund
recognized that these conservative Islamists limited Khatami’s influence and prevented
the development of a more civil society, Hooglund believed that Khatami’s election and
general attempts at building a more civil society showed that Iran was “not the monolithic
dictatorship frequently depicted in the Western media.”
Prior to running for president, Khatami was the head of Iran’s ministry of culture
and Islamic guidance, which monitors the press and bans religiously offensive material.
In this position he acquired a reputation for tolerance and general opposition to
censorship. During Khatami’s campaign he criticized the free market policies of his
predecessor and stressed respect for the civil rights of all citizens. He successfully
appealed to youths who yearned for social freedoms, women who desired equality, and
men who wanted a less intrusive government but more public services.
On the fundamental issue of the nature of an Islamic government and the
functions of an Islamic state, Hooglund discussed two general orientations: elitists and
populists. Elitists believed ultimate sovereignty belonged to God and that God’s
representatives in government should be those who are experts in religious law. Populists
believed political sovereignty should be based on a consensual contract among citizens
and that an Islamic state should focus not on punishment but on helping citizens obtain a
minimum level of material well being. Populists regarded extreme degrees of wealth and
poverty as social evils that engender conflict and undermine religion. Khatami, whose
ideas about the nature of an Islamic government fell unambiguously within the populist
perspective, was a notable exception to the views of most politicians, whose views were
typically in between elitist and populist.
Khatami’s opposition, the elitists and fundamentalist, blocked his efforts to
democratize the political system. Because the government branches outside of the
president’s control were dominated by conservatives and elitists, Khatami did not make
much progress at the time of the article. Khatami’s supporters, mainly moderates,
reformers, and radicals, kept pushing for change.
1. Sandra: Kepel, Gilles, "Khomeini's Revolution and its Legacy," in Kepel, Jihad:
The Trial of Political Islam: 106-135.
The Iranian revolution is the first successful revolution to transform a secular
Arab state to an Islamic Republic. The revolution transferred power from Shah Pavlahi to
Ayatollah Khomeini, its leader. The Iranian revolution’s effect was widespread, inspiring
the rise of Islamic movements throughout the Arab world.
The revolution was instigated primarily by unrest among students, devout middle
classes and the urban poor, caused by the suppression of democratic rights such as
freedom of speech and press, economic uncertainty, state alienation and poor living
conditions. As a result, radical sentiment grew driven by Marxism and socialist Shiism,
supported by the Shiite clergy. Unrest became revolution following the publication of a
Tehran newspaper article attacking Khomeini in 1978, upon which the defamed religious
leader rallied demonstrations (which became increasingly radical) led by students and
urban youth, and mobilized the entire network of mosques in Iran using religious
rhetoric.
Khomeini increased his support base by removing Islamic references from his
religious rhetoric and instead appealing to the “disinherited” mustadafeen, a term that
applied to basically everyone in Iran except for the shah. The shah was driven out of Iran
following the most resonant demonstration yet on 12/10/87.
Khomeini’s success lay in his ability to unify various components, religious and
secular, of a movement whose single point of departure was hatred of the shah and his
government. However, in doing so, different factions demanded different things of the
Khomeini’s news Islamic Republic. He held on to power by allowing opposition groups
(secular middle class, liberals) to participate in the political system, and then sapped
away their power by instating committees, which limited their influence. Urban youth
demanding change were effectively exterminated when Khomeini mobilized them to
fight against Saddam Hussein’s army during the 9/22/80 Iranian invasion. These events
represent Khomeini’s suppression of opposition, detracting from the once bright future
that the Iranian revolution promised to bring.
The Iranian revolution inspired Shiite uprisings in Saudi Arabia, and the islamization of
the Palestinian cause which had previously been a purely Arab nationalist movement.
The revolution represented a threat to Arab states and the West. The Revolution most
heavily impacted Lebanon and its pro-Khomeini Shiite Hezbollah movement, which
represented Iran’s only real success story in exporting its revolution.
Turkey’s November 2002 Elections: A New Beginning? (Ali Carkoglu)





Turkey’s 2002 elections had the Justice and Development (AKP) party established as the first
clear majority in Parliament since 1987 with close to a 2/3 majority of the seats. Even more
remarkable is that the members of the incumbent governing coalition lost 39% of the vote between
themselves.
The new government seems to be committed to EU membership, though it conversely seems to be
based in a mildly religious, conservative base that is pro-business and moderately Islamist. The
government is widely perceived as honest; pandering to voters will likely destroy that perception
and destroy the party’s move towards economic liberalization.
The AKP’s rise to power is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, its open and honest
governance could open the door to a new era of politics in Turkey that is inclusive and transparent.
On the other, its Islamist policies and popular support could rend the country asunder.
Turkey’s electorate’s voting patterns are dynamic; a full 23% of the populace votes for a different
party than it did in the previous election. While some of that is attributable to the banning of
parties in the past, recent elections have seen similar patterns. In the 2002 elections, 50% of the
populace switched parties. Even when all parties are placed into four categories along the
idealogical spectrum, 20% of the populace switched categories.
Recent electoral trends have also tended towards fragmentation, with large numbers of parties
gaining seats despite the very high 10% requirement for a party to qualify for seats. Some of this
was done through smaller parties running on larger parties tickets then fragmenting off after the
election. Electoral patterns in Turkey run along local and regional lines, not national, which also
plays a large role in this trend. The AKP is the first exception to this rule in that it has nationwide
support.





The 10% threshold needed for a party to hold seats typically keeps about 20% of voters
unrepresented. A lack of pre-election coalitions, the success of new parties like the AKP, and the
downfall of more established parties in 2002 meant that 45% of the populace voted for a party that
did not pass the threshold. This empowers the AKP to do as it wishes, yet it also forces the AKP
to get broad support for any policies so that their legitimacy will not be questioned.
The pattern of the last two decades is strongly towards the far right. On a scale of 1 to 10, 10
being furthest right, almost 20% of the population votes a 10.
These preferences are primarily divided along two lines:
o The first divide is a clear secular vs. Islamist line.
o The second divide is a nationalist vs. Kurd line.
 This divide is defined not only by the question of Kurdish rights, but also EU
membership vs. Euroscepticism.
The question is: Can the AKP, which has inherited a huge chunk of the political spectrum because
of fragmentation, maintain its popular support and work effectively to progress democracy in
Turkey, or will the population grow tired of AKP rule and move on to existing or new parties?
If AKP can substantially improve the economic situation, it will have gained vast amounts of
political capital which will help it push its agenda. Regardless, the election will likely be a
landmark in Turkish politics. It remains to be seen if that is a good or bad thing.
Esposito, Political Islam, Ch. 9
Islamists in Afghanistan
The main theme of this chapter is that Afghanistan has been a battlefield for members of
many different factions. The lack of attention paid to the region by the general American
public prior to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing (which involved militants who had
been trained in Afghan mujahiddin camps) was not reflected in the security community
or the world at large.
Afghanistan is a Sunni country (85%) which was ruled by a communist regime until the
mid-70s. It was invaded by the USSR after a coup. The US, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan
colluded to aid the rise of fighters who were opposed to Western interests, but also
opposed to the USSR. These fighters originated in Afghanistan at first, the product of an
educated elite that was not incorporated into the state’s governance structure and became
largely Islamic. As the jihad grew, mujahiddin from the rest of Arabia joined the fight in
increasing numbers.
The main sources of funding for the Afghan jihad were the CIA, the Pakistan security
service ISI and the Saudi agency Rahabit. They were substantially augmented by private
donations from religiously motivated Arabs like Osama bin Laden who were wealthy and
felt the call to jihad. The funds were heavily biased towards religious Salafi groups that
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan supported, and shorted nationalist resistance groups. These
groups were heavily influenced by Sayyid Qutb and his ideas of jahilliya and takfir.
The most important lesson to learn from this chapter is that while the groups created,
funded and made self-sustaining by foreigners to fight the Afghan jihad have persisted
and carried out attacks against their former handlers in some cases (most important by far
is al Qaeda), they were not products of the effort to fight the USSR with religious
mujahiddin. Esposito believes that they were the product of broken societies that did not
integrate an educated group of people or open the avenues of political participation.
Instead, forced into subjugation by a series of domestic governments and then a foreign
government, they became violent. While Esposito does concede that their military
capacities were greatly enhanced by the Western-led aid effort, he believes that they
would have existed independently of the aid effort. The Afghan people have also suffered
through the actions of radical Islamists, some of whom regard them as apostates and have
treated them brutally – especially the Taliban, which he does not discuss.
“What Kind of Nation? The Rise of Hamas in the Occupied Territories,” –Graham
Usher in Political Islam, Beinin and Stork, pp: 339-354
Led by Shaikh Ahmad Yasin, a Palestinian-branch Muslim Brothers emerged as an
organization dedicated to “founding the Islamic personality” in Palestine and struggling
against the PLO’s “atheist” government and secularism in Israel.
The Muslim Brotherhood controlled 40% of Gaza’s mosques by 1986 (supported by
Saudi money) and Hamas controlled Gaza’s single Islamic University
Israel declared the movement illegal only after discovering that Hamas was behind the
assassinations of two Israeli soldiers in 1989
In July of 1992 there were street battles in Gaza between Fatah and Hamas, because of
these “July clashes” Hamas lost “the street”. Palestinians were consistently nationalist
first and Islamist second.
Hamas turned to full fledged military struggle in 1992.
After the Oslo Accords even with improving relations between the PLO and the Israeli
leadership things deteriorated because Hamas would not put down its arms. As such
Rabin was forced to use collective sanctions against all Palestinians.
In January 1994, Hamas joined with the Palestinian Forces Alliance (PFA) a coalition of
ten Palestinian organizations opposed to the Declaration of Principles.
The Palestinian struggle will continue as long as the question of what type of nation
Palestine will be remains unanswered.
“Inside Hamas, The Untold Story of the Militant Islamic Movement” –Zaki Chehab
State of Israel created in 1948
June, 1967 -Israel launched the Six Day War, Palestinians called it Al Nakbah. Israel
fought against Jordanian, Egyptian and Syrian forces for the West Bank and Gaza Strip,
the Sinai Desert, and the Golan Heights.
Fatah: the ruling party which had been dominated by Yasser Arafat’s leadership since the
1960’s. Recently had been in peace negotiations with Israel but instead Palestinians
turned to Hamas in a protest vote.
Hamas: condones violence and refuses to recognize Israel
Most recent election victory was an “artfully choreographed strategy of deception” (pg 2)
Impending victory was kept under wraps by the leadership using a variety of methods,
including tricking pollsters by having voters use misleading responses.
Unfortunately Hamas’ strong showing was a protest vote against Fatah, instead of
solidarity for their party. Additionally the previous slogan of Hamas “A hand to resist
and a hand to rebuild” is proving difficult to implement after the election victories in
2006.
The Father/Founder of Hamas: Sheikh Ahmed Ismail Hassan Yassin
After a wrestling incident as a child was paralyzed, quadriplegic.
Had magnetism and diplomacy as a leader.
Eight daughters and three sons
Gave weekly sermons in the Gaza Strip
Was influenced heavily by the Muslim Brotherhood
Originally created the “Islamic Compound” and registered it with the Israeli forces;
consent withdrawn almost immediately.
Soon became the largest foundation in Gaza and began amassing weapons in 1983
On March 22, 2004 Ariel Sharon (Israeli PM) personally ordered and monitored the
helicopter assassination of Yassin
Yassin’s long term ambitions (to be achieved through Hamas): to reclaim Palestine as it
had been before 1948, with Jerusalem as the Palestinian capital, to redraw the borders as
they existed before 1967, and to dismantle the Jewish settlements
Four distinct phases to the formation of Hamas:
1. Time to build it’s institutions, charities and social committees which would open
doors to the young and old-anyone who could play a role in resisting the occupier
2. Time spent strengthening the roots of the resistance within every household in the
West Bank and Gaza. Also wanted to bolster political credibility.
3. Develop military capabilities, from rudimentary weapons to sophisticated
technology, to “…give the Israelis sleepless nights,” (pg. 22).
4. Finally Yassin believed that Hamas must move beyond Palestine and establish
dialogue with Islamic and Arabic neighbors
Esposito, "The Making of a Modern Terrorist," in Esposito, Unholy War: 325.
bin Ladin family – large industrial and financial empire – one of the largest
construction companies
in the Middle East – ties with the Saudi royal
family; very well respected/connected
Osama bin Ladin
– born in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia in 1957, the 17th of 52 children. 11th son;
only child to become a “fighter”
o influenced by father’s strong feelings about Palestinian-Israeli
conflict
– educated in Medina and Jeddah – degree in public administration – studied
economics and management
– religious worldview largely shaped by Saudi Arabia’s conservative
Wahhabi Islam and by revolutionary Islam of the 1970’s
o militant jihad ideology of Qutb
o Arab defeat in 1967 Arab-Israeli war
– Educated at a time when religious extremists and jihad groups were on the
rise
o Arab oil embargo, Sadat’s jihad against Israel, and Iranian
revolution gave Muslims new sense of pride
o Osama strongly affected by extremism/activism of the 70’s both in
Saudi Arabia and elsewhere
Wahhabi Islam
– Named after Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab
– Staple of Saudi Gov’t
– Strict and puritanical; emphasizes literal interpretation of the Quran and
Sunnah
– Anything perceived as un-Islamic = unbelief (kufr), which must be
countered by jihad
o Jihad not permissible but required (to fight unbelievers and
reestablish a true Islamic state)
Dr Abdullah Azzam
– Member of Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood; a founder of Hamas
– Advocate of militant global jihad
– Teacher and influence to Osama bin Ladin
Dr Muhammad Qutb
– brother of Sayyid Qutb
o “Father of militant jihad”
– teacher and influence to Osama bin Ladin
Jihad in Afghanistan
– soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan in 1979
o Major turning point in Osama’s life
 Brought lots of construction machinery and funding in
1982
 Became full participant in Afghan jihad
 Set up camps and commanded forces in battle
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Created al-Qaeda (the base) to organize supplies,
funds and soldiers
 At this point described as “ deeply impressionable,
always in need of mentors, men who knew more
about Islam and the modern world than he did”
Saudi Arabia and US supported Afghanistan
o US/CIA gave funding and advice
Soviet occupation gave common enemy and mission to diverse Afghan
groups
Radicalization of Osama
– Iraq invasion of Kuwait
o US troops sent to defend the House of Saud
 Bin Ladin outraged by foreign troop presence in the holy
land
 Made him despise Saudi gov’t and its alliance with
the US
– Osama began to view Saudi Arabian gov’t as corrupt and un-Islamic and
spoke out
– Moved to Afghanistan, where post-war chaos was going on (civil war)
– Moved to Sudan
o Worked with the NIF gov’t (Hasan Al-Turabi)
 Invested in construction projects, farms, businesses
o Voiced approval of WTC bombing in 1993 and US troop killings
in Somalia
o Saudi Arabia revoked citizenship and froze assets in S.A. because
he supported fundamentalist movements
o Expelled from Sudan in 1996 b/c of international pressure
Taliban and Bin Ladin
– Fled back to Afghanistan
– 1994 – Taliban refugees of Pakistan come to Afghanistan
o by 1996 Taliban had united 90% of the country (which had been
plagued by civil war etc), overtaking the Northern Alliance
– Taliban originally viewed as liberators
o Promised stability, security – disarmed population, cleaned up
corruption, implemented Shariah as law
– 1996 – revealed intent to rule country and impose strict puritanical Islam
o support form Saudi Arabia and Pakistan
 subdued 90% of country and drove Northern Alliance to
small area in NE Afghanistan
– strongly influenced by neo-Deobandi movement and Jamiyyat-i-Ulama-iIslam (JUI) party is Pakistan
o JUI – religious party with rigid, militant, anti-American, anti-nonMuslim culture
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o Many Taliban members trained at JUI madrasas which had Saudi
funding and Wahhibi Islamic influences
 Trained thousands of radical militants
Normal jihad belief (for defense of Islam against aggression) transformed
into militant jihad culture that targets unbelievers, including both Muslims
and non-Muslims
Revolutionary Islam – banned women from schools/workplaces, required
men to have beards, banned music, photography, and television; imposed
strict punishments
o Slaughtered 10% of Afghan Shiite minority, who they deemed
heretics
Numerous govt’s and human rights groups condemned Taliban violations
o UN and most countries refused to recognize Taliban
 Only recognized by S.A., Pakistan, and UAE
Bin Ladin developed strong relationship w/Taliban leader (Mullah Omar)
o Provided financial support, Arab soldiers for battle
Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri
– Most influential individual in Osama’s life
– Surgeon – became leader of Egyptian terrorist group
– Born in 1953 into wealthy, connected, conservative family
– Embraced radical political Islam
o Joined Muslim brotherhood at 14
o Quickly became leader
– Arrested after Sadat’s assassination – 3yrs in prison for arms charge
– On realease, moved to Saudi Arabia and the Afghanistan
o Worked in field hospitals on Arab/Afghan fighters
– Worked with bin Ladin and Azzam in recruiting/training Muslims to fight
jihad against soviets
– After soviet defeat, moved back to Egypt
o Worked with Islamic Jihad, and played important role in 1990’s
terrorist acts
– Moved both to Sudan and then later to Afghanistan with bin Ladin
o Together built powerful global ideology and agenda
Afghanistan and bin Laden’s Declaration of Holy War
– Declaration of Jihad – issued in Aug 1996
o Goals – to drive US out of Arab peninsula, overthrow S.A. gov’t,
liberate Islam’s holy sites, support revolutionary groups throughout
the world
– World Islamic Front of the Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders – formed in
2000
o Umbrella corp for radical movements across the Muslim World
o Osama issues a fatwa, stating duty of all Muslims to kill US
citizens and their allies
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For bin Ladin World politics were about competition and jihad; clash of
civilizations – between Muslims and West – between Islam and militant
Judeo-Christian conspiracy
Bin Ladin (just as Khomeini and Saddam Hussein) sought legitimacy from
general population by playing to their grievances
o “he hijacks Islam, using Islamic doctrine and law to legitimize
terrorism”
o “he paints a world in which Muslims and Islam are under siege”
blames American people for US gov’t actions and support for Israel
refers to his jihad as a “defensive jihad”
o “to terrify the innocent is unjust; however, terrorizing oppressors is
necessary”
Yavuz, “Turkey’s Fault Lines and the Crisis of Kemalism”
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Growing social fault lines can be traced to:
o 1) government’s decision to shift to export-oriented economic policies
o 2) the political liberalization that began in the 1980s, which allowed
Turkey’s various groups to assert identity
Mustafa Kemal, founder of Republic of Turkey (1923) – implemented reforms to
create a homogeneous nation-state
o Twin pillars of Kemalist ideology = republican nationalism and laicism
o Laicist state seeks to remove all manifestations of religion from the public
sphere and put it under strict state control
o Under Kemal, the state disestablished Islamic-Ottoman practices and
institutions
3 major sociopolitical consequences of Kemalism
o Uncritical modernization ideology  no open discussion that might lead
to a new social contract that recognizes the diversity in society
o No tolerance for articulation of different identities and lifestyles in the
public sphere since they undermine vision of ideal society
o Politics = a process of guiding political development and engineering a
new society
Kemalism isn’t the only source of friction – growing economic inequality is major
problem
Social fault lines involve four major actors:
o Military – uses Kemalism to legitimize itself
o TUSIAD – controls major media outlets
o Sunni Islamic groups
o Turkish ethnic/sectarian minorities (Kurds, Alevis)
Another major force in political landscape is the Islamic movements – political
Islam, state Islam, cultural Islam
o Political Islam – dominant force is the National Outlook Movement
o State Islam - Directorate of Religious Affairs controls and domesticates
Islam
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o Cultural Islam – major group is Nurcus. Goals – synthesis of Islam and
science, democracy, Islamic consciousness, etc.
Kurdish question
o Kemalist state considers Kurdish ethnonationalism a threat to its unity and
ideology
o Kurds excluded from the national body politic, denied basic cultural rights
o The Kurdish-Turkish fault line is the most active fault line, its
management has become increasingly difficult
Margulies and Yildizoglu, "The Resurgence of Islam and the Welfare Party," in
Beinin and Stork, Political Islam, pp. 144-153. CP
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In nationwide local elections on March 27th 1994, the Islamist Welfare Party
(Refah Partisi) took over 19 percent of the popular vote and captured 26 of the 72
metropolitan municipalities in the country, including Istanbul and Ankara. In
Istanbul the party’s vote was just over 26 percent. Suddenly Islam was on the
verge of making a serious bid for power in a country regarded as a fortress of
secularism in the Middle East.
At the end of the nineteenth century, Sultan Abdulhamid II, Caliph of all
Muslims, tried to pull his crumbling empire together by playing the pan-Islamic
card, demonstrating a function official Islam was expected to fill. With the
foundation of the Republic in 1923, the Ottoman’s State’s position as the worlds
leading Islamic power came to an end. The new Turkish state was secular: there
was no official religion, and religiosity was distinctly frowned upon.
For the founders of the new state, the struggle against religion was part and parcel
of their struggle against the ancien regime. The leading cadres of the new republic
were veterans of a long struggle between the nascent Turkish bourgeoisie and
Ottoman in ruling class.
The slow Islamic revival slowly began in the post-World War II period with the
Democrat Party. The DP program demanded greater respect for religion and less
government intervention in religious affairs, but this prove sufficient to mobilize
large segments of the population and incorporate many Islamic elements.
The military coup of 1980 combined with a number of developments to make the
1980 a fertile period for the growth of the Islamist movement. First, the
socioeconomic conditions which gave rise to the movement in the 1970’s
continued and in some cases intensified after 1980. Clearly less important but
nevertheless significant was the impact of the Iranian revolution and the Soviet
occupation of Afghanistan.
There are four basic reasons why RP is now a serious candidate for government.
One is that RP voices the concerns of sections of the population in dire economic
straits. The second is that no other party does so, thus enabling the RP party to
appear as the radical alternative. The third is that international developments
continue to highlight Islam as the most significant anti-imperialist force. Finally,
the RP organizes on the ground in a way that no other party does.
Challenges for the Justice and Development Party Government in Turkey
When the AKP party came into power, it was the first time that Turkey had a twoparty parliament. Here are some of the challenges that it was facing.
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Foreign Policy- “The party’s performance in this area has raised eyebrows
during the past several days. Certain remarks that Turkey would not allow the
United States to use Turkish bases in the event of a campaign against Iraq.caused jitters among some analysts. However the party highlighted it’s
commitment to the main tenets of Turkish Foreign Policy: to join the
European Union, enhance relations with the Western world, and increase
regional cooperation.
Social Policy – “Social Policy presents perhaps the biggest potential faultline
for AKP. Pressure from AKP’s hardcore voters could lead the party
leadership to focus on issues that are of immediate concern to this minority,
such as legalizing the wearing of headscarves in public buildings.
Erdogan’s role – “ A September 20 court bars him from political office due to
his 1997 conviction for inciting religious hatred. Even worse, Erdogan may
not be allowed to run the country; he does not have a parliamentary seat
which is required by the constitution
The Future of Political Islam
Its Not Over ‘Til Its Over
Graham Fuller opens the article posing the question about whether, “the attacks of September
11, 2001, [were] the final gasp of Islamic radicalism or the opening salvo of a more violent
confrontation between Muslim extremists and the West”.
He concludes that the United States must move beyond the military opposition to
terrorism and address the deeper sources of political violence and terror in the Muslim
World today.
The Many Faces of Islamism
It has become the primary vehicle and vocabulary of most political discourse throughout
the
Muslim world. No other ideology has remotely comparable sway in the Muslim world.
As such,
modem liberal governance is more likely to take root through organically evolving liberal
Islamist trends at the grassroots level than from imported Western modules of "instant
democracy."
Examples of Islamists groups: the Taliban of Afghanistan, the Algerian Armed Islamic
Group (also known as the GIA), The Tablighi Jamaat, the Muslim Brotherhood, and
Turkey’s modernist Fazilet/ Ak Party.
A Dynamic phenomenon
How local regimes respond to the phenomenon of Islamism often plays a major role in
determining how the local Islamist movement develops.
These days, nearly all Islamists push hard for democracy believing that they will benefit
from it
and flourish within it. They also have discovered the importance of human rights because
they
are usually the primary victims of the absence of rights.
The true test of any Islamist party comes when it gains office by the ballot box and must
then
adhere while in power to the democratic norms it touted in opposition. Unfortunately,
history
offers very few examples here.
“Non-Muslims should understand that democratic values are latent in Islamic thought if
one wants to look for them, and that it would be more natural and organic for the Muslim
World to dervive contemporary liberal practices from its own sources then to import
them wholesale from foreign cultures. The key question is whether it will actually do so”.
Who's Besieging Whom?
Obstacles to liberal revolution of Islamism include:
1.)The local political scene which often physically represses them
2.) International causes-like nationalist movements-that have produced a kind of
Muslim
"foreign legion" of radical, often violent, volunteers
3.) And the association of liberal democracy with the US, with whom many
Muslims have
very real grievances
4.) Islamist groups themselves often play politics, moving to more conservative
social
stances in order to gain political points.
5.) Finally, most in the Muslim world feel besieged by the West, which skews the
international
arena against their interest and supports authoritarian governments. This breeds a
vicious cycle in which dissatisfaction leads to anti regime action, which leads to
repression, which in turn leads to terrorism, US military intervention, and finally
further dissatisfaction.
Their Muslim Problem-and ours
The issue here is not the actual Islamist agenda, but whose Islamist writ will dominate. Islam
is
simply the vehicle and coinage of the struggle between the state and its challengers.
Association with the broader umma, the international Muslim community, is attractive
because it
creates new bonds of solidarity that can be transformed into increased international clout.
“Some in the West many think that Islam’s problem in not their problem, that Muslims just
need to face reality and get on with it. But the September 11 attacks showed that in a
globalized world , their problems can be our problems too.”
The Silent Muslim majority
Muslim societies do not hate American political values. Fuller states that “few Muslims
around the world want to inflict endless punishment on the United States or got to war with
it. Most of them recognize what happened on September 11 as a monstrous crime.
There may be a large silent majority in the Muslim World that is caught between accepting a
miserable status quo and siding with Islamic radicals.
Islamists need to find a way to mobilize this majority; the United States needs to open a
constructive inter-cultural dialogue with it.
Turkish delight?
Turkey is becoming a model because its democracy is beating back the rigid state ideology
and
permitting the emergence of Islamist movements.
Opening the political process enables people to sort out the effective moderates from the
rhetorical radicals and reactionaries.
“Terrorists must be punished. But will Washington limit itself to a merely punitive
agenda to treat only the symptoms of crisis in the Muslim world?”
(summary is a compilation of personal interpretation, direct quotations from the course pack, and excerpts
from summary handed out in class)